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Abstract 
Post-war Sierra Leone faces a deep deficit in the supply of basic public 
goods which is detrimental to quality of life and remains a risk factor for future 
conflict.  The government, under substantial donor influence, seeks to address this 
deficit through democratic decentralization.  However, evidence of the link between 
decentralization and improved public goods provision remains weak.  I approach the 
public goods deficit from a different angle; rather than assuming that an imported 
solution is needed, I consider what can be learned from existing patterns of public 
goods provision. 
At the core of this study is a comparison of ‘success versus failure’ in local 
public goods provision in the city of Makeni, with the aim of understanding key 
dynamics that lead to divergent outcomes.  While I set out to focus on cases of 
public goods provision led by two main categories of local government actors—
elected councils and chiefs—I found that it in all four cases, citizens played a 
substantial role.  I therefore analyze the cases as instances of coproduction of public 
goods. 
I find that coproduction is an important means of maintaining a basic supply 
of local public goods when state capacity is weak.  With this in mind, I draw on the 
case study evidence to develop a set of propositions about the conditions under 
which coproduction is more likely to succeed in contemporary Sierra Leone.  These 
propositions are suggestive of an alternate institutional approach to addressing the 
public goods deficit—one that is based on the development of workarounds for key 
obstacles rather than institutional overhaul.  However, coproduction is no ‘magic 
bullet’; it has troubling implications for social equality and the development of state 
capacity over the longer term and thus judgements about the desirability of 
coproductive arrangements are likely to involve complex trade-offs. 
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CHAPTER ONE: The Public Goods Deficit in Sierra Leone 
A decade after the end of the civil war (1991-2002), many Sierra Leoneans 
continue to lack access to basic public goods.  The stakes of improving the provision 
of public goods in Sierra Leone are high; as I shall show, such a step is essential to 
improving the quality of life of the poorest Sierra Leoneans and to neutralizing a 
potential driver of future conflict.  However, Sierra Leone’s post-war deficit of public 
goods has deep economic and political roots.  The effects of decades of chronic 
under-investment are pervasive and resilient traditions of corruption have developed 
within the public sector.  The Sierra Leonean state, heavily influenced by donor 
agencies, is addressing these challenges through a programme of public sector reform, 
one vital component of which is the decentralization of much public goods provision 
to a newly established tier of elected local councils.  This approach, while consistent 
with the rather ideological ‘good governance’ agenda, lacks clear evidentiary support. 
In this study, I attempt to set aside the tenets of ‘good governance’ and donor 
assumptions about the effects of decentralization in Sierra Leone.  Instead of asking 
whether decentralization in Sierra Leone will result in better public goods provision, I 
focus on existing patterns of public goods provision and ask what could be learned 
from them.1  More precisely, I compare cases of relative success and failure in local 
public goods provision led by newly-reformed local councils and chiefs to see what 
they can tell us about the characteristics of arrangements which are productive of 
public goods, yet are not predicated on the full realization of ‘good governance’ 
reforms.  While analyzing these cases, it became clear that they were all examples of 
coproduction of public goods—goods provided through the joint efforts of local 
government and citizens.  Working upwards from these cases, I develop propositions 
about the conditions under which coproduction of local public goods is more likely to 
succeed in the current social and political climate in Sierra Leone, which is generally 
inhospitable to the provision of public goods.  I reflect on the significance of these 
cases to theories of coproduction and explore the potential offered by coproduction as 
a means to address Sierra Leone’s public goods deficit.  I also consider the policy 
                                                
1 In adopting this approach, I was influenced by colleagues in the Local Governance strand of the 
Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), a five-year research programme funded by the UK’s 
Department for International Development.  I discuss the relationship of this study to the APPP in 
greater detail below. 
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implications of a more empirically grounded and gradual approach to improving local 
public goods provision and consider how such an approach could be applied in the 
context of local government reform in Sierra Leone. 
In this introductory chapter, I begin by establishing the significance of the 
public goods deficit in Sierra Leone and exploring its economic and political roots.  I 
then examine the rise of democratic decentralization as one of the principal donor-
backed solutions to improve local public goods provision, consider the evidence in 
support of the link between decentralization and the supply of public goods, and 
explore an alternative direction for research and policy aimed at addressing the public 
goods deficit.  Finally, I describe the ‘success versus failure’ research design and 
methods applied in this study, and provide an overview of the thesis as a whole. 
1.1 Origins and significance of the public goods deficit 
The classic economic definition of public goods holds that public goods are 
non-excludable (once produced, nobody can be excluded from their benefits) and 
non-rivalrous (one person’s enjoyment does not diminish another’s).  In practice, few 
goods meet these criteria when strictly applied.  In recent studies of public goods 
provision in developing countries, more flexible definitions have been used.  In her 
study of local public goods provision in China, Lily Tsai (2007, p. 5) uses the term 
public goods “to refer to products that have what economists call ‘positive 
externalities’ for the public – that is, they benefit everyone or almost everyone in 
society regardless of whether people pay for them or not”.2  Like Tsai, I use the term 
public goods inclusively to refer to both those goods that approximate the classic 
economic definition of public goods and those with positive externalities.3  My focus 
is on local public goods, whose non-excludable benefits tend to extend only to the 
boundary of the locality studied. 
There are two important features of public goods that are of interest in this 
study.  First, such goods are vulnerable to the free-rider problem.  When individuals 
cannot be excluded from the benefits of a good, they have a strong incentive not to 
contribute to its provision, hoping that others will carry the responsibility without 
them (Ostrom, 2005, p. 24).  This results in a collective action problem—although 
everybody would be better off by contributing to the good, the incentives for any 
                                                
2 I thank Tim Kelsall for recommending Tsai’s work on this topic. 
3 Although in chapter six I draw an analytical separation between these two sub-types. 
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individual to do so are weak; for collective action to succeed, some kind of 
mechanism is usually needed to impose costs on free-riders, making the practice less 
attractive.  Second, and related, public goods are generally not well-suited to private, 
profit-seeking provision, as it is difficult for private actors to charge all those who 
benefit from these goods and to exclude those who do not pay from their benefits 
once they have been provided (Batina & Ihori, 2005, p. 2).  Government intervention 
is therefore often needed to ensure an adequate supply of public goods, although 
government-led provision continues to face challenges in determining what level of 
these goods to provide and how to finance them (Batina & Ihori, 2005, p. 1; Ostrom, 
2005, p. 24).4 
The public goods deficit in Sierra Leone is well documented.  A recent 
national survey found that approximately 25 percent of children lacked access to a 
primary school and 67 percent to a secondary school; 55 percent of Sierra Leoneans 
lacked access to medical services; and 61 percent to safe water (Statistics Sierra 
Leone, 2007, p. 26).  Sierra Leone lingers at the bottom of the United Nations Human 
Development Index, ranked 180 out of 187 participating countries (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2011, p. 16).  Public goods and services are of obvious 
importance to the quality of life in Sierra Leone—literacy (40.9%) and life 
expectancy (47.8 years) remain low and maternal mortality (970:100,000) and under-
five mortality (192:1,000) high (United Nations Development Programme, 2011, pp. 
120-165).  These are outcomes that Sierra Leoneans care deeply about. 
Furthermore, it is usually through the process of providing goods and services 
in exchange for taxation that a state forms a social contract with its citizens. Tsai 
(2011, p. 47) notes that even in those states that do not collect taxes, such as socialist 
states or resource-rich rentier states, there is a strong link between the provision of 
public goods and services and citizen acceptance of state authority.  A predatory state 
that continues to tax its citizens while providing few reciprocal benefits is likely to 
see its popular legitimacy decline, leading to increased challenges to its authority.  In 
Sierra Leone, poor provision of public goods is not merely a product of civil war, but 
pre-dates it; in fact, the post-colonial state’s failure to form a social contract with its 
                                                
4 This challenge is derived from the fact that non-excludability makes it difficult to determine 
consumer preferences, which are usually revealed through consumers’ willingness to pay. 
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citizens around public goods provision can be considered an important driver of the 
decade-long conflict. 
The legacy of poor provision of public goods is associated with decades of 
poor economic performance, corrupt governance and public sector decline, 
exacerbated by the policy interventions of international financial institutions (IFIs).5  
David Fashole Luke and Stephen Riley (1989, p. 134) argue that economic decline in 
post-colonial Sierra Leone has its roots in the dominance of a personalized mode of 
politics which means that “effective economic strategy…has to compete with regime 
survival as the main dynamic governing political behaviour”.  This tension became 
evident during the long rule of President Siaka Stevens (1967-85) and his All People’s 
Congress (APC) party, which saw the transformation of Sierra Leone into a republic 
and later a one-party state.  William Reno (1995) argues that rather than strengthening 
the fragile bureaucratic state he inherited, Stevens dedicated much of his energies to 
the construction of a “shadow state”—a complex system of informal market networks 
connecting rulers and businessmen which served as an alternate basis for political 
authority.  One locus of intense shadow state activity was the diamond trade; Stevens 
dedicated the early years of his rule to gaining control of this trade, relying on 
reciprocal relationships with a small group of Lebanese exporters who were 
politically dependent on his favour because they were legally excluded from holding 
office.  While Stevens’ restructuring of the diamond trade was effective at 
strengthening his hold on political power, it led to the expansion of illicit trading and 
severely undermined public revenues.  To plug the expanding budget deficit, Stevens 
took advantage of state powers to negotiate grants and loans, once more with 
Lebanese assistance.  However, as the country’s financial position worsened and the 
availability of credit contracted, Stevens was forced to seek assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
From 1979 onwards, IMF stabilization programmes became a standing feature 
of the Sierra Leone economy.  Rather than narrowing the budget deficit, IMF policies 
under Stevens paradoxically contributed to further informalization of the economy, 
the erosion of state revenue and public sector decline (Reno, 1995; Sesay, 1995; 
                                                
5 Of course, it is possible to trace this history of poor public goods provision back even further to a 
colonial state which was largely interested in public goods provision as a means to support extraction 
of domestic products for export and maintaining order.  Limited space prevents me from exploring that 
earlier history here, but see Christopher Fyfe (1962), Abraham (1976, 1978), William Reno (1995) and 
Catherine Bolten (2012). 
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Reno, 1996; Keen, 2005b).  Stevens selectively implemented the policy measures 
prescribed by the IMF, avoiding those that would undermine his power base (Luke & 
Riley, 1989, p. 137; Sesay, 1995, p. 171).  Other measures, notably the privatization 
of state-run enterprises, were used to expand Stevens’ informal market networks 
further, with disastrous consequences for public revenues.  By December 1984, the 
IMF ended credit arrangements and Stevens left office with the state in full-blown 
economic crisis—in real terms, revenue in 1985/86 stood at just 18 percent of 
1977/78 levels and the budget deficit had risen from approximately 55 to 98 percent 
of revenue (Reno, 1995, pp. 137-146).  Steven’s hand-picked successor President 
Joseph Momoh (1985-92) resumed engagement with the IMF in order to address this 
economic crisis, and was ultimately forced to implement prescribed policies more 
fully in order to retain access to their support.  In 1986/87, Momoh implemented 
flotation of the Leone; price increases for key agricultural products such as coffee, 
cocoa and palm kernels; decontrol of the prices of basic consumer goods; and 
desubsidization of petrol and rice (Longhurst, Kamara, & Mensurah, 1988, p. 26; 
Sesay, 1995, pp. 172-175).  In 1991/92, these measures were followed by drastic staff 
cuts and salary reductions in the public sector (Keen, 2005b, p. 78). 
The austerity measures adopted during Momoh’s regime have been widely 
criticized for failing to achieve their stated aims, deepening poverty and further 
undermining state bureaucracy (Hoogvelt, 1987; Longhurst, et al., 1988; Sesay, 1995; 
Keen, 2005b).  Neither devaluation nor higher agricultural prices stimulated exports 
as anticipated; to the contrary, exports continued to fall throughout the 1980s (Sesay, 
1995, p. 177).  Richard Longhurst, Samura Kamara and Joseph Mensurah (1988, p. 
28) point to the short-term inelasticity of some crops; high input and transport costs; 
lack of access to credit; and constraints imposed by the land tenure system as possible 
reasons why higher agricultural prices did not feed through to increased domestic 
production.  Max Sesay (1995, pp. 176-177) argues that this was a case of “theory not 
being appropriate to the reality”, because the IMF ignored the structural imbalances 
present in the Sierra Leonean economy when setting policy.  Repeated currency 
devaluations did, however, lead to soaring inflation, while the desubsidization of rice 
and petrol placed further pressure on families’ budgets.  Salary increases did not keep 
pace with inflation, drawing the middle class into poverty.  Sesay (1995, p. 176) 
concludes that “a family on an average wage in 1980 will have at first slowly, and 
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then rapidly, slipped into poverty” and Ankie Hoogvelt (1987, p. 81) describes a “new 
tidal wave of grinding, gruelling poverty” in Sierra Leone. 
Neither IFIs nor the government made any real commitment to strengthen 
state structures alongside implementation of these austerity measures (Reno, 1995, pp. 
155-176; Sesay, 1995, p. 183; Keen, 2005b, pp. 77-81).  In Reno’s view (1995, pp. 
155-176), the priority for IFIs was to establish an arrangement which could deliver 
timely arrears payments, rather than to strengthen the Sierra Leonean state.  He argues 
that creditors’ continual push for privatization of state functions to foreign firms 
further undermined the feeble remnants of the state.  In 1991, Sierra Leone was 
offered a Rights Accumulation Programme (RAP) under which creditors would 
approve further loans and grants if Momoh could demonstrate that he was making 
some effort to follow IMF recommendations.  Reno interprets this as an indication 
that creditors viewed the Sierra Leonean state as a lost cause, describing the RAP as 
“a desperate creditor bid to replace the dying bureaucracies of the state with 
something with which they could continue to negotiate” (p. 183).  David Keen 
(2005b, pp. 78-81) is similarly sceptical about IFIs’ commitment to state-building, 
commenting on the lack of a public investment programme to accompany structural 
adjustment. 
Steep economic decline in Sierra Leone throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
therefore resulted in the erosion of state structures and dwindling revenues, which 
were disastrous for state-led provision of public goods and services.  While Stevens 
tried to maintain a minimum level of basic public goods in order to prevent unrest 
among those excluded from his patronage network, towards the end of his time in 
power even this unambitious project began to fail.  Following the introduction of 
Momoh’s austerity measures, social expenditure more or less ground to a halt (Reno, 
1995, p. 161).  In 1986/87, the Sierra Leone government’s expenditure on servicing 
its debt exceeded its total budget for health, education and other social services.  By 
1991 when the war began, social expenditure had dropped to a mere 15 percent of 
levels prevailing a decade earlier (Keen, 2005b, p. 78).  Given a lack of corporate 
discipline and the failure of the state to pay sufficient salaries (or later on, to pay 
salaries at all), corruption inside the public sector intensified.  In the early 1980s, the 
‘vouchergate’ scandal broke in the newspapers—reports of widespread theft of public 
resources across government through a complex system of payment vouchers, 
cheques and fraudulent contracts (Dumbuya, 2008, p. 57). 
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Kingsley Banya (1991) and Staneala Beckley (1993) look at the effects of 
state decline within the education sector during the 1970s and 1980s, citing problems 
such as non-payment of teacher salaries, leading to moonlighting; the exodus of more 
senior and qualified teachers; bribery to obtain junior teaching jobs; an absence of 
essential supplies, due in part to high levels of corruption; and a shortage of school 
buildings, leading to a two shift system of schooling.  While Beckley (p. 65) argues 
that the failings of government provision had begun to drive more coproductive 
arrangements, Banya (p. 134) argues that the government was obstructing a more 
coproductive approach by continuing to make promises it could not deliver on.  In 
Banya’s view, the degree of centralization remained persistent, with regional offices 
bypassed and all decisions, large and small, made in Freetown. 
Magbaily Fyle (1993) tells a comparable story of decline in the healthcare 
sector.  He finds that healthcare was inadequate in Freetown, but was even weaker in 
provincial6 and district headquarters towns, and more or less non-existent beyond that.  
The specific challenges he identifies include an under-supply of medical facilities and 
deterioration of existing facilities, with donor funds the only available channel to 
address this issue; a severe staff shortage, with staff disproportionately concentrated 
in Freetown; scarcity of drugs and supplies in government hospitals, due in part to 
corruption; and “informal privatization” of services (Blundo, De Sardan, Bako 
Arifari, & Tidjani Alou, 2006, pp. 101-103), with Freetown-based government 
doctors treating predominantly fee-paying private patients in government hospitals to 
compensate for poor salaries. 
Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (2004b, pp. 47-
50, 78-81) reiterates Fyle’s (1993) narrative of rural exclusion, arguing that the 
erosion of public goods and services took place far more rapidly in provincial Sierra 
Leone than in the capital, Freetown, a trend the TRC (2004b, p. 50) links to the 
dissolution of district councils in 1972: 
Despite their many weaknesses, district councils had at least supplied water, 
roads, healthcare, agricultural services and rudimentary communal facilities 
during the 1960s…the dissolution of district councils gradually stifled the 
                                                
6 The term ‘provincial Sierra Leone’ refers to the territory which once made up the Sierra Leone 
Protectorate, established by the British colonial administration in 1896.  It is constituted of three 
provinces: Eastern Province, Southern Province and Northern Province.  The fourth region of Sierra 
Leone is known as Western Area, which contains the capital, Freetown.  This territory was once the 
former Sierra Leone Colony, established in 1808.  The Colony was ruled directly, while the 
Protectorate was subject to indirect rule (see chapter three). 
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flow of services to people in most of the Provinces.  Riverine districts like 
Bonthe and Kambia, as well as remote ones like Koinadugu, Pujehun and 
Kailahun, received no electricity or pipe-borne water.  Bridges and roads were 
in a state of disrepair and few schools or health centres survived.  The whole 
of the North had neither running tap water nor electricity by the end of the 
1970s.  These were facets of regression rather than underdevelopment, as 
previous governments had apparently left several such facilities intact. 
The TRC report describes a subsequent period of “over-centralization of government 
service delivery” (p. 80) under Stevens and Momoh, with the majority of investment 
in infrastructure and service provision limited to the capital, Freetown, and the 
surrounding area.  The closure of Sierra Leone’s railway in 1970 and the deterioration 
of the country’s road network contributed to a sense of provincial isolation.  After 
district councils were disbanded, the principal form of local government for most 
rural provincial residents was provided by a system of paramount chieftaincy, 
discussed in detail in chapter three.  However, like other public sector workers, 
paramount chiefs and chiefdom officials were experiencing declining budgets and 
unpaid salaries, encouraging exploitation of provincial residents to bring in revenue, 
little of which was dedicated to public goods provision (Keen, 2005b, p. 80). 
The withdrawal of public goods and services from large swathes of Sierra 
Leone’s population during a period of high inflation, when many were struggling to 
survive, can be considered one driver of Sierra Leone’s civil war during the 1990s.7  
The failure of the education system in particular is viewed as contributing to youth 
vulnerability to militia recruitment, as those excluded from basic education saw few 
opportunities on the horizon.  Paul Richards (1996, pp. 28-29) characterizes the bush 
camps of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group which first initiated 
conflict in Sierra Leone, as an alternative to a failed school system for some.  He 
writes (p. 29): 
For many seized youngsters in the diamond districts functional schooling had 
broken down long before the RUF arrived.  The rebellion was a chance to 
resume their education.  Captives report being schooled in RUF camps, using 
fragments and scraps of revolutionary texts for books, and receiving a good 
basic training in the art of bush warfare.  Many captive children adapt quickly, 
                                                
7 Other significant (and overlapping) drivers of conflict identified in the literature include: the 
dominance of a neo-patrimonial form of governance, which weakened the already fragile state and 
created an excluded class; shame and humiliation experienced by members of this excluded class; the 
abysmal performance of the economy, exacerbated by IFI intervention; high levels of youth 
unemployment associated with poor economic performance; abusive local governance by chiefs; and 
the lure of diamond wealth and wealth acquired through looting (Richards, 1996; Zack-Williams, 1999; 
Abdullah, 2004b; Keen, 2005a; Richards, 2005b). 
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and exult in new-found skills, and the chance, perhaps for the first time in 
their lives, to show what they can do. 
Even those who were able to attend university encountered a poor quality of 
education, political repression and scarce job opportunities on graduation.  Ismail 
Rashid (2004, p. 86) argues that student radicals, through “generational contiguity, 
cultural interaction and radical politics”, unwittingly influenced the ‘lumpen’8 youth 
who seized arms against Sierra Leone’s rulers as members of the RUF and the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)9.  Related, Keen (2005b, p. 79) argues that 
repeated attacks on Njala University College during the civil war were a clear 
indicator of the anger of youth failed by the university system. 
The failure of state-led public goods provision in Sierra Leone has also been 
associated with feelings of humiliation and shame, which Keen (2005a) argues 
influenced the extreme violence deployed against civilians during the war.  Yusuf 
Bangura (1997, pp. 27-28) finds that those who lacked patrons to protect them from 
the fiscal crisis were “badly affected or humiliated by the informalization of the 
country’s resources and the astonishing contraction of the state”.  The TRC (2004a, p. 
6) makes a related argument that the selfish behaviour of those controlling the state 
apparatus contributed to “a collective failure to subscribe to notions of the common 
good” which led to people being “systematically deprived of their dignity”.  Keen 
(2005a, pp. 57-74) argues that the feelings of shame experienced by rebels before the 
war influenced the violent strategies they used during the conflict.  He writes (p. 59): 
Like a dream, war could sometimes hold out the prospect of reversing the 
humiliations and frustrations of normal life…a fundamental feature of the 
violence in Sierra Leone was the imposition of extreme humiliation and shame 
on the victims.  In many instances, the violence seems to have been an attempt 
to turn previous roles on their heads, by imposing the power of the gun on 
local big men…the widespread sexual violence also involved humiliating the 
victim.  Amputations were also sometimes experienced as extremely shaming. 
Drawing on the work of psychiatrist James Gilligan (1999), he suggests that through 
the humiliation of others, fighters were able to “physically eliminate the threat of 
shame” (p. 63), maintaining their own self-worth. 
                                                
8 Ibrahim Abdullah (2004a, p. 45) defines lumpen youth as “the largely unemployed and unemployable 
youths, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the 
informal or underground economy”. 
9 The AFRC was formed by elements within the Sierra Leone Army which led a military coup against 
President Kabbah’s government in May 1997; they then joined forces with the RUF. 
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The stakes of improving public goods provision in Sierra Leone are high—this 
step is critical to improving the quality of life of Sierra Leoneans and to establishing a 
basic social contract between the state and its citizens which will provide insulation 
against future conflict.  However, this brief account also indicates that barriers to 
improving state-led public goods provision have accumulated over a number of 
decades.  Three decades of economic decline, one of which was dominated by civil 
war, have left the economy extremely fragile.  A predatory form of personalized rule 
has dominated, which has established the public sphere as a space where actors seek 
to advance narrow private interests, rather than the common good.  State 
bureaucracies have been decimated by decades of neglect and corrupt practice, and 
there has been chronic underinvestment in infrastructure and human resources.  Few 
would argue that this history provides a challenging starting point from which to 
increase the flow of public goods in Sierra Leone. 
1.2 Decentralization: The solution to the public goods deficit? 
It is widely agreed that much of the action required to address the public 
goods deficit must take place at the local level, in areas where public goods are 
needed.  Since 2004, the Sierra Leone government has been implementing a 
decentralization programme which it argues will lead to “improvement on a 
consistently increasing basis in provision and delivery of basic, essential services” 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 2008, p. 105).  The decentralization programme was 
designed rapidly in 2003-04 with substantial involvement of donor agencies, 
particularly the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID).  Following the passage of the Local Government (LG) Act (2004) in March 
and subsequent local elections in May, 19 local councils took office, of which 5 were 
urban councils.  The LG Act (2004) outlined a programme of political and fiscal 
decentralization, according councils overall responsibility for development in their 
localities; devolving a range of functions from national ministries related to the 
provision of basic public goods and services; and empowering councils to tax and 
spend (within certain parameters). 
Sierra Leone’s decentralization programme is a prime example of the 
‘democratic decentralization’ approach which has grown prominent in Africa during 
the 1990s and 2000s.  Dele Olowu and James Wunsch (2004, pp. 38, 48-49) have 
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described this as a “fourth wave” of decentralization10, driven principally by 
economic and political crises in African states combined with donor pressure to 
achieve ‘good governance’, but also in some cases by urbanization, globalization and 
political conflict.  This new wave of democratic decentralization has been 
characterized by the transfer of power and resources to downwardly accountable 
elected local authorities, as compared to earlier models of deconcentration which 
involved the transfer of power and resources to local representatives of the central 
state who remained upwardly accountable (Ribot, 2002, pp. ii-iii).11  By the early 
1990s, countries such as Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania 
and Uganda had all implemented forms of democratic decentralization (Olowu & 
Wunsch, 2004, p. 39). 
Like the Sierra Leone government, the World Bank—the lead donor agency 
supporting decentralization in Sierra Leone—views decentralization as a means to 
improve the supply of basic public goods (World Bank, 2009, 2011).  The World 
Bank’s (2003b, pp. 89-90, 186-187) report Making Services Work for Poor People 
argues that bringing decision-makers closer to the people can enable citizens to 
acquire better information about local public goods provision and seek greater 
accountability from government, not least through local elections.  The World Bank 
applies exactly this logic in justifying its support for the decentralization process in 
Sierra Leone; according to a key project document (World Bank, 2003a) “service 
delivery and development needs of the population can be addressed more effectively 
by empowered local governments with a strong capacity to manage participatory 
development planning and implementation with accountability”. 
Despite the central role accorded to decentralization as a strategy for 
improving service delivery in Sierra Leone, evidence of its effectiveness on the 
ground is weak.  While a national survey conducted by the World Bank’s Institutional 
Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008b) 
                                                
10 According to Olowu and Wunsch (2004, pp. 31-38), the first three waves were: 1) the introduction of 
local councils during the late colonial period, 2) deconcentrated administration during the post-
independence period under a centralized model of government and 3) decentralization of provision of 
public goods and services under the conditions of structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s, 
usually with increased contracting out to the private sector overseen by deconcentrated local structures. 
11 Democratic decentralization and deconcentration are not mutually exclusive—it is possible to have 
an approach which combines elements of both.  Olowu and Wunsch (2004) use the term devolution to 
define decentralization to downwardly accountable local bodies, but Ribot (2002, p. iii) views this as a 
more general term which refers to “any transfer from central government to any non-central 
government body”. 
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found significant improvements in the health and agriculture sectors within which 
local councils had begun to manage decentralized functions, the authors of the survey 
report emphasize that the effects of decentralization cannot be separated from the 
effects of high levels of donor investment in these sectors and the efforts of many 
other actors.  A more recent assessment of the decentralization process (Fanthorpe, 
Lavali, & Sesay, 2011) found that the education sector had seen the greatest 
improvements and cited qualitative examples of local councils engaging in public 
goods provision.  However, the authors reiterate the conclusion that “it is almost 
impossible to isolate [decentralization’s] material impact in a country still undergoing 
extensive, donor-supported post-war reconstruction” (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 42). 
The evidence remains weak when examining the theorized pathways through 
which decentralization is anticipated to act on the provision of public goods: better 
government access to information about local preferences and more active 
accountability seeking by citizens.  Even when there is greater proximity between 
government and citizens, information about local preferences in terms of public goods 
can only flow between them when appropriate channels exist.12  Richard Fanthorpe, 
Andrew Lavali and Mohamed Gibril Sesay (2011, p. 43) find documentary evidence 
that needs assessments have been taking place at the small number of councils 
studied; I also observed a council needs assessment at my fieldwork site in Makeni.  
However, because these needs assessments are an official requirement which must be 
met in order for councils to receive development grants, they are not always 
implemented in a way that generates an accurate picture of local preferences (see 
chapter four) and beyond that may not influence council decision-making.  As 
Fanthorpe et al (2011, p. 43) observe, “enhancing poor people’s voice in local 
government has little intrinsic value unless it leads to concrete action”. 
In a recent World Bank volume, Yongmei Zhou and Ye Zhang (2009, p. 124) 
conclude that there is little evidence that Sierra Leone’s citizens are actively holding 
local councils accountable for public goods provision: 
Participation in local elections is widespread. Nevertheless, although much 
information about local council operations is public, citizens are not yet 
actively monitoring council operations. They also are not very confident in 
engaging the authorities and changing the status quo. 
                                                
12 Furthermore, as David Booth (2012, p. 66) notes, the provision of public goods “is only partly about 
services for which there is ‘demand’”. 
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Fanthorpe et al (2011, p. 43) focus on the role of ward development committees 
(WDCs)—new citizen bodies chaired by local councillors which were established as 
part of the decentralization process to serve a transparency and accountability 
agenda.13  Their survey findings indicate that levels of public interaction with WDCs 
and satisfaction with their performance are generally low, and they also report that 
participants in focus group discussions seldom mentioned WDCs unless prompted, 
suggesting that they are fairly inactive. 
The broader literature on the link between decentralization and improved 
public goods and services in Africa is also inconclusive.  For example, synthesizing 
the findings of recent studies on African decentralization, Diana Conyers (2007, p. 
21) concludes that “[t]he main impression gained from the limited data on the actual 
impact on service delivery is that decentralization has done little to improve the 
quantity, quality or equity of public services in the region”.  Jesse Ribot (2002, p. 10) 
summarizes the evidence  on African decentralization and service delivery in similar 
terms, stating that “evidence that decentralization or deconcentration leads to better 
service provision is thin”.  Etisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio (2009, pp. 152, 153) 
look at global evidence in support of the link and find that “general conclusions are 
still tentative”; moreover, the evidence is weaker for developing countries “where 
institutions are generally weaker than those in mature economies”.  Part of the 
difficulty in reaching firm conclusions is that the causal pathway between 
decentralization and improved public goods and services is indirect and complex and 
thus costly and difficult to measure; there are also numerous intervening variables 
which need to be taken in to account in order to isolate the effects of decentralization 
on public goods and services (Ribot, 2002, p. 10; Conyers, 2007, pp. 20-21).  
Decentralization processes are also contextually embedded and highly variable, 
making cross-national comparisons difficult (Ahmad & Brosio, 2009, p. 152).  
Decentralization’s assured place within donors’ ‘good governance’14 
portfolios, despite weak evidence in support of the link to improved public goods, is 
                                                
13 This was the status quo at the time of my fieldwork in 2009.  The Chiefdom and Traditional 
Administration Policy (Government of Sierra Leone, 2011) removes the role of chair from local 
councillors and awards it to chiefs. 
14 As Grindle (2007, p. S202) points out, there are many different, overlapping definitions of ‘good 
governance’.  She cites the following World Bank (n.d.) definition: “Inclusiveness and accountability 
established in three key areas: selection, accountability and replacement of authorities (voice and 
accountability; stability and lack of violence); efficiency of institutions, regulations, resource 
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perhaps indicative of the tendency of ‘good governance’ strategies to conflate 
ideological and evidence-based justifications for action.  Shortly after the publication 
of the World Bank’s (1992) milestone publication Governance and Development, 
Mick Moore (1993, p. 6) criticized the aid industry’s conception of ‘good 
governance’ both for its selective application of evidence and its treatment of distinct 
policy goals as though they were necessarily mutually supporting: 
‘Good government’ has been rushed onto the aid agenda by politicians. Many 
of the assumptions that underlie it are questionable, and others are plain 
wrong. We have long known that all the good things identified in the good 
government agenda – economic growth, electoral democracy, the market 
economy, respect for human rights, reduced levels of military expenditure and 
socioeconomic equity – do not typically come in interrelated and mutually 
self-sustaining packages.  Development policy is made in the same real world 
that obliges the British government, for example, to sacrifice some very highly 
cherished goals of economic policy in the attempt to achieve others. 
More recently, Merilee Grindle (2004) has challenged both the overwhelming length 
of the ‘good governance’ agenda and the treatment of all of its numerous components 
as necessary conditions for the reduction of poverty.  She advocates that a 
prioritization exercise be conducted on a case by case basis in order to establish an 
agenda for ‘good enough governance’, “a condition of minimally acceptable 
government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly 
hinder economic and political development” (p. 526).  Grindle thus recommends a 
more pragmatic and contextually sensitive approach. 
The Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), a five-year research 
programme funded by DFID, goes further in its rejection of the ‘good governance’ 
agenda, arguing that the imposition of Western institutional templates it implies has 
proven to be a flawed approach, and proposing that strategies that ‘go with the grain’ 
of African social and political realities are likely be more developmental.  Tim Kelsall 
(2008) sets out this view, arguing that the imposition of imported institutions based on 
a public-private divide which is incongruous with African realities has had the 
perverse effect of channelling dynamic forces in society into predatory behaviour.  He 
considers how it might be possible to build on “extant notions of moral obligation and 
interpersonal accountability” in order to harness social and political energies for 
developmental purposes (pp. 636-637).  He suggests that development policy might 
                                                
management (regulatory framework; government effectiveness); respect for institutions, laws and 
interactions among players in civil society, business, and politics (control of corruption; rule of law).” 
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be able to take better account of common aspects of an African ‘grain’ where 
relevant, such as the extended family; religion; clientelism; ethnic sentiment; and 
(neo-)traditional institutions.  As one (deliberately provocative) example, he floats the 
idea of service delivery ministries organized along ethnic lines in order to capitalize 
on ethnic solidarity.  Kelsall concludes that ultimately more empirical research is 
needed to identify whether more successful instances of public goods provision in 
Africa do indeed fit better with a social and political ‘grain’, and thus whether this a 
fruitful direction for theory and policy. 
Motivated by this alternative approach, this research project represents an 
attempt to set aside ‘good governance’ assumptions as they relate to local public 
goods provision in Sierra Leone.  Donor support for the decentralization process is 
based on the belief that decentralization will change social and political logics in 
Sierra Leone, encouraging government to conform both to legal-rational and 
democratic norms and encouraging citizens to aid them in that process by holding 
them accountable for their actions.  However, the limited evidence available suggests 
that such changes have not yet occurred in Sierra Leone, and may not do so in the 
foreseeable future.  I study examples of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods 
provision on the basis that such an approach is likely to provide insight into strategies 
that work with prevailing social and political logics and circumstances, rather than by 
transforming them. 
I focus in particular on how key barriers to success in local public goods 
provision are managed, rather than eradicated.  First, the political system in Sierra 
Leone offers LGAs little reward for public goods provision.  Chiefs, once elected, sit 
for life, and thus cannot be held accountable for their performance as public goods 
providers through subsequent elections.  Local councils are newly established bodies 
in a young and fragile democracy.  There is evidence to suggest that local councillors 
in this position are likely to lack the political credibility to make persuasive public 
goods promises that could help them win elections (Keefer & Khemani, 2005; Keefer, 
2007; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007).15  Philip Keefer (2007) argues that politicians with low 
credibility are likely to be motivated to seek votes via patrons who are credible with 
                                                
15 I thank David Booth for recommending this body of work. 
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their clients.16  This has a corrosive effect on public goods provision, as patrons 
generally prefer to provide targeted goods (such as jobs and infrastructure) which lend 
themselves to being apportioned as rewards to clients (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007, p. 
384).  Others argue that politicians in young democracies are deterred from public 
goods provision because they do not wish to impose the related costs on their 
constituents, for fear of losing votes (Juul, 2007).  Finally, the dominance of ethno-
regional voting practices in Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 1992, 2003; Kandeh, 2008) results 
in single party dominance in large swathes of the country, leaving local councillors 
more reliant on the upper echelons of the party to secure their seats than on the 
citizens they represent. 
Second, the public sector in Sierra Leone is characterized by intense resource 
scarcity, particularly at the local level.  In 2009 when fieldwork was conducted, aid 
accounted for 40 percent of Sierra Leone’s total revenue of 1.3 trillion Le (£238 
million)17 and 7.8 percent of GDP (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010).  Despite the 
emphasis on decentralization as the means to address the public goods deficit, only 
58.7 billion Le (£11.2 million) was transferred to local councils nationwide in 2009—
less than one percent of GDP.18  Of this, 10.4 billion Le (£2.0 million) was dedicated 
to administrative costs, leaving only 48 billion Le (£9.2 million) for the provision of 
local public goods and services nationwide.  2009 budget data does not show any 
central expenditure targeted to chiefs.  In a context of overall scarcity, local 
government actors (LGAs)19 are likely to focus their efforts on those areas where 
resources are more plentiful, neglecting underfunded goods.  Officials’ salaries are 
low and are often paid late, or in some cases not at all.  This contributes to corruption, 
which is already very firmly established in Sierra Leone, placing further pressure on 
already strained budgets. 
Third, trust in local government, particularly local councils, is low.  For 
example, a 2007 national survey of more than 6,000 households in Sierra Leone found 
that only a third (33%) of respondents trusted local councillors and just under half 
                                                
16 According to Keefer, the alternative is to use direct methods for building their credibility with voters, 
such as vote-buying or canvassing, but these are generally costly. 
17 For all currency conversions, I use the exchange rates which prevailed in 2009 when the fieldwork 
for this study was conducted. 
18 The figures discussed here for transfers to local councils exclude salary payments. 
19 LGAs are actors officially recognized as constituent parts of local government. 
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(47%) trusted chiefdom officials (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008b, p. 37).20  More 
recently, a 2011 survey of residents of four districts in Sierra Leone (n=608) assessed 
respondents’ trust in LGAs, understood as their confidence that LGAs would listen to 
their needs (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, pp. 82-84).21  Over 40 percent of respondents 
reported that local councils rarely or never listened to their needs, while just over a 
quarter (28%) of respondents indicated the same for chiefdom authorities.  Levels of 
trust were generally lower in northern Bombali District, in which Makeni (the site of 
this study) is based, than in southern Bo District.  Approximately 41 percent of 
respondents in Bombali District reported that the council rarely or never listened, 
while 37 percent of respondents took the same view of chiefdom authorities.  In Bo 
District, comparable figures were 16 percent for the council and 11 percent for 
chiefdom authorities.  In Eastern Kono District, levels of trust in the council were 
similar to those in Bombali District (39% reported that the council rarely or never 
listened), but substantially higher for chiefdom authorities (11% reported that chiefs 
rarely or never listened).  Low levels of trust mean that even when LGAs are 
motivated to provide public goods, they may struggle to raise the necessary revenue 
and secure popular cooperation with their initiatives. 
Finally, there is a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis local 
public goods provision.  As discussed in more detail in chapter three, local councils 
and chiefs constitute overlapping layers of government, rather than two 
hierarchically-ordered tiers.  A combination of colonial-era legislation (which remains 
in force) and post-war legislation leave both local councils and chiefs with 
responsibility in the areas of development, tax collection, land, and environmental and 
public health; both sets of actors are also permitted to create bye-laws.  Neither the 
boundaries of their respective roles nor the mechanisms for coordination of their 
efforts are clearly defined, and the two sets of actors are also in competition for 
resources.  Overlapping legislation provides a resource which councils and chiefs can 
draw on in staking a claim to desirable areas of activity, or evading responsibility in 
less desirable areas.  This state of affairs can therefore fuel conflict and encourage 
                                                
20 Respondents were asked if, in their opinion, certain groups of people or officials can be trusted, or if 
one should be careful when dealing with them. 
21 Respondents were asked whether local councils/chiefdom authorities listen to what people say and 
what they need. 
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neglect of onerous responsibilities, both of which are detrimental to local public 
goods provision. 
1.3 Success versus failure: Research design and methods 
i) Actors and concepts 
I focus on public goods provision led by one local council, Makeni City 
Council (MCC), and Makeni’s chiefs.  Sierra Leone’s 19 elected local councils are a 
product of the decentralization process, but also build upon an earlier tradition of 
(partially) elected local councils introduced in the colonial era.  The country is 
divided into 149 chiefdoms, each headed by a paramount chief from one of a select 
number of ruling houses22 who is elected for life by an electoral college known as the 
chiefdom council.  While the diffuse chiefdom council (made up of one representative 
for every 20 taxpayers) continues to be recognized in much legislation as the principal 
governing body of the chiefdom, in practice executive power resides with the 
paramount chief in consultation with a smaller body called the chiefdom committee, 
which includes the paramount chief, the chiefdom speaker (his deputy), section 
chiefs, court chairmen and women’s and youth representatives.23  The chief also 
oversees a small chiefdom administration comprised of salaried functionaries, which 
in 2009 included the chiefdom speaker, the treasury clerk, local court clerks, local 
court chairpersons, local court bailiffs, local court members and chiefdom police.24 
I use the term local government actors (LGAs) to apply to both the council 
and chiefdom authorities, by which I mean actors officially recognized as constituent 
parts of local government.  I have chosen to focus on LGA-led public goods provision 
because some form of public authority is needed to overcome free-riding problems 
and they provide one obvious source of such authority.25  I refer to chiefs’ 
constituents as subject-citizens in order to reflect their dual status as citizens of a 
democratically elected national state and subjects of a chief and to capture the distinct 
                                                
22 Lineages with founder status recognized by the colonial government as eligible to contest for the 
chieftaincy. 
23 The Chiefdom and Tribal Administration Policy (Government of Sierra Leone, 2011) applies the 
new name ‘chiefdom electors’ to the chiefdom councillors and applies the name ‘chiefdom council’ to 
the chiefdom committee.  I will retain the earlier names which were still in use at the time of my 
fieldwork in 2009. 
24 Local courts have subsequently been drawn under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. 
25 Although non-governmental actors can also serve as a source of public authority, for example, see 
Christopher Lund (2007). 
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yet overlapping discourses associated with these roles.26  When referring to 
councillors’ and chiefs’ constituents simultaneously, I use the form 
(subject-)citizens. 
The four cases of public goods provision that I study are all examples of 
coproduction.  Drawing on the definition of coproduction proposed by Anuradha 
Joshi and Mick Moore (2004)27, I define coproduction as the provision of public 
goods through a regular long-term relationship between government and citizens, 
where both make substantial resource contributions.  I did not select the cases as 
examples of coproduction.  Rather, during preliminary analysis of the case study data 
I had collected, I identified coproduction as a resonant and valuable analytical lens for 
this study.  By using coproduction as an analytical lens, I illuminate the extent to 
which LGAs are dependent on (subject-)citizens to provide public goods and I show 
that the dynamics of coproductive relationships often prove an important factor in 
explaining why some instances of local public goods provision succeed, while others 
fail. 
Joshi and Moore’s definition stipulates that coproduction is limited to cases 
involving “organised groups” of citizens, but I do not apply this restriction.  First, this 
is not a common assumption in the wider coproduction literature (see chapter two).  
Second, I see the value of the coproduction concept as lying in its capacity to 
illuminate the role of often ignored citizen contributions to public goods provision, 
and this restriction unnecessarily limits the scope to do so.  I also allow myself some 
latitude in applying the term coproduction to both official and unofficial instances of 
chief-led public goods provision which rely heavily on subject-citizen inputs (chapter 
six).  I do so because of the difficulty faced in separating official and unofficial 
activity in a meaningful way. 
Chiefs in Sierra Leone enjoy an unusually high degree of official recognition 
and incorporation into the state.  For example, the role of chiefdom authorities is set 
out in legislation, and includes core state functions such as tax collection; there is a 
formal structure in place for their supervision and support via the Ministry of Local 
                                                
26 I thank Tammie O’Neil for suggesting this term, which draws on the work of Mahmood Mamdani 
(1996). 
27 Joshi and Moore (2004, p. 31) define coproduction as “the provision of public services … through a 
regular long-term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both 
make substantial resource contributions”. 
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Government (MLG) 28; the office of paramount chief is constitutionally protected 
against abolition; and paramount chiefs are represented in the national parliament.  In 
addition to power delegated from the centre, Sierra Leone’s chiefs derive further 
authority from local traditions of chieftaincy and related social institutions.  Adrian 
van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1999, p. 23) argues that a chief “disposes of two bases 
of power from which he is able to operate towards the state and towards his people”, 
while Richard Sklar (2005, p. 18) describes the sovereign state and traditional 
authority as “two coexistent dimensions of government”.  In treating chiefs as LGAs, 
I recognize that in some instances they act on the basis of power delegated from the 
centre, while in others they draw on independent sources of local authority.  However, 
even when drawing on independent sources of authority, chiefs’ autonomy is 
ultimately underwritten by the central state.  Moreover, subject-citizens do not usually 
distinguish clearly between official and unofficial actions by chiefs.  To my mind, 
these circumstances provide sufficient justification for my chosen strategy of treating 
chiefs as government actors in the context of coproduction regardless of whether they 
are contributing to public goods provision in an official or an unofficial capacity. 
As typical in the bulk of the coproduction literature, the concept of 
coproduction that I apply is broad.  Some argue that this breadth is problematic, since 
the concept of coproduction can apply to almost any example of public goods 
provision.  I agree that coproduction is not always a distinct modality of public good 
provision, but rather a form of citizen-government relations which may co-exist with 
other modalities of provision.  I find it useful to conceive of a spectrum of 
coproduction—while some instances of public goods provision require only limited 
inputs from citizens others require more substantial inputs.  From an analytical 
perspective, there is perhaps most to be gained from the study of instances of public 
goods provision where citizen inputs are significant and thus citizen-government 
relations are important to the quality of provision.  That is the approach taken in this 
study. 
                                                
28 This ministry has been subject to frequent name changes.  Under the former SLPP government, it 
was known as the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development.  During the period 
when I conducted fieldwork, it was called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and 
Rural Development.  More recently, the internal affairs function has been separated out and it is now 
known as the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.  For simplicity, I will use the 
Ministry of Local Government throughout this thesis. 
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ii) Comparing success and failure 
The basic research design I adopt to examine existing patterns of local public 
goods provision is a comparison of ‘success versus failure’.  For each category of 
LGA—MCC and Makeni’s chiefs—I look at one case of relative success and one of 
relative failure in local public goods provision (see table 1.3.1). The four cases I 
compare are drawn from a single urban field site: Makeni, one of three provincial 
capital cities in Sierra Leone with a population of approximately 80,000 (Statistics 
Sierra Leone, 2004), introduced in more depth in chapter four.  I wanted to focus on 
an urban site which offered a reasonable pool of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in local 
public goods provision to choose from, and where there were good opportunities for 
studying both chiefs and councils concurrently.  I chose Makeni over other provincial 
headquarters cities because it had a greater deficit of public goods and therefore 
‘successes’ in this context seemed more likely to be instructive in terms of having 
overcome significant obstacles. 
In analyzing the cases, I ask: why do some instances of coproduction by LGAs 
and (subject-)citizens succeed, while others fail?  I pay particular attention to 
institutional explanations, as discussed in chapter two.  This ‘success versus failure’ 
research design is what John Gerring (2007, pp. 97-99) describes as a “diverse case” 
approach to case selection; cases are selected to represent as full a range as possible of 
values of the dependent variable—in this case, performance in public goods 
provision.  I chose this approach in anticipation that comparison of cases at opposite 
ends of the scale would provide the best opportunity for identifying key variables 
affecting performance in public goods provision. 
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Table 1.3.1 Cases of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ coproduction of public goods 
 Makeni City Council (MCC) Chiefs 
Relative 
success 
Clean market, through joint waste 
management efforts of MCC and 
traders 
Public order, through deciding cases 
with the cooperation and 
compliance of subject-citizens 
Relative 
failure 
Safe meat, through construction and 
management of the slaughterhouse 
in cooperation with the butchers 
Community infrastructure, through 
mobilization of unpaid community 
labour 
 
My categorization of cases as relative successes or failures is based on 
respondent perceptions (see sub-section iii) on research methods for further details).  I 
chose this approach for two main reasons.  First, I did not want to apply an external 
standard when assessing performance in public goods provision which was not 
consistent with local perceptions, as this could lead to the odd situation of drawing 
lessons from ‘successes’ which were considered undesirable by local residents.  
Second, I was analyzing four different public goods, which made it difficult to 
develop a common set of indicators to assess performance in public goods provision. 
The literature on local public goods provision in Sierra Leone is extremely 
sparse; given this, the aim of the study is to generate propositions (or hypotheses) 
about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in the 
current climate, rather than to test existing hypotheses.  A case study approach is 
well-suited to exploratory research of this kind because it affords an in-depth look at a 
wide range of possible variables affecting performance in public goods provision, and 
also provides insight into the mechanisms through which such variables might work 
(Gerring, 2007, pp. 39-42, 43-48).29  The strategy I pursue involves selection on the 
dependent variable—an approach which students of political science are commonly 
cautioned against (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 129-132, 141-122).  However, 
most of the objections to this approach are based on the assumption that the 
researcher is operating in a deductive mode, seeking to test hypotheses.  Gary King, 
Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) acknowledge that selecting observations 
                                                
29 In any case, no available dataset(s) exist which could have been used to carry out a large-scale cross-
case analysis of hypothesized factors explaining local government performance in public goods 
provision.  If I had chosen to develop such a dataset within the confines of the limited resources 
available to me, it would have remained a relatively superficial effort looking at a small number of 
variables at a shallow level. 
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with high and low values of the dependent variable, as I have done, can help in 
hypothesis generation. 
In adopting this approach, I draw on a well-established tradition of ‘success 
versus failure’ research designs in comparative political science.  For example, Robert 
Putnam’s (1993) landmark study of social capital is based on analysis of the North-
South performance gap between regional governments in Italy.  More recently, Tsai 
(2007) has investigated ‘success versus failure’ in local public goods provision in 
China, asking why villages with the same level of economic development achieve 
such different outcomes.  Judith Tendler’s (1997) highly regarded study of “good 
government” in Cearà, Brazil focuses on four cases of ‘success’, arguing that the 
existing literature abounded with examples of ‘failure’ which she could draw on for 
comparison (p. 19).  Finally, Ostrom’s (1990) celebrated study of institutions for 
managing collective pool resources is also based on a comparison of ‘success’ and 
‘failure’.  These authors take different methodological approaches—while Putnam 
and Tsai select the regions studied based on variation on a number of key independent 
variables due to the deductive nature of their research designs, Tendler (like me) 
selects her cases on the dependent variable and pursues a more inductive approach. 
I designed this research project to contribute to the broader research agenda of 
the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP).  I was a research student member 
of the Local Governance strand of the programme, which provided access to a 
number of benefits, including research funding, training in ethnography and advice 
from senior researchers.30  However, my research was not fully integrated into the 
APPP Local Governance strand.  I did not participate in collective efforts to carry out 
coordinated fieldwork and analysis, which were carried out on a different timescale.  
Nor was the design of my research project subject to any particular APPP 
specifications; rather it reflects my own efforts to link up with the Local Governance 
strand’s research agenda.  Several key aspects of the research design are therefore 
influenced by my involvement with the APPP, including my focus on public goods; 
my interest in comparing success and failure; and my interest in institutional 
explanations (explored in chapter two).  Members of the APPP Local Governance 
strand also introduced me to relevant literature, perhaps most significantly Ostrom’s 
                                                
30 Tim Kelsall provided invaluable advice during fieldwork and on my immediate return, and read and 
commented on drafts of chapters five and six.  David Booth and Richard Crook both provided 
comments on a working paper based on chapter five. 
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(2005) institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, which forms a major 
component of the analytical framework I apply in this study.31  However, the IAD 
framework was not applied by the Local Governance strand to structure their analysis, 
and my application of Ostrom’s framework, which I set out in chapter two, was 
arrived at independently.  Furthermore, my emphasis on coproduction, which also 
forms a major component of my analytical framework, was not influenced by my 
participation in the APPP, but was identified during the analysis phase of the research 
because of its good fit with the evidence.  Where there are overlaps between this 
study and the work of the APPP Local Governance strand, they are clearly specified. 
iii) Research methods32 
The core of this study is a comparison of two sets of ‘success versus failure’ in 
local public goods provision.  Case selection proceeded in two stages: first, during the 
preliminary research phase, I identified a number of potential cases and selected lead 
options; subsequently, I conducted a survey of senior representatives of households to 
confirm whether there was popular support for the characterization of these lead 
options as ‘successes’ and ‘failures’.  Having selected the four cases, I collected data 
on each through a combination of participant observation, semi-structured interviews 
and documentary research.  I also collected data on the broader historical, political, 
legislative and policy context.  I describe my methods in more detail below. 
Preliminary research and identification of cases 
During the preliminary phase of the research (February-March 2009), I spent 
time in Makeni initiating relationships with local government figures.  I observed 
events and spaces linked to each form of governance and talked informally to those I 
encountered there.  I also conducted 30 preliminary interviews of approximately 30-
40 minutes in length with representatives of MCC; chiefs; and representatives of civil 
society organizations.  Based on the judgements made by respondents in these 
preliminary interviews, I identified a number of potential cases of ‘successful’ and 
‘failed’ public goods provision led by MCC and Makeni’s chiefs for further study (see 
table 1.3.2). 
Table 1.3.2 Potential cases of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ public goods provision 
                                                
31 This framework was discussed during the design stages for collective Local Governance strand work 
(Kelsall, 2009b). 
32 See appendix 1 for a copy of the overall timeline for the research. 
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 MCC Chiefs 
Relative 
success 
 Clean streets, through waste 
management efforts33 
 Drainage, through construction of 
culverts 
 Public order, through 
deciding cases34 
 Land rights, through a 
system of land management 
Relative 
failure 
 Safe meat, through construction 
and management of the 
slaughterhouse 
 Roads, through grading and 
surfacing 
 Community infrastructure, 
through mobilization of 
unpaid community labour 
Note: Underlining is used to indicate the cases finally selected 
 
For MCC, waste management and construction of culverts were the two most 
commonly cited successes.35  I judged clean streets through waste management to be 
a better case to study for two main reasons.  First, interviews and informal 
conversations suggested that concerns about the construction of culverts were more 
pervasive than concerns about waste management and therefore it was a more 
questionable success.  Second, there was no culvert construction ongoing at the time 
of the study and thus no opportunity for participant observation, which I deemed 
important to gaining good insight into the process of providing the good. 
Respondents identified fewer cases of MCC failure.  This is partly due to the 
fact that many of my respondents were representatives of MCC.  However, it is also 
likely that relatively low expectations of local councils as public goods providers 
made it more difficult for respondents to identify those things MCC was not doing, or 
was doing badly.  A small number of respondents cited problems with the 
slaughterhouse and roads.  Of these two, I judged the slaughterhouse to offer a better 
case for study.  I was seeking examples of public goods provision led by MCC, and 
responsibility for roads is shared with the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA).  At 
the time, the council was in the midst of negotiations with the SLRA regarding plans 
                                                
33 The scope of this case was ultimately narrowed to Makeni’s market. 
34 The scope of this case was ultimately narrowed to a single chief’s barri—an open-sided structure 
where cases are heard and meetings are held. 
35 Although note that there were episodes of failure in the context of both efforts—the corruption 
scandal described in chapter five focused on the projects funded by MCC’s 2005 Local Government 
Development Grant, which included a failed initiative to install giant dustbins and a number of culverts 
considered to be of poor quality. 
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to improve Makeni’s road network and road construction was largely on hold while 
this was being worked out, so once again there were no obvious opportunities for 
participant observation. 
It was more difficult to identify cases of public goods provision for chiefs, as 
they did not generally conceive of themselves first and foremost as providers of 
public goods and sometime struggled to identify discrete outputs of their efforts.  
Rather than asking what public goods were provided by chiefs collectively, I asked 
chiefs about the contributions that they made personally.  Deciding cases or resolving 
disputes was by far the most frequently cited example of a positive chiefly 
contribution.  The paramount chief cited his role in management of land, but few 
others mentioned this.  Some chiefs identified mobilization of labour for community 
development as a positive contribution, but a senior chief spoke of the difficulties 
faced in doing so successfully in Makeni and informal conversations supported the 
view that chiefs did this infrequently and with limited success.  I judged public order 
generated through deciding cases the most suitable example of success as 
management of land was mentioned less frequently and responsibility for enforcing 
land rights was shared between chiefs and the council. 
Community infrastructure provided through chiefly mobilization of unpaid 
community labour was the only concrete example of failure that I identified during 
this preliminary period of research.  I had some misgivings about selecting this as a 
case for study because I was concerned that I would not be able to find a suitable 
opportunity for participant observation due to the relatively low levels at which it 
appeared to be occurring; a concern that was later borne out.  However, as I was not 
able to identify a viable alternative, I considered it the best option available. 
Survey of senior representatives of households 
In July 2009, I conducted a survey of senior representatives of households 
(both men and women) in Makeni (n=279) in order to determine how far public 
opinion regarding ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in public goods provision led by 
MCC/Makeni’s chiefs concurred with the views of the elite respondents interviewed 
during the preliminary period of research.36  I wanted to test my initial judgements 
                                                
36 It would have been ideal to conduct the survey in April 2009, immediately following the preliminary 
research.  However, due to logistical issues in accessing human and financial resources for the survey, 
it was not possible to do so until July.  In the meantime I began to collect data about the two cases I had 
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about case selection against this broader evidence base and confirm or reject these 
choices. 
Sample selection 
The final sample was arrived at through a three-stage process, set out in detail 
in appendix 2.  First, dwelling units were randomly selected from MCC’s recently 
compiled list for the collection of house rates.  Subsequently, a household listing was 
completed for each dwelling unit.  Finally, a senior representative of each household 
was identified and interviewed.  Dwelling units were assigned alternately to male and 
female enumerators, who interviewed respondents of the same sex because it was 
believed that this would allow the freest exchange of information.  Senior 
representatives of households were either: a) the recognized head of the household 
(that is, the person other members of the household recognized as its head); b) the 
spouse of the recognized head of household; or c) the eldest resident in the household 
of the appropriate sex. 
I chose to survey senior representatives of households rather than randomly 
selected members of households for two main reasons.  First, I felt that members of 
this group were more likely to be established residents of the city and have an 
informed view on the state of public goods provision.  Second, the protocol for 
identifying the senior representative of household was more straightforward for 
enumerators and therefore more likely to be followed by them.  I recognize that this 
approach means that the survey data are not representative of the views of Makeni’s 
residents in general; in particular, the views of youth (a category which refers both to 
those young in age and those that have not achieved the full social status of an adult, 
as discussed in chapter six) are under-represented. 
                                                
chosen for MCC, as I was more confident that they provided the best available comparison.  If survey 
data did not confirm my case selection choices, I was prepared to drop one or more of these cases in 
response. 
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Survey instrument and administration 
The survey instrument included 29 items covering the following topics: i) 
respondent characteristics (8 items); ii) public goods provision by Makeni City 
Council (7 items); iii) public goods provision by Bombali Sebora’s chiefs (9 items); 
and iv) the extent and source(s) of LGAs’ authority (5 items).  A copy of the 
questionnaire is included in appendix 3. 
The survey instrument was administered in one continuous session by nine 
enumerators, all tertiary students in Makeni (four female, five male).  They received 
three days training in application of the survey instrument and completed one 
observed classroom interview and one observed field interview before being approved 
to administer the survey.  The survey instrument was structured, with both close- and 
open-ended items.  Krio was used for the majority of interviews (94.6%), with a 
smaller number of interviews conducted in Temne (4.3%) and English (1.1%).  All 
enumerators participated in a collective session to translate the survey into Krio 
during the training and written Krio translations were included on the questionnaire.  
A Temne-speaking supervisor was present during the small number of Temne 
interviews to ensure that questions were phrased in a consistent manner.  All 
responses were completed in English. 
Data processing, data quality and analysis 
Initial data entry was conducted by a research assistant under my supervision.  
I  subsequently reviewed the data entry for each questionnaire and cleaned the data.  
All the data from the survey of senior representatives of households were entered into 
one dataset with each respondent as an observation.  Two main checks were made to 
verify the quality and accuracy of the data.  First, enumerators were asked to 
subjectively assess the ability of the respondent to understand the language used in the 
survey and the quality and truthfulness of the responses.  There were seven 
observations for which enumerators reported that the respondent had “serious 
problems speaking or understanding the language” or that they were “not at all 
confident” in the accuracy of the responses.  These observations were excluded from 
the analysis.  Second, myself and two other supervisors revisited over 95 percent of 
dwelling units to verify that household listings had been done correctly and that 
interviews were conducted with the appropriate respondents.  Interviewers were asked 
to return to dwelling units where errors had been made in order to correct them.  I 
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analyzed the survey data using standard techniques for descriptive statistical analysis 
in SPSS. 
Butcher questionnaire 
Through a separate but complementary process, Makeni’s butchers were asked 
to assess their satisfaction with the slaughterhouse.  These data were collected due to 
low levels of awareness about the facility among senior representatives of households.  
The instrument for the butchers was administered by a single male enumerator and 
Krio was used for all interviews; a copy is included in appendix 4.  The same process 
for data entry and analysis were used as for the main survey dataset. 
Case studies 
As discussed in chapter four, analysis of the survey data indicated that they 
were generally supportive of my case selection.  I dedicated one month to intensive 
data collection for each case study.  I used a combination of participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews as the main methods of data collection for each case.  
However, I was unable to identify an appropriate opportunity for observation for the 
fourth case, mobilizing labour for community infrastructure, due to low levels of 
activity in this regard, exacerbated by the onset of the rainy season.  In total, I 
completed more than 45 days of participant observation and conducted 56 
interviews—27 for council cases and 29 for chiefly cases.  I also drew on a range of 
documentary data, including minutes of MCC and Bombali Sebora chiefdom 
committee meetings; financial data for MCC; and copies of relevant news stories.  My 
understanding of each case was further developed through numerous informal 
conversations and additional ad hoc observations. 
The data collection for the case studies employed three main languages—
English, Krio and Temne—with each requiring a distinct approach.  I usually went 
unaccompanied to interviews conducted in English.  If I wanted to explore sensitive 
issues, I did not record the interviews, but made notes which I typed up soon 
afterwards for best recall.  Otherwise I recorded the interviews and later created either 
a verbatim or summary transcript from the recording.  I began Krio language training 
in early 2008 and had reached a level of intermediate competency by the time I began 
my fieldwork.  I was therefore able to conduct most Krio interviews myself, but 
always went accompanied by my research assistant who intervened in case of any 
difficulties in expression or comprehension by either myself or the person being 
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interviewed.  All Krio interviews were recorded.  My research assistant created 
preliminary verbatim transcripts of these interviews with English translations, which I 
later reviewed and edited.  As I do not speak Temne, I relied on my research assistant 
to carry out ‘on the spot’ translation during interviews.  I later hired a credible 
professional translator to produce verbatim transcripts of the Temne interviews.  
During participant observation, the bulk of the conversation took place either in Krio 
or in Temne.  My research assistant was with me at all times and carried out ‘on the 
spot’ translation when those around us were speaking Temne and provided 
clarifications when needed when people were speaking Krio.  I made notes and later 
in the day we sat and jointly reviewed them for accuracy.  In this thesis, I include 
footnotes with the original language for all Krio quotes and footnotes indicating that 
the quote is translated for all Temne quotes. 
I coded the interview and observational data in NVivo.  I reviewed a range of 
literature on coding strategies (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998; Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Richards, 2005a; Bazeley, 2007; Gibbs, 2007; 
Saldaña, 2009) and developed an approach which drew together strategies that I found 
productive.  I read through key transcripts and kept a record of aspects that I found 
interesting, in order to stimulate the creative thinking process (Richards, 2005a).  I 
then coded each transcript, using a combination of “concept-driven” and “data-
driven” coding (Gibbs, 2007).  I wrote memos on particular interviews and issues of 
interest (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003).  I gradually built up 
a relatively complex set of codes, which I then worked to integrate and simplify so 
that the coding framework served as a useful resource when writing up my final 
analysis.  Ultimately I analyzed the cases through the lense of the concept of 
coproduction, drawing on elements of Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework.  This 
analytical framework is described in detail in chapter two. 
Establishing the broader context 
In order to situate the cases I studied in broader perspective, I conducted 
approximately 20 interviews with stakeholders in local government in Sierra Leone.  
Respondents included representatives of central government and provincial and 
district government; national non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and donor 
organizations.  All of these interviews took place in English, most were not recorded 
and summary transcripts were created from notes.  I collected a wide range of 
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documents, both in ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ form, including copies of legislation dealing with 
chiefdom and council governance, relevant ‘grey’ literature and government and 
donor datasets.  I also monitored three national newspapers between November 2008 
and September 2009—Awoko, Standard Times and Concord Times—and clipped 
news stories about local government, party politics and civil society.  I kept a 
spreadsheet documenting each story and noting aspects relevant to the themes of the 
research.  Finally, I spent a week doing archival research at the National Archives in 
Kew, attempting to trace the development of the institutional arrangements studied 
during the post-colonial period, but with limited success. 
A mixed methods approach 
I collected and analyzed multiple sources of data to build a more complete 
picture of local public goods provision.  When selecting cases, I used preliminary 
interviews to develop an initial set of options and then conducted a survey of senior 
representatives of household to reach final choices.  When collecting data for each 
case, I focused first on carrying out a period of participant observation and document 
review.  Through this process, I developed a good base of knowledge from which to 
formulate interview questions and conduct interviews.  This helped to minimize the 
risk that respondents would give easy answers, or answers that they thought would 
appeal to me.  I interviewed a wide range of relevant actors involved in the provision 
of each good to ensure a balanced view.  In developing the case study narratives 
presented here, I have drawn on a range of respondent accounts, rather than relying on 
one respondent too heavily.  Inevitably, there is some unevenness in the quantity and 
quality of evidence supporting the case study narratives.  Where the evidence on a 
particular point is limited, I have clearly indicated that this is the case. 
Research ethics 
The research was carried out in accordance with the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) Research Ethics Policy (2006) and the 
Economic and Social Research Council Research Ethics Framework (2006).  An LSE 
ethics review questionnaire was completed and reviewed by my supervisor, who 
determined that a full LSE Research Ethics Committee review would not be required.  
The main potential risk posed by the research was damage to relationships between i) 
LGAs and donors; ii) LGAs and central government; and iii) (subject-)citizens and 
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discuss any participant’s views with others.  In reporting the research honestly and 
accurately, reputational risks cannot be eradicated altogether, but I have aimed to be 
sensitive to the importance of relationships and reputation to research participants in 
my reporting. 
I obtained informed consent orally from all those who participated in either 
semi-structured or survey interviews.  I explained how the information collected 
would be used and I made it clear that participation was voluntary.  With the 
exception of those in prominent leadership roles (the mayor, the paramount chief and 
Pa Rok), participants were told that they would not be identified by name in the final 
report, but may be identified by title or organization.  All recordings and transcripts of 
interviews were stored securely on my laptop, in a password-protected folder and 
without the use of participants’ names.  During the course of my fieldwork, my digital 
recorder was stolen with a number of recordings on it, as I was only able to transfer 
these periodically when I had computer access.  On the advice of LSE’s Research 
Ethics Committee, I visited all those whose recordings were stored on the recorder at 
the time of the theft to explain what had happened and the possible implications, and 
to offer my apologies. 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows.  In chapter two, I set out the analytical 
framework that structures the case studies of ‘success versus failure’ and review the 
literatures which inform this framework.  In chapter three, I provide an account of 
local government in Sierra Leone, focusing on the dynamics of post-war reform, the 
historical development of local government, and contemporary academic debate about 
chiefs and local councils.  In chapter four, I introduce Makeni, the field site for this 
study, and provide a more detailed account of the specific forms of chiefdom and 
council government found there.  I also present the findings of the survey of senior 
representatives of households, which provide insight into respondents’ views on the 
performance of MCC and Makeni’s chiefs as public goods providers.  In chapter five, 
I compare two cases of coproduction led by MCC—the more successful case of a 
clean market jointly produced with the traders and the less successful case of a safe 
supply of meat jointly produced with the butchers.  I follow this with a comparison of 
two cases of coproduction led by Makeni’s chiefs in chapter six—the more successful 
case of public order generated through a senior chief’s barri with the cooperation and 
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compliance of their subject-citizens and the less successful case of community 
infrastructure produced through the mobilization of unpaid labour.  In chapter seven, I 
consider the case studies collectively in light of theories of coproduction, set out four 
propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed 
in post-war Sierra Leone, and anticipate and address some of the main criticisms of 
the analytical approach taken.  In chapter eight, I conclude by exploring the potential 
of coproduction as a means of addressing Sierra Leone’s public goods deficit, reflect 
on the policy implications of a more grounded and gradual approach to institutional 
reform to improve local public goods provision, and consider how such an approach 
might apply in the context of local government reform in Sierra Leone. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical Underpinnings 
At the core of this study is a comparison of four cases of relative success and 
failure in local public goods provision.  I analyze these cases through the lens of the 
concept of coproduction, taking an institutional approach which draws on elements of 
Ostrom’s (2005) institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework.  I accept 
her definition of institutions as rules, or more specifically as “the prescriptions that 
humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interaction, including 
those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, 
private associations and governments of all scales” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 3).  In this 
chapter I describe the analytical framework that I apply in this study and review the 
key literature which informs this framework.  First, I consider two of the main bodies 
of literature looking at local public goods provision in Africa which motivated me to 
pursue an institutional approach: literature based on experimental games conducted in 
African settings and social anthropological accounts of ‘everyday governance’ in 
Africa.  Next, I describe the broad context of ‘new’ institutionalist literature from 
which the IAD framework emerges, set out my application of the framework and 
address two main theoretical points of contention: the characterization of human 
agency and institutional change.  Finally, I review the literature on coproduction, 
including literature critical of coproduction’s deployment as a strategy for improving 
the supply of public goods. 
2.1 Institutions and local public goods provision in Africa 
Both the experimental and anthropological literatures looking at local public 
goods provision in Africa is complex and worthy of extensive discussion; here I am 
able to provide only a highly partial summary of each and indicate how they relate to 
the analytical framework that I apply in this study.  While these literatures are based 
on very different assumptions about the nature of the social world and causality, they 
both share an interest in the micro-level study of institutions and the way in which 
these shape public goods outcomes. 
i) Experimental games 
Experimental games have been used principally by economists, but 
increasingly by other social scientists also, to compare theoretical assumptions about 
human behaviour to actual behaviour; the games are structured interactions intended 
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to replicate relevant theoretical scenarios.  More specifically, researchers have used 
games to better understand the role played by preferences and norms in shaping 
behaviour.  Colin Camerer and Ernest Fehr (2004) provide a useful overview of the 
games played and the key findings yielded.  The main headline is that a substantial 
portion of players in such experiments do not conform to the model of the rational 
egoist, pursuing only material net benefits; they appear to have other-regarding 
preferences, including preferences for reciprocity and equality.37 
The majority of experimental games conducted in the 1980s and 1990s relied 
on the participation of student populations in Western countries.  More recently, 
studies have been conducted with a wider range of subjects, including those in 
African countries (Henrich, et al., 2004; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & 
Weinstein, 2007; Hofmeyr, Burns, & Visser, 2007; Barr, Lindelow, & Serneels, 2009; 
Vollan, 2012; Voors, Turley, Kontoleon, Bulte, & List, 2012).  Joseph Henrich et al 
(2004) have conducted what is perhaps the most widely known cross-cultural study, 
based on a set of experimental games played by members of fifteen small-scale 
societies, including four based in Africa.  Two main games were played—the 
ultimatum game38, which measures the extent to which participants are willing to 
punish other players for unfair behaviour at a cost to themselves, and the public goods 
game39, which measures the extent to which participants are willing to contribute to a 
public good at a cost to themselves. 
The researchers interpret results from the fifteen societies studied alongside 
existing experimental evidence (based principally on Western student populations).  
The results are consistent with existing evidence to the extent that no society studied 
lent support to the textbook economic assumption of rational egoism.  However, the 
degree of variation in patterns of play across the fifteen groups exceeded that found in 
the entire literature to date, suggesting that preferences are influenced by participants’ 
                                                
37 The evidence for this is that players reward reciprocal and fair behaviour (or punish the lack thereof), 
even at a material net loss to themselves. 
38 In this game, the first player (the proposer) receives a sum of money (the pie) and can choose to 
allocate any portion of it to a second player (the responder).  The responder, with full knowledge of the 
size of the pie and the size of the offer, can accept or reject the proposal.  If the responder accepts, she 
receives the amount proposed and the proposer receives the remainder.  If she rejects the proposal, 
neither party receives anything.  If players were behaving like ‘egoists’, all positive offers would be 
accepted, and proposers would offer very small amounts. 
39 In this game, players receive a sum of money and can choose to contribute any share of it (from zero 
to 100 percent) to a group fund.  After all players have had a chance to contribute, the collective pot is 
increased by 50 percent (or in some cases doubled), and distributed equally among all players.  
‘Egoists’ would choose to free-ride, contributing zero to the fund. 
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environments rather than universal in nature.40  Institutions appear to be a principal 
channel through which environmental influence exerts itself.  The authors argue that 
variation in levels of market integration and the payoffs to cooperative behaviour41 
between societies, which are associated with distinct institutional structures, explains 
about half of the variation in mean ultimatum game offers.  The authors also highlight 
some specific micro-level examples where patterns of play in the public goods game 
are consistent with the behaviour implied by local institutions.  For example, they 
note that the Orma in Kenya explicitly recognized the parallels between the public 
goods game and the Kenyan institution of harambee, which involves a locally driven 
process of contributions to support the provision of local public goods such as a road, 
school or other community building (pp. 39, 49).  The contributions made by Orma 
participants were noticeably more generous than those of other groups, and wealthier 
participants tended to contribute more than poorer ones, as they would in the context 
of harambee.  The authors also propose that the Hadza group in Tanzania implicitly 
made a connection between food-sharing practices and the ultimatum game (p. 40).  
In general, Hadza participants made low offers and experienced high rejection rates.  
The authors suggest that there are parallels with the pattern of evasion and 
punishment typical of food-sharing practices within this group. 
Experimental work of this kind has been criticized for heroic assumptions 
about the extent to which behaviour in an experimental setting maps onto behaviour 
in ‘real life’.  Based on research in rural Sierra Leone, Maarten Voors, Ty Turley, 
Andreas Kontoleon, Erwin Bulte and John List (2012) investigate whether public 
goods games are predictive of behaviour in the context of a development intervention 
to provide public goods in the community and find no statistically significant 
relationship between the two.  They suggest that respondents’ behaviour may be 
affected by the pool of subjects involved; the context in which decision-making takes 
place; the extent and nature of scrutiny by others; the presence or absence of ethical 
                                                
40 For example, in the ultimatum game, mean offers varied from 25 to 57 percent of the pot, while the 
range typical in experiments with student subjects is 42 to 48 percent.  In the public goods game, the 
mean contribution for student subjects is approximately 40 to 60 percent and typical distributions of 
contributions have a U-shape, with a mode at full defection (contribution of zero) and a secondary 
mode at full cooperation (contribution of 100 percent).  Mean contributions for the 5 societies which 
participated in public goods games ranged from 34 to 65 percent and none had a mode at full defection. 
41 These measures are based on rankings of each society according to how frequently its members 
engage in market exchange and the potential benefits of cooperative productive activities (rather than 
those conducted alone or on a family basis). 
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considerations; and the stakes of the game (p. 308).  Henrich et al (2004, pp. 42-44) 
comment on a range of ways in which the framing of the experiments they conducted 
could have influenced the results, including experimenter bias where the experimenter 
had a pre-existing relationship with the participants; the use of money, which may 
provide a specific cue or signal about the nature of the situation; and the strategy used 
to instruct participants on how to play the games.  Cecile Jackson (2011) suggests that 
more fundamental framing effects are at play in the work of Henrich et al (2004) than 
those the authors discuss.  For example, she argues that the very act of naming an 
activity as a game has a significant framing effect, as there are specific cultural views 
about the behaviour appropriate to the playing of games; related, she argues that 
experimental games involve largely informal interactions which may be divorced 
from the formal arenas which (in some cases) they attempt to replicate. 
The cross-cultural application of experimental games is also vulnerable to 
accusations of ‘culturalism’.  Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2004, p. 63) describes 
culturalism as an essentialization of culture, which “reduces all societies (along with 
their various groups and sub-cultures) to ‘one’ system of cultural values, or even to a 
‘national character’ or ‘basic personality’”.  The tendency of analyses of data from 
experimental games to point to single group-level cultural dynamics, such as food-
sharing practices establishing generalized cultural standards of fairness, can be 
interpreted as falling into a trap of cultural simplification and essentialization.  These 
critics would emphasize the multiplicity of cultural logics influencing human 
behaviour, as well as the high degree of internal differentiation within any society. 
ii) The anthropology of ‘everyday governance’ 
Anthropological studies of patterns of ‘everyday governance’ at the local level 
in Africa provide a valuable counterpoint to the more abstract findings of 
experimental games.  I base this discussion on three recent and prominent edited 
volumes: Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur’s (2009) volume focused on the 
governance of public goods provision42; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan’s (2006) 
volume looking at “everyday corruption” in front-line services; and Christian Lund’s 
(2007) volume which focuses on “twilight institutions”—those which are not formally 
part of the state, yet exercise public authority regardless. 
                                                
42 The authors use the term “collective service delivery” which they leave open to cover the provision 
of “public, collective and communal goods and services” (p. 2) by a range of actors. 
 53 
These volumes share an interest in producing scholarship which is both 
empirically grounded and free of artificial boundaries derived from ill-fitting theory.  
Blundo and Le Meur (p. 2) observe that all contributors “describe and analyze in very 
concrete terms the institutional and political processes stemming from the provision 
of a number of public, collective and communal goods or services”; Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan (p. 8) state the authors’ primary objective as “to describe the habits, 
procedures and justifications involved in corruption and, furthermore, to understand 
how public services work ‘in reality’ and how their users participate in or adapt to this 
mode of operation”; and Lund (p. 2)  argues that the authors “investigate how public 
authority actually works in the face of obvious state failure and impending collapse”, 
approaching the study of public authority from below.  This approach can be read as a 
response both to research by proponents of ‘good governance’, which is perceived to 
be an effort to legitimate an inappropriate ideal, and to prominent accounts of the 
African state by authors such as Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) and 
Jean-François Bayart (1993), which are perceived to suffer from weak empirical 
grounding and exhibit culturalist bias (Lund, 2007, p. 2; Blundo & Le Meur, 2009, p. 
2). 
Many of the heterogeneous cases discussed in these volumes provide insights 
into factors affecting performance in local public goods provision in Africa. Kristine 
Juul (2007) and Marc-Éric Gruénais, Raphaël Okalla and Eric Gauvrit (2009) focus 
on the perverse incentives created by decentralization of public goods provision.  Juul 
finds that in the rural municipality of Barkedji in Senegal, the transfer of 
responsibility for tax collection from an appointed administration to an elected 
administration has weakened tax enforcement, as local councillors avoid unpopular 
enforcement measures for fear of electoral consequences.  This leaves the council 
with little to no revenue to fund public goods provision and thus renders councillors 
reliant on wealthy patrons to fund urgent development projects, reinforcing a system 
of clientelism.  Gruénais et al find that decentralization in Cameroon has improved 
the incentives for facilities based in the capital to provide healthcare services at the 
expense of those based in more peripheral areas.  While centrally located facilities can 
take advantage of greater autonomy to recruit better staff, access funding more rapidly 
and increase their independence, peripheral facilities receive less central government 
support, but are not able to attract qualified staff and continue to face difficulties in 
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accessing resources which can only be obtained in provincial centres after paying 
bribes. 
Others focus on the interaction between what political scientists usually term 
formal and informal institutions.43  Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2006, p. 5) 
define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels”.  
Nassirou Bako Arifari’s (2007) study of customs authorities in Benin, Niger and 
Senegal provides one example of a close study of informal political institutions which 
operate alongside more formal ones.  Bako Arifari finds that the central government 
sets targets for customs authorities without providing the necessary resources to meet 
them.  In response, directors of customs offices “develop strategies ‘to attract clients’ 
which are characterized by a certain flexibility towards the clientele” (p. 217).  For 
example, customs officers develop reciprocal relationships with traders who provide 
petrol and vehicles to support the operations of the customs service in exchange for 
favourable treatment—this could be described as corrupt coproduction.  Using Helme 
and Levitsky’s language, the coproductive arrangements are “substitutive” as regards 
revenue-raising, as they achieve the same outcome that the formal institution is 
intended to in terms of enabling the customs service to meet its designated revenue 
targets.  However, these arrangements are “competing” as regards the public safety 
role of the customs service, as the flexibility offered to clients undermines customs’ 
officials ability to protect the public interest. 
This body of work offers a contextually embedded narrative of public goods 
provision based on rich accounts of the processes through which public goods are 
provided in practice.  The ethnographic methods employed by anthropologists are 
well-suited to the study of incentives for local public goods provision, which are often 
context dependent and cannot simply be read from formal institutional structures; and 
informal institutions, particularly those that lie concealed behind officially sanctioned 
ones.  Many of the studies included in these collections yield surprising findings 
about local public goods provision, and often run counter to orthodox development 
thinking about the strategies most likely to improve the quantity and quality of public 
goods available.  However, these collections do not offer a more general explanatory 
                                                
43 Olivier de Sardan (2008) argues that it is more appropriate to refer to professional and social norms 
and rules, which may have an official or more practical character. 
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theory about the conditions under which local public goods provision is more likely to 
succeed (indeed, many of the authors would be likely to reject such a project). 
While some working in an anthropological tradition question the validity of an 
approach based on experimental games, as discussed above, from the perspective of 
those conducting such experiments there is potentially much to gain from an 
engagement with social anthropology.  Experimental games aim to generate general 
propositions; anthropological work can explore how these propositions might apply in 
particular contexts, as well as expose the limits of their applicability.  When 
surprising patterns of play emerge in experimental games, such as those observed by 
Henrich et al (2004), anthropological work may be able to explain these with 
reference to participants’ perception of the games and related social beliefs and 
practices.  Similarly, when there is a disparity between the findings of a set of 
experimental games and observed practice, such as that discussed by Voors et al 
(2012), anthropological work may be able to indicate why such a gap exists. 
Furthermore, despite significant differences between these bodies of literature, 
they also point in a similar direction: the micro-level study of institutional 
arrangements through which public goods are provided.  In pursuing this direction, I 
follow the social anthropological literature in studying how public goods are provided 
in practice, through direct observation.  At the same time, I am interested in 
developing more generalizable propositions about the conditions under which 
coproduction in Sierra Leone is more likely to succeed.  Rather than an experimental 
approach, which would require me to test specific hypotheses, I follow a more 
inductive approach, but one that is structured by the use of a common analytical 
framework which I elaborate on in the next section. 
2.2 An institutional approach 
i) Three institutionalisms 
The study of institutions has enjoyed a resurgence over the course of the last 
three decades.  From the perspective of political scientists, this large and multi-
disciplinary ‘new’ institutionalist literature is generally understood to break down into 
three main schools of thought: rational choice institutionalism (RCI)44, historical 
institutionalism (HI) and sociological institutionalism (SI).  It is difficult to draw clear 
                                                
44 Related work in economics is usually known as the new institutional economics. 
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boundaries between these schools of thought, given the diverse range of literature 
which each contains and recent efforts to bridge the gaps between them (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-370).45  There is insufficient space here to 
describe each of these schools in detail and this has been done ably by others 
elsewhere (Koelble, 1995; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; Campbell, 2004).  
Instead I offer a brief sketch of each and explain my reasons for drawing on the IAD 
framework, which falls within the rationalist tradition, but also challenges key aspects 
of rationalist thinking. 
Rational choice institutionalists (RCIs) have generally shown interest in 
institutions from a theoretical perspective as a means of explaining the discrepancy 
between rational choice predictions and observed behaviour in situations where 
collective action problems are expected to occur, but do not.  Institutions, RCIs have 
argued, can facilitate cooperation and enable collective action problems to be 
overcome.  They tend to conceive of institutions as either exogenous constraints on 
action or equilibrium46 ways of doing things (Shepsle, 2006).  The work of economic 
historian Douglass North (1990)47 is a prominent example of the former approach; he 
defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally…the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.  North argues that 
institutions reduce uncertainty in the face of complex problems and limited human 
problem-solving capacity.  Kenneth Shepsle (2006) argues that the view of 
institutions as equilibrium ways of doing things is distinct in that it treats the rules of 
the game as endogenous, that is, they can be changed by the ‘players’.  Under this 
interpretation, rules are considered a reflection of popular will rather than exogenous 
constraints.  When influential players seek to change the rules of the game, the 
equilibrium way of doing things can be considered unstable and the institution fragile. 
Historical institutionalists (HIs) have shown interest in institutions from a 
more empirical perspective as a means of explaining specific real world political 
outcomes (Thelen, 1999, p. 373; Steinmo, 2008, pp. 156-158).  According to Sven 
Steinmo (2008, pp. 156-158), HIs’ interest in institutions emerged inductively as 
                                                
45 Examples of work in the RCI tradition which draw on insights from HI and SI include Robert Bates 
et al’s (1998) technique of analytical narratives, Avner Greif’s (2006) technique of comparative and 
historical institutional analysis and Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework. 
46 In game theory, a Nash equilibrium exists when each player is making the best decision s/he can, 
taking into account the decisions of others. 
47 North is considered a major contributor to the new institutional economics. 
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comparative political studies persistently identified institutional structures as a 
significant influence over political strategies and outcomes.48  HIs’ definition of 
institutions tends to be somewhat looser than that of RCIs; according to Peter Hall 
and Rosemary Taylor (1996, p. 938), HIs define institutions as “formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure 
of the polity or political economy”.  One important way in which HI work differs 
from much RCI work is in its emphasis on the importance of historical context and 
temporal sequencing in determining the structure and effects of institutions  (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 941; Immergut, 1998, pp. 16-25; Thelen, 1999, p. 371; Steinmo, 
2008, pp. 164-167).  HIs are also more likely than RCIs to characterize institutions as 
the product of political struggles which reflect the will of dominant political forces 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 940; Immergut, 1998, p. 16).  Finally, HIs have tended to 
place greater emphasis on the role of ideas alongside institutions (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 941; Steinmo, 2008, pp. 167-174). 
Sociological institutionalism (SI) emerged from the field of organizational 
studies in the late 1970s and challenges the view that organizational structures merely 
represent efficient designs to achieve organizational goals.  Instead, sociological 
institutionalists (SIs) tend to characterize organizations as socially embedded, and 
organizational structures as reflective of the broader institutional environment 
(Powell, 2007).  SI is associated with a more cultural understanding of institutions 
which focuses on the way in which institutions serve as a medium through which 
individuals interpret the social world and provide templates for action (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 948).  In emphasizing the interpretive role played by institutions, SIs draw on 
concepts such as “symbolic systems, cultural scripts and mental models” (Powell, 
2007, p. 1).  SIs perceive institutional structures to offer far more limited scope for 
individual choice than most RCI and HI colleagues, arguing that human behaviour is 
guided by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of consequences’.  In what 
is widely recognized as a key SI text, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991, p. 10) 
write: 
…individuals do not choose freely among institutions, customs, social norms, or 
legal procedures.  Once cannot decide to get a divorce in a new manner, or play 
chess by different rules, or opt out of paying taxes.  Organization theorists prefer 
                                                
48 Well-known examples include Ellen Immergut (1992) on health care, Steinmo (1993) on taxation 
and Victoria Hattam (1993) on the US labour movement. 
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models not of choice but of taken-for-granted expectations…absorbed through 
socialization, education, on-the-job learning or acquiescence to convention. 
The emphasis here is on the imaginative limitations that institutions impose on 
individuals and the dominance of habitual, rather than calculated, forms of behaviour. 
My choice to draw on Ostrom’s IAD framework does not reflect a 
straightforward privileging of an RCI perspective over other forms of institutionalism.  
The diversity of work on institutions reflects their complex, multi-faceted character, 
and different theoretical approaches capture distinct facets of their operations and 
effects.  Moreover, while Ostrom’s work falls within a rationalist tradition, she also 
challenges important aspects of rationalist thinking: she rejects a simplistic model of 
human agency based on the assumption of a universal rational egoist and accords a 
significant role to social norms; draws on insights from cognitive research about the 
importance of ‘mental models’ as an influence on behaviour; and employs a multi-
tiered approach to analysis which can be used to explain how political struggles at 
different levels shape institutions.  Nevertheless, there are a number of key aspects of 
RCI thinking which are reflected in her work that I find valuable for the purposes of 
my investigation.  These include: a theoretical focus on institutions as a means to 
resolve collection action problems, such as that posed by the provision of public 
goods; a clear definition of institutions as rules which is appropriate for micro-level 
study of public goods provision; and a focus on the role of human agency and 
strategic behaviour.  Beyond these broader benefits, the IAD framework is designed 
for pragmatic, policy-oriented work and flexible use, which suits my purposes well. 
ii) The analytical framework 
The concept of coproduction provides an entry-point for analysis of the four 
cases I discuss, but it does not offer an analytical framework for dissecting them.  For 
this, I draw on the IAD framework.  As discussed, Ostrom (2005) defines institutions 
as rules; despite the wide diversity of human institutions, she argues that they are 
underpinned by a common set of “universal building blocks”.  The IAD framework is 
an attempt to identify and describe these universal components so that they can be 
used to make sense of institutions.  Ostrom emphasizes the strategic character of 
human behaviour in institutional contexts, summarizing the essence of the IAD 
framework: “[i]ndividuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices 
regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves 
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and others” (p. 3).  Ostrom captures this strategic interaction using the concept of an 
action situation. 
According to Ostrom, an action situation occurs whenever “two or more 
individuals are faced with a set of potential actions that jointly produce outcomes” (p. 
32).  The main purpose of defining an action situation is to draw boundaries around a 
discrete set of actors, actions and outcomes for the purpose of analysis.  The 
analytical focus is on a particular snapshot of an institution at a given moment, rather 
than the historical development of an institution over time.  However, this approach 
does not imply examining a particular phenomenon in an isolated way; relevant 
historical, social and economic context is drawn into the analysis, represented 
principally by exogenous variables influencing the action situation.  Ostrom defines 
seven sets of variables that make up an action situation, which are based on the basic 
components of a game in game theory: 1) the set of participants; 2) positions to be 
filled by participants; 3) potential outcomes; 4) allowable actions and action-outcome 
linkages; 5) the control participants have over action-outcome linkages; 6) the 
information available to participants about actions, outcomes and their linkages; and 
7) the costs and benefits of actions and outcomes.  To these, she adds a further three 
sets of exogenous variables which influence action situations: 1) the rules which 
participants use to order their relationships; 2) the attributes of the biophysical and 
material world being acted upon; and 3) the attributes of the broader community in 
which action is grounded. 
I do not employ the formal IAD terminology in chapters five and six as I find 
it too cumbersome for the purposes of presenting a case study narrative intended to be 
legible to a wider audience.  However, underpinning the case studies is an implicit 
conception of each case as an action situation in which there are two positions to be 
occupied: LGA and coproducing (subject-)citizen.49  The specific participants are 
Makeni City Council (MCC); Makeni’s chiefs; and the groups of (subject-)citizens 
that they engage with in the course of public goods provision, including traders, 
butchers, those involved in cases heard by chiefs and young men.  MCC is treated as a 
corporate actor, while the other participants are treated as individual members of a 
group with common interests. 
                                                
49 Arguably I describe more than two positions in the course of each case study narrative.  However, 
the main dynamic of interest is that between LGAs and coproducing (subject-)citizens. 
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I assume that participants make decisions about how to behave based on an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of potential actions and outcomes.  Ostrom 
recommends breaking the costs and benefits of potential actions and outcomes down 
into 1) the physical outcome of a chain of action; 2) associated external material 
rewards/sanctions; and 3) the valuation placed on a combination of 1) and 2) by the 
participants.  For the cases I discuss, the physical outcome is ultimately the public 
good in question, produced to variable quality.  Further material rewards/sanctions 
can attach to the potential outcome itself, or to actions leading to the potential 
outcome.  The valuation of the physical outcome and related material 
rewards/sanctions is dependent on participants’ preferences.  Ostrom is open-minded 
on the nature of participants’ preference structures—as discussed in greater detail in 
the next section, she argues that beyond preferences for material gain, human beings 
demonstrate other-regarding preferences and preferences shaped by social norms. 
In fleshing out the kind of human agency exercised in action situations, 
Ostrom argues that it is important for analysts to specify how participants acquire and 
use information and how they select a particular action from a possible pool of 
potential actions.  Field-based researchers do not have access to the specific cognitive 
data generated through experiments; I therefore take one strategy recommended by 
Ostrom, and adopt an assumption of bounded rationality (Simon, 1972; Ostrom, 
2005).  To clarify, while I consider all participants to be capable of strategic 
behaviour, I assume that there are limits to their rationality.  They are likely to have 
access to incomplete information about the situation they are in, including the full 
range of actions they might take, possible outcomes and the linkages between actions 
and outcomes.  They are unlikely to make a comprehensive calculation about how 
best to maximize benefits to themselves at each decision point.  Instead, they are 
likely to rely on context-specific heuristics to simplify the decision making process, 
which include strategies such as satisficing (seeking an acceptable rather than an 
optimal outcome). 
Of the three categories of exogenous variables which Ostrom identifies, she 
places the greatest emphasis on rules.  Ostrom defines rules as “shared understandings 
by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) 
are required, prohibited or permitted” (p. 18).  This definition is unusual in its claim 
that rules are always understood by participants to be enforced, so in order for a 
prescription to qualify as a rule, Ostrom (p. 151) requires that arrangements for 
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monitoring and imposing sanctions are in place.  In Ostrom’s view, it is this key 
feature which distinguishes rules from norms.  While norms are also prescriptive, 
failure to observe a norm is costly because of the internal value that participants 
attach to norm violation, rather than as a result of externally imposed sanctions.  
Although Ostrom emphasizes that rules are “shared understandings…about enforced 
prescriptions [my emphasis]”, she indicates (p. 139) that this does not imply that rules 
are necessarily consciously recognized by participants as such.  Further, while Ostrom 
emphasizes that rules are enforced prescriptions, she argues that this does not imply 
that rule conformance is based solely on fear of punishment (p. 167).  She suggests 
that it is common for rules to have a significant degree of normative support which 
leads to voluntary compliance, noting that it would be very costly to maintain many 
rules if compliance was fully dependent on punishment.  However, Ostrom also 
argues that in the absence of punishment, normative support for rules commonly 
dwindles as those following them see violators go unpunished. 
Ostrom outlines seven categories of rules which link to different components 
in the action situation, set out in table 2.1.1.  Her motives in classifying rules in this 
fashion include providing a consistent language which can be used by institutional 
scholars to prevent “babbling equilibrium” problems, providing a full sense of the 
structure of the action situation and helping analysts cope with the complexity of the 
wide array of rules found in the social world (p. 175).  I have used Ostrom’s rule 
classification system to map out the key rules organizing the action situation in each 
of the four cases I discuss, which helps to clarify the underlying structure of rules in 
each case, and I include copies of these rule classifications at the end of each chapter 
for reference. 
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Table 2.1.1 Classification of rules affecting an action situation 
Type of rule Definition 
Position rules Specify the positions in an action situation and restrictions on the 
number of participants who may hold the position 
Boundary rules (entry 
and exit rules) 
Specify eligibility for positions; the process for determining which 
eligible participants enter and exit positions; and the process through 
which participants enter and exit positions 
Choice rules Specify what participants occupying positions must, must not or may do 
Aggregation rules Specify who decides the action or activities to be undertaken 
Information rules Specify the lines of communication between participants and the form 
which communication will take 
Payoff rules Specify the costs and benefits attached to actions and outcomes 
Scope rules Specify which outcomes must, must not or may be affected in the action 
situation 
 
The other two sets of exogenous variables that Ostrom identifies are attributes 
of the biophysical and material world and attributes of the community.  In the former 
category, it is important that all four goods studied are public goods, broadly 
interpreted to include those with positive externalities.  Aside from this, I do not 
discuss attributes of the biophysical or material world in any detail during my 
analysis.  Ostrom provides no clear definition of attributes of the community, but cites 
a number of relevant variables, including size and composition, the values of 
behaviour accepted, the degree to which common understandings about particular 
action situations are shared, the degree to which preferences are shared and levels of 
inequality (pp. 26-27).  I focus on attributes of the social and political environment 
which present a barrier to the provision of public goods, including a political system 
which offers little reward for public goods provision; resource scarcity; low levels of 
trust in local government; and a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities (as 
discussed in more detail in chapter one). 
While defining an action situation sets the boundaries of a unit of study for 
micro-analysis, Ostrom also emphasizes that action situations do not tend to exist in 
isolation; rather multiple action situations are “nested” within one another.  Ostrom 
argues that the rules applied at one level of analysis are nested within rules set at 
another level of analysis which establish how the first set of rules can be altered. She 
defines three levels of rules: 
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 Operational rules—those which directly affect everyday decision-making for 
participants; 
 Collective choice rules—those which determine the rules to be used in changing 
operational rules; and 
 Constitutional rules—those which determine the rules to be used in changing 
collective choice rules. 
The case studies I present focus on operational rules, while touching on collective 
choice rules to a lesser extent.  I do not carry out structured analysis of how any 
action situation(s) at a higher level act on those set out in chapters five and six.  
However, I do describe a large portion of the relevant constitutional rules in chapter 
three, which provides an introduction to local government in Sierra Leone. 
To summarize, I treat each of the four cases studies as instances of 
coproduction of local public goods.  I draw on elements of Ostrom’s IAD framework 
to animate these instances of coproduction, treating each as an action situation in 
which LGAs and coproducing (subject-)citizens face strategic decisions about the 
actions they take in the context of the rules governing coproduction; attributes of the 
social and political environment; and the character of the goods they are coproducing.  
I use concepts from Ostrom’s framework to underpin and structure the analysis, but I 
do not employ formal language.  My purpose in employing the IAD framework is to 
gain insight into the specific cases studied and through these cases into the empirical 
phenomenon of coproduction of local public goods in Sierra Leone. 
iii) Modelling agency 
The IAD framework is clearly in keeping with the tendency of RCI work to 
emphasize the role of human agency, with the analysis centring on the strategic 
calculus made by individuals in order to maximize the attainment of their preferences 
within the context of an institutional structure.  Such an approach conflicts with the 
views of SIs who believe that a ‘logic of appropriateness’ dominates human decision-
making.  Beyond arguments about the primacy of a habitual logic of action, some SIs 
have focused on the cognitive limits which restrict human capacity to make strategic 
calculations and lead to reliance on decision-making shortcuts, and others have 
challenged the very notion of human rationality.  For example, the well-known 
‘garbage can’ model of organizational decision-making suggests that problems and 
solutions may not be connected by a clear causal link, but instead meet at random 
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(Immergut, 1998, p. 15).  Many HIs do not object in principle to the conception of 
actors as strategic calculators; they have been willing to make use of both ‘calculus’ 
and ‘cultural’ models of agency in their arguments as needs require (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 939; Steinmo, 2008, p. 163).  However, HIs have criticized RCIs’ 
characterization of actors’ preferences.  HIs have argued against the assumption of a 
universal rational egoist whose preferences are fixed and exogenous to institutions.  In 
contrast, HIs argue that preferences are formed within an institutional context which 
helps give them shape (Koelble, 1995, p. 232; Thelen, 1999, p. 375). 
Ostrom (2005, pp. 99-133) considers the significant challenge of how to 
model human agency for the purposes of institutional analysis in some depth, bridging 
the gap between these different perspectives on agency to some extent in the process.  
As discussed above, the IAD framework does not require the assumption of a 
universal rational egoist.  In fact, Ostrom’s assessment of the evidence indicates that 
the model of the rational egoist is only effective at predicting human behaviour in 
competitive market settings.  She points to the abundance of experimental evidence 
(such as that described in section 2.1) that participants in games posing social 
dilemmas do not behave like rational egoists; they value actions and outcomes for 
reasons other than the material net benefits they generate.  She explains this deviation 
from the rational egoist model using the language of norms. While Ostrom suggests 
that humans have an innate capacity to learn norms, she indicates that they are 
socially transmitted.  She proposes that norms lead to the formation of intrinsic 
preferences about how participants behave and how they wish others to behave.  This 
leads them to assign positive or negative values to actions and outcomes based on the 
emotional responses they evoke. 
By underlining the relationship between norms and preferences, Ostrom 
acknowledges that preferences are context dependent.  This implies a feedback loop 
between institutions and preferences, as institutions will inevitably have an effect on 
norms.  However, when analyzing a particular action situation (particularly in a 
predictive mode), Ostrom finds it important to treat participants’ preferences as fixed 
and exogenous to the action situation for the sake of analytical clarity.  Thus Ostrom 
recognizes that preferences are context dependent, but the IAD framework is not 
designed to model preference formation.  Ostrom’s conception of norms also provides 
one means of closing the gap between the ‘logic of consequences’ privileged by most 
RCIs and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ privileged by some SIs.  Ostrom suggests that 
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norms about appropriate behaviour influence preferences and therefore feed into a 
strategic calculation about how to behave.  However, this is unlikely to be satisfactory 
to analysts who see behaviour as having a more taken-for-granted quality. 
Ostrom’s focus on strategic behaviour does not imply that human beings are 
perfect calculating machines.  Like some SI colleagues, she is persuaded by cognitive 
research which indicates that individuals often rely on heuristics to make decisions 
rather than performing a complex calculation to maximize net benefits received.  She 
also emphasizes the role played by mental models which draw on culture in shaping 
participants’ perception of an action situation, including their expectations of how 
others are likely to behave.  However, unlike some SI colleagues, she sees these 
mental models as relatively malleable, arguing that they are likely to be revised 
through information search and experimentation with different strategies if the 
outcomes they deliver are unsatisfactory to participants. 
In sum, Ostrom advocates for a complex model of human agency, which 
allows for varied preferences influenced by norms and a diversity of decision-making 
processes.  This approach addresses some of the main criticisms levied by HIs and 
SIs, but it leaves some key tensions unresolved, including the question of how 
institutions shape preferences and the appropriate treatment of habitual behaviour.  It 
also remains challenging to specify a complex model of agency when carrying out 
analysis with the IAD framework, leaving analysts dependent on general assumptions 
such as bounded rationality in some instances. 
iv) Institutional change 
This study is not centrally concerned with questions of institutional change.  
My focus is on a spatial comparison of the performance of four sets of institutional 
arrangements in 2009, rather that the origins of those arrangements and the process 
through which they developed over time.  However, my purpose in comparing 
examples of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods provision is to see what they 
might teach us about strategies for addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra 
Leone.  Some grounding in theories of institutional change is therefore helpful in 
order to think through the policy implications of the findings.  In particular, I am 
interested in what institutional theory suggests about the possibilities of deliberate 
interventions to reform institutions. 
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RCI scholarship has been criticized for failing to provide a persuasive theory 
of institutional change; a difficulty that many RCI scholars acknowledge (Bates, 
1998; Greif & Laitin, 2004; Greif, 2006; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011) and one that is 
shared by other forms of institutionalism.50  In conceiving of institutions as equilibria, 
RCIs face theoretical difficulties in explaining how and why one equilibrium breaks 
down and another establishes itself (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 953; Thelen, 1999, p. 
381; Steinmo, 2001; Greif, 2006, p. 159).  Sven Steinmo (2001), drawing on the work 
of Shepsle (1986), summarizes the problem as one of uncertainty acting as a barrier to 
change; he writes, “People are afraid of changing the rules because it is difficult to 
know what will happen after the rules are changed”.  Avner Greif (2006, p. 159) 
argues that conceiving of institutions as an equilibrium phenomenon appears to negate 
the possibility of endogenous change.  To elaborate, in the context of an equilibrium, 
each player’s behaviour is a best response, given their expectations about how others 
will behave.  As such, it would appear that the stimulus for change must come from 
exogenous sources as otherwise nobody has any incentive to deviate from the 
institutionalized behaviour. 
For Ostrom (2005, pp. 243-251), institutional change is change in a complex 
nested hierarchy of rules.  As discussed, she identifies three levels of rules—
operational, collective choice and constitutional; the scope for change in the rules at 
one level is constrained by the rules set at a higher level.  She suggests that 
institutional change proceeds through a strategic process whereby a “minimum 
coalition” of participants in an action situation must find that the benefits of change 
outweigh the costs; uncertainty and cognitive limitations mean that they may well be 
wrong and the rule change will result in unintended outcomes.  Ostrom and Basurto 
(2011) set out a broad range of mechanisms through which institutional change can 
occur, both deliberate and unconscious.  Among the deliberate mechanisms identified 
are imitation of perceived successes; external interventions (such as aid 
                                                
50 Hall (2009) suggests that a general problem faced by all three institutionalisms is that theories 
focused on institutional persistence tend to emphasize the robustness of institutions rather than their 
malleability.  In general, HIs are able to provide strong and nuanced accounts of change for particular 
institutions, but have failed to develop more generalized theories (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 954-955; 
Steinmo, 2008, pp. 167-174), although recent work by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2009) 
represents a notable exception.  SI approaches enable theorists to explain why particular institutional 
forms might be chosen for reasons such as their interpretive resonance and legitimacy, but is less 
effective at describing the role of competition and conflict in institutional change (Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
pp. 953-954). 
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interventions); responses to changes in the biophysical environment; competition; and 
conflict over the meaning of rules.  Unconscious mechanisms identified include 
cognitive dissonance; technological change; and non-enforcement of rules, all of 
which can erode rule systems.  Their list therefore allows for both endogenous and 
exogenous processes of change, but they do not specify how the proposed 
mechanisms work. 
While Ostrom and Basurto (2011) identify a wide range of mechanisms of 
change, their extensive research into institutions for managing common pool 
resources has persuaded them that some mechanisms are more likely to result in 
successful institutional outcomes than others.  When it comes to deliberate processes 
of change, they favour a locally driven process of “trial and error”, or “tinkering”.  
This is a common theme of Ostrom’s work (1990, pp. 182-216; 2005, pp. 217-254) 
and is based principally on the argument that institutions are complex systems of rules 
which interact with changing social and physical environments.  Given this, it is 
simply not possible for public officials and other reformers to conduct analysis that 
will yield the “perfect set of rules” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 254).  While external expertise 
can still play an important role in undertaking more finite analytical projects, its 
importance is likely to be secondary to the expertise accumulated by those who have 
long been engaged in refining and following a particular system of rules, and thus a 
gradual, adaptive approach which builds on their knowledge base is likely to achieve 
greater success.  While Ostrom and Basurto (2011, p. 337) freely acknowledge that 
such a process will not necessarily lead to effective institutions, they see the external 
imposition of “a uniform set of formal rules” as a dangerous move which will not 
yield the level of variety needed for adaptive learning to take place. 
Greif (2006, pp. 158-186) provides a fuller theory of institutional change 
which explicitly addresses the question of how endogenous institutional change can 
occur in the context of an institutional equilibrium.51  When an equilibrium exists, an 
institution can be described as self-enforcing: “each individual, taking the structure as 
given, finds it best to follow the institutionalized behavior that, in turn, reproduces the 
institution” (p. 16).  Greif argues that endogenous change occurs when self-enforcing 
institutions lead to outcomes which modify key exogenous variables that affect the 
motivation of actors.  When this causal link between institutional outcomes and key 
                                                
51 Greif’s work has been used by the APPP Local Governance strand elsewhere (Booth, 2010). 
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exogenous variables increases the range of situations in which the institution is self-
enforcing, institutional reinforcement occurs.  Conversely, when this link reduces the 
range of situations in which the institution is self-enforcing, institutional erosion 
occurs. 
Greif (pp. 169-170) identifies a range of different patterns of institutional 
change, depending on whether the changes to key exogenous variables and their 
significance are recognized.  He argues that when these changes are not widely 
recognized, it is more likely that institutional change will occur as a result of 
experimentation and risk-taking.  When these changes are recognized after they have 
already progressed substantially, they can result in sudden institutional change.  
Finally when these changes are recognized as they occur, decision-makers are likely 
to lead deliberate processes of institutional reform to reinforce failing institutions.  
Greif (2006, pp. 187-199) argues that deliberate processes of reform to tackle the 
weaknesses of failing institutions more commonly follow a gradual process which 
requires “marginally altering their elements or adding new ones to render them self-
enforcing” (p. 195).  Greif suggests that this gradual approach is not only more 
common than a radical overhaul, but more likely to be successful because institutional 
elements with historical standing perform better than newer alternatives. 
He defines institutions more broadly than Ostrom as “rules, beliefs, norms and 
organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behaviour” (p. 30).52  At 
the root of the “fundamental asymmetry” between old and new institutional elements 
is the fact that such elements are attributes of individuals as well as institutions; they 
“reside in individuals’ memories, constitute their cognitive models, are embodied in 
their preferences…; they are what individuals bring with them when they face new 
situations” (p. 188).  As such, they are the default that individuals draw on when 
attempting to establish the “micro-foundations of behaviour”, for example “a 
cognitive framework, information, normative guidance, and a way to anticipate what 
others may do to coordinate their behaviour with their responses” (p. 190).  Although 
newer, alternative institutional elements can also inform and guide behaviour in this 
way, introducing them is likely to be both costly and difficult.  In particular, it 
requires altering individuals’ internalized beliefs, including their beliefs about how 
others are likely to behave.  Achieving this is no mean feat—Greif suggests that 
                                                
52 Although Ostrom’s IAD framework also specifies a role for beliefs, norms and organizations. 
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“bargaining, coordination, search, and learning costs” would be involved; change 
would take time; and its outcomes would be uncertain (p. 190). 
The debate on institutional change is both complex and relatively immature 
(Thelen, 1999; Hall, 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011).  The 
contributions discussed indicate that scholars working in an RCI tradition recognize 
both exogenous and endogenous sources of change, and are making progress in 
theorizing the latter.  From the point of view of deliberate interventions to reform 
institutions, Ostrom and Greif both lend their support to a gradual approach to reform 
which recognizes the value of local experience and longstanding institutions.  In light 
of their contributions, the wholesale import of institutions implied by ‘good 
governance’ looks highly problematic. 
2.3 Coproduction and its critics 
I adopted the concept of coproduction as an analytical lens for this study 
because it provides valuable insight into the four cases of LGA-led public goods 
provision that I investigated, all of which relied on substantial (subject-)citizen inputs.  
In particular, I find Joshi and Moore’s (2004) account of coproduction helpful in 
making sense of these cases.  As discussed in chapter one, I draw on their work to 
define coproduction as the provision of public goods through a regular long-term 
relationship between government and citizens, where both make substantial resource 
contributions.  Aside from the cases discussed in this study, many other arrangements 
for local public goods provision that I observed in Makeni were examples of 
coproduction.  Olivier de Sardan (2011, p. 29) proposes that “co-delivery of a good or 
service by actors belonging to a number of different modes” 53  is the norm in West 
Africa (although only those examples which involve cooperation between government 
and citizens constitute coproduction, according to my definition).  Coproduction 
therefore appears to be a widespread phenomenon, worthy of attention. 
The concept of coproduction was developed in the context of debate about 
urban service provision in the United States (US) during the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  At the time, local governments were under intense pressure due to a 
combination of federal budget cuts, declining local tax revenues linked to citizen 
resistance to taxation, poor economic performance and dwindling urban populations 
                                                
53 The modes Olivier de Sardan discusses are: chiefly, associational, municipal, project-based, 
bureaucratic, sponsorship-based and religious and merchant. 
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(Palmer & Sawhill, 1982; Ahlbrandt & Sumka, 1983; Levine & Fisher, 1984; 
Brudney, 1985).  Following President Reagan’s victory in 1981, ideas about down-
sizing the state and reducing government spending on public services came to the fore 
(Palmer & Sawhill, 1982).  Given this backdrop, coproduction was viewed by many 
theorists as a strategy that could help urban governments make savings on service 
delivery.  For example, Richard Rich (1981, p. 62) describes savings from 
coproduction as a “substantial boon to the city budget”; Charles Levine and Glenn 
Fisher (1984, p. 186) talk about coproduction as a “powerful tool for resolving fiscal 
stress”; and Roger Ahlbrandt and Howard Sumka (1983, p. 219) argue that “[a]s city 
budgets become tighter…residents will find themselves having to participate more 
and more to sustain adequate levels of service”.  This framing of coproduction 
positions citizens as a resource to be taken advantage of by city governments in order 
to deliver savings. 
However, in this literature, coproduction is viewed as far more than a 
straightforward cost-cutting measure.  Researchers also emphasize other substantial 
benefits associated with coproduction, including higher quality service delivery and a 
revitalized culture of citizenship.  One of the main insights of the coproduction 
literature is the importance of citizen contributions in the context of people-centred 
services, such as education and health, where transformation of human beings is the 
main aim.  These services rely on interdependent contributions—neither governments 
nor coproducing citizens can produce them alone (Parks, et al., 1981).  Ostrom and 
Vincent Ostrom (1977) argue that appropriate engagement with and support of citizen 
coproducers in the context of such services is essential to achieving a high quality of 
provision.  They write (p. 93): 
Without the intelligent and motivated efforts of service users, the service may 
deteriorate into an indifferent product with insignificant value…When 
professional people presume to know what is good for people rather than 
providing people with opportunities to express their own preferences, we 
should not be surprised to find that increasing professionalization of public 
services is accompanied by a serious erosion in the quality of those services. 
Gordon Whitaker (1980, p. 246) finds that Americans “have been misled into an over-
reliance on service agents and bureaucratic organization of human services”.  When 
government actors recognize their reliance on citizen coproducers, he argues, they are 
able to act in accordance with the limitations and the opportunities this relationship 
entails, achieving a better quality service. 
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As regards the effects on citizenship, Elaine Sharp (1980, p. 114) argues that 
coproduction offers a valuable alternative to a conflictual citizen-government 
relationship vis-à-vis public services, in which citizens simply “demand, consume and 
judge”.  She argues that this conflictual model sets public officials on the defensive 
and ultimately leaves those citizens who make the effort to engage with government 
disillusioned.  In contrast, she finds (pp. 109-110, 114-115) that the model of joint 
responsibility represented by coproduction enables public officials to engage with and 
invest in citizens more freely and creates opportunities for citizens to learn about 
public service provision and develop new competencies.  Levine and Fisher (1984) 
make a similar argument, proposing that coproduction is one of the few cost-cutting 
strategies that could also address the crisis of public confidence in local government 
indicated by citizen resistance to taxation.  They argue that unlike popular cost-cutting 
measures such as privatization of public services or interventions to improve 
operating productivity, coproduction recognizes citizens as integral to public service 
provision and brings citizens and public officials into daily interaction with one 
another.  In their view (p. 181), this provides a platform for citizens to “build both 
competence and a broader perspective, a vision of the community and of what it can 
and should become”.  These authors suggest that coproduction offers a more 
expansive role for citizens—rather than critical consumers of public services, they 
become active producers, with opportunities to learn, develop and shape their political 
communities. 
The US debate on coproduction died down by the mid-1980s, as coproduction 
lost out to marketization as a means of delivering public services at lower cost; 
privatization and contracting out strategies were adopted by governments around the 
world, managerialist approaches became dominant, and academic and policy interest 
in coproduction dwindled (Alford, 1998, 2009).  However, coproduction has 
experienced something of a revival in European and North American policy literature 
in the late 1990s and 2000s (Alford, 1998; Bovaird, 2007; Alford, 2009; Pestoff & 
Brandsen, 2009; Verschuere, Brandsen, & Pestoff, 2012).  John Alford (2009, pp. 4-
9) argues that this can be explained by the emergence of ‘Third Way’ public service 
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reformers in the US and the UK, who were interested in bringing ‘community’ back 
in alongside market-based solutions.54 
The focus of this thesis is on coproduction in the context of debates about 
international development.  Overall, coproduction has received relatively little 
attention in this field; indeed, one of Joshi and Moore’s (2004) key arguments is that 
coproductive arrangements have gone unrecognized because of low levels of 
awareness of the concept.  The 1980s were dominated by the direct introduction of 
market-oriented strategies for public goods provision in developing countries, usually 
under the auspices of IFIs and donor agencies (Larbi, 2006, p. 25).  However, by the 
1990s evidence had accumulated that market-based solutions were insufficient for 
development, and there was renewed interest in the role of state-society engagement 
in achieving developmental outcomes.  Peter Evans (1996b; 1996a) and Ostrom 
(1996) examine coproduction in the context of a broader exploration of state-society 
synergy—a virtuous circle in which citizen engagement strengthens government 
institutions, which in turn provides an enabling environment for citizen engagement 
(Evans, 1996b, p. 1034).  They take a generally optimistic view, emphasizing 
coproduction’s potential to improve public goods outcomes and the quality of 
governance, while acknowledging that this potential may go unrealized. 
Ostrom (1996) argues that the potential for state-society synergy is only 
present when citizen and government inputs into coproduction of a good are 
interdependent, rather than substitutable.55  When inputs into coproduction of a good 
can be made by either citizens or government, they are substitutable.  For example, 
citizens can take their waste to central collection points for pick-up, or government 
officials can collect it from their residences.  According to Ostrom, the key question 
in the case of substitutable inputs is whether the wage rate paid to government 
officials is higher than the opportunity cost to citizens; if this condition holds then 
there are efficiency gains to be made by maximizing citizen inputs, as long as citizens 
are motivated to perform.  When some combination of inputs from citizens and 
                                                
54 In the UK, coproduction is currently being discussed in the context of the Coalition’s ‘Big Society’ 
agenda which aims “to give citizens, communities and local government the power and information 
they need to come together, solve the problems they face and build the Britain they want” (Cabinet 
Office, 2012).  However, it has tended to be left-wing think tanks which have promoted the idea of 
coproduction as a means of achieving greater citizen participation in government (New Economics 
Foundation, 2008; Muir, 2010), even as many on the left have criticized the ‘Big Society’ agenda 
overall as merely a cover for deep cuts in social spending. 
55 Ostrom was one of the co-authors of Parks et al (1981); this argument builds on that earlier work. 
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government is required for production of a good, they are interdependent.  For 
example, government officials cannot educate students or improve patients’ health 
without their active cooperation.  In the case of interdependent inputs into 
coproduction, the potential for synergy lies in the possibility that government and 
citizens will influence each other’s behaviour in a positive direction, encouraging 
greater mutual effectiveness.  Ostrom argues that deliberate government efforts to 
engage citizens in a participatory fashion can help to elicit such synergy.  She 
compares two cases—a highly successful water and sanitation initiative in peri-urban 
Brazil and poorly performing primary schools in Nigeria.  In the Brazilian case, the 
municipal government encourages extremely high levels of citizen participation in 
design and maintenance of a condominial sewerage system, while in the Nigerian 
case, central government’s top-down control of education and wild fluctuations in 
education policy disempower teachers and parents, discouraging their contributions. 
Evans argues that synergetic coproduction is usually dependent on two 
features: complementarity and embeddedness.  Complementarity exists when there is 
a clear division of labour between public and private institutions based on their 
particular attributes, and embeddedness describes the ties, often informal in nature, 
that connect citizens and public officials across the public-private divide (1996a, p. 
1120).  Complementarity is clearly present in the case of coproduction based on 
interdependent inputs by local government and citizens.  However, Evans argues that 
the full potential of this complementarity can only be realized in cases where 
embeddedness is also present.  Evans sees embeddedness at work in the successful 
case of coproduction described by Ostrom (1996), as well as in Wai Fung Lam’s 
(1996) study of coproduction in the irrigation sector and Tendler’s (1997) study of a 
coproductive health campaign in Brazil. 
Both Ostrom and Evans draw links between coproduction and social capital, 
suggesting that state-society synergy established in the context of coproduction can 
contribute to state-society synergy more broadly.56  Evans argues that the production 
of social capital is not limited to the societal sphere; the ties across the public-private 
divide that constitute embeddedness also draw upon and contribute to a stock of social 
capital.  Ostrom notes (p. 1083) that social capital developed through coproduction 
                                                
56 Robert Putnam (1993, p. 167) defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. 
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can ‘spill over’ to other areas of action, enhancing citizens’ capability to seek an 
active role in improving the quality of other goods.  More recently, Tsai (2011) has 
argued that social capital generated through coproduction can ‘spill over’ in a 
direction favoured by local officials, by encouraging greater citizen willingness to 
follow state policies.  However, not all forms of social capital are developmental.  In 
earlier work, Evans (1995) argues that embeddedness is only developmental when a 
state has achieved a threshold level of corporate coherence which renders it 
autonomous.  In predatory states, Evans argues, embeddedness is likely to result in 
capture of the state by private interests. 
Despite these important contributions to the debate in the 1990s, coproduction 
did not become a widely used concept in the literature looking at state-society 
engagement vis-à-vis public goods provision; over time, this discussion became 
largely dominated by the narrower issue of formal partnerships between non-state 
actors (most commonly NGOs) and governments to deliver goods (Robinson & 
White, 1998; White & Robinson, 1998; Batley, 2006; Batley & McLoughlin, 2010).  
In the 2000s, Joshi and Moore and colleagues (Joshi & Ayee, 2002; Masud, 2002; 
Joshi & Moore, 2004) revived the concept of coproduction because they felt it 
captured a modality of public goods provision which was distinct from the range of 
approaches recognized by the aid establishment.57 
Joshi and Moore (2004) take a far less optimistic view than Ostrom (1996) and 
Evans (1996a)—for them, coproduction is more a survival strategy to maintain a basic 
supply of public goods in states where authority and public finances are weak than a 
desirable approach which can improve the quality of public goods provision.  They 
identify two sets of drivers of coproduction, both “variants of the imperfection or 
incompleteness of states” (p. 41).  The first set of drivers discussed are “governance 
drivers”, declining levels of state-led public goods provision which result in an 
adaptive response by citizens to retain access to much-needed public goods.  When 
the quantity and quality of goods and services declines, “organized groups of citizens 
with something at stake move in to help shore them up” (p. 41).  The second set of 
drivers discussed are “logistical drivers", environmental factors such as complexity or 
                                                
57 They argue (p. 34) that the standard classification of approaches to public goods provision includes: 
a) collective action independent of state agencies, b) direct provision through private associations, c) 
direct market provision on a for-profit basis, d) direct provision through state agencies and e) indirect 
state provision through sub-contracting to other agencies. 
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variation in the physical environment or difficulties in accessing poor households in 
rural areas which lead citizens to organize at the local level and link up with 
government actors to ensure access to services.  I find this a more fuzzy category, as it 
is clear that the degree of logistical challenge that the state can manage without 
citizen support depends to a high degree on state capacity (a theoretical overlap that 
Joshi and Moore acknowledge).  Joshi and Moore include coproduction driven by 
citizen control of key resources needed for provision of the good (whether 
information, personnel or public authority) within this category; it therefore seems to 
subsume the concept of interdependent coproduction identified by other theorists. 
To an extent, Joshi and Moore’s account resonates with 1980s work on 
coproduction as a response to fiscal crisis in urban settings in the US.  However, 
rather than planned policy interventions to reduce public spending, the examples of 
coproduction they describe tend to be ad hoc adaptations to scarcity as governments 
and coproducing citizens struggle to maintain an adequate supply of public goods.  In 
keeping with their more modest approach, Joshi and Moore do not claim that 
coproduction implies state-society synergy, nor that it generates developmental social 
capital with broader applicability.  In contrast to Ostrom and Evans, Joshi and Moore 
view the embeddedness which underpins coproduction with some anxiety.  Although 
they consider the Weberian model of statehood critically, they ultimately accept its 
value as an ideal template.  For them, embeddedness implies the blurring of public 
and private power, resources and authority in a murky fashion that undermines clear 
lines of accountability.  
Like Evans (1996a) and Ostrom (1996), Diana Mitlin (2008) and John 
Ackerman (2004) are less concerned about the preservation of a Weberian model of 
statehood; instead, they see positive value in the penetration of the state by organized 
groups of citizens.  Mitlin describes the efforts of grassroots slum-dwellers 
associations to improve the quality of housing and services available in informal 
settlements through  “self-organized co-production”: taking on responsibility for 
securing land for new housing; constructing housing; and providing some components 
of sanitation services, sometimes without state consent.  She argues that the daily, 
practical engagement in public goods provision implied by coproduction provides a 
better platform for influencing the state than oppositional accountability-seeking 
practices, leading to gradually expanding grassroots influence over policy.  In her 
view, engagement on a more practical level can avoid a defensive reaction by the 
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state; build positive linkages between public officials and grassroots organization; 
improve the skills and capacities of members of grassroots organizations; encourage 
greater participation by disadvantaged members of grassroots organizations; and 
enable the design of systems of public goods provision to be grounded in local 
experience.58  Ackerman focuses on “co-governance for accountability”—the joint 
involvement of citizens and public officials in oversight activities and other core 
government functions.  His examples include state-society collaboration to generate 
city budgets in Brazil; organize federal elections in Mexico; govern schools in 
Chicago; and audit public expenditure in India.  He considers the direct involvement 
of citizens in the core functions of the state as far more effective than recognized 
vertical and horizontal mechanisms of accountability and argues for the formal 
institutionalization of co-governance strategies by governments.  These accounts do 
not provide a particularly persuasive rebuttal of Joshi and Moore’s concerns, 
however, because they both rely on an implicit assumption that coproducing citizens 
act in the public interest.  There is a gap in both accounts regarding how citizens with 
governmental responsibilities can be held accountable by citizens more broadly. 
Alongside these studies, a body of literature has emerged which is intensely 
critical of public goods provision reliant on citizens’ unpaid or low paid labour 
(Miraftab, 2004; Zerah, 2009; Samson, 2010; Boesten, Mdee, & Cleaver, 2011).59  
For these authors, such practices are associated with the hegemony of neoliberal ideas 
about statehood and result in exploitation and deepening inequality.  Their arguments 
resonate with David Harvey’s (2005) characterization of the neoliberal project as one 
intended to restore the power of elites.  He writes (Chapter 1, ‘Why the Neoliberal 
Turn?’, paras 9-1060): 
Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a 
persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the 
whole project…the evidence strongly suggests that the neoliberal turn is in 
some way and to some degree associated with the restoration of reconstruction 
of the power of economic elites. 
Following this logic, the package of decentralization, privatization and participation 
strategies promoted by the aid establishment and adopted by governments for local 
                                                
58 Mitlin’s account is therefore close to Sharp’s (1980) account of coproduction as a means of 
achieving enhanced citizenship. 
59 I thank Kate Meagher for pointing me to this body of work. 
60 A Kindle copy of the book was used and thus I provide a paragraph number rather than a page 
number. 
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public goods provision are considered by these authors to be aimed at keeping costs 
low rather than improving the quality of public goods provision or democracy, while 
the elite bias built into these policies means that their effects on inequality are 
overlooked or met with relative indifference by those implementing them. 
One key argument made by some of these authors is that the discourse of 
participation and empowerment is deployed strategically to justify deep cuts in public 
spending on public goods provision.  Faranak Miraftab (2004) argues that the linked 
concepts of community participation, social capital and empowerment have on the 
one hand been depoliticized by the development industry by treating them in isolation 
from community power structures, and on the other hand have been used as a 
rationale for a very political reorganization of public goods provision.  In her view (p. 
239), the outcome is one of “symbolic inclusion…and…material exclusion”.  Marie-
Hélène Zérah (2009, p. 856) makes a similar argument that the discourse of 
participation has been “co-opted” by neoliberalism, short-circuiting more radical 
forms of opposition.  She finds that the neoliberal logic of participation shifts 
additional responsibility to the individual, requiring each one to “live his/her life in an 
‘entrepreneurial form’”; this conception of participation furthers the aims of those 
seeking the withdrawal of the state from direct provision of public goods. 
Miraftab (2004) describes how the dynamics of symbolic inclusion/material 
exclusion manifested in the context of new waste collection schemes in black 
townships and informal settlements in Cape Town based on privatization and 
community-based participation strategies.  Some schemes utilized a ‘contracting-out’ 
approach, which involved private providers recruiting unemployed community 
members as labourers.  One scheme targeted unemployed women in particular, while 
another involved the recruitment of community entrepreneurs to oversee labourers; 
entrepreneurs were given a fixed budget for all operating costs and retained any 
unspent portion for themselves.  Another scheme was based on a ‘volunteer’ 
approach—groups of women were encouraged by local councillors to sweep the 
streets and collect trash on an unpaid basis.  Public officials argued that these schemes 
empowered black communities by providing capacity building opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and employment opportunities for labourers.  In addition, those 
schemes specifically targeting women, whether on short-term contracts or as 
volunteers, were described as achieving gender empowerment, as women were 
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considered to be developing marketable skills that could aid them in finding future 
employment. 
Miraftab (p. 251) argues that, on the contrary, the schemes reinscribed and 
expanded the scope of racial, class and gender inequality in Cape Town.  The 
schemes were purportedly designed to extend waste collection services to poor, black 
neighbourhoods, but in Miraftab’s view did so only on the condition that residents of 
these areas made investments of their own unpaid or low paid labour, while residents 
of wealthier, predominantly white neighbourhoods received curbside collection of 
waste as a “citizen’s entitlement” (p. 252).  She finds the empowerment of black 
entrepreneurs to be a narrow form of economic empowerment ultimately dependent 
on the exploitation of labourers, which does nothing to challenge the collective 
disadvantage faced by residents of black townships.  In addition, she finds the terms 
of employment for labourers highly unfavourable.  Paid labourers received wages 
substantially lower than the standard municipal rate.  The scheme targeting women 
paid a particularly low rate of wages and recruited workers on the basis of one-year 
non-renewable contracts.  However, on completion of these contracts they were not 
able to find further employment and refused to leave their positions, leading to a clash 
with volunteer women expecting to replace them.  She argues that far from 
empowering women, these schemes were based on patriarchal gender ideologies 
about the low cost and easy availability of women’s labour, and their suitability to 
cleaning work, which extends their housekeeping role from the domestic to the 
municipal level. 
Melanie Samson’s (2010) analysis of the waste management sector in 
Johannesburg extends this discussion.  Samson argues that it is the specific 
associations forged between spaces and subjects in the context of racialized gender 
ideologies that enables the recruitment of unpaid female volunteers for street 
cleaning.  She compares the situation of male street cleaners in formerly white 
business districts in the employ of an initiative funded by local businesses to that of 
female street cleaners in townships working on short-term contracts or as volunteers.  
While street cleaning in Johannesburg has developed an identity as a feminized area 
of work over recent decades, male street cleaners were preferred in business districts 
to give the illusion of additional security.  In contrast, the association between women 
and unpaid or low paid street cleaning work was reinforced in townships through 
recruitment strategies for poverty alleviation and volunteer programmes.  Samson 
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argues that female volunteers were persuaded to take on these roles by gender 
discourse which framed their street cleaning work as protective of their children and 
political discourse which framed it as a means of demonstrating revolutionary 
commitment to the African National Congress (ANC) party, as well as more 
instrumental motivations to secure future employment. 
Zérah (2009, pp. 872-873) also discusses the potential for exploitation of 
labour in the context of participatory development schemes in Mumbai, but places 
greater emphasis on the way in which such schemes result in a power shift towards 
the middle and upper classes.  For example, Zérah describes a coproductive 
programme for waste management based on partnership between street or building-
level associations and the municipality which has resulted in improved cleanliness 
and has enabled members of these associations to acquire greater influence in local 
decision-making.  However, the leadership of these associations is largely drawn from 
an elite strata of society and their political vision consists of a “modern, clean and 
efficient city cleared of hawkers, shanties, encroachment of public space and overall 
‘chaos’” (p. 867); Zérah therefore concludes that this form of coproduction 
contributes to a trend of ‘peripherization’ of the poor.  Boesten et al (2011, pp. 53-54) 
discuss a related issue of elite domination in the ranks of community-based workers 
(CBWs) commonly serving on a voluntary or low paid basis in the context of 
participatory programmes, resulting in some instances in elite monopolization of 
project resources intended for the community writ large. 
This literature plays an important role in highlighting the equality implications 
of coproduction of public goods.  There are three particularly significant dimensions 
brought out by these authors.  First, the uneven application of coproduction as an 
approach to public goods provision can imply a tiered system of citizenship, where 
certain categories of citizens receive public goods as a citizenship entitlement, while 
others are expected to make inputs of their own labour or other resources.  Second, 
and related, coproduction’s reliance on unpaid or low paid labour can lead to 
exploitation of vulnerable populations; in many instances, it is those occupying less 
favourable positions within a social hierarchy whom will be expected to make inputs 
of labour.  Their performance of this labour may ultimately reinforce their lower 
social status.  Third, coproduction can facilitate elite capture of the benefits of a 
particular good, or can provide an in-road for elite political influence which may 
undermine the interests of the poor. 
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These authors situate coproduction as continuous with other forms of 
privatization and driven by a common neoliberal logic.  This approach is valuable in 
highlighting that the failures of state capacity resulting in governance-driven 
coproduction in developing countries are linked to governance policies promoted by 
the aid industry as well as other factors such as poor economic performance and 
mismanagement of public resources.  It is also helpful in raising awareness of 
continuities between coproduction and related modalities of public goods provision, 
particularly as they unfold within specific contexts.  However, by characterizing 
coproduction as a form of privatization, these authors obscure some of its distinctive 
features.  Coproduction is about joint provision of public goods by public officials 
and citizens.  This is distinct from a market-based strategy like contracting out to a 
private provider which relies on low paid or voluntary inputs of labour.  The latter 
does not provide for direct interaction between public officials and citizens which are 
credited by advocates of coproduction as the basis for state-society synergy.  In 
addition, contracting out represents a deliberate policy decision to formally delegate 
responsibility for provision or production of a particular good to a private agent, 
leading directly to a leaner state.  In contrast, coproduction often leaves formal 
responsibility with the state while informal dependencies on citizens develop 
organically and as a result of citizen-led as well as state-led action; these 
dependencies may not be recognized officially and are likely to be easier to reverse 
should the revenue position of the state improve. 
This literature is ultimately performing a critique of what it perceives as the 
global dominance of a neoliberal ideology about the role of the state aligned with a 
system of capitalism and complicit with structures of patriarchy and racism.  Given 
this broader agenda, this literature has a tendency to generate heavy expectations of 
processes of public goods provision to deliver radical social transformation.  The 
unspoken implication of this literature seems to be that only a strong, well-resourced 
state committed to egalitarian social transformation can provide public goods 
appropriately; this leaves an unresolved question about the best course of action in the 
absence of such a state.  Given the lack of adequate public goods available in many 
developing countries, the value Joshi and Moore accord to arrangements—even if not 
ideal—that can deliver at least some modicum of goods in the context of scarcity does 
not look out of place.  As such arrangements often work through existing institutions, 
it seems unsurprising that they often sustain hierarchies rather than transform them.  
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The goods generated through such arrangements may not benefit all citizens equally 
in all instances, while still improving life for the poorest citizens some of the time.  
Given this tension, coproductive arrangements require scrutiny; they raise questions 
about which trade-offs are acceptable in the short- to medium-term to maintain a 
supply of public goods and about what the long-term implications of making such 
trade-offs will be.  However, it seems premature to disregard them outright. 
Concluding comments 
In this chapter, I have set out the institutionally-oriented analytical framework 
that I will be applying in chapters five and six and reviewed key literatures that 
inform this framework.  In doing so, I have established some of the themes to be 
revisited later in the study.  In chapter seven, I compare the cases of coproduction 
presented in preceding chapters and discuss their collective relevance.  I consider how 
these cases fit with existing theories of coproduction and what they suggest about the 
implications of coproduction for the quantity and quality of public goods, the quality 
of governance more broadly and equality.  I reflect on the model of agency implied by 
my case study narratives, taking into account SI and HI critiques of an RCI model of 
agency.  And in the final chapter, I reflect on the value of coproduction as a means of 
addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Local Government in Sierra Leone 
Local councils and chiefs are the principal local government actors (LGAs) in 
post-war Sierra Leone.  They make up two layers of government which are 
conceptually distinct but in practice overlap, and their fate is in many ways inter-
linked.  In this chapter, I situate these LGAs in political and historical context, paying 
attention to the connections between them.  I begin by describing the processes of 
post-war reform of local government underway in Sierra Leone and some of the 
different interests at stake in them.  I then look at selected historical episodes in the 
development of local government over the course of the last century which deepen 
our understanding of the post-war scenario.  Finally, I provide an overview of the 
current academic debate about local government in Sierra Leone, which I revisit in 
the concluding chapter of this study. 
3.1 Post-war reform 
In the post-war flurry to understand the causes of the civil war, failures of 
chiefly governance and the withdrawal of the central state from the provision of 
public goods were identified as significant drivers of conflict (Richards, 1996; 
Fanthorpe, 2001; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004b), 
energizing donors to collectively throw their support behind a democratic 
decentralization programme.  While the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) 
government formally embraced decentralization, there is little research which 
explores its motives in doing so.  Given the extent of Sierra Leone’s dependence on 
donor funding, there were certainly incentives “to ‘say the right things’ to external 
donors” (Jackson, 2006, p. 102).  Daniel Esser (2012, p. 405) goes further, arguing 
that “[n]ot only were major political reforms…conceived by international agencies, 
but responsibilities ensuring that these reforms were put into practice were also 
divided among them”.  Following consultations in 2003, the Local Government (LG) 
Act (2004) was drafted and passed swiftly, ahead of local government elections in 
May.  DFID was one of the main supporters of democratic decentralization, yet in 
2000-02 had also funded a programme to restore paramount chiefs to their chiefdoms 
(Fanthorpe, Jay, & Kamara, 2002).  This engagement with ‘anti-democratic’ actors 
was unpopular with other members of the donor community (Fanthorpe, 2005, p. 34), 
and led one commentator to suggest that DFID was “helping to re-create the 
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conditions for war” (Hanlon, 2005).  Following the launch of the decentralization 
process, power struggles began to play out in the local government sphere between 
donors and central government; ministries and local councils; and local councils and 
chiefs. 
In 2009, tensions between donors and central government were evident in the 
context of the state architecture responsible for oversight of local councils.  The LG 
Act (2004) established the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Local Government and 
Decentralization (a committee of ministers and selected council chairpersons) to 
provide strategic leadership for the decentralization process, but among donors it was 
said that its performance had been lacklustre.61  Aside from these bodies, the Ministry 
of Local Government (MLG) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MOFED) were formally responsible for oversight of council operations 
and finances respectively.  However, in practice, donor-funded project units weakly 
integrated within these departments were providing the most direct guidance and 
oversight of local councils.  In MLG, there was a significant rift between the World 
Bank-funded Decentralization Secretariat (DecSec) (which occupied its own 
buildings) and the rest of the ministry.  DecSec had essentially staked out the territory 
around local councils—indeed, a World Bank representative that I spoke to justified 
its insulation from MLG on the grounds that this had allowed decentralization to 
advance more rapidly.  Deprived of control over a significant chunk of its portfolio, 
MLG maintained a tight grip over chieftaincy and was not particularly disposed to 
work cooperatively with the donor-funded decentralization architecture. 
The SLPP government accepted a relatively high degree of donor intrusion 
into the local government sphere during the early implementation of decentralization, 
but the APC government has since shown signs of re-asserting control over local 
councils.  When local councils were first established, MLG’s district offices closed 
their doors and MLG supervision was left to the provincial administration.62  
However, in mid-2010 MLG announced its intention to bring back district officers in 
a re-centralizing move enabled by powers set out in colonial era legislation 
(Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 14).  In its public response, the opposition SLPP (2010) 
                                                
61 Other governing bodies established by the Act include the Local Government Service Commission 
(responsible for oversight of human resources) and the Local Government Finance Committee 
(responsible for the formula for grant allocations). 
62 This consists of the resident minister, the provincial secretary and supporting staff. 
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argued that this was a strategy to exert greater political control over opposition 
councils: 
The SLPP holds the position that the APC is disturbed by the fact that they do not 
have absolute control of all districts despite the fact they are in charge of central 
government. The APC is particularly disturbed by the fact that as a ruling party, 
they can only influence 10 out of 19 councils. 
Rather than being driven by partisan politics, Fanthorpe et al (2011, pp. 18, 21) 
suggest that this move was influenced by conservative forces within the civil service, 
emphasizing that councils from both sides of the political divide opposed the move. 
Ministries have flexed their muscles by resisting the devolution of powers to 
local councils.  Key areas of responsibility accorded to local councils by the LG Act 
(2004) include education up to mid-secondary level, primary health care, feeder 
roads, management of the rural water supply, land registration and coordination of 
mining licences.  A supporting statutory instrument set out 80 specific functions for 
devolution, but by mid-2009 only 37 had been transferred and, under donor pressure, 
MLG re-launched the devolution process (Decentralization Secretariat, 2009).  
Among the ministries and agencies most resistant to devolution were the Sierra Leone 
Roads Authority, the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of 
Education63; donors grumbled that ministerial resistance was largely attributable to 
reluctance to allow any disruption of established corrupt practices in these lucrative 
areas.  The devolution that has occurred appears to have taken a fairly superficial 
form—local councils approve district-level budgets for ministries, but do not exert 
real influence over their policies, and lack of payroll devolution in key sectors (for 
example, education) means that relationships with Freetown remain more important to 
officials than those with local councils (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 47). 
The SLPP government was careful never to cede control over chieftaincy to 
donors, and this strategy has been maintained by the APC.  The majority of legislation 
governing chiefly practice was first developed under colonial rule during the 1930s, 
and survived largely unchanged into the post-colonial period.  To date, the 
government has passed only one significant piece of post-war legislation addressing 
chieftaincy: the Chieftaincy Act (2009), which focuses on the election of paramount 
chiefs and maps closely onto existing practice.  Under the Chieftaincy Act (2009), 
paramount chiefs will continue to be elected for life from ruling houses (lineages 
                                                
63 In keeping with the approach used for MLG, the latter three are simplified names. 
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recognized by the colonial government as having an eligible claim) by an electoral 
college of chiefdom councillors under the supervision of MLG.  Efforts by reformist 
NGOs to lobby for the introduction of universal adult suffrage and to bring elections 
under the supervision of the National Electoral Commission (NEC)64 were 
unsuccessful (Bayoh, 2009; Civil Society Platform on the Chieftaincy Bill 2008, 
2009; Kamara, 2009).  Under sustained pressure from donors, the government later 
produced the Chiefdom and Tribal Administration Policy (2011), but this also largely 
preserves the status quo.  Notably it emphasizes the need to retain chiefdoms as “the 
basic unit of administration”, which provides a strong signal that councils are not 
expected to assume full administrative responsibility.  However, the policy does make 
one important concession to reformist pressures by setting out a commitment to hold a 
national debate on whether to introduce universal suffrage in chieftaincy elections and 
promising legislation before the end of 2014.  If this proceeds, it will be a substantial 
reform which will inevitably influence the way in which chiefs construct their bases 
of support. 
The introduction of the LG Act (2004) and the Chieftaincy Act (2009) without 
the repeal of colonial era legislation has resulted in some overlap in the roles and 
responsibilities accorded to councils and chiefs: both have responsibilities as regards 
development, tax collection, land, and environmental and public health, and both have 
the right to develop bye-laws.  However, the key point of contention between chiefs 
and elected councils is not their overlapping mandates, but access to resources.  Both 
rely on a combination of central support, mining revenue (where relevant) and 
locally-raised revenue.  Councils receive central grants based on a common formula 
which are ‘tied’ to specific categories of expenditure and remain highly dependent on 
donor backing.  According to the recently developed chiefdom policy (2011), the 
government will provide annual grants to the chiefdoms and cover the salaries of 
paramount chiefs and chiefdom police.  However, early post-war consultations with 
chiefs suggested that government grants had not been paid in years (Fanthorpe, et al., 
2002, p. 20), and those I spoke to in 2009 said that central transfers to chiefdoms were 
small and irregular.  The LG Act (2004) entitles councils to a precept paid from the 
local tax65 collected by chiefdoms.  In addition, councils are permitted to raise 
                                                
64 Although the Act does accord NEC a role alongside MLG in chieftaincy elections. 
65 A head tax of 5,000 Le (£0.95) levied on every adult over the age of 21. 
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revenue from licences, fees and charges, and property rates; however, in rural areas, 
much of this revenue is shared with chiefs (Fanthorpe, Sesay, Turay, & Koroma, 
2009, p. 46; Kargbo, 2009, p. 42; Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 57).  Moreover, local 
revenue collection is challenging in general, given a weak revenue base, popular 
resistance to taxation, poor information systems and limited resources for revenue 
collection.  I monitored three newspapers closely in 2009 and found no stories of 
violent confrontation between chiefs and councils over resources, but this underlying 
tension was raised in numerous discussions by those involved in local government 
over the course of my fieldwork. 
Donor commitment to decentralization makes it difficult for central 
government to formally resolve the ambiguities in revenue-sharing in chiefs’ favour.  
However, MLG has intervened in chiefs’ favour as regards the precept on local tax.  
Following the passage of the LG Act (2004), it was agreed that councils would 
receive 40 percent of the local tax revenue collected by the chiefdoms.  Yet in 2009, 
MLG permitted chiefs to retain the full amount of 2008 local tax revenue collected, 
on the grounds that they needed to pay a backlog of salaries.  Subsequently the 
precept was reduced to between 5 and 15 percent of local tax revenue, depending on 
chiefdom size (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 57).  A senior representative of MLG that I 
spoke to justified a reduced precept on the grounds that local councils should not have 
a right to transfers from both above (from central government) and below (from 
chiefs).  He also argued that local councils had delivered relatively little of note to the 
chiefdoms in the first four year of operations and thus had undermined people’s 
willingness to pay local taxes.  MLG’s willingness to go against the LG Act (2004) 
provides further evidence of central government’s strong support for chieftaincy. 
This brief account of post-war reform of local government is necessarily 
incomplete because it is based principally on my 2009 observations of an evolving 
political process.  However, it provides some insight into the multiplicity of interests 
at stake, the fault lines which underpin the upbeat donor narrative as regards 
decentralization and the inter-connections between local council and chiefdom 
governance.  The history of local government that I set out in the next section 
significantly enriches our understanding of the dynamics of post-war reform of local 
government in Sierra Leone by clarifying why chieftaincy enjoys such a high degree 
of central support and by exposing the historical baggage which the ‘new’ system of 
elected councils established under the decentralization process carries with it. 
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3.2 Historical background 
I provide a brief overview of four overlapping episodes which offer insight 
into the historical development of local government in Sierra Leone: colonial efforts 
to refashion chieftaincy for the purposes of indirect rule 1896-1940, experimentation 
with local councils 1946-72, constitutional reform 1947-1951 and the subsequent role 
of paramount chiefs in party politics during the 1960s-70s.  Collectively, these 
narratives demonstrate how chiefly government became a deeply embedded 
component of the Sierra Leonean state and political system over the course of the last 
century, while local councils failed to gain traction and were frequently suspended 
even in their comparably short lifetime. 
i) Indirect rule and the refashioning of chieftaincy 
Britain’s colonization of Sierra Leone followed a dualist track.  The Freetown 
peninsula was ruled directly as a Crown Colony from 1808, while the interior was 
subject to indirect rule following the declaration of a Protectorate in 1896 (Fyfe, 1962, 
pp. 1-104; Kilson, 1966, pp. 1-2; Cartwright, 1970, p. 15).  From the perspective of 
the British, indirect rule required refashioning of local political institutions in order 
that they could serve as a medium to govern on their behalf.  Treaty-making during 
the 1800s had already begun this process, applying the common label of ‘paramount 
chief’ to local leaders of quite different standing and limiting chiefs’ diplomatic, 
judicial and economic powers (Little, 1967; Abraham, 1976; Wylie, 1977, pp. 129-
143; Abraham, 1978, pp. 171-214).  The Protectorate Ordinance (1896) deepened 
these strictures, and the subsequent introduction of a house tax triggered violent 
resistance to the colonization of the Protectorate in 1898, known as the Hut Tax War.  
Within the year, the conflict had been brutally put down and many of the ‘insurgents’ 
had been executed.  The failure of the Hut Tax War resulted in a grim acceptance of 
the reality of colonization and the radical changes brought about by the Protectorate 
Ordinance (1896) and related legislation began to take effect (Wylie, 1977, pp. 167-
207; Abraham, 1978, pp. 145-169). 
With the implementation of colonial laws in earnest, chiefs lost sovereignty in 
their own territories and instead became agents of the colonial administration.  Their 
diplomatic powers ceased; they were required to collect taxes for a higher authority; 
and their legal powers were emasculated (for further discussion on the loss of legal 
powers, see chapter six).  Colonial reform of chieftaincy also had the effect of 
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undermining pre-colonial checks and balances on chiefs’ power.  Prior to the 
declaration of the Protectorate, paramount chiefs usually ruled in consultation with 
sub-chiefs and other advisers, who provided a significant portion of their resources 
through the collection of tribute.  Under colonialism, new legislation backed by 
colonial force transformed the dynamics of this process such that tribute was driven in 
a more top-down way and by the 1920s was frequently demanded in cash rather than 
in kind; paramount chiefs were thus liberated from dependence on their advisers, who 
had previously served as a significant check on their power (Dorjahn, 1960, p. 132; 
Finnegan, 1965, p. 50; Kilson, 1966, p. 20; Wylie, 1977, p. 202).  The threat or use of 
violence as a means to control chiefs’ behaviour was more or less eradicated.  Chiefs 
could no longer be overthrown in war nor could sub-chiefs and sodalities66 assassinate 
an unpopular ruler (Dorjahn, 1960, pp. 136-139; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 28-30).  The 
British used powers to remove and replace chiefs liberally during the preliminary 
consolidation of colonial rule (up until around 1910) and thus many of those in power 
lacked popular legitimacy (Wylie, 1977, p. 198; Abraham, 1978, pp. 280-300); they 
were perceived by their subjects as “tax gatherers masquerading as chiefs” (Fyfe, 
1962, p. 606). 
These developments encouraged a situation in which paramount chiefs began 
to take advantage of their prerogatives to secure highly advantageous positions within 
the modernizing economy (Kilson, 1966, pp. 57-59; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 30-32).  
One of the key means through which they did so was through the use of their powers 
to call for unpaid community labour.  Recognition of the right to command 
community labour in 1905 was both a sop to chiefs and an attempt to regulate this 
practice to some extent in order to uphold the abolition of slavery.67  Given colonial 
pressure to gradually relinquish slaves over the next three decades, chiefs began to 
rely heavily on unpaid community labour to operate their farms, undermining their 
subjects’ capacity to engage in commercial agriculture on their own behalf (Abraham, 
1978, p. 269; Reno, 1995, pp. 37-40).  The Forced Labour Ordinance (1932) 
introduced restrictions on chiefs’ powers in this regard, limiting the scope of 
permitted tasks for which chiefs could call on unpaid community labour, and the 
                                                
66 Sodalities are sacred associations for men or women which are organized around rituals of initiation 
and the transmission of secret information (Richards, Bah, & Vincent, 2004, p. 8).  They are often 
referred to as secret societies. 
67 Although it was only slave trading which was abolished when the Protectorate was declared; 
domestic slavery was not abolished until 1926. 
 89 
maximum contribution of labour which could be asked of any individual.  
Nevertheless, chiefs continued to take advantage of unpaid labour for commercial 
gain, calling upon their subjects to build permanent cement-block houses, work 
commercial farms and transport commercial goods (Commission of Inquiry into the 
Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 162-168; Cartwright, 1970, p. 31). 
In the late 1930s, the colonial administration made more serious efforts to 
standardize the institution of chieftaincy through the introduction of a ‘native 
administration’ (‘NA’) system similar to those already established in other British 
colonies in Africa, notably Nigeria.  Legislation passed in 1937 confirmed chiefs’ 
recognized role in maintaining public order, but also established new responsibilities 
in the areas of public health, sanitation and social welfare; granted chiefs the authority 
to raise revenue through taxes; and established separate treasuries for each chiefdom 
to manage their resources.  The reforms introduced by these ordinances were 
implemented gradually, as chiefs were given a choice about whether to opt into the 
‘NA’ system.  A decade later, just over half of the chiefdoms had chosen to do so 
(Kilson, 1966, p. 28; Barrows, 1976, p. 101).  Martin Kilson argues (1966, pp. 25-33) 
that some chiefs resisted the transition because it replaced their multiple revenue 
streams with a regular salary.  In order to address this, the colonial administration 
permitted a large proportion of chiefdom revenue to be allocated towards salaries, 
leaving little for the supply of basic public goods. 
In its implementation, the ‘NA’ system failed miserably to check abuses by 
chiefs; instead, it offered additional grounds for chiefs to advance their own position, 
often at the expense of their subjects (Kilson, 1966, pp. 53-59; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 
30-33).  In 1946-51 there was a high frequency and intensity of demonstrations 
against chiefs in eastern Mendeland (Barrows, 1976, pp. 100-120; Tangri, 1976), and 
in 1955-56, more widespread anti-chief protests broke out in the North.  Chiefs’ 
houses were burned down, their property was destroyed and some were physically 
attacked.  Both Kilson (1966, pp. 60-64) and John Cartwright (1970, pp. 75-86) 
interpret the northern protests as evidence of popular resistance to intolerable chiefly 
abuses.  In Kilson’s words (1966, p. 60), the riots were evidence of “a form of rural 
‘radicalism,’ which in some cases constituted a virtual peasant revolt against 
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traditional rulers and authority”.  Walter Barrows68 (1976, pp. 100-120) and Roger 
Tangri (1976) take a different view, arguing that these outbreaks of violence were the 
product of an alliance between youth angered by chiefly abuses and ‘big men’69 from 
rival chiefly factions.  From their perspective, the protests were not a revolt against 
chieftaincy per se, but an attempt by youth to secure more attentive patrons and by 
‘big men’ to secure control of the chieftaincy for themselves. 
Kilson and Cartwright are close in many ways to the interpretation of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces set up by the 
government to investigate the matter (the Cox Commission).  The Cox Commission 
(1956, pp. 226-230) concludes that the violence was the consequence of “grave 
maladministration” by chiefs, enabled by weak oversight by a government which 
demonstrated “almost complete ignorance” of chiefly abuses and the tensions they 
had created at the local level.  According to the Cox Commission, the immediate 
trigger for violent protests was steep tax rises between 1954-55, but the Commission 
situates rising taxes in the context of a broader set of chiefly abuses, including the use 
of forced labour; the collection of illegal licences, levies and tribute; and miscarriages 
of justice by chiefs’ courts.70  Chiefs’ failure to provide the public goods for which 
they were made responsible under the ‘NA’ system is not addressed at any length, 
although the Cox Commission (p. 175) observes that “less than one third of [tribal 
authorities’] revenue goes in expenditure within their own scope and visible to the 
taxpayers; of that small proportion some goes to reserves or other unspectacular 
projects”, suggesting that the enlargement of chiefs’ role in this regard had not really 
taken off. 
The Sierra Leone government (1956, pp. 6-7), which consisted of a 
combination of colonial administrators and African ministers, had few populist 
sympathies and officially rejected the Cox Commission’s interpretation.  Instead, the 
government argued that protests against chiefs could be explained by northerners’ 
greater exposure to other regions of the country in the context of modernization, 
which had changed their attitude towards chiefs “from one of consent or tolerance to 
one of bitter resentment”.  The government did commit to implementing some of the 
                                                
68 Note that Barrows’ discussion is limited to eastern Mendeland. 
69 The term ‘big men’ refers to those that are wealthy and/or powerful patrons. 
70 Although based on popular testimony, the Cox Commission’s perception of these practices is of 
course heavily biased by colonial administrative norms and much of the nuance of what people were 
aggrieved about and why is lost in the account. 
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Cox Commission’s recommendations, including the abolition of demands for forced 
labour; the prohibition of fees, charges and fines (other than local tax and court fines); 
and prosecution of those exacting tribute.  A number of other important 
recommendations were side-stepped or rejected, including those to establish reformed 
chiefdom authorities in place of existing chiefdom councils (tribal authorities) and to 
end chiefs’ involvement in party politics (Sierra Leone Government, 1956, pp. 8-18).  
Following further government investigations, nine paramount chiefs were either 
deposed or forced to resign and two suspended, but within four years, five of the 
eleven had been reinstated.  While steps were taken to follow through on some of the 
commitments made, for example, the enactment of legislation to abolish forced 
labour, central government oversight of chiefs remained permissive and thus chiefly 
abuses continued over subsequent decades.  Thus while in one sense this outbreak of 
anti-chief violence represented a significant challenge to chiefly authority, the 
government’s response also underlined strong central support for retaining the status 
quo. 
ii) Experimentation with local councils 
In the late 1940s, the colonial administration began to experiment with local 
councils as an additional form of local government in the Protectorate.  Kilson (1966, 
pp. 203-216) and Tangri (1978b) suggest that this was a nationally-driven 
development, arguing that (given the known weaknesses of chiefdom government) 
district councils were viewed as a means of putting post-war development plans into 
action.  However, Reno (1995, pp. 59-60) argues that the colonial administration’s 
commitment to a system of local councils was reflective of a change of heart in 
Westminster; concerned about popular resentment of traditional authority in African 
colonies, the Colonial Office directed national administrations to develop more 
inclusive political institutions which could foster the development of a moderate 
political class interested in maintaining an amicable relationship with the British in 
the post-colonial era, and perhaps encourage the emergence of a civil society which 
demanded more efficient government.  Reno suggests that local officials resisted this 
Westminster-driven agenda to some extent because of their enduring reliance on 
paramount chiefs to retain control of local polities.  This helps to explain why local 
councils in Sierra Leone took such a conservative form, remaining very much under 
the sway of the colonial administration and chiefs. 
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District councils were originally established under the Protectorate Ordinance 
(1946) as consultative bodies for development planning, but reformed by the District 
Councils Ordinance (1950) to play a greater role in the implementation of 
development plans.  From 1950, the membership of each district council consisted of 
the paramount chiefs within the district, plus additional members elected by chiefdom 
councils (tribal authorities), which were subject to the paramount chief’s influence.  
District commissioners served as council presidents until the mid-1950s, when a 1954 
amendment to the Ordinance was passed allowing council members to choose their 
own president, enabling paramount chiefs to secure most of these positions.  While a 
further amendment in 1956 provided for the direct election of non-chief members, 
paramount chiefs continued to hold between a quarter and a third of the seats in each 
council as well as most of the presidencies (Hicks, 1961, p. 197; Kilson, 1966, pp. 
203-207; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 77, 86, 119; Tangri, 1978b, p. 19) 
Urban councils in the Protectorate were established during the 1950s and 
1960s under separate legislation—first in Bo during the mid-1950s, then subsequently 
in Makeni, Kenema and Koidu after enabling legislation was passed in 1959.  
Paramount chiefs also presided over these urban councils and two-thirds of their 
members were nominated either by the government or by chiefdom councils, while 
the remaining third was elected.  Freetown City Council dates back far earlier to 
1893, but suffered from a troubled relationship with the colonial administration which 
saw its dissolution and replacement by a municipal board with a government-
appointed majority in 1926; this board ruled the city for the next two decades (Kilson, 
1966, p. 221; Wyse, 1987). 
Colonial reports indicate that district councils initially “got off to a flying 
start” (Hicks, 1961, p. 198)—they established health centres, dispensaries, sanitary 
services and took steps to protect forests and develop seedling nurseries.  Given these 
early positive results, and the Colonial Office’s policy of support for more 
representative local government, it is unsurprising that a senior British official 
looking into the potential for expanding councils’ responsibilities, H.W. Davidson, 
recommended that a “bold policy of Decentralisation” be adopted, giving councils 
substantial control over the provision of public goods and services (Davidson, 1953, 
p. 9).  Davidson notes that most officials ‘on the ground’ preferred a more 
conservative approach based on gradual development of district councils’ role, but 
rejects this on the grounds that it would inhibit political progress.  In line with this 
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recommendation, an enlargement of council powers was enacted in legislation in 
1954 (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 209; 
Tangri, 1978b, p. 20).  Yet within two years, the Cox Commission (1956, p. 214) was 
arguing that district councils were an aggravating factor in stirring up local 
resentments; it recommended that district councils be reconstituted as advisory bodies 
and that service delivery functions be returned to chiefdom authorities and central 
government. 
The Cox Commission’s recommendations were ignored, but local councils 
continued to fare poorly in the post-independence period.  From the 1960s, councils 
came under increasing levels of political attack from the centre over the misuse of 
funds.  Between 1962-65 and 1967-71, they were temporarily suspended and replaced 
with committees of management made up largely of centrally-appointed district 
officers and paramount chiefs.  From 1968, a series of calls was made for their 
dissolution.  In 1969, a private member’s motion was passed in parliament calling for 
a review of their continued existence.  Although the resulting Local Government 
Review Committee recommended that councils be overhauled rather than abolished, 
the Sierra Leone government chose instead to suspend them indefinitely from early 
1972 (Tangri, 1978b, pp. 25-26).  Subsequently, district councils were dissolved and 
their infrastructure and staff absorbed by the provincial administration.  Urban 
councils continued to operate as government-controlled committees of management 
(Kanu, 2009, p. 53). 
A number of inter-linked explanations have been proposed in the literature for 
the failure of district councils, including an insecure and inadequate resource base, 
poor management, domination by paramount chiefs, and a lack of resonance with 
ordinary Sierra Leoneans.  Initially local councils were funded by central grants, 
which were supported in part by the war-time reserves of produce marketing boards.  
They also had the power to raise resources through a voluntary precept on chiefdom 
administrations; from 1954 this precept was made compulsory, with the size of the 
precept to be negotiated between each council and the relevant chiefdoms (Hicks, 
1961, p. 198; Tangri, 1978b, pp. 18-19).  The Cox Commission argued that the 
precepting system contributed to anti-chief uprisings because the burden of paying the 
precept (which ranged between 40-55 percent of local tax revenue in 1955) drove up 
average tax rates.  After more than a decade of paying a fixed sum of tax (1937-50), 
the tax burden on Protectorate Sierra Leoneans increased by between 120 and 230 
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percent from 1950 to 1955 (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the 
Provinces, 1956, pp. 126, 208-210, 255).  While the precepting system survived into 
the 1960s, with the precept now fixed by government, it became an increasingly 
unreliable source of income.  From the mid-1960s onwards, paramount chiefs were 
frequently unwilling or unable to pay precepts and central intervention to enforce 
precept obligations was inconsistent.  Regular central grants for economic 
development came to an end in 1955, leaving only intermittent capital grants which 
could be withheld for political reasons.  This precarious situation meant that a rising 
share of local councils’ resources was dedicated to administrative expenditure, and 
functions gradually leaked back to central government due to council incapacity 
(Cartwright, 1970, p. 172; Tangri, 1978b, pp. 21-22).  One explanation for council 
failure, then, is that councils were transitioned too rapidly from almost total 
dependency on central grants to dependency on a new and volatile system of local 
taxation which could not adequately support them to fulfil their responsibilities. 
This brief explanation of problems with council financing also indicates 
underlying management problems.  Shortly after their creation as local development 
agencies to implement government projects, councils were transitioned abruptly to the 
status of local political authorities.  The colonial administration withdrew from their 
supervision around the same time, transferring oversight to a new SLPP Minister for 
Local Government, who was understandably preoccupied with developments on the 
national stage as Sierra Leone approached independence.  It was also not in the 
interests of the newly-established SLPP cabinet to interfere with the operations of 
councils because (as discussed in section 3.2, iii) an alliance with paramount chiefs 
was critical to their political success.  Central oversight of councils was therefore 
weak, enabling widespread misuse of funds with few repercussions.  Staffing for 
councils presented a further challenge from a management perspective.  Prior to a 
significant expansion of councils’ powers, H.W. Davidson (1953, pp. 10-11) 
recognized a skills shortage as regards service delivery, and recommended that central 
government assign posts focused on local service delivery to councils in order to 
avoid duplication.  However, looking back on the relatively short life of local 
councils, Tangri (1978b, p. 23) finds that councils filled their own vacancies on the 
basis of close ties to council members, facilitating collusion in a range of corrupt 
practices.  In his view, the inadequacy of staff was a “chronic weakness” equal in 
severity to lack of central oversight. 
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Kilson (1966, pp. 205-216) perceives both the financial fragility and 
mismanagement of councils to be linked to the corrosive effects of chiefly domination 
of councils.  He argues that chiefs deliberately overloaded district councils with 
functions that they did not wish to perform through their own administrations, while 
holding on to the larger share of local revenue.  At the same time, he perceives them 
to be responsible for much of the embezzlement of district council funds that took 
place during the 1950s and 1960s.  He describes paramount chiefs taking advantage 
of council powers to access advances for private vehicles and extensive misuse of a 
building materials loan scheme to allocate loans to chiefs’ clients.  In his view, 
parasitic behaviour of this kind was enabled first by continued commitment of the 
colonial administration to indirect rule through chiefs (despite policy in Westminster) 
and later by the political reliance of the SLPP on chiefs. 
However, the Cox Commission’s analysis (1956, pp. 204-218) suggests that 
district councils were themselves parasitic on the people, as remote bodies 
accumulating tax revenue to provide goods on a highly uneven basis and with little 
regard for popular demand.  The Commission reports (pp. 211-212): 
We have learnt of areas where development and services are non-
existent…We have learnt everywhere that there is dissatisfaction with the 
works and services which…are concentrated in urban areas…Witness after 
witness has asserted…that they do not wish to pay for water supplies in towns 
where nature has provided them with perennial streams; that they do not wish 
to pay for electricity in towns where they can use oil lanterns…Witness after 
witness has said that there are schools only in urban areas and even where they 
are provided elsewhere they are not provided for everyone.  Even roads, it is 
said, are not provided everywhere. 
The Commission’s report suggests that district councils should not have been created 
as political bodies at all because districts are not meaningful political units 
underpinned by a “common local feeling” (p. 214).  For this reason, the Commission 
argues that public goods provision should remain at chiefdom level, where such 
“common feeling” does exist and where accountability relationships can develop.  
While Kilson (pp. 202, 214) disregards this argument as a justification for the “nearly 
pathological obsession” of the colonial administration with indirect rule, Tangri 
(1978b, p. 20) concurs that chiefdoms were the “primary point of identification” for 
most Sierra Leoneans, while the district councils remained remote bodies which 
commanded little loyalty. 
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iii) Constitutional reform 
To accompany the development of more inclusive local political institutions, 
Westminster also pushed for national constitutional reform offering increased 
opportunities for self-government (Wyse, 1990, pp. 144-145).  In the mid-1940s, 
Europeans continued to dominate Sierra Leone’s two governing bodies—the 
Executive and Legislative Councils—with African representation limited to a 
minority of seats on the Legislative Council, of which the largest share was allocated 
to the Colony.  In 1947, Governor Stevenson’s submission of a set of proposals for 
the reform of the Legislative Council launched a fierce constitutional struggle that 
would last until 1951.  The historical literature suggests that there were four main sets 
of interests at stake in this struggle: those of the Colony elite, predominantly Krios71; 
those of an educated Protectorate elite; those of paramount chiefs; and those of the 
colonial administration (Kilson, 1966, pp. 154-170; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 43-63; 
Jones, 1981, pp. 175-186; Wyse, 1990, pp. 133-163). 
The most significant feature of Stevenson’s proposals was the introduction of 
an African majority in the Legislative Council.  However, the terms he suggested 
were favourable to the Protectorate, and to paramount chiefs in particular: they gave 
the Protectorate ten seats in the Legislative Council, leaving only four for the 
Colony72; they required that the Protectorate members be elected by the Protectorate 
Assembly73 from among its members, which gave chiefs a great deal of influence 
over the selection of candidates74; and they delayed the introduction of a literacy 
                                                
71 Krios are the descendants of freed slaves who settled on the Freetown Peninsula under the auspices 
of British philanthropists and the British government (Fyfe, 1962, pp. 1-104; Kilson, 1966, pp. 1-2; 
Cartwright, 1970, p. 15).  Early settlers who sailed from London, Nova Scotia and Jamaica 1787-1800 
were joined by those freed from slaving ships after the abolition of the slave trade by Britain in 1807.  
Over time, these distinct groups took on a common identity. 
72 The remaining seats were to be held by Europeans—some accounts put this at ten seats (Kilson, 
1966, pp. 161-162; Wyse, 1990, pp. 144-145), while others put this number at nine (Cartwright, 1970, 
p. 44; Jones, 1981, p. 177). 
73 The Protectorate Assembly was an additional consultative body for the Protectorate that was 
established alongside the new district councils in 1946.  The body had a total of forty-two members: 
ten official members; six nominated unofficial members, of whom four were required to be Africans; 
and two members from each of the thirteen district councils (reduced to twelve district councils after 
1950).  In common with the district councils, the Protectorate Assembly was dominated by paramount 
chiefs, who made up more than three quarters of the membership throughout the body’s lifespan. 
74 Stevenson’s proposals required that nine representatives be elected from the pool of members put 
forward by district councils and one be elected from the pool of nominated members.  The nine 
candidates put forward by district councils therefore move through a three-stage process: 1) if 
paramount chiefs, they are automatically ex-officio members of district councils, otherwise they are 
elected by chiefdom councils who are under paramount chiefs’ influence; 2) district councils 
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requirement (which approximately 80 percent of chiefs could not meet (Kilson, 1966, 
p. 164)) for three years. 
The Colony’s largely Krio elite had campaigned for constitutional reform to 
establish an African majority in the Legislative Council since the 1920s, yet when the 
moment finally came they found themselves facing a colonial administration 
supportive of giving majority rule to the Protectorate.  While the colonial 
administration had been signalling this direction throughout the 1940s, nevertheless 
the Colony elite experienced this more explicit statement of colonial policy as a bitter 
betrayal.  They raised a number of significant objections to the Stevenson proposals, 
including: the substantial role accorded to chiefs, the related waiver of a literacy 
requirement and the incoherence of a single Legislative Council to represent both 
Colony and Protectorate overlaid on a dualistic system which accorded distinct legal 
statuses and rights to Colony and Protectorate persons (Cartwright, 1970, p. 47; 
Wyse, 1990, pp. 150-152). 
Protectorate leaders understandably took a more welcoming stance to the 
proposals.  However, there was a divide between paramount chiefs and members of 
an educated Protectorate elite.  The latter, represented by the Sierra Leone 
Organization Society (SOS), were also concerned about the domination of political 
opportunities by paramount chiefs and argued in favour of a literacy requirement.  
This cleavage within the Protectorate leadership provided the basis for a potential 
alliance between educated professionals in the Colony and the Protectorate.  While 
some authors suggest that Colony intransigence prevented such an alliance from being 
realized (Kilson, 1966, pp. 166-168; Cartwright, 1970, p. 51), I concur with Akintola 
Wyse (1990, p. 154) that the attractions of an alliance with chiefs would have 
outweighed those of an alliance with the Colony even if the latter had adopted a more 
flexible approach.  Not only was there a high degree of social overlap between the 
chiefly class and educated professionals in the Protectorate, as many of the latter 
group belonged to chiefly lineages, but the logic of majority rule suggested that an 
alliance with Colony politicians would be of little enduring value. 
Once more following Westminster’s lead with reluctance, the colonial 
administration pursued a conservative vision of reform which preserved chiefly 
                                                
(dominated by paramount chiefs) elect candidates to the Protectorate Assembly; and 3) the Protectorate 
Assembly (dominated by paramount chiefs) elects candidates to the Legislative Council.  
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power.  There is agreement in the literature that the administration intervened in the 
constitutional conflict to reconcile the chiefs and the educated Protectorate elite, as 
they envisaged a role for both in the future government of Sierra Leone.  While 
Kilson (1966, pp. 158-161, 166) and Cartwright (1970, p. 51) also describe efforts to 
placate Colony representatives, Wyse (1990, pp. 138-139, 146) points to long-
standing anti-Krio bias among colonial officials and suggests that they may have 
encouraged Protectorate politicians to inflame tensions with Colony politicians, 
presumably in order to push them to unreasonable behaviour and facilitate the 
development of a Protectorate-based alliance. 
The Stevenson proposals were considered at a tense select committee meeting 
in mid-1948 which brought together the attorney general, the chief commissioner, the 
African members of the Legislative Council and additional extraordinary members to 
allow equal representation of Colony and Protectorate.  At the outset of the meeting, 
the three extraordinary members from the Colony walked out in protest at the chief 
commissioner’s participation, which they claimed would prevent the paramount 
chiefs from speaking freely.  In their absence, an agreement was reached on the make-
up of the Legislative Council—the committee advised the government to expand the 
number of Legislative Council seats for both the Colony and the Protectorate (from 
four and ten to seven and fourteen respectively) and to refrain from making a 
universal recommendation on the sensitive issue of literacy.  Crucially, the committee 
also recommended that the unofficial members of the Legislative Council be 
permitted to elect four of their number to the Executive Council, expanding the scope 
of the constitutional reform significantly.  These proposals were subsequently 
endorsed unanimously by the full Legislative Council and approved by the governor 
and the secretary of state for the colonies. 
Far from concluding the matter, the finalization of these proposals initiated a 
period of protest by the SOS and Colony representatives.  The SOS submitted a 
memorandum demanding a more democratic form of election to the Legislative 
Council.  Colony representatives launched a vitriolic public campaign in the national 
press that played on Krio fears of Protectorate rule; unsuccessfully petitioned the 
secretary of state for the colonies; and used their majority in the Legislative Council 
to delay the proposed constitutional reforms.  The governor’s attempts to set up a 
second committee to consider the constitution failed because Colony and Protectorate 
representatives could not agree on its composition.  In April 1950, the governor issued 
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an ultimatum to the Legislative Council that the 1948 proposals would be passed 
unless they could come together and agree on a revised set of measures.  By this 
point, the rift between Colony and Protectorate had deepened to such an extent that a 
rapprochement was unachievable.  Moreover, it was not in the interests of 
Protectorate representatives (particularly chiefs) to make further compromises, as the 
default outcome served them well.  Reconciliation was achieved, however, between 
paramount chiefs and members of an educated Protectorate elite.  When the governor 
recommended that the 1948 proposals be implemented in May 1950, two additional 
concessions to the Protectorate educated elite were made—the inclusion of a literacy 
requirement and changes to the make-up of district councils to create additional 
opportunities for the participation of non-chiefs.  In July 1950, the Freetown branch of 
the SOS passed a resolution calling for the constitution’s implementation, signalling 
an end to the Protectorate educated elite’s opposition to the proposed constitutional 
reform (Cartwright, 1970, p. 52). 
The alliance between paramount chiefs and an educated Protectorate elite 
developed through this constitutional crisis grew stronger as the Legislative Council 
elections got underway (Cartwright, 1970, pp. 55-63; Wyse, 1990, pp. 160-163).  In 
August 1950, a number of Colony political groups formed a political party called the 
National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL).  Prior to the November 1951 Legislative 
Council elections, Protectorate politicians followed suit, dissolving the SOS and 
forming a national political party which incorporated some Krio politicians, the SLPP.  
The SLPP first courted chiefs because of their high degree of control over the 
electoral process for Protectorate seats, but continued to do so after the election 
because chiefs secured eight seats on the Legislative Council while SLPP members 
secured only six (four Protectorate seats and two Colony seats).75  In November 1951, 
the Legislative Council was convened and at an extraordinary session the governor 
sought to identify the leader of the majority party.  Following the SLPP’s refusal to 
form a coalition with the NCSL (which had secured three Colony seats), the governor 
called for a division on the Legislative Council and all of the paramount chiefs 
declared their support for the SLPP.  The SLPP’s leader, Milton Margai, was 
subsequently given the position of leader of government business and was able to 
                                                
75 According to Wyse (1990, p. 159), the SLPP did not contest the elections on a party basis, so these 
numbers reflect those candidates who had declared their membership of the SLPP; Cartwright (1970, p. 
58) finds that only three avowed SLPP members won Protectorate seats. 
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select the unofficial African members of the Executive Council.  From 1953, these 
Executive Council members assumed ministerial positions, which gradually increased 
in scope until full independence was declared in 1961.  An alliance between a national 
political party and paramount chiefs was therefore a foundational element of the post-
colonial state in Sierra Leone, which was to persist through subsequent decades. 
iv) Paramount chiefs and party politics 
By the 1960s, paramount chiefs were well-established as critical players in 
party political struggles.  Victor Minikin (1973) was among the first to describe the 
role that chiefs, as well as their rivals for chiefly power, played as political brokers in 
national elections.  He argues that Sierra Leone’s ruling politicians “feared the 
implications of mass participation in politics” (p. 129)—the threat to their 
conservative agenda and ultimately their political ascendance— and sought only to 
secure a sufficient number of votes to maintain their hold on power.  Rather than 
investing in building a party structure to mobilize voters, the SLPP preferred to rely 
on paramount chiefs to bring in the vote.  The opposition APC in turn formed 
alliances with rival ruling house factions eager to secure the chieftaincy for 
themselves.  According to Minikin, this approach enabled national politicians to 
divert popular energies into local-level struggles and pursue a conservative national 
strategy free from interference.  By serving as political brokers, chiefs and their rivals 
were able to further their own interests within the chiefdom, as well as securing 
political protection for the institution of chieftaincy.  The result was a “two way 
process” in which “national politicians exploited local conflicts to further their own 
elite interests; while simultaneously local brokers used national issues, and the 
conflict between the political parties, in the struggle for advantage” (p. 30).  Barrows 
(1976, pp. 217-232) describes a similar pattern of “double politics” based on self-
interested reciprocal exchange between ruling house faction and party, but disagrees 
with Minikin that national politicians deliberately excluded the masses.  In his view, 
the factional pattern of support for political parties was fairly effective at generating 
integration between national elites and the masses, as each national politician was a 
member of a local elite, and each faction contained both local elites and masses.  He 
concludes that “[t]hrough the intermediacy of local elites, the masses and the political 
center are connected”. 
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 Despite this difference, Minikin (1973) and Barrows (1976) largely agree on 
the adverse consequences of ‘double politics’ in Sierra Leone and are joined in their 
gloomy assessment by Tangri (1978a).  First, ‘double politics’ makes the pursuit of 
coherent national policies difficult because political parties are required to court 
numerous and disparate local actors.  Minikin (p. 135) blames ‘double politics’ for 
“the parochialism and the preoccupation of national politicians with local disputes”; 
Barrows (p. 233) describes political parties as “the prisoners of small-scale 
squabbles”; and Tangri (p. 171) argues that attempts to contain “a patchwork of 
interests” have prevented parties from assuming “a distinctive ideological posture”.  
Second, ‘double politics’ creates instability and violence at the local level.  According 
to Barrows (p. 225), it is the utilitarian character of party-faction relationships that 
makes them unstable because either side is liable to switch their loyalties if the 
alliance ceases to be advantageous.  Party elites are therefore likely to use repressive 
tactics to maintain factional support and factions are likely to use violence to gain 
party attention. 
The APC’s rise to power in the 1960s initially seemed to mark a shift in 
central-local relations.  Excluded from the close relationships with paramount chiefs 
enjoyed by the SLPP, the APC adopted alternative strategies to increase its chances of 
success in the 1967 elections, building a robust network of party organizers; playing 
on northern anxieties about their region’s neglect by the SLPP; and employing anti-
chief rhetoric (Barrows, 1976, pp. 128, 235).  This led some to believe that the APC 
would abolish chieftaincy, or at least take steps to curtail the powers of chiefs.  
However, on taking office, the APC continued to collaborate closely with chiefs to 
maintain political control.  The early years of APC rule were particularly turbulent at 
the local level, as many of the rival factions that had supported the APC during the 
elections used violent tactics to remove and replace incumbent chiefs with tacit 
government approval (Minikin, 1973, p. 135; Barrows, 1976; Tangri, 1976, pp. 319-
320; 1978a, p. 168).  Tangri (1976, pp. 319-320) and Minikin (1973, p. 135) argue 
that locally driven violence subsided after the APC’s second election victory in 1973 
when senior APC politicians made public statements indicating that they would no 
longer tolerate violence in local political struggles.  Yet during the same period, the 
APC government began to directly deploy violent tactics to ensure local control.  For 
example, in diamondiferous Kono District, the APC government used state agencies 
to forcibly install paramount chiefs with no local standing.  However, not all such 
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attempts were successful; some were thwarted by strong local resistance and thus the 
APC government could not fully dispense with ‘double politics’ in favour of brute 
force (Reno, 1995, pp. 79-103).  Perhaps counter-intuitively, ‘double politics’ also 
survived the transition to a one-party state in 1978, as factionalism within the APC 
was sufficiently high to support a pattern of rival chiefdom factions linking up with 
rival factions within the party (Barrows, 1976, p. 255; Tangri, 1978a, p. 167). 
The general pattern of central-local linkage in post-colonial Sierra Leone built 
directly upon the template of indirect rule established during the colonial period.  
However, this pattern was destabilized by the introduction of competitive party 
politics, as there was a mismatch between a system of chiefs elected for life, while 
power at the national level transferred hands between parties (prior to one-party rule).  
On the one hand, chiefs’ involvement in party politics increased their value to the 
centre and thus incentivized central government to protect chiefs’ autonomy and 
access to resources in general terms.  On the other hand, chiefs became more 
vulnerable to politically motivated violence—they were forced to make risky choices 
about how far to show their support for the government of the day during elections, 
and exposed to challenges from rival factions backed by the opposition party.  Chiefs’ 
involvement in party politics also led to a decline in their legitimacy, as their subjects 
disapproved of their orientation towards rewards from the centre rather than local 
needs (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 147; 
Minikin, 1973, p. 132; Tangri, 1978a, p. 169).  In sum, this account is both a 
testament to the remarkable durability of centre-chief linkages, and also to the 
distortion that chiefs’ role has undergone in order to sustain this pattern of linkage, 
with attendant implications for their local relationships and standing. 
3.3 Contemporary debates 
During the post-war period, academic debate on local governance in Sierra 
Leone has clustered around three main questions: 1) how far can failings of chiefly 
governance be considered a cause of the civil conflict?; 2) should chiefly governance 
be abolished or reformed in the post-war period?; and 3) what potential do elected 
local councils have to bring about a transformation of political culture at the 
grassroots? 
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i) Chiefs 
Richards (2005b) has been one of the most forceful voices identifying chiefly 
governance as a significant driver of conflict in rural areas.  In Richards’ view, there 
are strong historical continuities between the practice of domestic slavery prevalent in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the exercise of customary power by 
chiefs in the late twentieth century.  He attributes this in large part to indirect rule, 
which he believes “froze in place” (p. 582) chiefly privilege.  Richards emphasizes 
three sets of customary practices which chiefs use to retain control over women and 
young men, particularly those of lower status: exercising the chiefly right to call for 
unpaid community labour; maintaining a system of polygynous customary marriage 
based on costly bride payments, often converted to long-standing labour obligations; 
and using judicial power, including disproportionate fines, to enforce their decisions.  
Richards (p. 585) summarizes the combined force of these practices: 
Regular fining of young cultivators keeps them in poverty and dependency.  
Chiefs and landowners thereby accumulate surplus labour and send their own 
children to town for education.  The children of the poor remain in the village, 
providing ‘community labour’ for roads and other basic amenities mainly 
benefiting traders and the chiefly classes.  The more docile among the 
descendants of the former slaves continue to work the land for subsistence 
returns.  Others, less willing to queue in line for increasingly uncertain 
patrimonial scraps, default on their fines, are hounded into vagrancy and end 
up as protagonists of war. 
Influenced by the work of Emile Durkheim, Richards draws the conclusion that the 
civil war was a form of “slave revolt” (p. 580) of the descendants of former slaves 
against the chiefly class that exploited their labour and denied them opportunity. 
Fanthorpe (2001) also describes the exclusionary tendencies of chiefdom 
governance as a factor motivating young men and those of low status to join militias, 
but for somewhat different reasons.  Fanthorpe argues that rural Sierra Leone has long 
been characterized by the “extreme localization of criteria of identity and belonging” 
(p. 372).  The introduction of a system of ‘native administration’ in the 1930s locked 
in this pattern by linking access to rights and property to inclusion on a village tax 
register.  The consequence of this approach has been to establish an enduring reliance 
on chiefs “to authorize and guarantee the ‘native’ identities that confer rights to land, 
legal protection, and political representation”, thus limiting the number and location 
of points at which such rights can be secured (p. 383).  With demographic and 
economic change, chiefs in many rural settlements were neither able to guarantee 
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rights nor offer a viable livelihood to all those with a legitimate claim.  As a result, 
young people and those of low inherited status were increasingly prevented from 
accessing rights and property, whether they remained in their home village or sought 
opportunity elsewhere.  Fanthorpe (p. 385) concludes: 
Sierra Leone may therefore represent a case in which alarming numbers of 
people have become neither ‘citizen’ nor ‘subject’…we should not be 
surprised to find that many underprivileged young Sierra Leoneans have been 
as ready to embrace the ‘secular sectarianism’ of the RUF and the camaraderie 
of the combat group as the undisciplined lifestyle of the footloose ‘lumpen’.  
The only moral communities available to these agents may be those of their 
own desperate making. 
Fanthorpe is therefore making a structural argument about the limitations of a system 
of governance based on localized identity, with chiefs responsible for guaranteeing 
associated rights, rather than suggesting that chiefly abuses are responsible for driving 
young people out of villages and into the arms of militia groups.  He also views the 
exclusionary character of chiefdom governance as a contributory factor in the civil 
war, rather than a central cause. 
 In later work, Fanthorpe (2005) persuasively criticizes Richards’ (2005b) 
account of the war as a slave revolt against a chiefly class on methodological and 
interpretive grounds.  He finds that Richards’ case relies heavily on testimony from 
ex-combatants during the post-war period, which is distorted because it is, at least in 
part, a strategic response to the political context.  According to Fanthorpe, intensive 
popular engagement conducted by a raft of donor-funded NGOs led to “the use of 
grievance as a rhetorical device” by ex-combatants eager to influence NGO decision-
making to their advantage (p. 40).  He suggests that the emphasis on the abuses of 
chiefs and elders in ex-combatant discourse should be considered one of a number of 
rural social tensions, rather than the dominant one.  Revisiting the chiefly practices 
Richards finds most problematic, Fanthorpe argues that chiefs commonly use their 
power to call for community labour to generate public, rather than private, goods: 
While chiefs’ calls for ‘community labour’ may be resented by some, many of 
these activities—e.g. clearing overgrown bush paths that may harbour 
poisonous snakes, maintaining footbridges, and refurbishing school 
buildings—clearly benefit the community as a whole and not just local elites.  
These activities are hardly comparable with the agricultural corvées of the 
early colonial era. (p. 36) 
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Furthermore, Fanthorpe finds that there is little anthropological evidence to suggest 
that chiefs and elders monopolize young women or use the institution of customary 
marriage to shore up their power in the way that Richards suggests. 
In Fanthorpe’s view, the attitude of the majority of rural Sierra Leoneans 
towards chiefly authority is one of ambivalence rather than outright rejection.  While 
they complain of chiefly abuses, they also value chiefs because it is they rather than 
the central state that “‘know a person’s right’, i.e. the customary rights and properties 
that establish de facto local citizenship” (p. 44).  Fanthorpe confirms that the pattern 
of ‘double politics’ described by Barrows, Minikin and Tangri persists; national 
politicians continue to intervene in chiefdom politics in order to advance their 
interests and control of the chieftaincy remains a significant prize because of the 
access to resources and influence that it affords.  For all of these reasons, chiefdom 
politics remain highly energized. 
The Richards-Fanthorpe debate can be broadly characterized as one of 
abolition versus reform (Jackson, 2006; Sawyer, 2008).  The obvious implication of 
Richards’ (2005b) argument is that the post-war restoration of chieftaincy is likely to 
facilitate renewed chiefly abuses and drive another generation of young men to war.  
Richards (p. 588) concludes that reforming rural rights is “as urgent an issue as 
tracking the gun-runners or diamond- and timber-smugglers”.  Although he stops 
short of calling for outright abolition of chiefs, he does argue for the abolition of the 
“unsupervised and undocumented judicial practices” in which they are involved 
“through exemplary appeals to higher courts” (p. 587)—a significant step towards 
undermining chiefs’ authority.  The logical policy route following from Richards’ 
research seems to be one of significant disempowerment and ultimately abolition of 
chiefs.  Fanthorpe (2005) seems to advocate a more gradual process of reform.  His 
emphasis on the vitality of chiefdom politics and the perceived importance of chiefs 
as guarantors of citizenship rights suggest that abolition of chieftaincy is neither 
achievable nor politically desirable, despite the problematic character of chiefdom 
governance.  He suggests that a pathway of “re-bureaucratization” (p. 44) at chiefdom 
level along lines that would render chiefs more downwardly accountable would be a 
preferable approach. 
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Subsequent empirical research provides mixed evidence.  Lending support to 
the reformist view, Edward Sawyer (2008) presents survey evidence from four 
localities76 which runs counter to Richards’ (2005b) claims that chiefly justice is 
predominantly a mechanism for control of youth labour.  He finds that chiefs are 
considered to perform well relative to other actors in terms of resolving conflict, with 
section chiefs and village headmen ranked in third and fourth place respectively out of 
a range of nine possible providers, below religious organizations (first place) and 
NGOs (second place), but above local courts (sixth place).  In rural areas, chiefs had 
even higher levels of support, with headmen and section chiefs ranked in second and 
third place after religious organizations.  A complementary survey conducted by 
Fanthorpe et al (2011, pp. 71-105) finds that traditional authorities achieve higher 
satisfaction scores than local councils and central government for their performance in 
managing projects and services; 47 percent of respondents reported that traditional 
authorities always or often respond to local needs in an efficient manner, compared to 
40 percent for local councils and 38 percent for central government.  In Bombali and 
Kono, respondents identified traditional authorities most frequently as the political 
authority they would approach first to ask for development and services, while in Bo 
and Western Area Rural, local councils were the more common choice. 
In support of an abolitionist perspective, the findings of an ambitious national 
study of chieftaincy by Daron Acemoglu, Tristan Reed and James Robinson (2012) 
are consistent with Richards’ characterization of chiefs as anti-developmental.  The 
authors reconstruct the basic history of all 149 of Sierra Leone’s chiefdoms in order to 
investigate how the concentration of chiefly power impacts on development.  They 
find that those chiefdoms which have been controlled by fewer ruling houses have 
significantly worse development outcomes, notably lower rates of literacy, school 
attainment, and non-agricultural employment.77  At the same time, they find that 
attitudes to chiefs are more positive and social capital78 is higher in those chiefdoms 
which have been controlled by a smaller number of ruling houses.  They interpret this 
as evidence that chiefs have captured civil society to serve their own purposes, which 
                                                
76 Sawyer reports findings from a survey (n=300) conducted in Tonkolili District in the North, Kenema 
District in the East, Western Area Urban (which contains Freetown) and Western Area Rural. 
77 They consider non-agricultural employment to be a proxy for economic development in lieu of 
micro-data on incomes. 
78 Measured by attendance of community meetings, participation in groups and the undertaking of 
collective actions. 
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they suggest incentivizes greater popular investment in chieftaincy and leads to more 
positive attitudes towards chiefs.  This theory casts doubt on the use of attitudinal 
survey data to assess chiefs’ developmental potential, but also sits uneasily with 
Richards’ reliance on accounts of grievances against chiefs.  However, aside from the 
puzzling concurrence of poor development outcomes and positive attitudes to chiefs, 
the authors do not provide further evidence in support of this link.  In addition, the 
model the authors specify is quite limited and leaves important questions unanswered.  
For example, they only look at the relationship between the concentration of chiefly 
power and a narrow set of developmental outcomes (literacy, education and non-
agricultural employment); the attitudinal data they draw on focus on attitudes to age 
and authority, not to chiefs specifically; and they do not discuss how government 
installation of chiefs (Abraham, 1976; Reno, 1995) (which could potentially introduce 
a dynamic of reverse causality between economic development and number of ruling 
houses) affects their results. 
Richards has worked with colleagues (Mokuwa, Voors, Bulte, & Richards, 
2011) to investigate his earlier claims about chiefly abuses in greater depth; this has 
resulted in more narrowly circumscribed but better substantiated claims.  Using court 
records and survey data79, the authors explore whether there is evidence that elderly 
polygynists encourage sexual relationships between young men and their wives in 
order to demand their labour in recompense, or, if this fails, to sue them for ‘woman 
damage’ (adultery).  They find that ‘woman damage’ claims occur at an extremely 
high frequency both in local courts and in adjudication outside of the local court 
system; the frequency of claims is positively associated with the amount of upland 
farm land cultivated and the level of demand for labour; and the accusers tend to be 
older than those accused and are more likely to have larger upland farms and multiple 
wives.  However, these findings apply only to the Gola Forest region and to upland 
rice farming specifically.  Furthermore, the findings are evidence of capture of the 
local legal system broadly speaking by an elderly elite, rather than of chiefs’ abuse of 
judicial powers.  While chiefs may well play a key role in shoring up the power of 
                                                
79 The authors surveyed local court records in nine chiefdoms bordering the Gola Forest over the period 
2000-10 and analyzed these alongside an existing sample of World Bank court data from 2006-07.  
They also conducted a household survey investigating adjudication outside of the local court system 
(by family members, elders, village chiefs, etc.) in seven chiefdoms during the first half of 2010. 
 108 
this elderly elite, their precise role in relation to these practices requires further 
elaboration. 
ii) Local councils 
Comparatively speaking, Sierra Leone’s reformed local councils have received 
relatively little academic attention.  This is partly a consequence of their short 
lifespan, but perhaps also of a perception among Western researchers that as 
institutions built on a recognized template they are better understood.  Yet analysis of 
Sierra Leone’s decentralization process by Fanthorpe (2005), Paul Jackson (2005, 
2006) and Esser (2012) suggests that imported assumptions about local councils 
obscure important aspects of the social reality in Sierra Leone and underlines the 
importance of a contextualized understanding of these actors.  In assessing whether 
councils have the potential to deliver political transformation at the grassroots, two 
particular themes emerge in these authors’ work: the failure of both donors and 
central government to take account of the “lessons of history” (Fanthorpe, 2005, p. 
46); and the complex relationship between donor and central government agendas vis-
à-vis decentralization. 
While donors believe that decentralization will serve to “[reincorporate] the 
rural poor into the Sierra Leonean body politic” and “capture and catalyze 
modernizing ideas about citizenship and sociality already emerging at the grassroots” 
(Fanthorpe, 2005, pp. 34-35), Fanthorpe argues that the decentralization process is a 
far more conservative reform than they imagine.  He finds the resemblance between 
‘new’ elected councils and those abolished in the early 1970s striking: they are 
financially dependent on a precarious combination of central (donor-backed) grants 
and local revenues shared with chiefs, and operationally dependent on the capacity of 
chiefdom government to fulfil many of their roles.  This leads Fanthorpe to conclude 
that post-reform local councils remain vulnerable to a similar fate to their 
predecessors and that re-bureaucratization should have focused first at the chiefdom 
level to provide a foundation which local councils could build upon. 
Jackson concurs with Fanthorpe in recognizing conservative forces at work in 
the decentralization process, and sees much of this conservatism as emanating from 
an administrative cadre.  He writes (2005, p. 56): 
It is somewhat alarming to have conversations with government officials who 
see this pre-war period as some kind of perfect system that needs to be 
rebuilt...It is closely linked to the denial of the war itself within Freetown…in 
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that there is a belief that during the war the bureaucracy somehow heroically 
kept the country going in the face of barbarism. 
He sees this administrative conservatism as manifesting through the recycling of 
personnel from the former centrally controlled system of local government.  In 
Jackson’s (2006) view, administrators stand alongside local politicians and chiefs as 
one of three key groups which will determine the form that decentralization takes and 
its likely outcomes.  He is concerned about the competence of recycled staff, as well 
as the increased likelihood of both conflict and collusion with chiefs based on pre-
existing relationships. 
All three authors agree that donors and the SLPP government approached 
decentralization with different agendas, and that the government’s support for the 
decentralization process was probably motivated by a desire to maintain access to 
external resources and/or to extend its political control.  However, while Fanthorpe  
sees the partisan character of local councils as providing a potential entrée for elite 
capture of these bodies, Esser (2012, p. 415) argues that partisanship is a “blessing 
rather than a curse” because it enables local representation and serves as a conduit for 
change.  At dispute is a decision by the SLPP government that local elections should 
be held on a partisan basis, rejecting the recommendation of a national consultation 
conducted by MLG (with DFID and United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) funding) to the contrary.  Fanthorpe sees this as an instance of the SLPP 
government seeking to expand its base of support in the face of “overwhelming 
popular demand” (p. 46) for non-partisan elections.  Describing the local elections 
that followed, Fanthorpe cites examples of well-worn partisan tactics: canvassing by 
chiefs on behalf of ruling party candidates, on threat of deposition for disobedience; 
and the development of a local form of ‘double politics’ whereby opposition 
councillors ally with rival chiefdom factions to gain leverage against government-
allied paramount chiefs.  He suggests that it is in the context of these bitter political 
struggles that the value of customary regimes to the rural poor becomes visible; while 
such regimes enable chiefly exploitation, they also provide some protection for the 
rights of the rural poor, which are completely disregarded in the milieu of zero-sum 
partisan politics “in which loyalty and trust are available to the highest bidder” (p. 
45).  While Jackson (2005, p. 52; 2006, p. 103) makes a less explicit judgement on the 
government’s motivation for rejecting the recommendation for non-partisan elections, 
his comments reflect sympathy with Fanthorpe’s position. 
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Esser (2012, pp. 406-407) tells a very different story.  He perceives the 
consultation recommendation in favour of non-partisan elections to be a reflection of 
a donor agenda, rather than popular disillusionment with partisan politics.  He further 
argues that the SLPP government was in favour of non-partisan elections as a means 
of preventing the opposition APC from getting more of a foothold.  In his view, it was 
a conflict with the 1991 constitution, which provides for elections to be held on a 
partisan basis, that prevented the joint interests of donors and the SLPP from being 
realized.  Focusing on the implications of decentralization in Freetown, Esser is 
intensely critical of aid agencies’ behaviour.  He describes the way in which donors 
took advantage of their unusual degree of influence in Sierra Leone to push 
decentralization through while making little effort to engage national ministries, let 
alone sub-national stakeholders.  Following the APC’s electoral success in Freetown, 
Esser finds that donors colluded with the SLPP government to undermine the APC-
run Freetown City Council (FCC) in direct contradiction of their professed 
commitment to democratic principles.  As a concrete example of donor-government 
collusion, Esser cites a power struggle between the SLPP government and FCC over 
waste collection in Freetown (2012, pp. 412-413).  Rather than supporting FCC to 
take on responsibility for this area in accordance with the LG Act (2004), donors 
continued to channel funds through central government.  In doing so, he suggests that 
they were motivated by their desire to pursue their development plans under 
politically stable conditions.  In his view, an approach consistent with democratic 
decentralization “would have required sincere engagement with different parties, 
while also accepting the risk of changes in national counterparts and plans” (p. 410). 
Despite his critical account of the role played by aid agencies in inhibiting 
decentralization in Freetown, Esser remains in some ways the most optimistic about 
decentralization’s potential to deliver political transformation at the grassroots.  He 
sees the APC’s record in controlling FCC as a potential driver of the APC’s 2007 
election victory and concludes that “[r]ather than reigniting conflict, partisanship has 
proved to be a source of change driven by Sierra Leonean preferences instead of 
international blueprints” (p. 415).  However, given the dramatic episodes of partisan 
violence which occurred in Freetown in March 2009 (Anonymous, 2009), triggered 
by an incident involving Freetown’s APC mayor, this seems to be rather a selective 
reading of the evidence.  Nevertheless, Esser makes a valuable contribution in 
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highlighting the distinct dynamics of decentralization in Freetown where the city 
council must struggle against central government rather than chiefly encroachment. 
Fanthorpe is perhaps the most pessimistic about decentralization’s 
transformative potential.  For him, it represents a revival of an earlier, failed model of 
local government, and he concludes that “[i]t is hard to imagine an arrangement less 
likely to promote a transformation in political culture” (p. 45); instead, he suggests, 
there is a substantial risk that “decentralization will simply create new platforms for 
the old politics”, leaving the rural poor “locked, as before, into a desperate scramble 
for elite patronage” (p. 47).  Jackson (2006) steers something of a middle course, 
arguing that the success of decentralization will depend on the outcomes of power 
struggles between chiefs, local councillors and administrators.  He believes that local 
councils have a chance of “breaking down the damaging socio-political relationships 
that supported a rural gerontocracy”, but also sees co-optation of local councils by 
that gerontocracy as a real possibility. 
Concluding comments 
The post-war reform of local government currently underway looks quite 
different when understood in historical perspective, rather than through a donor lense.  
Based on pre-conceptions about the marginality of traditional authority, donors tend 
to over-estimate the fragility of chieftaincy.  For example, Fanthorpe (2005, pp. 35, 
36) finds that international staff tend to view decentralization as a means to “capture 
and catalyse modernizing ideas about citizenship and sociality” and are “predicting 
the final demise of chiefdom administration”.  A consideration of the history of 
chieftaincy in Sierra Leone instead points to an unusually resilient local government 
institution which has maintained a prominent status over the course of the last century 
(although it came under violent attack during the civil war).  Much of chieftaincy’s 
success can be explained by the close linkages chiefs have forged with the centre, 
during colonial indirect rule, at the birth of the post-colonial state and through the 
pattern of ‘double politics’ sustained during the post-colonial period up until the 
present.  According to Fanthorpe (2001), even the popular resonance of chieftaincy is 
rooted in chiefs’ role as guarantors of local rights and citizenship, which is a 
consequence of the incorporation of chieftaincy by the state during colonial rule.  
With this historical background in mind, the central government’s approach to 
chieftaincy in the post-war period seems best interpreted as an effort to protect the 
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status quo, which serves their political interests.  Both ‘reformist’ and ‘abolitionist’ 
academics recognize that chiefly power is deeply embedded in the Sierra Leonean 
state, and in society; while the former see the degree of embeddedness as a barrier to 
drastic curtailment of chiefs’ powers, the latter see the harm caused by chiefs as 
necessitating drastic action. 
Donor agencies supporting local councils in Sierra Leone believe them to be a 
democratic innovation, but the historical evidence indicates that the contemporary 
local council system has far more in common with the failed local council system of 
the 1940s-70s than they might like.  Councils are heavily dependent on continued 
external support for their survival, creating a risk that politicians and administrators 
will view councils more as a temporary extractive opportunity than an enduring 
component of the political landscape, and rendering them vulnerable to collapse when 
funding is reduced or withdrawn.  As in the past, councils are likely to struggle to 
capture the political affections of their constituents, particularly given the large size of 
their jurisdictions, the relative isolation of many Sierra Leonean localities; and their 
limited resources.  In this struggle, as in their efforts to secure resources and carve out 
a clear role for themselves, they must compete with chiefdom authorities.  Councils’ 
success in this regard depends heavily on the level of central backing they receive, but 
given their unproven utility to the centre as compared to chiefs, they remain in a 
highly precarious position.  At the same time, there is tentative evidence that new 
connections have been forged in the context of decentralization which link the fate of 
chiefs to that of councils.  For example, the government’s concession as regards the 
potential applicability of universal suffrage to paramount chief elections suggests that 
it is becoming difficult for chieftaincy to evade the logic of democracy which 
underpins the council system.  Should this change proceed, it could provide an entrée 
for reformists to push for further reconfiguration of chieftaincy along more 
democratic lines.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Public Goods Provision in Post-war 
Makeni 
Against the general background of the local government landscape set out in 
chapter three, I now introduce the city of Makeni, my fieldwork site.  I provide an 
overview of Makeni’s history from the colonial era to the present, focusing in 
particular on the economic and political events which have contributed to the city’s 
relative underdevelopment.  I introduce the LGAs studied—Makeni City Council 
(MCC) and the chiefs of Bombali Sebora—and provide a flavour of the dynamics 
which characterize each form of government.  I then set out the findings from the 
survey of senior representatives of households that I conducted in Makeni, which 
provide insight into local perceptions of public goods provision in the city.  As the 
purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the case studies of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ 
which follow, I conclude by considering what the data tell us about the potential of 
these LGAs as providers of local public goods. 
4.1 An introduction to Makeni 
Makeni is the main economic and political hub in northern Sierra Leone, 
located approximately 110 miles from the capital city Freetown by a paved road and 
home to a population of 81,715 at the 2004 census (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004).  It 
was upgraded from a town to a city following the introduction of decentralization, 
along with three others—Bo in the South (pop.148,705) and Kenema (pop. 126,966) 
and Koidu-New Sembehun (pop. 79,981) in the East (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004).  
Makeni, Bo and Kenema serve as the headquarters for each of Sierra Leone’s three 
provinces, while Koidu-New Sembehun is the main urban centre in the Kono 
diamond mining district, close to the Liberian border.  Makeni is the smallest of the 
three provincial headquarters with the least favourable supply of key public goods, a 
position which is the legacy of the colonial administration’s approach to regional 
development.  It is also the heartland of support for the ruling APC party, which 
regained power in late 2007 (a year before my fieldwork began), and the current 
president’s home town. 
The city of Makeni is a relatively recent creation, the result of railway and 
road construction in the 1910s-30s.  According to Milton Harvey (1967, p. 28), the 
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first settlement of Makeni was established at the turn of the twentieth century by 
Keni, the rebellious son of one of the elders of nearby Rogbani, who set up a three-hut 
village near the current city centre.80  Following the construction of a northern railway 
branch connecting Makeni to Freetown in 1916, the settlement transformed rapidly in 
size and significance.  From the perspective of the colonial administration, the main 
purpose of the northern railway was to extract palm kernels, which yielded palm oil 
used in Britain during the Industrial Revolution to make candles and lubricant for 
machinery (Bolten, 2008, p. 34).  Between 1916-23, Makeni saw a wide variety of 
new facilities grow up alongside this extractive trade, including Syrian- and 
European-run commercial enterprises, a prison, a dispensary, a post office with 
savings facilities, a mission school and a military barracks.  In 1921, Makeni was 
declared the district headquarters of the newly created Bombali District and by 1927 
its population had reached approximately 1,000 people (Harvey, 1967, pp. 27-31). 
During the 1930s, Makeni’s position grew steadily stronger.  The railway line 
heading north from Makeni to Kamabai was closed, leaving Makeni as the terminal 
point on the northern branch of the railway.  Subsequently, roads were built 
connecting Kamabai, Kamakwie and Kabala (significant settlements which lay further 
north) to Makeni, consolidating the town’s position as a regional economic hub.  In 
1931, Makeni was declared the provincial headquarters town in place of Makump and 
by 1933 its population had reached 2,325 people (Harvey, 1967, p. 30).  From 1950 
onwards, services in Makeni expanded and improved and its population continued to 
grow.  By the mid-1960s, Makeni was home to more than 12,000 people, as well as 
five elementary schools, two secondary schools and a teacher training college; a 
hospital; city, district and provincial administrative buildings; two major businesses; a 
bank; a cinema; 25 Lebanese shops; more than 60 African shops and bars; and three 
open air markets. (Simpson, 1968, pp. 21-33). 
While Makeni’s growth and development was rapid, the pace of development 
in the North lagged behind both the South and East from the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  Catherine Bolten (2008, pp. 43-47) argues that higher levels of 
colonial investment in the South and East reflect the colonial administration’s relative 
valuation of the export products derived from these regions.  The railway to the South 
and East was completed between 1895-1908, enabling these regions to gain an early 
                                                
80 The name Makeni can be translated ‘to Pa Keni’s village’ (Harvey, 1967). 
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advantage in cash crop farming.  While the main focus in the North was on the 
extraction of palm kernels, a range of additional cash crops were farmed in the South 
and East, including tree crops and swamp rice which required investment in 
mechanized agriculture.  The export economy was later transformed by the discovery 
of alluvial diamonds in the East in the early 1930s; palm products dropped from 71 to 
36 percent of national exports between 1928 and 1936, while diamonds rose from 0 to 
56 percent of exports between 1931 and 1936 (Reno, 1995, p. 48).  Both the colonial 
administration and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, a subsidiary of De Beers which 
had been granted a monopoly on exploration and mining, made investments in 
infrastructure in Kenema and the East in order to maximise profits from the diamond 
trade (Reno, 1995, p. 47; Bolten, 2008, p. 46).  In addition, educational opportunities 
were far better in the predominantly Christian South, in part due to higher levels of 
missionary activity.  In 1938, the number of children attending school in the South 
was four times higher than in the North, and remained more than three times higher a 
decade later (Cartwright, 1970, p. 26). 
The disparity between the South and East and the North persisted during the 
post-colonial period.  Comparing Kenema and Makeni in the 1960s, Dick Simpson 
(1968, pp. 28-33) finds that Kenema has a larger population, more industries and 
commercial firms, higher levels of employment and wealth, and larger and higher 
quality hospitals and schools.  In 1978, a dam on the Dodo River was completed that 
provided power to Bo and Kenema, but no similar dam was developed at the 
Bumbuna River, which sat in close proximity to Makeni (Bolten, 2008, p. 48).  While 
Harvey’s (1967, p. 37) account of Makeni from the late 1960s describes an electrified 
town, according to Bolten (2008, p. 76) mains electricity in Makeni was supplied by 
diesel-fuelled generators at a local power plant and broke down some time in the 
1980s or early 1990s, as did the supply of piped water.  In 1994, an attempt by the 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military junta to restore electricity and 
piped water was scuppered by the reluctance of Makeni’s residents to pay for these 
services (Bolten, 2008, pp. 92-95).  National survey data from 2007 indicate that 
approximately a quarter of households (26%) surveyed in Kenema and a fifth (19%) 
of those surveyed in Bo enjoyed mains electricity, while none in Makeni did so 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 2007, p. 148).  In addition, well over half (58%) of the 
households surveyed in Kenema and close to a fifth (19%) of those surveyed in Bo 
had access to either piped water or a public tap/standpipe, while fewer than one 
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percent of households surveyed in Makeni did so (Government of Sierra Leone, 2007, 
p. 144).   
The relative underdevelopment of northern Sierra Leone was a critical factor 
in the successful mobilization of support by the APC party between its formation in 
1960 and its first election victory in 1967.  The party was formed by disgruntled 
northerners, both Temnes and Limbas81, who felt that they were under-represented 
within the United Front government established in 1960 by Prime Minister Milton 
Margai in an attempt to co-opt his opposition (Cartwright, 1970, pp. 115-122, 125-
137; Kandeh, 1992, pp. 91-92).  The APC mobilized support by exploiting a number 
of significant grievances in the North and in Western Area, including resentment of 
southern prosperity (Tangri, 1978a, p. 172).  By 1962, a ethno-regional voting pattern 
had emerged—while the SLPP dominated in the South and East (where Mendes82 
make up the largest ethnic group), the APC won a majority of seats in Northern 
Province (twelve seats compared to the SLPP’s five) and challenged the SLPP’s 
dominance in Western Area (four seats compared to the SLPP’s five).  This regional 
divide had deepened by the 1967 elections in which the APC ultimately prevailed83, 
taking close to three quarters of the recorded votes in Northern Province and Western 
Area, but only 16 percent of the vote in Mendeland (Cartwright, 1970, pp. 157, 249). 
Despite the APC’s reliance on a core of northern support, Makeni’s relative 
underdevelopment persisted through decades of APC rule (1967-93).  Arthur 
Abraham and Habib Sesay (1993) argue that the North did receive disproportionate 
access to public goods and services under APC rule, citing road construction to 
Makeni and other northern destinations and the distribution of agricultural projects.  
However, Bolten (2008, p. 49; 2012, p. 37) argues forcefully that Makeni was passed 
over for major development projects during Stevens’ era because of his anger against 
a group of northern politicians who broke away to form the United Democratic Party 
in 1970 and held meetings in Makeni.  British government records underline the 
                                                
81 The Temne ethnic group is the largest in Sierra Leone, making up approximately 35 percent of the 
population, while the Limba ethnic group is the third largest, making up 8 percent of the population 
(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).  These two groups are generally considered to constitute the 
bulk of the ethnic base of APC support (Kandeh, 1992, p. 92). 
82 The Mende ethnic group is the second largest in Sierra Leone, making up approximately 31 percent 
of the population. Mende-Temne rivalry currently forms the principal politicized ethnic cleavage in 
Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 1992, p. 90). 
83 The APC won the election in March 1967, but a series of coups and counter-coups took place before 
an APC government was formed in April 1968. 
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significance of this challenge to President Stevens’ rule (The National Archives: 
Public Record Office DO 223/1), yet it seems unlikely that Makeni’s association with 
this political challenge was the principal cause of decades of neglect.  The account of 
Sierra Leone’s economic decline that I set out in chapter one indicates that 
patrimonial resources were under intense pressure and that providing public goods, 
rather than those targeted to specific supporters, was low on Stevens’ list of priorities.  
Reno (1995, pp. 79-129) argues that Stevens initially invested his energies and 
resources in bringing the diamond trade in the East under his control.  It seems likely 
that rewarding Makeni’s residents collectively for their political loyalty with a 
substantial boost in public goods was simply not a priority for Stevens, particularly 
given the lack of strong political competition in the city.  Jimmy Kandeh (1992, pp. 
94-95) lends some support to this view, arguing that despite the status of the North as 
an APC base of support, contracting patronage opportunities resulted in “widespread 
popular discontent with the performance of the APC regime that cuts across ethnic 
and regional lines”, expressed through demonstrations in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 
Makeni was largely unaffected by the early stages of Sierra Leone’s civil war 
(1991-2002).  However, from early 1994, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces 
(the rebel group which instigated Sierra Leone’s civil war) began to make incursions 
into Bombali District (in which Makeni is based) and establish bases there.  In May 
1997, members of the Sierra Leone Army led a coup against President Kabbah’s 
elected government, formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and 
announced that they had established an alliance with the RUF.  In February 1998, 
RUF/AFRC forces driven out of Freetown by troops from the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) engaged in a wave of violent looting in Makeni 
known as ‘Operation Pay Yourself’.  In March 1998, ECOWAS troops established a 
base in Makeni and RUF/AFRC forces spread throughout the district.  After ongoing 
fighting between ECOWAS forces and the RUF/AFRC during the latter half of 1998, 
the RUF/AFRC seized control of Makeni on December 24, 1998, and the town 
remained a key base of operations until 2001.  After the violent collapse of early 
disarmament attempts in Makeni in early 2000, government helicopter gunships 
attacked RUF/AFRC positions in and around Makeni between May and July 2000, 
leading to numerous civilian deaths, property damage and mass exodus.  Makeni was 
returned to the control of peacekeeping forces in April 2001 and disarmament began 
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in earnest in September 2001 (Smith, Gambette, & Longley, 2004, pp. 125-129; 
Bolten, 2012, pp. xvi-xx). 
Bolten (2008, p. 42) argues that despite the suffering of Makeni’s residents, 
they were stigmatized by Kabbah’s SLPP government as rebel collaborators, while 
the residents of occupied towns in the East like Kailahun and Kono were treated as 
victims.  According to Bolten, this enabled Kabbah to restrict the flow of post-war aid 
to Makeni, while investing in the regions where he had political support.  However, 
when I arrived in Makeni in October 2008, almost seven years had passed since the 
end of the war and the political pendulum had swung in Makeni’s favour with the 
return of the APC to power.  President Koroma, who took office in late 2007 and held 
on to power in the 2012 elections, is not only the first president identifying as a 
Temne (both Stevens and Momoh identified as Limbas), but was born and raised in 
Makeni, where his mother still lives.  Far from being stigmatized by the central 
government, Makeni was now a focus of party pride.  The president was in the habit 
of making frequent weekend visits to Makeni between 2008-09 and the 2009 APC 
conference led to a significant cleaning and redecorating of the town and the 
temporary supply of electricity to some of the city’s streets in order that it could show 
Sierra Leone its best face. 
Despite this significant change in Makeni’s political fortunes, there were 
surprisingly few major projects underway to improve its supply of public goods 
during the course of my fieldwork in 2009.  The city’s central square remained 
scarred by a failed project to construct a clocktower (see image 4.1) and there was 
little obvious movement to establish mains electricity and piped water and bring the 
city up to the standard of Bo and Kenema, the other provincial capitals.  However, 
since leaving Makeni I have heard through correspondence with my research assistant 
that significant improvements in the city’s infrastructure took place prior to the 2012 
elections, including the completion of the clocktower.  While Makeni may finally be 
receiving some political reward for its loyalty to the APC, the legacy of 
underdevelopment it has inherited will only be overcome with sustained support. 
4.2 Local government actors in Makeni 
Like other provincial localities, Makeni is governed both by a local council, 
MCC, and chiefdom authorities headed by a paramount chief, in this case Paramount 
Chief (PC) Kasangna II of Bombali Sebora chiefdom.  The city council and chiefdom 
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authorities are not the only form of local government present in the city—the district 
council, district offices of ministries and the provincial administration are also found 
there; the latter consists of the resident minister, North (the regional representative of 
the Ministry of Local Government) and the staff that supports him, headed by the 
provincial secretary.  However, it is MCC and Bombali Sebora chiefdom authorities 
that are the focus of this study. 
i) Makeni City Council 
Makeni Town Council was established in 1962 under the authority of the 
Townships Act (1959)—seven years after Bo’s council, but one year before 
Kenema’s council.  While initially the council was partially elected, from 1972 it 
operated as a centrally appointed committee of management (Kanu, 2009, p. 53).  It is 
difficult to trace the early history of the council with a high degree of precision, as its 
records were destroyed when the council building was burned down during the RUF 
invasion of Makeni; the provincial archives held at the provincial secretary’s office 
were also destroyed (Reed & Robinson, 2012, p. 2).  Council workers claim that the 
rebels started the fire at the council building, but most of Makeni’s residents believe 
that the council workers themselves burned down the building for fear that their 
corrupt practices would be discovered and retribution visited upon them. 
The secondary literature touching upon the early history of Makeni Town 
Council is extremely sparse.  Based on fieldwork conducted in the mid-1960s, 
Simpson (1968, pp. 69-72) describes a council made up of thirteen councillors—six 
elected, two appointed by central government, two appointed by the chiefdom 
committee, the paramount chief, the area engineer and the medical officer.  While he 
finds the town council more effective than its district-level counterpart, he notes that 
the council faced a significant problem in encouraging the town’s residents to pay 
building rates, which had driven them into deficit.  Alhassan Kanu (2009, p. 53) 
argues that town councils’ performance deteriorated after they were converted to 
committees of management in the early 1970s.  In his view, they were simply the 
local machinery of predatory governance driven from the centre and provided little of 
benefit to the town’s residents.  Drawing on newspaper archives, Bolten (2008, pp. 
80-84) provides some insight into Makeni Town Council under military rule in the 
1990s.  On coming to power, the NPRC fired all councillors and replaced them with 
new appointees.  Initial successes in road repair and the construction of new public 
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buildings were short-lived; by the mid-1990s the council was bankrupt, a corruption 
scandal exploded and the chairman and six other councillors were suspended.  Bolten 
suggests that this cycle of corruption has established itself as a familiar routine of 
council behaviour which makes it very difficult for residents to trust any council 
enough to invest in paying taxes. 
The first post-reform Makeni Town Council established in 2004 had a total of 
twelve political representatives—one chairman, a former NGO worker called Musa 
Mansaray, and eleven councillors, four of whom were women.  All of the councillors 
represented the APC party.  The post-reform council inherited the administrative and 
operational staff of the pre-war committee of management.  Decades of patronage had 
swelled the ranks of these inherited staff to almost 100; this is consistent with 
accounts by Kanu (2009, p. 53) and Tangri (1978b, p. 23) which report that council 
recruitment was used systematically to reward clients.  While several of those in more 
senior administrative positions remained in office, approximately 50 percent of the 
administrative and operational staff were laid off at the end of September 2004.84  
This led to immediate protests about the lack of redundancy payments (Bolten, 2008, 
p. 101) which according to staff at the Decentralization Secretariat, remained unpaid 
in late 2009 due to a protracted dispute about whether payment was a central 
government or council responsibility. 
The first eighteen months of the council’s operations were highly turbulent, 
characterized by struggles with local interest-based associations.  Bolten (2008, pp. 
99-107) describes a bitter dispute over dues collection in the lorry park which resulted 
in two different drivers’ unions collecting dues simultaneously—one at the behest of 
the council, and the second operating on its own authority.  In chapter five I describe 
a similar dispute over dues collection in the market which caused significant 
animosity with the Traders’ Union and primed them to take action against the 
council’s chairman over a corruption scandal which blew up in late 2005.  By 
February 2006, the chairman, the deputy chairman and the chief administrator of 
MCC had been forced to resign.  This was claimed as a victory of citizen 
accountability-seeking by advocates of decentralization (Zhou, 2009, p. 25), when it 
would be more accurate to characterize this episode as the product of local political 
struggles, as discussed in the next chapter.  The chairman was replaced by another 
                                                
84 Minutes, council meeting, October 21, 2004. 
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councillor for the remainder of the term, Andrew B. Kanu.  Makeni Town Council 
was subsequently renamed Makeni City Council (MCC) after the town was upgraded 
to a city, and Andrew B. Kanu became Makeni’s first mayor. 
Following the 2008 elections, the number of political representatives increased 
to sixteen, seven incumbents and nine new representatives.  Seven of the sixteen 
councillors were women, including the deputy mayor; this is likely to reflect the APC 
party’s desire to make a nod to the gender equality agenda of development donors.  
Of the five former councillors who were not re-elected, two had resigned during the 
corruption scandal and two gave up their seats to compete for the separately elected 
position of mayor.  They lost out to a newcomer, Moses Sesay, a young man who had 
worked as a teacher for more than a decade in both Sierra Leone and Gambia and 
subsequently as a corporate sales executive for a mobile phone company.  He only 
became active in politics in 2007, shortly before his election.  The APC’s choice of 
Sesay for mayor therefore seems to indicate a desire for new blood in local politics 
following their national victory.  By 2009, the number of professionalized 
administrative staff at MCC had expanded following a recruitment exercise to fill a 
standard set of positions for each council.85  The chief administrator (CA) was a 
member of the old guard—he had first joined Makeni Town Council as an 
administrative assistant in 1993, but was promoted to acting deputy CA in the post-
reform world and then managed to win the CA post after the forced resignation of his 
predecessor in the corruption scandal.  Some of the other key posts, including that of 
finance officer and deputy CA, were filled by newer recruits. 
Survey data collected by the World Bank project supporting the 
decentralization process86 indicate that in 2008 MCC’s councillors ranged in age from 
32 years to 58 years old, with a mean age of 45 years.  Twelve of the sixteen (75%) 
were born in Bombali Sebora chiefdom, a further three (19%) in other chiefdoms in 
Bombali District and one (6%) in nearby Tonkolili District.  Ten (63%) identified as 
Temne, four (25%) as Limba and one each as Fula and Mende (6%).  Nine (56%) 
were Christian and five (31%) Muslim, with the religious identification of the 
                                                
85 These positions were: chief administrator, deputy chief administrator, finance officer, accountant, 
procurement officer and statistician (Kanu, 2009). 
86 The 2008 Decentralization Stakeholders Survey was carried out by the Institutional Reform and 
Capacity Building Project (IRCBP).  I obtained a copy of the dataset and carried out basic descriptive 
analysis of this data using SPSS.  I include the mayor in the category ‘councillors’ for the purposes of 
this analysis. 
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remaining two unknown; this does not reflect the religious make-up of the city, where 
Islam is the majority religion.  In general, councillors appeared to be wealthy.  Eleven 
councillors (69%) had a generator, ten (63%) had a television, eight (50%) had a 
motorized vehicle and three (19%) had a computer—all unusual possessions.  Eight 
councillors (50%) had lived outside the country, predominantly in West Africa, and 
twelve (75%) had family members living outside of the country, predominantly in 
North America and Europe. 
Once more, all councillors represented the APC party—this was unsurprising, 
as more than 90 percent of votes cast in Makeni’s 2008 local elections were for the 
APC (National Electoral Commission, 2008). The APC’s decision about which 
candidates would receive the party symbol was therefore critical in determining 
electoral outcomes.  On average, councillors reported facing approximately six rivals 
in their bid to win the party symbol.  Councillors reported receiving assistance from 
local party officials (62%), Freetown party officials (23%) and their communities 
(15%) in their bid for the party symbol.  Over 80 percent of councillors said they paid 
a financial contribution to the party for the symbol—this ranged from 200,000 Le to 
250,000 Le (£38 to £48).  In addition, councillors reported spending between 200,000 
Le and 20,000,000 Le (£38 and £3,800) of their own funds on their election 
campaigns; the median amount spent was 3,500,000 Le (£670).  Over 50 percent of 
councillors said that their own funds were the most important source of support for 
their campaign, while others cited supporters within their ward (19%), supporters 
outside their ward (13%) or the party (13%) as their most important source of support.  
Twelve councillors reported receiving 1,000,000 Le (£190) from the APC towards 
their campaign costs, while the remaining four councillors said they did not receive 
anything.  Only four councillors reported receiving funds from the chiefdom 
authorities—for three of them, this amounted to 50,000 Le (£9.50), while one 
received 200,000 Le (£38).  Five councillors reported receiving funds from private 
businesses ranging from 100,000 Le to 1,000,000 Le (£19 to £190). 
The survey demonstrated strong kinship links between Makeni’s councillors 
and chiefs.  Fifteen of sixteen councillors (94%) were members of a ruling house, 
twelve (75%) counted a town chief or section chief among their relatives and eleven 
(69%) were related to a paramount chief, of whom six (38%) were related to PC 
Kasangna.  The survey data suggested that relationships between PC Kasangna and 
the council were generally positive.  All but one of the councillors reported that the 
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paramount chief strongly supported decentralization and all councillors agreed that 
there was no current dispute with the paramount chief.  On average, councillors 
reported meeting the paramount chief approximately five times during the previous 
month.  Seven councillors (44%) said they would consider running for the position of 
paramount chief in the future, while twelve councillors (75%) expressed an interest in 
running for an MP position.  It therefore appears that there is a significant overlap 
between councillors and the chiefly elite in Makeni; a phenomenon that has been well 
documented for national politicians in Sierra Leone (Kilson, 1966, pp. 71-75; 
Barrows, 1976, pp. 204-205). 
Life for the council in 2009, when I was conducting fieldwork in Makeni, was 
far calmer than during the first phase of reform.  Mayor Moses Sesay seemed to have 
avoided making significant enemies, leaving him at lower risk of exposure through a 
corruption scandal.  However, there were rumours during the 2009 APC conference 
held in Makeni that the president was dissatisfied with his performance and would not 
give him the symbol for a second term in 2012.87  My experience with the council 
suggested that the mayor makes most of the decisions on its behalf behind closed 
doors.  Monthly council meetings are constructed as a dialogue between the mayor 
and individual councillors speaking one at a time, rather than a group discussion.  
Although the mayor sometimes seeks councillors’ approval for decisions during these 
meetings, I never witnessed a vote take place on any issue discussed.  Councillors 
also run fifteen committees focused on different functions and services.88  However, 
the committee system is quite disorganized—some committees fail to meet and they 
often have little to report when called upon by the mayor during meetings.  
Councillors complain about the lack of budget and administrative support available to 
them to operate these committees.  The role of a councillor appears to be a relatively 
powerless one—it is only those who have the mayor’s ear who can exert influence 
over council policy. 
The council implements a number of ‘transparency, accountability and 
participation’ measures specified in the LG Act (2004), including opening its 
meetings to the public, posting meeting minutes and developments plans on the notice 
                                                
87 According to my research assistant, Moses Sesay did indeed lose his position in the 2012 elections. 
88 The committees set up in 2008 were: agriculture, budget and finance, development, education, 
establishment, health and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, local technical planning, procurement, social welfare, 
surveys and town planning, taxation, women’s empowerment, works and technical maintenance and 
youth and sport. 
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board and holding needs assessments.  However, few people attend council meetings, 
perhaps due to their length, uncertain start times and/or the relative lack of decision-
making taking place there.  Minutes and plans are usually posted after some delay and 
often only a few pages are visible due to limited space on the glass-covered notice 
board.  I observed one needs assessment shortly after arriving in Makeni; it was 
extremely well attended, but few people had the opportunity to speak, and the meeting 
quickly descended into a dispute about the lack of transport allowances available.  
These few observations indicate that ‘transparency, accountability and participation’ 
measures may be dulled in their implementation. 
The clear continuities between past and present councils touched upon here 
lend further support to the view that Sierra Leone’s decentralization process is 
conservative in character (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2006).  To Makeni’s residents, 
the ‘new’ local council represents the latest manifestation of city government, rather 
than a radical break with the past.  The key administrator is recycled from a widely 
discredited period of city government.  The councillors representing Makeni’s 
residents exhibit characteristics common to Sierra Leonean politicians: they are drawn 
from elite backgrounds and enjoy close links to chiefs.  While they are elected rather 
than appointed (as under the former committee of management), the dominance of 
ethno-regional politics means that councillors remain reliant on central goodwill for 
their positions.  Struggles over local resources and cycles of corruption which have 
already re-established themselves in the post-war period are also familiar to Makeni’s 
residents. 
This account is also suggestive of an underlying tension between a donor-led 
model of decentralization and local political culture.  The basic architecture set out in 
the LG Act (2004) is in place and prescribed practices to promote transparency and 
accountability—for example, holding meetings open to the public—are followed.  Yet 
it is partisan politics that really energizes the local council system and this continues 
to imply a set of clientelist relations.  The effectiveness of electoral accountability is 
undermined both by councillors’ lack of influence and by the APC’s role in hand-
picking candidates.  While some measures to promote transparency and accountability 
are in place, they do not appear to be encouraging societal accountability-seeking of 
the kind envisaged by donors; the key example of change cited by donors (the 2005 
corruption scandal) is underpinned by a local political narrative which is suppressed 
when it is framed in this light.  In sum, I found little evidence of electoral or societal 
 125 
accountability developing in a manner which would yield better public goods 
provision in accordance with popular theories of decentralization. 
ii) Bombali Sebora chiefdom 
Makeni lies entirely within Bombali Sebora chiefdom, a Temne chiefdom, 
making up one of its five sections.  Bombali Sebora was first established as a ‘native 
administration’ in 1939.  While Makeni was a site of protest during the outbreak of 
anti-chief violence in the North in 1955-56, the extent of the outbreak was relatively 
limited (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 34-
36).  Government hearings were held in early 1957 to investigate the paramount 
chief’s conduct.  Complaints against him included showing a lack of respect to his 
people; employing forced labour on his farms; and allowing the ‘native’ court to 
impose excessive fines, often prior to cases being heard.  Although the paramount 
chief’s conduct was found to be “subversive of the interests of good government”, he 
narrowly avoided deposition and was instead temporarily suspended (Edwards, 
Willan, & Storr, 1957, pp. 23-29, 73-24). 
The current paramount chief is PC Kasangna II, who has been in power since 
1993.  The chiefdom he rules is structured according to two distinct logics.  The 
standard administrative hierarchy derived from colonial-era legislation (described 
briefly in chapter one) is in place.  However, the chiefdom is also structured 
according to a Temne hierarchy of pre-colonial origin, made up of kȧp"r, or 
ceremonial chiefs.  These ceremonial chiefs are chosen by the paramount chief and 
undergo an extended period of ritual seclusion with him known as kantha before his 
installation.  There are a number of titled positions in the kȧp"r hierarchy, each with 
its own set of responsibilities, including ritual responsibilities connected to the death 
and installation of a new chief (see Simpson (1968, p. 57), Vernon Dorjahn (1960, p. 
113) and Kenneth Wylie (1977, pp. 31-53) for further detail). 
The Temne institution of chieftaincy89 has a mystical dimension which is not 
shared in the more secular Mende tradition (Biyi, 1913; Ture, 1939; Dorjahn, 1960; 
Ijagbemi, 1973).  E. Adeleye Ijagbemi (1973, pp. 25-26) describes a pattern of 
mystical linkage connecting each Temne paramount chief to his predecessor in a line 
                                                
89 Esu Biyi (1913, pp. 198-199) and Vernon Dorjahn (1960, p. 112) note that there are important 
differences between ‘Muslim’ and ‘society’ chiefdoms.  In the former, sub-chiefs bear the title 
alimamy rather than kȧp"r.  Bombali Sebora is a ‘society’ chiefdom. 
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stretching back to the first king Bai Farma Tami, a Fula90 man who once ruled over all 
Temne people, but returned to Fuuta Jalon (across the border in Guinea) at his death.  
Each man selected to be paramount chief is required to undergo a process of 
transformative preparation before his installation.  An account of the installation 
process in Makari chiefdom documents three stages: an annointing ceremony; the 
performance of rites by the former chief’s kȧp"r and the selection of new kȧp"r; and a 
period of seclusion (often lasting many months) known as kantha along with those he 
has chosen, during which the chief learns about his chiefdom and his responsibilities 
as chief (Ture, 1939).  During these stages, the prospective chief takes on a series of 
names symbolising his transformation; it is only once he leaves kantha and is 
crowned that he takes on his chiefly title.  In Bombali Sebora, those I spoke to 
mentioned a progression from ɔwe-a leŋ (the one that is meant/intended) following 
the chief’s election, to ɔsip (the leopard) once he enters kantha, to kombolo (a flying 
squirrel) in the later stages of kantha.91 
In 200992, PC Kasangna had not yet completed the ritual installation process, 
creating an awkward situation where an interim chief (Pa Rok93) and a paramount 
chief rule concurrently.94  Until the elected paramount chief enters into kantha, he 
must share the power of the chieftaincy with the kȧp"r or ceremonial chiefs of the 
former paramount chief, in particular Pa Rok, who rules as interim chief between the 
death of one paramount chief and the installation of the next.  When a chief goes into 
kantha, he takes those he has selected to serve as his kȧp"r with him.  The first among 
them is Kȧp"r M"s"m (guardian of traditions/customs), who is always the prospective 
chief’s sister’s son—according to several of the chiefs I spoke to, this ensures that 
women (who cannot become paramount chiefs in the North) have their own share in 
the chieftaincy.  On the death of the chief, Pa M"s"m becomes Pa Rok, an interim 
                                                
90 There has been a Fula presence in Sierra Leone since the 17th century, with the majority of Fula 
originating from Fuuta Jalon in Guinea.  A permanent Fula settlement in Freetown was established in 
the early 1800s.  Other areas of settlement included Bombali District, Tonkolili District, Kailahun 
District and Pujehun District (Jalloh, 1999, pp. 1-10). 
91 These discussions were somewhat incidental and therefore this may not be a comprehensive list of 
the names a chiefly candidate takes on during his transformation. 
92 The rest of this account is based on fieldwork in 2009 and uses the present tense to describe events at 
that time. 
93 This is the common usage English spelling, so I do not italicize. 
94 According to his Facebook page, PC Kasangna did enter kantha in 2011, and has now been crowned 
in accordance with Temne custom. 
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ruler who plays a significant role in the burial rites of the former chief and the 
installation of the new chief.95 
As he has not yet entered kantha, Kasangna is a paramount chief in the eyes of 
the government, but he is not a full chief according to Temne custom; a number of 
chiefdom elders emphasized to me that he is still ɔwe-a leŋ (the one that is 
meant/intended).  Pa Rok retains certain powers, including the right to operate the 
main chiefdom barri (where cases are heard) and oversight of the kȧp"r and the 
chiefdom’s sodalities (secret societies) (see chapter six).  He also plays a critical role 
during the installation of a new paramount chief.  Pa Rok’s presence ensures the 
continuity of the “mystic chain” (Ture, 1939, p. 95) of chiefs—he is the human link 
which connects one paramount chief to another.  However, the delay in PC Kasangna 
going to kantha creates risks for the renewal of the chieftaincy in its Temne form.  
The former chief’s kȧp"r are dying out and cannot be replaced and Pa Rok himself 
could die before PC Kasangna enters kantha, undermining a sense of continuity. 
Many different explanations are given for Kasangna’s failure to enter kantha.  
His critics say that he is afraid because he violated chiefdom laws during the election 
and that if he goes to kantha he will die there, presumably as a consequence of 
supernatural forces.  In contrast, the account given by Kasangna and his allies 
suggests that the attorney general, the son of the former paramount chief, is blocking 
his ability to enter kantha because it will undermine his influence over the chiefdom, 
exercised through Pa Rok and the other kȧp"r.  A further possibility is that Kasangna 
is reluctant to commit to a period of several months in kantha, which could result in 
him having to relinquish his position as one of the paramount chief representatives in 
parliament. 
There are further tensions in Bombali Sebora over the practice of rotation of 
the chieftaincy between clans or ruling houses observed in most Temne chiefdoms 
(Dorjahn, 1960, pp. 126-127).96  In Bombali Sebora, there are four ruling houses 
which all belong to the Kamara clan: Petbana Marank, Petbana Masimbo, Maboleh 
                                                
95 If Pa M"s"m dies before the paramount chief, the chief selects a Kȧp"r Bana who will take on the 
role of Pa Rok in his stead. 
96 The practice of rotation is not unique to Temne chieftaincies.  In some cases, rotational agreements 
were created when colonial amalgamations took place.  For example, see Fanthorpe et al (2009, pp. 32-
33). 
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and Mabureh.  Historically, they have taken turns in holding the chieftaincy97 and in 
any given election local custom dictates that only the descendants of the relevant 
ruling house should compete in earnest.  PC Kasangna from Maboleh ruling house 
was reportedly elected ‘out of turn’ in the rotational cycle, breaking with this custom.  
There were clear dividing lines between the ruling houses over the events which 
transpired during the election.  Those I spoke to from Petbana Masimbo (which was 
passed over) and Mabureh (which would follow Maboleh if rotation were observed) 
argued that there was a clear custom of rotation, but this was overcome through the 
intervention of the NPRC military regime in favour of Michael Kamara (who later 
became PC Kasangna II).  Michael Kamara’s wealth was also seen as key to his 
success, as it enabled him to spend generously in order to mobilize chiefdom 
councillors and to pay the 1,000,000 Le (£190) fee required to ‘buy’ the ballot boxes.  
His main rival from Petbana Masimbo reports that he could not afford this sum and 
was forced to drop out of the running; his subsequent petitions to NPRC and SLPP 
governments were fruitless.  This is perhaps unsurprising, as Kasangna is perceived 
locally as a staunch supporter of the SLPP; while he denies this, he acknowledges that 
his failure to campaign actively for the APC in 2007 disappointed President Koroma, 
particularly as Koroma’s father was instrumental during Kasangna’s own election to 
the chieftaincy. 
Those from Maboleh (house of the current chief) and Petbana Marank (house 
of the previous chief) argued that the rotational system was no longer in effect at the 
time of the last election, as it had been undermined by the claim of chiefly 
descendants from obsolete chiefdom Konta Bai Siari98 that they had the right to 
compete in elections in Bombali Sebora (although to my knowledge this claim had 
not yet been fully recognized by chiefdom elders).  Representatives of both Maboleh 
and Petbana Marank said that there was little protest from other ruling houses during 
the last election, highlighting a post-election letter to the district commissioner signed 
by all ceremonial chiefs which confirmed their support for Michael Kamara.  Looking 
                                                
97 Although local accounts describe a lapse of 48 years when the chiefdom crown was stolen; Simpson 
(1968, pp. 47-48) puts this as occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
98 According to PC Kasangna, Konta Bai Siari was absorbed into Bombali Sebora and Paki Masabong 
chiefdoms during the colonial period.  He believes that there was no formal amalgamation agreement 
and therefore descendants of Konta Bai Siari’s chiefs have not been considered eligible to stand for 
election in either of these chiefdoms.  The Sierra Leone Protectorate Handbook (1960) documents an 
amalgamation of Bombali Sebora and Bombali Siari in 1949 with the name Bombali Sebora persisting 
as the name of the new amalgamated territory. 
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forward, it is not clear whether rotation will continue to be practised—representatives 
of three out of four ruling houses said that they believed that the next election would 
be open to candidates from all ruling houses.99   
This description of Bombali Sebora chiefdom is broadly consistent with the 
literature on central-local relations describing the prevalence of ‘double politics’ 
(Minikin, 1973; Barrows, 1976; Tangri, 1976, 1978a).  Opponents’ accounts of the 
election suggest that the NPRC government played a significant role in assuring PC 
Kasangna’s election, and he appears to have subsequently formed a reciprocal 
relationship with the ruling SLPP government.  This has placed him in an awkward 
position with the current APC government (and his own subjects) which is likely to 
require some renegotiation.  While central intervention in chiefdom affairs is evident, 
struggles for control and influence are played out in the context of local institutions.  
PC Kasangna’s rivals accuse him not of bad government, but of violating long-
standing customs.  While PC Kasangna appears to have been successful in riding 
rough-shod over chiefdom rules regarding rotation of the chieftaincy, he has not been 
so lucky when it comes to practices around initiation and crowning of a chief.  This 
account emphasizes the resilience of a characteristically Temne form of chieftaincy—
the hierarchy of kȧp"r and the practice of kantha discussed are a prominent feature of 
accounts of Temne chieftaincy in the nineteenth century (Ijagbemi, 1973; Wylie, 
1977, pp. 31-53).  Wylie (1977, p. 212) argues that the preservation of Temne 
institutions played a protective role during the decades of colonial government, 
allowing Temne people “some dignity and some identity”.  While the present 
manifestations of these institutions are, of course, much changed, they continue to 
materially shape the power and authority of the chief.  PC Kasangna’s delay in going 
to kantha means that he must share power with a rival and his patron, and cannot 
oversee the chiefdom’s main barri or the sodalities—both activities that carry a 
significant degree of local legitimacy.  Thus while central support may have enabled 
PC Kasangna to obtain and hold the position of paramount chief, he cannot easily 
brush away the consequences of not adhering to local rules. 
                                                
99 The 2009 Chieftaincy Act states that in amalgamated chiefdoms, elections will be conducted on a 
rotational crowning basis.  It is not clear what this will mean yet given the particular history of 
amalgamation in Bombali Sebora. 
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4.3 Survey findings: Local perceptions of public goods 
provision 
In chapter one, I set out the methods used to conduct a survey of senior 
representatives of households.  Here, I set out the findings.  First, I establish the main 
characteristics of the respondent group.  I then set out respondents’ views of LGAs’ 
performance as public goods providers, considering how far they support my case 
selection.  Finally, I present some data on respondents’ views on the nature and extent 
of LGAs’ power. 
i) Respondent characteristics 
The final dataset analyzed (n=272)100 was made up of 47 percent male and 53 
percent female senior representatives of households.  They varied in age from 18 to 
88, with a mean age of 37.4 years (SD=14.0).  Current life expectancy in Sierra Leone 
stands at 47.8 years (United Nations Development Programme, 2011).  The women 
interviewed were on average younger than the men, with a mean age of 
approximately 35 years, as opposed to 40 years for men. 
Approximately one third of those surveyed (34%) identified Bombali Sebora 
as their chiefdom of birth, and can thus be considered ‘indigenes’ of the chiefdom.  Of 
the ‘strangers’ born outside of the chiefdom, 18 percent identified a chiefdom of birth 
in Bombali District and a further 21 percent identified a chiefdom of birth outside of 
the district but within Northern Province.  Only two percent reported being born in a 
chiefdom in either Southern Province or Eastern Province.  Approximately 20 percent 
reported that they could not identify their chiefdom of birth101, but could name a 
district, of whom 75 percent identified a district in Northern Province, 16 percent a 
district in Eastern Province and 9 percent a district in Southern Province.  The 
majority (69%) of respondents identified as Temnes, while smaller numbers identified 
as Limba (9%), Fula (9%), Loko (4%), Mandingo (4%) and Mende (1%).  Islam was 
the dominant religion (79% of respondents), but a substantial proportion (21%) of 
respondents were Christian. 
                                                
100 As discussed in chapter one, seven respondents were excluded due to concerns about the quality of 
their responses. 
101 This result is surprising given Richard Fanthorpe’s (2001) arguments about the “extreme 
localization of criteria of identity and belonging” (p. 372) in rural Sierra Leone (chapter three).  It is 
possible that the linkage to a chiefdom of birth becomes less critical for those that have permanently 
relocated to a city.  It is also possible that respondents found this question invasive, as it identifies them 
in a very explicit way. 
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Thirty-six percent of respondents reported having no formal education within 
the school system, a further fifteen percent had ended their education at primary level 
and thirty-one percent at secondary level.  Three percent had attended university, ten 
percent had attended training to be a teacher or nurse, and four percent had attended 
technical or vocational training.  Women had lower levels of education than men.   
This gap was widest at the extremes; female respondents made up 70 percent of those 
with no formal education and only 32 percent of those who had completed further or 
tertiary education. 
Respondents were asked whether somebody in their household owned a 
variety of technological items, including items for managing communications and 
transport.  In terms of communications, a high proportion (80%) of respondents 
reported household ownership of a mobile phone and a radio, but only 18 percent 
reported household ownership of a television.  This is unsurprising given not only the 
higher cost of this item, but the lack of a central supply of electricity and low levels of 
generator ownership, which stood at 20 percent.  In terms of transport, 18 percent of 
respondents reported household ownership of a bicycle and 9 percent household 
ownership of a motorized vehicle.  Just over a quarter (27%) of respondents reported 
household ownership of at least one high value item (a generator, television or 
motorized vehicle). 
Fifteen percent of respondents lived in a household where a member occupied 
a position within chiefdom government, including that of paramount or section chief 
(4%), kȧp"r (ceremonial chief) (3%), sub-chief (5%), chiefdom councillor (10%) or a 
local court position (1%).  No respondent lived in a household where a member 
occupied a recognized position within local council government, while one percent 
had a household member who was a ward development committee (WDC) member.  
All respondents who counted a WDC member among the members of their household 
also had a household member who served within chiefdom government. 
ii) Public goods provision led by MCC 
The questionnaire first probed respondents’ views of the positive contributions 
made by MCC in an open-ended way in order to situate the cases of interest in the 
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broadest possible context (table 4.3.1).102  The five positive contributions most 
frequently identified by respondents were cleaning the city (73%); 
constructing/maintaining the drainage system (58%); constructing/maintaining roads 
(33%); constructing/maintaining the new council building (16%); and providing 
market facilities (16%).  When asked to identify the single best thing the council had 
done, cleaning the city was the clear leader (41%), while maintaining the drainage 
system lagged behind in second place (20%).  Only seven percent of respondents 
identified constructing/maintaining the slaughterhouse as a positive contribution and 
only one percent considered it the best thing the council had done. 
In response to a similar open-ended probe about areas in which the council 
had failed to perform, the five areas of failure most frequently identified were 
providing a water supply (45%), constructing/maintaining roads (43%), providing 
electricity (36%), cleaning the city (28%) and constructing/maintaining the drainage 
system (22%) (table 4.3.1).  When asked to identify the most important thing MCC 
had failed to do, providing a water supply (18%) and electricity (15%) topped the list, 
with only eight percent of respondents identifying the cleaning effort.  Very few 
respondents identified the construction and management of the slaughterhouse as an 
area of poor performance (2%) and even fewer (1%) considered it MCC’s most 
important failure. 
                                                
102 When coding responses, I created a response category if a minimum of six respondents (2.2%) 
considered the area either a success or a failure.  All other responses were coded as ‘other’. 
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Table 4.3.1 Respondents’ perceptions of MCC’s successes and failures 
Percentage of respondents identifying as: Activity 
Success* (n=247) Failure** (n=259) 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Clean the city 73.7 71.3 72.5 25.4 30.1 27.8 
Construct/maintain the drainage 
system 
59.3 55.8 57.5 25.4 19.5 22.4 
Construct/maintain roads 33.9 32.6 33.2 54.0 33.1 43.2 
Construct/maintain new council 
building 
28.8 4.7 16.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Provide market facilities 12.7 18.6 15.8 9.5 21.8 15.8 
Collect revenue 9.3 9.3 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construct/manage slaughterhouse 12.7 0.8 6.5 0.8 2.3 1.5 
Construct/maintain other buildings 5.9 5.4 5.7 11.9 3.0 7.3 
Provide water supply 5.1 5.4 5.3 55.6 34.6 44.8 
Provide educational 
facilities/services 
5.1 3.9 4.5 4.8 12.8 8.9 
Carry out public health activities 5.9 3.1 4.5 15.9 3.0 9.3 
Provide medical facilities/services 3.4 3.1 3.2 7.9 9.0 8.5 
Behave transparently/accountably 2.5 2.3 2.4 4.8 2.3 3.5 
Maintain public order 0.8 3.0 2.0 1.6 3.8 2.7 
Provide electricity 1.7 1.5 1.6 32.5 39.1 35.9 
Generate employment 0.8 0.8 0.8 11.1 9.0 10.0 
Control commodity prices 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.6 6.8 4.2 
Construct clocktower 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.5 11.3 21.6 
Provide personal advice and support 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 22.6 13.1 
Renovate stadium 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 3.0 7.3 
Manage the council administration 
effectively 
0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 3.8 4.6 
Provide support for agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.0 2.7 
Other 3.0 4.1 3.6 6.3 3.8 5.0 
None 2.5 9.3 6.1 0.0 0.8 0.4 
 
*Respondents were asked: “From 2004 when it was established until now, what good things has the 
new Makeni City Council done for the city”/ “Frɔ 2004 we dɛn briŋ dis nu Makeni Siti Kawnsil until 
naw, wetin na di gud tiŋ dɛn we yu fil se Makeni Siti Kawnsil dɔn du fɔ di siti?” 
 
**Respondents were asked: “From 2004 when it was established until now, what has Makeni City 
Council failed to do the city”/ “Frɔ 2004 we dɛn briŋ dis nu Makeni Siti Kawnsil until naw, wetin na di 
tiŋ dɛn we yu fil se Makeni Siti Kawnsil nɔ du fɔ di siti?” 
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Respondents were also asked to assess their satisfaction with the cleaning 
effort on a four-point scale (1=very unsatisfied, 2=unsatisfied, 3=satisfied, 4=very 
satisfied).  More than three-quarters of respondents reported that they were either 
satisfied (64%) or very satisfied (12%).  The median satisfaction score was 3, or 
‘satisfied’, and the mean satisfaction score was 2.81 (SD=0.73).  Women (M=2.85, 
SD=0.75) were more satisfied than men (M=2.77, SD=0.71); those aged 35 and below 
were more satisfied (M=2.94, SD=0.66) than those aged 36 and above (M=2.67, 
SD=0.76); and those living in households which owned at least one high value item 
(M=2.92, SD= 0.77) were more satisfied than those living in households which did 
not (M=2.77, SD= 0.72).  The only statistically significant difference was in mean 
scores by age (t(242)=3.07, p<0.01).103 
Levels of respondent knowledge of the slaughterhouse were low—22 percent 
of respondents reported that they had no knowledge of the slaughterhouse and a 
further 43 percent had heard about it, but never visited.  Due to their greater 
familiarity with its operations, butchers rather than survey respondents were asked to 
assess their satisfaction with the slaughterhouse.  Over 95 percent of the butchers 
reported being either very unsatisfied (14%) or unsatisfied (82%) with the 
slaughterhouse facilities provided by MCC.  Butchers’ median satisfaction score was 
2, or ‘unsatisfied’, and their mean satisfaction score was 1.91 (SD=0.43). 
The survey data provide strong support for the choice of a clean market (as 
one outcome of MCC’s cleaning effort) as a case of relatively successful public goods 
provision.  While responses to the open-ended probe indicated that MCC’s efforts to 
clean the city were not universally well-regarded, approximately three-quarters of 
respondents identified the cleaning effort as a success, while approximately one-
quarter of respondents cited it as a failure.  Over 40 percent of respondents identified 
it as the single best thing the council had done, while fewer than 10 percent of 
respondents pointed to it as MCC’s most important failure.  Reported satisfaction 
levels with the cleaning effort were generally high, despite some variation by age and 
economic status. 
                                                
103 The assumption that the data are normally distributed was not met.  However, the Student’s t-test is 
known to be fairly robust to violations of its assumptions.  I also carried out a Mann-Whitney U test, 
which confirmed that the only statistically significant difference in satisfaction scores was by age. 
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The survey data provide weaker support for the choice of safe meat produced 
through construction and management of the slaughterhouse as a relative failure.  This 
area of activity did not draw significant attention from respondents either as a success 
or failure.  This can be explained in part by the fact that levels of knowledge about the 
facility were low.  The butchers’ more informed assessment of the slaughterhouse is 
consistent with my characterization of this case as a relative failure. 
iii) Public goods provision led by chiefs 
For chiefs, the five positive contributions most frequently cited by 
respondents104 were deciding cases (60%)105, providing personal advice and support 
(for example, food, loans, monetary gifts) (26%), maintaining public order (for 
example, upholding laws, keeping the peace, preventing violence and witchcraft) 
(17%), managing land (9%) and advocating for infrastructural improvements (8%) 
(table 4.3.2).106  Deciding cases was identified as the best thing that chiefs do by 45 
percent of respondents, a lead of more than 30 percentage points over providing 
personal advice and support (11%), the next most popular choice.  Mobilizing 
community labour was identified as a positive contribution by seven percent of 
respondents and five percent of respondents considered it the single best thing that 
chiefs do. 
The five failures most frequently cited by respondents were deciding cases 
(26%), providing personal advice and support (25%), advocating for infrastructural 
improvements (15%), providing water (12%) and generating employment (11%) 
(table 4.3.2).  The most important failures reported were deciding cases (14%) and 
providing personal advice and support (11%), echoing the greatest successes.  
Mobilizing community labour was identified as a failure by 10 percent of respondents 
and 5 percent considered it chiefs’ most important failure. 
                                                
104 There was a higher level of non-response to questions about chiefs than MCC, particularly chiefs’ 
contributions.  For example, 56 percent of respondents answered the question about chiefs’ positive 
contributions and 75 percent answered the question about their failures, while 91 percent and 95 
percent answered the same questions for MCC respectively.  This may reflect a number of factors, 
including lower levels of knowledge about chiefs’ activities, lower levels of positive regard for chiefs 
and a reluctance to pass judgement on chiefs (although response levels were higher for chiefly failures 
than successes). 
105 I consider deciding cases to be a form of maintaining public order, but I made the decision to 
separate it out from other related activities due to the high volume of respondents that identified this 
sub-category specifically. 
106 When coding responses, I created a response category if a minimum of six respondents (2.2%) 
considered the area either a success or a failure.  All other responses were coded as ‘other’. 
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Notably, respondents (albeit in quite small numbers) appeared to expect chiefs 
to get involved in a wide range of activities which are currently beyond their official 
mandate, including providing water (12%), educational facilities and services (9%), 
roads (9%) and electricity (4%).  This may reflect confusion about chiefs’ role in a 
shifting local government landscape, but could also be interpreted as suggesting a 
continued appetite for chiefly involvement in local public goods provision despite the 
introduction of elected local councils. 
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Table 4.3.2 Respondents’ perceptions of chiefs’ successes and failures 
Percentage of respondents identifying as: Positive contribution by chiefs 
Success* (n=151) Failure** (n=203) 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Decide cases 63.6 55.4 59.6 27.5 25.0 26.1 
Provide personal advice and support 27.3 24.3 25.8 14.3 33.0 24.6 
Maintain public order 20.8 12.2 16.6 11.0 9.8 10.3 
Manage land 9.1 8.1 8.6 13.2 8.0 10.3 
Advocate for infrastructural 
improvements 
13.0 2.7 7.9 20.9 9.8 14.8 
Mobilize community labour 6.5 8.1 7.3 12.1 8.0 9.9 
Clean the city 9.1 4.1 6.6 7.7 9.8 8.9 
Collect revenue 6.5 2.7 4.6 9.9 2.7 5.9 
Provide information 5.2 4.1 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cooperate with MCC 3.9 4.1 4.0 2.2 10.7 6.9 
Carry out public health activities 3.9 2.7 3.3 1.1 2.7 2.0 
Provide market facilities 2.6 1.4 2.0 2.2 3.6 3.0 
Control commodity prices 2.6 1.4 2.0 1.1 9.8 5.9 
Provide water supply 3.9 0.0 2.0 5.5 17.0 11.8 
Generate employment 2.6 0.0 1.3 16.5 6.2 10.8 
Provide educational 
facilities/services 
1.3 1.4 1.3 5.5 12.5 9.4 
Construct/maintain roads 2.6 0.0 1.3 7.7 9.8 8.9 
Behave transparently/accountably 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.2 3.6 3.0 
Advocate for reduced taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 8.0 5.9 
Provide electricity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 4.4 
Advocate for food 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 3.0 
Construct clocktower 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.6 3.0 
Other 5.2 13.4 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
None 6.5 17.6 11.9 4.4 1.8 3.0 
*Respondents were asked: “What good things do the paramount chief and his sub-chiefs do for the city 
of Makeni?”/ “Wetin na di gud tiŋ dɛn we di paramawnt chif ɛn di ɔda chif dɛn we de ɛp am du in wok 
de du fɔ di siti?” 
 
** Respondents were asked: “What are chiefs failing to do for the city of Makeni?”/ “Wetin na di tiŋ 
dɛn we yu fil se di chif dɛn nɔ du fɔ di siti?” 
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When asked to assess their satisfaction with chiefs’ performance in deciding 
cases, more than 60 percent reported that they were either very satisfied (17%) or 
satisfied (47%), resulting in a median satisfaction score of 3, or ‘satisfied’, and a 
mean satisfaction score of 2.69 (SD=0.90).  In contrast, when asked to assess their 
satisfaction with chiefs’ performance in mobilizing community labour, more than 60 
percent of respondents were either unsatisfied (25%) or very unsatisfied (36%), 
resulting in a median satisfaction score of 2, or ‘unsatisfied’ and a mean satisfaction 
score of 2.12 (SD=1.01).  A paired samples t-test indicated that the difference in mean 
satisfaction scores for deciding cases and mobilizing community labour was 
statistically significant (t(241)=6.97, p<0.01).107 
Mean satisfaction scores for each activity were compared by gender, age, 
whether a member of the household owned a high value item, whether respondents 
were indigenes of the chiefdom and whether a member of their household was 
involved in chiefdom government.  The results are reported in table 4.3.3.  Most of 
the differences in mean satisfaction scores across the sub-groups compared were 
small—approximately 0.1 or less.  The outliers were the greater satisfaction with 
chiefs’ performance in mobilizing labour reported by respondents from households 
which owned one high value item (a margin of 0.24) and respondents who were 
‘indigenes’ of the chiefdom (0.21), and the lower satisfaction with chiefs’ 
performance in deciding cases reported by those involved in chiefdom government 
(0.22).  Using independent samples t-tests, no statistically significant differences were 
found between means for any of the pairs of sub-groups compared.108 
                                                
107 As above, the assumption of normality was not met.  A Wilcoxon signed-rank test also indicated 
that there was a statistically significant difference between satisfaction scores. 
108 As above, the assumption of normality was not met.  Mann-Whitney U tests also indicated that there 
were no statistically significant differences between satisfaction scores for any of the pairs of sub-
groups compared. 
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Table 4.3.3 Mean satisfaction scores for chiefs’ performance in deciding cases and 
mobilizing community labour 
   t df 
 Gender    
 Female Male   
Deciding cases 2.71 (0.93) 2.66 (0.87) -0.46 241 
Mobilizing labour 2.06 (1.06) 2.17 (0.94) 0.90 266 
 Age    
 0-35 36+   
Deciding cases 2.71 (0.94) 2.69 (0.86) 0.12 233 
Mobilizing labour 2.09 (1.00) 2.15 (1.02) -0.43 256 
 High value item    
 Yes No   
Deciding cases 2.76 (0.86) 2.66 (0.92) -0.76 240 
Mobilizing labour 2.29 (0.94) 2.05 (1.02) -1.73 265 
 Indigene    
 Yes No   
Deciding cases 2.78 (0.90) 2.68 (0.87) -0.80 194 
Mobilizing labour 2.02 (0.95) 2.23 (1.01) 1.51 207 
 Involved in chiefdom government   
 Yes No   
Deciding cases 2.50 (0.88) 2.72 (0.90) 1.44 241 
Mobilizing labour 2.20 (0.98) 2.10 (1.01) -0.55 266 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses 
The survey data provide strong support for the choice of public order 
generated through deciding cases as a success.  Deciding cases was the most 
frequently cited positive contribution made by chiefs (60%), it was identified as the 
best thing that chiefs do by a clear margin (over 30 percentage points) and the 
satisfaction scores for this activity were high across a number of different sub-groups.  
Despite this strong overall performance, a substantial proportion of respondents 
expressed dissatisfaction with chiefs’ performance in deciding cases—approximately 
a quarter saw it as an area of poor performance and 14 percent saw it as chiefs’ most 
important failure. 
The survey data provide somewhat weaker support for the choice of 
community infrastructure produced through chiefly mobilization of community labour 
as a failure.  Small and relatively equal numbers of respondents considered chiefs’ 
efforts to mobilize community labour a positive contribution (7%) and a failure 
 140 
(10%).  This pattern was repeated in respondents’ choice of mobilization of 
community labour as chiefs’ best contribution (5%) or most important failure (5%).  
However, the relatively low satisfaction score generated for this area of activity, 
which persisted across sub-groups, lends greater support to the characterization of this 
good as a failure. 
iv) Comparative power of MCC and the chiefs 
Respondents were also asked to share their views on the power of councils and 
chiefs, defined as a coercive or disciplining power—“pawa fɔ kɔntrol di pipul 
dɛn/power to control the people” (table 4.3.4).  Questions on this topic were intended 
to provide some insight into popular perceptions of the nature of LGAs’ power and 
where the balance of power between the council and chiefs lay.  Responses to an 
open-ended question about the sources of power for each category of government 
actors were strikingly similar.  Just over half of the respondents (56%) identified the 
central government as a source of power for MCC, and close to half (47%) did so for 
chiefs.  This suggests that both sets of government actors are perceived to operate 
with central backing, and perhaps under central control.  At the same time, 
approximately 40 percent of respondents identified the will of the people, expressed 
through election or selection, as a source of power for both sets of government actors.  
This implies that despite the hereditary element of chiefly elections, many 
respondents perceived the electoral outcome to be a reflection of popular will.  Only 
five percent of respondents specifically identified chiefdom councillors, the 
individuals who actually vote in chiefly elections, as a source of chiefs’ power.  The 
president was also a frequently cited source of power for both MCC (17%) and chiefs 
(13%) 
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Table 4.3.4 Respondents’ perceptions of MCC’s and chiefs’ sources of power 
Source of power* Percentage of respondents identifying 
source 
 MCC Chiefs 
The central government 56.0 46.7 
A higher local authority 8.2 3.1 
The people, through election or selection 42.4 41.2 
The people, through their cooperation 6.2 5.8 
Their good actions 4.7 3.1 
The law 10.1 8.2 
Their ability to inflict punishment 2.3 3.9 
The APC party 4.3 2.3 
The president 17.1 12.5 
The mayor 3.1 0.0 
The youth 1.9 2.3 
The police and/or the military 2.7 2.3 
MCC 0.0 7.0 
Chiefs and elders 17.1 - 
Chiefdom councillors - 4.7 
Sub-chiefs (including ceremonial chiefs) - 7.8 
Tradition and ceremony 0.0 13.6 
God 9.3 14.8 
Status as a natural leader 0.0 2.7 
Other 19.5 19.9 
*Respondents were asked: “What gives the Makeni City Council/the paramount chief and his sub-
chiefs authority over the people?”/ “Wetin yu fil se naim gi di Makeni City Council/di paramownt chif 
ɛn di ɔda chif dɛn we de ɛp am di pawa fɔ kɔntrol di pipul dɛn?” 
 
Some respondents reported that MCC and chiefs derive power from one 
another.  This was particularly true for MCC—17 percent of respondents identified 
chiefs and elders as a source of MCC’s power, while only 7 percent considered MCC 
to be a source of chiefs’ power.  Chiefs were also perceived as having some unique 
sources of power—14 percent of respondents identified tradition and ceremony109 as a 
source of chiefly power, and 3 percent reported that chiefs acquired their power 
because they were the natural leaders of the people.  Relatively few (less than 3%) 
                                                
109 Unfortunately, responses were not detailed enough to unpack this category. 
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considered either the police and/or the military or the youth a source of LGAs’ power, 
suggesting that neither MCC nor chiefs routinely use these actors to enforce their will. 
More than two-thirds of respondents reported that both MCC and chiefs had 
either strong (42% for MCC and 43% for chiefs) or very strong (29% for MCC and 
27% for chiefs) power to control the people.  However, a clear majority (63%) agreed 
that chiefs had more power than MCC, with only a third (33%) reporting that MCC 
had more power than chiefs and four percent reporting that they had the same level of 
power.  Chi-square tests were carried out to see whether respondents’ assessments of 
the relative power of MCC and chiefs were affected by their age, sex, household 
ownership of a high value item, ‘indigene’ status or household involvement in 
chiefdom government.110  Only age had a significant effect—60 percent of those aged 
35 or under reported that chiefs were more powerful, compared to 72 percent of those 
aged 36 and above (χ2 (1, n=244)=4.07, p<0.05). 
Concluding comments 
The brief history of Makeni that I set out here indicates that the poor supply of 
public goods available in the city is, at least in part, the product of a troubled history 
with government.  Neglected in the colonial period because its export goods were less 
lucrative and required less investment in supportive technologies, Makeni’s relative 
underdevelopment remained unaddressed by the SLPP government in the early post-
colonial period.  The rise of the APC was facilitated by exploiting northern grievances 
about the poor supply of public goods in the region, yet Makeni’s underdevelopment 
persisted through decades of APC rule.  This history is likely to have resulted in 
particularly low levels of trust vis-à-vis public goods provision in both central 
government and those LGAs that have historically served as its agents; the survey 
data indicate that respondents see a close linkage between central and local authority 
for both the council and chiefs.  While I do not have access to data about levels of 
trust in Makeni specifically, data presented in chapter one suggest that the levels of 
trust in LGAs are far lower in Bombali District than in more developed Bo District; 
chiefs do better than councils by a small margin (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, pp. 82-84).  
Low levels of trust make it difficult to raise the revenue necessary to support local 
public goods provision, and to secure the necessary cooperation from citizens which 
                                                
110 The four percent of respondents who reported that MCC and chiefs had the same level of power 
were excluded from this analysis. 
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the provision of many local public goods (including those I describe in subsequent 
chapters) relies upon. 
The data set out here provide some insight into why chiefs in Makeni might 
enjoy greater legitimacy and trust as public goods providers than the city council, 
despite their long association with a range of exploitative practices.  Chiefly 
government is underpinned by governmental structures of pre-colonial, as well as 
colonial, origin; as Wylie (1977) suggests, the former are likely to be particularly 
valued because they invoke a sense of local ownership and pride.  Moreover, 
governmental structures of pre-colonial origin are imbricated with sodalities: 
powerful social and political institutions in their own right which are usually 
understood to enjoy significant legitimacy (Richards, et al., 2004).  Yet a potentially 
modest advantage in terms of legitimacy and trust does not mean chiefs have the will 
or the capacity to provide a full range of local public goods; survey data suggest that 
popular expectations of chiefs as public goods providers focus in particular on the 
provision of public order, personalized advice and support, and, to a lesser degree, 
management of land. 
This leaves plenty of scope for the reformed city council to carve out a role as 
a local public goods provider and survey data suggest that Makeni’s residents are 
willing to recognize successes when they occur.  However, this account supports the 
view put forward in chapter three that it is important to recognize that the council is 
not starting afresh, but building on a discredited history of predation and poor 
performance.  While continuity with the pre-reform town council may have escaped 
the notice of donors, it has not escaped the notice of Makeni’s residents.  The re-
establishment of familiar routines of behaviour is particularly troubling in this context 
as they are likely to further deepen mistrust in the council, increasing the barriers it 
faces in addressing the public goods deficit. 
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Images 
 
Image 4.1 Makeni’s failed clocktower, October 2009 (author’s photograph) 
 
Image 4.2 Makeni City Council’s new building, October 2009 (author’s photograph) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Makeni City Council and Interest-based 
Associations:  Forging Fragile Bargains for Public Goods 
Provision 
In post-war Makeni, interest-based associations—those representing the 
shared interests of members with a common trade—are widespread.111  Organized and 
often in control of substantial financial and political resources, these associations are 
often well-suited to take on coproductive responsibilities.  In this chapter, I compare 
two cases of public goods coproduced by MCC and members of interest-based 
associations.  The first one, a clean market produced through collaborative waste 
collection and disposal by MCC and members of the Traders’ Union, is relatively 
successful; the second, a safe supply of meat produced through partnership between 
MCC and members of the Butchers’ Association to enable inspection of meat at a 
council-run slaughterhouse, less so. 
I use the concept of coproduction to frame the following analysis, drawing on 
Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework to flesh out the dynamics of the coproductive 
relationships (as discussed in chapter two).  I describe the process through which each 
good is coproduced, identifying the key rules underpinning coproduction.  I then 
identify the main differences which provide an explanation for the performance gap 
between the two cases (section 5.1).  Following this, I set out the main incentives and 
deterrents which influence the willingness of MCC and members of interest-based 
associations to follow the rules of coproduction (sections 5.2 and 5.3).  The range of 
incentives and deterrents influencing actors’ behaviour is large, and I do not attempt 
to describe them all.  Instead, I focus my attention on the small number which seem to 
exert the greatest influence.  These incentives and deterrents are shaped by important 
features of the social and political context (which constitute exogenous variables 
within the IAD framework).112  Again, these are numerous, and selectivity is required.  
I pay particular attention to some of the key barriers to local public goods provision 
(set out in chapter one), namely a political system which provides little motivation for 
                                                
111 Sources on interest-based associations in Sierra Leone include Michael Bürge (2011), John Amman 
and James O’Donnell (2011),  John Stirling (2011), Krijn Peters (2007), Richards et al (2004), Kenneth 
Little (1957) and Michael Banton (1957). 
112 These exogenous variables are considered fixed for the purposes of analysis of the action situation, 
in this case each set of coproductive arrangements. 
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local councils to provide public goods; a public sector characterized by intense 
resource scarcity; and poor citizen trust in local councils. 
5.1 Two cases of council-led coproduction 
i) MCC and the traders: coproducing a clean market113 
Cleaning the city is not a devolved function recently assigned to MCC114; it 
was formally declared a council responsibility by the Townships Act (1959), which 
provided the legal basis for expanding the presence of urban councils in Sierra Leone.  
Makeni’s council workers and residents describe significant fluctuations in cleaning 
efforts over the years, dependent on political will, access to resources, and public 
cooperation.  Here I focus on MCC’s efforts to clean one strategic site in the city, the 
main market, through cooperation with the traders, who are represented by the 
Makeni branch of the Sierra Leone Traders’ Union, known locally as the Traders’ 
Union (the TU). 
At MCC, responsibility for cleaning the city lies with a small health 
department led by two health workers who have been with MCC for over a decade: an 
environmental health officer (EHO) on assignment from the Ministry of Health and a 
senior health aide.115  Although the EHO is the senior staff member, he plays only a 
limited role in waste management activities.  The health aide is the direct supervisor 
in this area; it is his job to hand out assignments to waste collection workers each 
morning and to monitor their activities.  MCC owns a modest fleet of vehicles, but a 
number of them are usually out of service at any time.  In May 2009, MCC was 
operating with six motorized tricycles and one large rear-loading rubbish truck, which 
had recently returned from being repaired, while a further five motorized tricycles and 
a small tractor were out of service.116  By August 2009, only three tricycles were 
working, but maintenance was underway.  The vehicles are managed by one truck 
                                                
113 The following description is based primarily on observational and interview data collected during a 
month-long intensive period of fieldwork focused exclusively on waste collection in May 2009, as well 
as follow-up observational and interview data collected between June and September 2009.  I use the 
present tense to describe the status quo at that time. 
114 As discussed in chapter four, before Makeni was declared a city in 2006, MCC was called Makeni 
Town Council.  For simplicity’s sake, I use the name MCC to refer to all incarnations of the council in 
this chapter. 
115 The Ministry of Health is a simplified name.  The EHO is paid through the Ministry of Health.  The 
job title ‘senior health aide’ is taken from the MCC budget for 2009-11.  Health staff tend to use job 
titles flexibly, usually referring to themselves as public health officers or health inspectors. 
116 This represents a big improvement on the situation in 2004 when the ‘new’ council took office.  At 
this time, only the small tractor was available. 
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driver, a team of five tricycle riders and five tricycle assistants who ride with them, 
known as their ‘mates’.  Their efforts are supplemented by a team of eight labourers, 
four of whom are assigned to the market and other central areas of town. 
The LG Act (2004) established a chief administrator (CA) at each local 
council to act as its administrative head and to implement decisions made by MCC’s 
political representatives: the mayor and the fifteen councillors.  The CA works with 
the finance team to make funds available for fuel, vehicle maintenance and salaries.  
Waste collection workers engage in a daily struggle to secure fuel and on occasion 
maintenance and salary payments are delayed for several weeks, even months.  
However, a minimum flow of resources is always maintained by MCC so that waste 
collection can continue.  The mayor appears to be more active than the CA in 
supervising the activities of the health department, despite the fact that his role is 
intended to focus more on agenda-setting than implementation.  On one occasion, he 
personally disciplined workers in response to complaints that they had been asking for 
payments for household waste collection, which carried weight because he had 
already fired one tricycle rider and his mate for transporting private goods in their 
tricycle.  According to one of the waste collectors, the mayor also tries to counteract 
the negative effects of weak cash-flow by providing fuel money from his own pocket 
when needed, instructing the workers, “Make the city shine like a mirror.” 
The councillors sit on committees overseeing each service delivery area.  The 
committees have a mandate to monitor performance and finances and report back to 
the council with recommendations.  In general the committees are weak: they meet 
infrequently, lack access to appropriate information, fail to keep records of their 
meetings and rarely make substantive recommendations.  The chairlady for the health 
and sanitation committee was suffering from a long-term illness during the period of 
study and therefore that committee was particularly inactive.  This appeared to cause 
little to no disruption to waste collection activities by MCC, which suggests that the 
committee’s inputs are not critical to the waste collection effort.  There have also been 
several attempts to establish citizen-led waste collection committees, but these have 
proved unsustainable.  In 2006, the health and sanitation committee established a 
waste collection committee made up of six representatives of each of the city’s three 
wards to carry out monitoring, but this was no longer active.  In May 2009, MCC and 
UNDP held a meeting to establish a solid waste management committee made up of 
representatives of interest-based associations, local radio stations and the WDCs 
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created by the LG Act (2004).  To the best of my knowledge, this committee had not 
met again by September 2009. 
The market, which sells food and household goods, lies concealed behind 
Makeni’s main square.  Heading north, a long, narrow street which peels off to the 
right leads into the most densely populated area of the market.  Two dark, congested 
buildings where traders sell their goods at fixed tables lie on either side of the narrow 
street, while others sell directly on the street itself, from baskets, wooden stools, or 
their laps, hoping to capture shoppers before they enter the market buildings.  From 
there, the market sprawl continues to the north and east, thinning in density. 
The frequency with which waste is collected in the market fluctuates, 
depending on the availability of vehicles and fuel.  In May 2009, MCC sent vehicles 
to the market every morning to collect waste, but by August 2009, this had dropped to 
three mornings per week.  The large rubbish truck struggles to make its way down the 
narrow street which runs through the market, forcing the street traders (who are acting 
against MCC instructions by trading there) to snatch up their goods and edge 
backwards to the sides of the street.  A small number of tricycles support the truck’s 
efforts by collecting waste from the outskirts of the market, before heading off to 
cover other areas of the city.  This waste is then transported to a number of sites 
outside the city limits117 and burned. 
MCC’s waste collection activities are heavily reliant on traders’ efforts to 
gather waste for collection.  On my first day observing waste collection in the market, 
I watched traders on the outskirts of the market setting up for the day.  A middle-aged 
woman dressed in a white tank-top and a blue wrapper and a man in a football t-shirt 
swept the breadth of the street leading up to the market with palm-leaf brooms, 
eventually depositing neat piles of waste next to a tricycle parked on the road before 
returning to their stalls.  This is a typical scene; for most traders in this part of the 
market, preparing waste for collection in the areas where they work is part of their 
daily routine. 
Inside the market buildings, gathering waste is more labour-intensive.  The 
buildings are dark, the aisles between the tables are narrow, and the spaces under the 
tables fill up with bags and baskets of goods for sale.  Waste, much of it organic, 
                                                
117 I refer to sites that fall beyond the colonial-era administrative boundary of the city.  Most of them 
are in peri-urban areas. 
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accumulates quickly during the day as sales are made.  According to MCC waste 
collection workers, two of the riders’ mates come to the market at five o’clock in the 
morning a few times a week to sweep out the market space.  It was difficult to 
confirm the frequency at which this was happening, but it was not sufficient to keep 
the market buildings free of waste.  The traders sweep the market buildings 
themselves, as well as making voluntary contributions to young men to act as 
additional market sweepers. 
MCC periodically organizes general cleaning days when all residents of the 
city are expected to join with MCC, the army and the police to tackle standing waste.  
Many people say this practice was first introduced during the military regime of the 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) (1992-96), while others argue that it 
dates back beyond that.  While MCC claims that these cleanings occur every month, 
in practice they take place closer to once every two to three months, and often serve 
as preparation for an important event in the city, such as a presidential visit or party 
political event.  On general cleaning days, traders’ contribution to cleaning the market 
is particularly apparent.  When I visited the market early in the morning on a cleaning 
day, I found that it was closed for trade, with the usual intense buzz of buying and 
selling replaced with vigorous cleaning.  Near the entrance, a young man was 
standing inside one of the deep gutters that lined the streets for drainage purposes, 
digging out a pile of slime-covered, rotting rubbish and mud.  Similarly green piles of 
waste had been deposited along the edge of the gutter behind him.  The rubbish truck 
was parked in the middle of the street and a steady flow of women and children 
hurried towards it, emptying baskets, buckets and other containers.  Three to four 
hours passed before the cleaning effort wound down and traders could return to 
business. 
Aside from the significant labour inputs traders make to support the waste 
collection effort, they pay dues and licence fees to the council.  In May 2009, those 
trading at tables paid daily dues of 200 Le (£0.04) per table, while owners of 
permanent stalls paid annual licence fees which usually fell between 50,000 and 
100,000 Le (£9.50 and £19.00).  This revenue is not tied to waste collection; it goes 
into a discretionary account.  However, MCC staff said that these funds were 
sometimes used to cover fuel and workers’ salaries and therefore paying dues can be 
considered a further trader input into the cleaning effort.  In August 2009, the CA told 
me that MCC was currently negotiating with the TU to increase market dues to 400 
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Le (£0.08) per table.  In November 2009, traders began to pay an increased rate of 
300 Le (£0.06) per table following the completion of negotiations.118 
It seems inevitable that some traders are free-riding119 by failing to contribute 
labour or money towards the cleaning of the market, but this was not a complaint 
made by respondents, either MCC representatives or traders, suggesting that levels of 
free-riding are generally low.  However, MCC workers do complain about destructive 
behaviours demonstrated by a small number of traders, including bringing household 
waste into the market and dumping it there for collection and obstructing the council’s 
rubbish truck in its efforts to travel down the narrow street through the market.  
Nobody I asked could give a recent example of the former offence, but an incident 
occurred in August 2009 when a group of traders fought with the truck driver after he 
crushed one woman’s goods on the market street, even throwing stones at the vehicle, 
according to some reports.  This was dealt with swiftly through the imposition of fines 
on the violating traders.120  Dues are collected daily by a team of privately-contracted 
dues collectors.  Disputes between the dues collectors and traders in the market are 
relatively common, but resolved quickly, often through the intervention of a market 
chief.121  MCC’s 2009-11 budget estimates compliance with market dues payments at 
95 percent.122  Despite instances of conflict, for the most part traders seem to be 
contributing their labour and paying their dues. 
This description suggests a small number of essential rules underpinning the 
coproduction of a clean market by MCC and the traders.  On MCC’s side, MCC must 
provide vehicles to collect waste on a regular basis.  On the traders’ side, traders must 
gather waste for collection, pay market dues or annual licence fees and ensure that 
they do not obstruct MCC’s collection efforts.  The monitoring and enforcement 
arrangements for these rules are discussed in greater detail below.  A fuller 
categorization of rules and norms governing the coproduction of a clean market are 
set out in table 5.A.1, attached as an annex to this chapter. 
                                                
118 I am grateful to my research assistant Edward Kanu for providing this information after my 
departure from Makeni. 
119 See chapter one for further discussion of free-riding. 
120 My attempts to pinpoint exactly who had imposed the fine were unsuccessful. 
121 I describe the role of market chiefs in section 5.3. 
122 I include budget estimates in my analysis, but I suggest that they be treated with some caution.  I do 
not have sufficient information about the budgeting process used by MCC to be confident that the 
estimates included in the budget are realistic. 
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ii) MCC and the butchers: coproducing safe meat123 
The new slaughterhouse in Makeni was constructed in 2004, replacing an 
older, open-sided structure at the same site.  It was funded by a Local Government 
Development Grant124 in accordance with the Rapid Results Approach, which 
required that councils use the grant money for projects that could be completed within 
100 days, in order to build immediate trust in their capacity to deliver public goods 
(Kanu, 2009).  The new building was spacious, consisting of a slaughtering hall, a 
holding area for cattle, an inspection area with two tiled counters, a cool room, an 
office, two toilets and a bathroom.  By 2009, the slaughterhouse had fallen into a state 
of disrepair, with cracks and crevices in the concrete floor of the slaughtering hall in 
which blood congealed; loose or missing hooks for securing cattle; damage to the 
metal roof from the vultures that gathered there each morning; and a broken door.  On 
its opening, the slaughterhouse was equipped with a generator and two freezers, but 
the generator broke within a year and was never repaired, and the freezers were 
eventually relocated to MCC’s staff canteen.  Running water was originally supplied 
by Sierra Leone’s water parastatal, but this ceased after pipe damage occurred during 
roadwork.  Construction of a well began with the support of an international NGO, 
but was never completed.  By June 2009, the only water source available to the 
slaughterhouse was a small stream that ran behind the building. 
Like waste collection, management of cattle slaughtering was declared a 
council responsibility by the Townships Act (1959), and is the responsibility of the 
health department.  The EHO, the senior staff member, takes care of day-to-day 
supervision.  He comes to the slaughterhouse almost every morning at six o’clock to 
inspect the meat after slaughter.  He is joined by a supernumerary policeman attached 
to MCC, who collects the slaughtering fee from the butchers, and sometimes by the 
chiefdom health officer (CHO) for a neighbouring chiefdom, who also fills in as the 
principal inspector from time to time when the EHO is absent.  Two elderly labourers 
clean the facility every day, one of whom lives in a room at the slaughterhouse, 
doubling up as a night caretaker. 
                                                
123 The following description is based primarily on observational and interview data collected during a 
month-long intensive period of fieldwork focused exclusively on cattle slaughtering in June 2009, as 
well as follow-up observational and interview data collected between July and September 2009.  I use 
the present tense to describe the status quo at that time. 
124 These grants are intended to support development projects designed by local councils in 
consultation with their constituents. 
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The CA and the finance team control the flow of resources to the 
slaughterhouse, which has slowed to a trickle.  One of the labourers at the facility 
showed me a series of handwritten copies of letters that he had submitted to MCC 
asking them to carry out repairs and provide cleaning supplies, which he said were 
ignored.  The only resource consistently provided by MCC is kerosene for homemade 
lamps which are used to light the slaughtering and inspection, a job they do poorly.  
The EHO claimed that two gallons of kerosene are provided each month, but one of 
the labourers stated that he usually receives only one gallon, which is inadequate.  
Only very minimal cleaning supplies are available; the two labourers clean blood and 
guts off the slaughtering floor with water, cleaning rags, small brooms and their bare 
hands.  The CA appears to provide little oversight of staff performance.  Although the 
health and sanitation committee is generally inactive, at a May 2009 council meeting 
one of its members who had taken the initiative to visit the facility said he suspected 
that there was a gap between the number of cows slaughtered and the slaughtering 
fees submitted to MCC, and described the maintenance problems at the 
slaughterhouse, but no further action was taken.  Notably, the mayor himself never 
personally intervened. 
There are eleven registered butchers in Makeni, who operate thirteen meat 
stalls at different locations in the city.125  They, or more commonly their assistants, 
bring their cattle to the slaughterhouse every morning, often travelling quite long 
distances on foot in the darkness, at some risk from thieves.126  During the period of 
observation, an average of six cows were brought for slaughter each day.  At the 
slaughterhouse, a small group of men and/or boys slaughter each animal by the weak 
light of MCC’s homemade kerosene lamps and the electric torches they bring along 
with them, and one of them carries the meat upstairs to the inspection room.  The 
inspector (either the EHO or the CHO) looks over the meat, palpating it and making 
incisions to identify cysts, abscesses and parasitic infections, amongst other problems, 
also working in very dim light.  He sometimes cuts out infected pieces or holds back 
an entire organ before returning the remainder to the butcher or assistant, who usually 
submits to the inspector’s decision without complaint.  For each cow slaughtered, the 
                                                
125 The number of registered butchers cited here is based on an interview with the chairman of the BA 
and the number of stalls on my own observation.  In its 2009-11 budget, MCC works on the 
assumption of only ten licence-paying butchers. 
126 Following the war, there is no central cattle enclosure in Makeni where butchers can graze cattle.  
As a result, cattle are transported from different peripheral locations by their owners/owners’ assistants. 
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butcher or assistant pays 4,000 Le (£0.76) to the supernumerary policeman.  Each 
group then packs their meat up into a wheelbarrow and transports it to the relevant 
stall, beginning sales immediately. 
At a council meeting shortly after the completion of the slaughterhouse in 
December 2004, councillors agreed on 10,000 Le (£1.90) as a reasonable fee for each 
cow slaughtered and a 10,000 Le (£1.90) monthly fee for each meat stall.127  
Following negotiations with the butchers in early 2005, this was reduced to 4,000 Le 
(£0.76) per cow and an annual licence fee of 50,000 Le (£9.50) for their meat stalls.  
According to the EHO, the CA had subsequently tried to negotiate an increase with 
the chairman of the Butchers’ Association (the BA), but he was angrily rebuffed 
because the butchers felt that they were paying for facilities such as electricity and 
water which were no longer being provided. 
Non-attendance at the slaughterhouse can be considered a form of free-riding 
because those butchers who do not attend the slaughterhouse can benefit from 
information about outbreaks of cattle disease without contributing towards the costs 
of surveillance.128  It was difficult to assess precisely how many butchers were 
regularly sending cows to be slaughtered in the slaughterhouse, as slaughtering took 
place in darkness; butchers commonly sent assistants to slaughter on their behalf; and 
the frequency at which butchers slaughter a cow varies.  Observation suggested that a 
substantial proportion of the small group of eleven butchers was sending cows to the 
slaughterhouse regularly and paying the required fees, so this is not a case where non-
attendance had reached desperate levels.  However, representatives of the council and 
the Ministry of Health complained about butchers slaughtering outside of the 
slaughterhouse, identifying two unofficial slaughtering sites—one in the centre of 
town and one on the outskirts of town.  As slaughtering takes place in darkness in the 
early hours of morning, and because slaughtering outside the slaughterhouse is 
sensitive, I was unable to observe this practice directly.  MCC estimates butchers’ 
compliance with payment of the slaughtering fee at only 60 percent in their 2009-11 
                                                
127 Minutes, council meeting, December 20, 2004. 
128 Secondarily, they may benefit from any positive effect that the presence of the slaughterhouse has 
on customer demand for beef.  This effect is likely to be slim because it requires that: a) customers 
assume that butchers use the slaughterhouse, b) customers believe that beef coming out of the 
slaughterhouse is safer than beef resulting from unsupervised slaughtering, c) customers are concerned 
enough about meat safety to change their buying habits to purchase more beef and d) customers 
consider different forms of meat to be substitutable.  The survey data discussed in chapter four do not 
support a) or b). 
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budget, which is consistent with council representatives’ complaints about non-
attendance at the facility (although it is also possible that this estimate reflects the 
retention of a portion of the slaughtering fee by MCC staff at the slaughterhouse).  
Butchers’ reports confirmed that slaughtering outside the slaughterhouse did occur 
with some regularity—approximately one-third of butchers and assistants interviewed 
said they had slaughtered a cow outside the slaughterhouse since its construction. 
In terms of the essential rules which underpin coproduction, it seems that 
MCC must provide a slaughterhouse facility and the critical operating resources it 
requires, such as health personnel, electricity, water and a freezer.129  Butchers must 
slaughter their cattle in the slaughterhouse, submit to the inspection carried out by the 
EHO and pay a slaughtering fee.  As above, the monitoring and enforcement 
arrangements for these rules are discussed in greater detail below.  The full 
categorization of rules and norms governing the coproduction of a clean market are 
set out in table 5.A.2, attached as an annex to this chapter. 
iii) Drawing comparisons 
These accounts of the coproduction of a clean market and a safe supply of 
meat are consistent with the characterization of the former as a relative success, and 
the latter as a relative failure.  They provide insight into the institutional reasons for 
this variation in performance, by indicating that the essential rules underpinning 
coproduction are generally followed by both MCC and the traders in the case of 
cleaning the market, but are largely disregarded by MCC and only weakly followed 
by the butchers in the case of the slaughterhouse.  Thus the coproductive 
arrangements for cleaning the market are an example of a relatively functional 
institution that is producing a regularity of a behaviour, while the coproductive 
arrangements for providing safe meat are an example of a weak or failing institution 
that does not exert sufficient influence over participants’ behaviour. 
In both cases, the consistency and quality of MCC’s inputs are affected by 
constrained resource flows.  Waste collection suffers from an uneven flow of 
resources, which means that the level of service fluctuates.  The slaughterhouse is 
being steadily starved of resources, which means that the level of service continually 
declines.  I argue that these different resource allocations are the result of an explicit 
                                                
129 I consider this a rule because the butchers do appear to impose sanctions, albeit somewhat weak 
ones, for a failure to do this.  See discussion in 5.3 i) for further detail. 
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decision by MCC to invest in waste collection and follow the rules which enable 
cooperation, and an implicit decision to neglect the slaughterhouse. 
Both the mayor and the CA informed me that MCC had decided to concentrate 
on waste collection as their highest priority.  Given MCC’s modest resource base, the 
council is not in a position to tackle larger-scale problems like electricity and piped 
water, except through partnership with central government.  In their eyes, the choice 
comes down to waste collection and construction of culverts, which are both 
achievable on a relatively small budget.  While the latter had been the previous 
mayor’s top priority, the current mayor told me that MCC had ceased activity in this 
area because the Sierra Leone Roads Authority had plans to work on a section of 
Makeni’s road network.  While the decision to prioritize waste collection is not a 
formal one, documented in MCC’s annual development plan, it is explicit.  The 
mayor’s personal involvement in monitoring this activity and the presence of ongoing 
resources to fund it indicate that it is backed by real commitment. 
The best evidence of the implicit decision to neglect the slaughterhouse is 
provided by MCC’s persistent failure to act on warnings about the problems occurring 
there.  As early as May 2006, the former chairman of the council130 complained at a 
council meeting about “the inefficient and ineffective supervision of the 
slaughterhouse which is hazardous in that community”131, yet no further action was 
taken.  A series of letters by an MCC worker to the CA about the need for repairs to 
the facility were ignored.  Information reported at council meetings was not acted 
upon.  Finally, the mayor, who once told me that when he delegates “nothing much 
happens”, had not intervened personally to improve matters as he had with waste 
collection. 
It is evident that the presence of inputs by members of coproducing interest-
based associations is essential to the provision of a clean market and a safe supply of 
meat.  When looking at the monetary inputs, it is clear that the traders are more 
willing to cooperate than the butchers: the former agreed to an increase in dues, while 
the latter are resisting a fee hike.  When it comes to comparing levels of participation 
in the cleaning effort and attendance at the slaughterhouse, it is more difficult to draw 
clear conclusions, due to incomplete information and the variable size of the two 
                                                
130 The position of ‘chairman’ was given the new title of ‘mayor’ after Makeni became a city at the end 
of 2006. 
131 Minutes, council meeting, May 5, 2006. 
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groups; while the number of traders runs into the hundreds, the butchers number only 
eleven.  What is clear is that representatives of MCC perceive free-riding to be a 
problem in the case of the butchers, but not in the case of the traders; this is reflected 
both in their comments and in the budget estimates for market dues and slaughtering 
fees respectively.  In addition, the small size of the group of coproducing butchers 
means that there is a noticeable impact on the safety of the meat supply if even one 
does not attend—just under 10 percent of the meat available for sale that day will 
have escaped inspection.132  In contrast, the cleaning effort in the market is unlikely to 
be affected by a small number of traders free-riding by refusing to clean; those that do 
participate are likely to absorb their share of the work.  While it would be ideal to 
have a more precise estimate of how levels of cooperation compare for each group, 
the data strongly suggest that butchers are less willing to cooperate with MCC than 
the traders, with more serious consequences. 
In the following sections, I dig deeper by looking at the main incentives and 
deterrents which influence the choices made by MCC and members of interest-based 
associations.  I focus in particular on incentives which vary across the two cases, 
addressing two questions: 
 Why is MCC willing to invest in a clean market and follow the essential rules 
which enable relatively successful coproduction, while failing to do the same in 
the case of the slaughterhouse? (section 5.2) 
 Why are the TU and its members more willing to cooperate with MCC and follow 
the essential rules which enable relatively successful coproduction than the BA 
and its members? (section 5.3) 
5.2 Incentives and deterrents for MCC 
i) External funding 
Resource scarcity is one of the defining characteristics of the broader political 
environment in which MCC operates.  The council survives predominantly on a range 
of modest grants from central government, which are backed by donor funding and 
‘tied’ to specific categories of expenditure.  According to MCC’s 2008 financial 
                                                
132 Assuming that each butcher slaughters approximately the same amount of cattle and that the 
inspection improves meat safety. 
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statement133, these grants amounted to approximately 647 million Le (£122,900) in 
2008, making up 65 percent of MCC’s total recorded income of approximately 996 
million Le (£189,200), while own source revenue accounted for only 34 percent.  In 
this context of overall deprivation, one of the most powerful incentives influencing 
MCC decision-making is access to external funding134.  Senior MCC staff are 
understandably reticent to identify money as a motivation for their actions, but there 
is substantial circumstantial evidence to suggest that MCC prioritizes waste collection 
and neglects the slaughterhouse because of the relative financial gain to be had from 
each. 
                                                
133 I obtained an unofficial electronic copy of this document from MCC. 
134 I use this term to refer to funds from central government or from donor agencies. 
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Table 5.2.1 MCC’s recorded income in 2008135 
Category Amount (millions of Le) Amount (£) 
Inter-governmental grants   
General fund (salary and administration) 175 33,200 
Health 132 25,100 
Education 64 12,200 
Agriculture 41 7,800 
Library 57 10,800 
Solid waste management 45 8,500 
Other 19 3,700 
Local Government Development Grant 91 17,300 
Special health initiatives 23 4,400 
Sub-total 647 122,900 
Own source revenue 335 63,600 
Other 14 2,700 
Total 996 189,200 
 
MCC receives regular injections of resources to support waste collection in the 
form of a quarterly ‘tied’ grant for solid waste management and ongoing donations of 
vehicles and equipment.  The waste management grant was recorded as 
approximately 45 million Le (£8,500) for 2008 and was estimated at 105 million Le 
(£20,000) for 2009.136  According to MCC staff, vehicles have been donated by the 
Bishop of Makeni (a tractor, 2004), the Libyan government (a rubbish truck, 2005), 
central government (six tricycles, 2006) and UNDP in partnership with One World 
Link (five tricycles, 2009).  In August 2009, MCC was expecting a skip truck, 30 
skips and a bulldozer, also paid for by UNDP and One World Link.137  More 
temptingly, waste collection has the potential to attract large-scale donor investment 
in the form of cash grants, rather than equipment procured by the donor agency 
themselves.  Since 2004, MCC had been waiting for a sizeable grant from the World 
Bank to develop a permanent landfill site.  “I want to believe the money came and 
                                                
135 This table is based on an unofficial copy of MCC’s 2008 financial statement.  
136 I obtained this figure from MCC’s 2009-11 budget. 
137 Interview with UNDP representative in Makeni, May 28, 2009. 
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went to wrong hands,” the former mayor told me, suggesting that the Ministry of 
Health had diverted the funds to the SLPP for electioneering.  However, in 2009, the 
mayor was alerted that over £250,000 in World Bank funds was available for landfill 
sites in four cities and would be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis.  If MCC 
secured a quarter of this collective fund, the amount received would be equivalent to 
approximately 30 percent of its annual reported income in 2008.  Furthermore, MCC 
might obtain latitude to manage the money itself, creating greater opportunity for 
diversion of a portion of the funds. 
Since its completion, the slaughterhouse has offered very weak opportunities 
for financial reward.  It is very likely that some portion of the original slaughterhouse 
budget of approximately 97 million Le (£18,400)138 was returned to MCC staff and 
political representatives in the form of a kickback from the construction contractor, as 
this practice is considered routine.  It is also quite likely that the anticipation of 
kickback money influenced MCC’s decision to use the Local Government 
Development Grant to build a slaughterhouse, as there was no popular pressure, either 
from the butchers or any other group, to undertake this initiative.  The accountant at 
another local council in the region told me that kickbacks for construction projects are 
usually negotiated by the finance officers because they are “a technical matter”.  He 
estimated that an average kickback would be a cash payment equivalent to 
approximately 10 percent of the total contract, which would then be divided between 
senior staff, with the largest share going to the chairman or mayor of the council.  The 
total reported income from the slaughterhouse in 2008 was approximately 4.3 million 
Le (£820)139; this amount is unlikely to have even covered the costs of frontline 
workers and the supply of kerosene, which I estimate at approximately 5.6 million Le 
(£1,060).140  From the time the slaughterhouse was completed, there has been next to 
no external interest in the facility, and neither money nor equipment has been 
                                                
138 This figure was obtained from a dataset of Local Government Development Grants for 2004-07 
compiled by the World Bank’s Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP). 
139 It should be noted that this figure seems low.  During the period of observation, we saw a mean of 
six cows being slaughtered per day.  Based on 355 working days per year, the slaughterhouse should 
generate 8.5 million Le (£1,620). 
140 My estimate is based on salary data from MCC’s 2009-11 budget, and includes 100 percent of the 
annual salary and benefits for two cleaners (3.9 million Le/£740), 25 percent of the annual salary and 
benefits for one supernumerary policeman (480,000 Le/£92), 25 percent of the annual salary and 
benefits for one senior health aide (800,000 Le/£151) and 24 gallons of kerosene at an estimated price 
of 16,500 Le per gallon (400,000 Le/£75). 
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forthcoming.  MCC has not made any attempt to fundraise for the slaughterhouse, 
perhaps recognizing its relative lack of saleability to donors. 
When MCC receives external funding to support waste management, it comes 
under pressure to demonstrate a minimum level of results in order to keep the money 
flowing.  This leads MCC to become more dependent on the traders, as the 
coproductive relationship between MCC and the traders provides a low-cost means to 
demonstrate results in one of the city’s most visible locations—the market.  At the 
same time, MCC has adequate resources to make sustained contributions to the 
cleaning effort.  Without regular injections of external resources, MCC lacks the 
capacity and the motivation to invest in the upkeep of the slaughterhouse and allows 
the facility to deteriorate. 
ii) Political capital 
MCC’s decision to prioritize waste collection in the market can also be 
explained by its desire to acquire political capital with the traders, who make up one 
of the most powerful economic blocs in the city.  According to MCC records, market 
dues from those trading at tables totalled approximately 139 million Le (£26,400) in 
2008, 14 percent of MCC’s total recorded income and 42 percent of MCC’s own 
source revenue.  Not only do market dues provide a substantial proportion of MCC’s 
annual income, they are also received on a daily basis and are therefore critical to 
tiding MCC over when central government grants are delayed.  Aside from the 
valuable income they provide for the city, the traders have a proven capacity to 
disrupt MCC.  This was demonstrated during a period of mounting tension between 
the TU and MCC which began shortly after the 2004 local elections and culminated in 
the forced resignation of the first MCC chairman in February 2006.  At the heart of 
this conflict was control of market dues collection.  I now briefly describe the main 
events of this conflict in order to illustrate the character of the relationship between 
MCC and the TU. 
Following the May 2004 local elections, MCC privatized dues collection in 
the market, awarding the contract to the Dollar Guys, an association of money 
changers, rather than to the TU.141  The TU’s executive was angered by this decision, 
believing the TU to be the rightful collector of market dues, and the Dollar Guys 
                                                
141 See Anuradha Joshi and Joseph Ayee (2002, 2009) for a related discussion of the use of interest-
based associations as tax collectors in Ghana.  I discuss this case further in chapter seven. 
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merely one of the sub-groups falling under its umbrella.  The TU allowed dues 
collection in the market to go ahead, but when a corruption scandal broke against the 
MCC chairman in late 2005, its executive was more than ready to organize against 
him. 
The scandal centred around the use of MCC’s 2005 Local Government 
Development Grants.  Initial concerns about the quality of the projects142 undertaken 
with these funds led to an investigation by a civil society grouping which included 
NGOs, local media and interest-based associations, revealing a significant 
discrepancy between reported and actual expenditure.  In November 2005, Awoko 
newspaper reported that Makeni’s traders were reluctant to pay their dues because of 
their suspicions about MCC’s involvement in fraud (Anonymous, 2005).  In January 
2006, the APC party gave the MCC chairman 48 hours to resign from his position and 
revoked his membership of the party, seemingly anxious about the effects of the 
scandal on the anti-corruption platform it was promoting in the run-up to the 2007 
elections (Anonymous, 2006a).  The chairman did not resign, but instead turned 
towards the ruling SLPP for support.  On February 13, 2006 the city’s frustrated 
residents, including the traders, engaged in a full-day strike.  The same day, the SLPP 
resident minister for the northern region issued an ultimatum calling on the chairman 
to resign within 24 hours (Anonymous, 2006c).  On February 15, 2006, the chairman 
finally submitted a letter of resignation and stood down (Anonymous, 2006b). 
I do not argue that the traders were the main architects of the movement to 
remove the chairman from power.  Bolten (2008) suggests that an older generation of 
politicians, including the paramount chief, may have been working behind the scenes 
to orchestrate more visible civil society action, acting in a well-recognized political 
tradition of concealment (Shaw, 2000; Ferme, 2001).  A teacher active in local 
politics made a similar case to me, arguing that the chairman had angered the 
paramount chief, the provincial secretary and others by ending a system where market 
dues were informally shared between a circle of the city’s political ‘big men’, rather 
than retained for the council alone.  “His enemies waited for him to make a mistake 
and then took it to civil society,” he said.  Whether or not the TU was one of the main 
                                                
142 MCC had undertaken to complete three projects: the construction of culverts (40 million 
Le/£7,600), the development of a rice farm (65 million Le/£12,400) and the installation of large 
dustbins at strategic collection points in the city (60 million Le/£11,400).  This information was 
obtained from a dataset of Local Government Development Grants for 2004-07 compiled by the 
IRCBP. 
 162 
strategists behind the effort to remove the chairman, the participation of the traders 
was critical to achieving his final resignation.  In particular, the success of the strike 
hinged largely on their ability to shut down economic activity in the city and 
withdraw one of MCC’s most critical sources of income. 
The TU’s struggles with MCC did not end with the introduction of a new 
chairman, but rather entered a new cycle.  The TU was finally awarded the contract 
for dues collection in the market, but quickly fell behind in its payments, and came 
under suspicion of corruption itself.  The chairman of the TU denied these 
accusations, arguing that the debt reflected diminished revenue resulting from public 
holidays, cleaning days and seasonal dips in trade.  By May 2007, the TU had 
submitted a letter attempting to revoke their contract for dues collection with MCC143, 
but their request was not accepted, and by December 2007 the TU’s debt had reached 
almost 13 million Le (£2,400).144  The July 2008 elections saw the introduction of a 
new mayor, the third post-reform change in the political leadership of MCC.  The 
contract for dues collection in the market once again returned to the Dollar Guys.  
While initially MCC seemed set to pursue an aggressive strategy against the TU to 
recover its debt, proposing the possibility of court action145, later on the matter was 
quietly dropped.  The CA told me, “We need an improved personal relationship.  For 
a traditional Temne man, once you take him to court, he is an enemy for life.”  This 
was in many ways a shrewd move, which went some way to mend fences, but left 
MCC with leverage over the TU. 
In the context of the détente underway between MCC and the TU, MCC’s 
decision to prioritize cleaning of the market can be viewed as a way to build political 
capital with the traders and encourage improving relations.  The traders constitute a 
significant source of MCC revenue and a substantial body of political support (or 
opposition).  By performing well in waste collection, MCC can acquire political 
capital to spend in securing the important financial and political resources controlled 
by the traders.  MCC has arguably already used political capital acquired through 
collecting waste in the market to negotiate an increase in market dues.  MCC has an 
established channel of support with the TU via its executive, which facilitates the 
process of spending political capital.  However, the desire to acquire political capital 
                                                
143 Minutes, council meeting, May 23, 2007. 
144 Minutes, council meeting, December 13, 2007. 
145 Minutes, council meeting, February 11, 2009. 
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with the traders is a relatively fragile incentive for MCC action.  The recent history of 
MCC’s relationship with the TU suggests that it is prone to episodes of conflict, 
during which MCC adopts more aggressive or coercive methods to secure access to 
market revenue. 
Relations between MCC and the BA have a far more detached character.  
When I spoke to the chairman of the BA in June 2009, he told me that he had not met 
with the mayor at any point during his first year in office to discuss the 
slaughterhouse.  The butchers make only a small contribution to MCC revenue: their 
slaughtering fees brought in less than one percent of total recorded income in 2008, 
and at maximum their meat stall fees could have brought in 650,000 Le (£124).146  
While 60 percent of the butchers interviewed reported that they were born in Bombali 
Sebora chiefdom, 80 percent of them identified as Fula, rather than Temne (the ethnic 
majority).  The local reputation of this minority ethnic group is that they are careful to 
avoid political controversy.  One Fula butcher described this cautious approach as the 
best way to protect one’s property, saying, “You have a vehicle, children, a wife, a 
business…If you have conflict, you might lose one of those things.” 
Historian Alusine Jalloh (1999) argues that throughout the post-independence 
period, Fulas favoured a pragmatic approach to involvement in politics which 
consisted of prioritizing their business interests and adapting to changing 
configurations of power, rather than seeking to shape them.  Jalloh finds that despite 
this business-oriented approach, Fulas suffered as a result of the transition from SLPP 
to APC rule in 1967-68.147  During 16 years of SLPP rule (1951-67), Fula merchants 
developed a close relationship with the SLPP leadership, making substantial financial 
contributions to the SLPP between 1961-67 and supporting the party in the 1967 
elections.  Their refusal to provide similar support for Siaka Stevens’ 1967 APC 
campaign led to the harassment of Fulas during the elections and their subsequent 
alienation from the APC government.  Fula attempts to negotiate a better relationship 
with Stevens’ APC government were set back after Stevens illegally deported 
Freetown’s Fula chief Alhaji Bah in 1971 to face imprisonment in Guinea at the will 
of his ally President Touré.  In 1975, after extensive Fula lobbying, he was eventually 
                                                
146 This is an estimate based on licence payments of 50,000 Le for 13 butchers’ stalls.  There is no 
disaggregated data for payments from meat stalls in the 2008 financial statement. 
147 The SLPP lost the election in March 1967, but a series of coups and counter-coups took place before 
the APC finally took office in April 1968. 
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released and restored to his earlier position.  Despite his poor treatment at the hands 
of the APC, in 1978 Alhaji Bah led a sustained Fula mobilization to secure protection 
for Fula business interests in exchange for financial contributions to the APC.  This 
troubled political history provides further justification for a contemporary strategy of 
caution. 
Further investigation into the political history of Fulas in Makeni is needed for 
a fuller understanding of the political dynamics of the relationship between the 
predominantly Fula butchers and MCC.148  However, it seems reasonable to draw a 
preliminary conclusion that the Fula butchers’ cautious profile prevents MCC from 
fearing disruptive action organized by the butchers.  Given this, the BA’s related 
passivity149, and the limited revenue that the butchers bring in for MCC, it is not 
surprising that MCC sees little incentive to acquire political capital with the butchers 
through exerting itself at the slaughterhouse. 
5.3 Incentives and deterrents for traders and butchers 
One explanation for the difference between traders’ and butchers’ level of 
cooperation with MCC could be the variable benefits which accrue to the executive 
members of the TU and the chairman of the BA respectively.  The mayor told me that 
MCC had offered to send a percentage of the market dues collected to the TU’s 
account if they agreed to an increase in the daily rate, some of which would be likely 
to end up in executive members’ pockets.  As far as I am aware, no such offer had 
been made to the chairman of the BA.  Personal profit could be sufficient to motivate 
the TU executive to renegotiate the rate of market dues on an ongoing basis and make 
efforts to minimize free-riding, while the lack of personal profit could motivate the 
chairman of the BA to resist renegotiation of the slaughtering fee and ignore free-
riding.  However, neither the TU executive nor the BA chairman has sufficient control 
over the members of their associations to secure their compliance to unpopular 
measures.  The TU’s executive is vulnerable to protest because a group of younger 
traders is lobbying to take over leadership of the organization, while the BA’s 
chairman is one of a small group of businessmen who relate on fairly equal terms 
                                                
148 Secondary sources on this topic are very limited. 
149 There are parallels here with Joseph Ayee and Richard Crook’s (2003) study of public toilets in 
Ghana.  In contrast with the policy wisdom that local associations are suitable advocates for improved 
services, they find that local associations are frequently not well positioned to challenge local 
politicians and may suffer retaliation when they do so.  See chapter seven for further discussion of this 
case. 
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rather than an authority figure to be obeyed at all costs.  The TU executive’s 
confidence in negotiating an increase in market dues is therefore likely to reflect an 
awareness that traders will be sufficiently receptive to this change, whereas the BA 
chairman’s refusal to renegotiate the slaughtering fee is likely to reflect an awareness 
of the mood among the butchers.  It is therefore important to look at the 
incentives/deterrents which motivate the broader membership of interest-based 
associations. 
i) Confidence in government reciprocity 
One of the main challenges to cooperation between MCC and members of 
interest-based associations is the poor legacy of local government in Makeni, which is 
characterized by repeated cycles of corruption and betrayal.  Bolten (2008, p. 84) 
argues that the people of Makeni operate according to a “conflicted narrative of 
governance”, caught between “hope and cynicism”.  The very existence of 
coproductive arrangements for public goods provision can be viewed as an expression 
of hope by members of interest-based associations.  However, cynicism prevents 
members of interest-based associations from contributing freely to public goods 
provision without direct evidence of government reciprocity. 
Writing from a psychological perspective, Linda Molm, David Schaefer and 
Jessica Collett (2007, p. 199) define positive reciprocity as “the giving of benefits to 
another in return for benefits received”.  They argue that acts of positive reciprocity 
convey two distinct dimensions of value to the recipient.  First, the instrumental 
value, which is the value to the recipient of the material benefits received from the 
reciprocator.  Second, the symbolic value, which is the value conveyed by the act of 
reciprocity itself through the information it provides about the partner and the 
relationship.  As discussed in chapter two, there is experimental evidence to suggest 
that many people have a preference for reciprocity which is based on its symbolic 
value, rather than its instrumental one; in numerous games, experimental subjects 
have demonstrated willingness to reward generous behaviour and punish selfish 
behaviour, even though delivering the reward or punishment comes at a net cost to 
themselves (Camerer & Fehr, 2004, p. 56).  Molm et al argue that on a symbolic level, 
acts of positive reciprocity can build trust in the reciprocator.  According to this 
theory, positive reciprocal behaviour by MCC would ameliorate the baseline level of 
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low trust between MCC and its citizens over time, while negative reciprocal 
behaviour would communicate disregard and erode trust further. 
In general, traders are more willing to contribute to the cleaning of the market 
than butchers are to the operations of the slaughterhouse because they are relatively 
confident that MCC will reciprocate their efforts.  There is no formal contract which 
lays out the inputs that MCC and the traders will make to the cleaning effort.  The 
coproductive relationship works through daily reciprocal exchange—the traders 
gather waste and MCC collects it.  If MCC fails in its obligations to collect waste, the 
traders can reduce or cease their efforts to gather it, acting individually or collectively.  
Traders do not consistently impose sanctions against MCC for poor performance, but 
they have done so in some instances.  Bolten (2008, p. 83) describes just such an 
episode of negative reciprocity in mid-1996, when residents heaped up rubbish at the 
market and on main roads to protest against the lack of waste collection. 
This daily model of exchange can be described as a form of in-built 
monitoring which enables cooperation in spite of generally low levels of trust.  The 
traders have accurate information about whether MCC is collecting waste and a range 
of responses at their disposal.  As a result, they need not fear being duped by MCC.  
Over time, it seems likely that if the pattern of positive reciprocity this in-built 
monitoring enabled were to persist, the symbolic value conveyed would begin to 
increase traders’ trust in MCC.  However, I did not find any clear evidence that trust 
was growing.  For example, the TU chairman remained acutely aware of the threat of 
earlier court action: 
Well, the council, we are waiting and listening, we are listening to them.  We 
are listening to what they say, what they do.  Because, before, the other man 
told me that they have written that they will take us to court, take the union to 
court for what we owe…if they take us to court, then they are doing us wrong, 
they are forgetting all the good we have been doing for them…150 
In addition, conversations with traders in the market yielded mixed results: some were 
appreciative of the council’s efforts in cleaning, while others were resentful of past 
wrongs.  
                                                
150 “Wɛl di kansul, wi de wet, de lisin dɛm.  Wi de lisin wetin dɛm se, wetin dɛm du.  Bikɔs trade di ɔda 
wan tɛl mi se dɛm dɔn rayt se dɛm fɔ put wi na kɔt, put di, put di yuniɔn na kɔt fɔ wetin wi o… if da dɛm 
put wi na kɔt da na bad dɛm de du wi, da wit di gud we wi dɔn du dɛm ɔl dɛm nɔ mɛmba da…”. 
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The butchers agreed to pay a slaughtering fee of 4,000 Le (£0.76) per cow and 
an annual licence fee of 50,000 Le (£9.50) per meat stall on the understanding that 
MCC would provide a fully-staffed slaughterhouse facility with running water, 
electricity and a freezer.  While this agreement requires an element of daily exchange, 
with MCC providing fuel and staff and butchers attending and paying fees on a daily 
basis, it also requires MCC to make longer-term investments to maintain the buildings 
and equipment.  It was difficult for the butchers to monitor whether MCC was 
investing sufficiently in maintenance at first, but MCC’s persistent failure to fix the 
damaged water pipes or the broken generator sent a clear message that they would not 
fulfil their agreed commitments. 
The butchers perceived this as a significant breakdown in reciprocity.  In the 
words of the chairman of the BA: 
…they built the slaughterhouse, brought water, made all the facilities, gave 
them to us, they even bought us a freezer, but that was all for one month, two 
months…After that, nothing.  They gave us electric light there, in the 
mornings when we go to slaughter, but right now nothing…That is finished.  
But any cow that we kill over there, we pay 4,000 Le (£0.76) per cow, we are 
paying for the council, the city.151 
The EHO reported that during the last meeting with the butchers: “they were really 
angry because they said they are paying and they are not enjoying the facilities they 
are paying for.”  While I was observing at the slaughterhouse, butchers approached 
me to complain about the “shameful” facility; a common point made by butchers was 
that the place had been built to a good standard, but had deteriorated.  The emotional 
tone of many of these reactions suggests that the butchers were responding to the 
disregard conveyed by MCC’s actions (the symbolic value of reciprocity), as well as 
the loss of material benefits (the instrumental value of reciprocity), but it is difficult to 
tease these two dimensions apart. 
The most dramatic possibility open to the butchers in terms of demonstrating 
negative reciprocity would be an outright refusal of cooperation, either by refusing to 
pay the slaughtering fee or refusing to attend the facility.  However, this would 
involve a direct confrontation with MCC; an outcome the reticent butchers would 
prefer to avoid (as discussed in section 5.2).  I consider the BA’s refusal to 
                                                
151 “…dɛm bild di slawta, briŋ wata, du ɔl di fasiliti dɛm, gi wi dɛm, briŋ ivin friza dɛm bɔt da ɔl na 
wan mɔnt, tu mɔnt… Natin egen.  Dɛm bin gi wi layt de, na mɔnin we wi de go fɔ go slawta, bɔt rayt 
naw natin…Da dɔn dɔn.  Bɔt ɛni kaw we wi de kil yanda, wi de pe wan kaw fɔ tawzin liyons, na wi de 
pe fɔ di kansul, di siti.” 
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countenance an increase in the slaughtering fee and perhaps also the reluctance of 
some butchers to consistently slaughter at the slaughterhouse as more moderate forms 
of punishment for MCC’s rule-breaking behaviour.  It is for this reason that I describe 
the prescriptions governing MCC’s behaviour at the slaughterhouse as rules, rather 
than norms. 
ii) Self-enforcement of cooperative behaviour 
MCC is in a weak position to carry out monitoring and enforcement of the 
rules governing trader and butcher inputs into coproduction because it lacks both the 
necessary human resources, and a clear basis for action.  Official MCC rules applying 
to management of the market and the slaughterhouse are derived principally from 
older legislation, and are not well-known by all MCC representatives; MCC has not 
yet passed its own bye-laws.152  While MCC representatives describe making 
intermittent interventions against more extreme rule violations, such as an attack on a 
rubbish truck or persistent unsupervised slaughtering by a particular butcher, they do 
not act on more routine rule-breaking such as low daily effort in cleaning the market 
or periodic absences by butchers in general. 
In the market, there are multiple layers of self-regulation operating 
independently of MCC which help to encourage cooperative behaviour as regards the 
cleaning effort.  First, there are three market chiefs whose principal role is to resolve 
disputes between traders in the market.  The position of market chief is integrated 
within the chiefly hierarchy; the market chiefs are approved by the paramount chief 
and act under his authority.  However, market chiefs are also executive members of 
the TU.  Aside from resolving disputes, market chiefs, two of whom trade in the 
market themselves153, act as monitors and trouble-shooters.  One of the market chiefs 
described his role: “to monitor the activities of the people, to listen and observe their 
movement”154.  Their very presence therefore helps maintain orderly behaviour.  
Market chiefs do not perceive themselves to have any specific responsibility for 
cleaning of the market, which is considered to fall within MCC’s purview.  
Nevertheless, on general cleaning day, the market chiefs can be seen walking up and 
                                                
152 The LG Act (2004) empowers MCC to create its own bye-laws, but this process has lagged.  
Suggested bye-laws were not submitted to the CA until February 2009 following which they must be 
sent to Freetown for review by the attorney general’s office.  (Notes from council meeting, February 
11, 2009) 
153 The third is now elderly and acts more as an adviser. 
154 Translated from Temne. 
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down the narrow street through the market, overseeing traders’ efforts, listening to 
their complaints and offering encouragement.  Market chiefs are also likely to be 
among the first to know about problems like free-riding, conflict between traders and 
waste collectors, and the accumulation of standing waste, and are drawn into efforts to 
resolve such issues. 
Traders also regulate each other through normative pressure.  Traders usually 
sell in the same spaces every day, which makes their behaviour highly visible to each 
other.  In many cases, traders are operating alongside peers selling the same kind of 
goods.  They are not only each other’s neighbours, but each other’s creditors, lending 
money or goods when needed.  They also belong to sub-groups of the TU, for 
example, the Fish Sellers’ Association, or the Cigarette Sellers’ Association, each 
with its own chairperson.  If traders do not follow rules such as sweeping their areas 
each day, or contributing for additional sweepers, they are likely to be sanctioned by 
social disapproval which could damage their reputation and interrupt their access to 
intra-group benefits.  Conversations with traders suggest that expressions of social 
disapproval are usually quite mild, with persuasion emerging as the most common 
first response to a neighbour who does not join in the cleaning effort.  However, for 
those highly dependent on their peers, social disapproval can have a powerful 
influence. 
Alongside advocating for traders’ interests to MCC, the TU executive also 
plays a regulatory role in the market.  According to the market chiefs, members of the 
TU executive do not have the authority to impose fines on traders, but they can 
prevent a troublesome trader from accessing a table from which to sell his/her goods 
in the market.  The chairman of the TU described his own efforts to encourage traders 
to clean: “I tell the traders that if anybody does not go to his/her table, I will seize the 
table…everybody goes to clean his/her table.”155  The regulatory authority exercised 
by the TU executive is likely to be supportive of MCC’s aims only when the two 
bodies are aligned. 
Butchers, like other traders, are highly dependent on each other for periodic 
loans.  Their business is capital intensive because of the high cost of purchasing a 
single cow.  It is common for butchers to purchase a cow on a repayment basis from 
another butcher or a cattle trader, or to pair up and take turns slaughtering a cow and 
                                                
155 “…a tɛl treda dɛm ɛnibɔdi we nɔ go na in tebul, a de siz in tebul…ɛnibɔdi de go klin na in tebul.” 
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sharing out the meat to prevent having to freeze too much overnight.  Butchers are 
therefore well positioned to apply normative pressure on one another to attend the 
slaughterhouse, but appear not to do so. 
The BA chairman does advocate to local government on behalf of the 
butchers, but he is far less active than the TU executive in this regard.  The BA’s main 
function seems to be coordinating mutual support efforts to keep each butcher 
operating at a profit.  According to the BA chairman, meetings of the butchers focus 
mainly on current threats to profitability and the BA collects contributions to support 
any butcher who sustains a shock to his business.  The chairman of the BA has passed 
responsibility for most of the daily running of his butcher business on to his sons, and 
appears to serve more as a senior adviser for a group of businessmen than a regulator.  
Individual butchers’ choices not to attend the slaughterhouse seem to go relatively 
unchallenged by him. 
This disparity in self-enforcement of the rules underpinning coproduction 
between the traders and the butchers points to a further reason for higher levels of 
cooperation with MCC found in the former group.  There is tentative evidence that 
this disparity is linked to differences in the perceived legitimacy of the coproductive 
arrangements between groups.  Traders’ desire for a clean market is relatively 
uncomplicated—informal conversations with traders often yielded comments such as, 
“When the place is clean, you feel comfortable,” and, “If the place is dirty, it smells, 
you cannot get good air.”  As a consequence, they are likely to accept the aims of 
coproduction as valid.  The pattern of positive reciprocity that has been maintained 
recently lends further support to the legitimacy of the coproductive arrangements.  In 
contrast, the construction of the slaughterhouse was a top-down initiative and thus 
reveals nothing about butchers’ interest in having such a facility.  While no butcher 
argued that the slaughterhouse was unnecessary, it seems likely that butchers are 
ambivalent about the facility—on the one hand, it offers advantages such as council-
provided cleaning, a place to interact with other butchers, and the acquisition of 
information about cattle disease, but it is also inconvenient and costly to transport and 
slaughter cattle there.  The council’s failure to adhere to the terms of the agreement 
reached with the butchers has conveyed disregard and resulted in the withdrawal of 
key resources such as electricity and running water which would make slaughtering 
easier.  The general mood among the butchers is therefore one of dissatisfaction, 
which undermines the legitimacy of the coproductive arrangements. 
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Concluding comments 
MCC has forged a bargain, albeit a somewhat fragile one, with the traders 
regarding the cleaning of the market.  Its decision to do so appears to be driven 
principally by material and political motives.  Through demonstrating visible results 
in the market in terms of waste collection, MCC is able to maintain its access to 
central and donor funds to support this area of activity.  Working cooperatively with 
the traders and following the rules of coproduction is perhaps the most 
straightforward way for MCC to enjoy steady access to a favourable flow of market 
dues and to reduce the likelihood of disruptive political action by the traders.  The 
cleaning effort therefore forms one component of a broader politicized exchange 
between MCC and the traders.  In contrast, MCC has reneged on a more finite deal 
with the butchers regarding the upkeep of the slaughterhouse, seeing little financial or 
political gain to be had from maintaining the arrangement. 
The traders have a clear interest in the cleanliness of the market, are able to be 
relatively confident of ongoing reciprocity by MCC because the daily structure of the 
pattern of exchange protects them against being duped and are subject to self-
enforcement by multiple layers of regulatory authority within the market.  These 
factors combined encourage them to pay dues and assist in cleaning the market.  The 
value butchers accord to the slaughterhouse is less certain, particularly when critical 
resources such as electricity and water are taken away, and given their poor treatment 
they have little reason to believe that MCC will uphold future commitments.  As a 
consequence, the BA and its members are unwilling to countenance an increase in the 
slaughtering fee and a lack of self-enforcement in their ranks allows non-attendance at 
the slaughterhouse to go unchecked.  
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Annex 
Table 5.A.1 Key rules and norms underpinning coproduction of a clean market by MCC and 
the TU and its members 
Type of 
rule/norm 
Content of rules (R) and norms (N) 
Position There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a citizen coproducer 
Boundary (entry 
and exit rules) 
LGA: MCC must take on the role of LGA with responsibility for cleaning the 
market (or else face punishment by central government/donors) (R) 
Citizen coproducer: All those trading in the market must take on the role of citizen 
coproducer of market cleanliness (or else face punishment by MCC) (R); traders’ 
families, friends and associates may also play the role of citizen coproducer (N) 
Choice Waste collection: MCC must provide vehicles to collect waste on a regular basis (or 
else face punishment by traders/central government/donors) (R) 
Diversion of council resources: MCC workers must not divert waste collection 
vehicles for personal use (or else face punishment by the MCC executive) (R) 
Waste gathering: Citizen coproducers must gather waste for collection (or else face 
punishment by their peers/market chiefs/the TU/MCC) (R) 
Payment: Citizen coproducers must pay market dues or annual licence fees (or else 
face punishment by MCC/court action) (R) 
Obstruction: Citizen coproducers must not obstruct waste collection vehicles (or 
else face punishment by market chiefs/MCC) (R) 
Information MCC and citizen coproducers should share information about waste collection via 
the TU (N) 
Aggregation MCC should decide on the frequency and scope of collection (N) 
The TU and its members must agree to gather waste (or else coproduction of a 
clean market cannot occur) (R) 
Payoff Waste collection: If MCC neglects to perform waste collection, traders may refuse 
to gather waste in the future (or else if MCC persists in its neglect they may impose 
further punishment) (R), or central government/donors may withdraw funding (or 
else if MCC persists in its neglect they may impose further punishment) (R) 
Diversion of council resources: If MCC workers divert waste collection vehicles for 
personal use, they may lose their jobs or be subject to other serious penalty (or else 
if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R) 
Waste gathering: If citizen coproducers refuse to gather waste, they may be subject 
to fines by the market chief, refusal of a table by the TU or denial of support by 
peers (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R) 
Obstruction: If citizen coproducers obstruct waste collection, they may be subject to 
fines by the market chief or be taken to the local court (or else if they resist they 
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may be subject to further punishment) (R) 
Payment: If citizen coproducers refuse to pay market dues or annual licence fees, 
dues collectors may seize their premises/goods (or else if they resist they may be 
subject to further punishment) (R) 
Scope A minimum level of market cleanliness must be maintained (or else MCC may lose 
access to donor funding) (R)  
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Table 5.A.2 Key rules and norms underpinning the coproduction of safe meat by MCC and 
the BA and its members 
Type of 
rule/norm 
Content of rules (R) and norms (N) 
Boundary There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a citizen coproducer 
Position LGA: MCC must take on the role of LGA with responsibility for operating the 
slaughterhouse (or else face punishment by central government) (R) 
Citizen coproducer: All butchers must take on the role of coproducer of safe meat 
(or else face punishment by MCC) (R) 
Choice Facility and basic resources: MCC must provide and staff a slaughterhouse 
facility (or else face punishment by central government) (R) 
Additional resources: MCC must maintain the facility to a reasonable standard, 
provide electricity and water and provide a freezer (or else face punishment by the 
butchers) (R)* 
Slaughtering: Butchers must slaughter their cattle in the slaughterhouse (or else 
face punishment by MCC) (R)* 
Inspection: Butchers must submit to the inspection carried out by the EHO (or 
else face punishment by MCC) (R) 
Fee: Butchers must pay a slaughtering fee (or else face punishment by MCC) (R) 
Information MCC and citizen coproducers should share information via the BA (N) 
Aggregation MCC should set the basic operating procedures at the slaughterhouse (N) 
MCC and the butchers must reach an agreement about their respective inputs into 
the coproduction of safe meat (or else coproduction cannot occur) (R) 
Payoff Facility and basic resources: If MCC fails to provide or staff a slaughterhouse 
facility, central government may take disciplinary action (or else if MCC resists 
central government may impose further punishment) (R) 
Additional resources: If MCC fails to provide additional resources agreed with the 
butchers, the butchers may refuse to pay an increased slaughtering fee (or else if 
MCC resists they may utilize further tactics of resistance) (R) 
Slaughtering: If butchers slaughter their cattle outside the slaughterhouse, MCC 
may make warning visits and ultimately have them charged to court (or else if 
they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R) 
Inspection/fee: If butchers refuse to submit to an inspection or pay their 
slaughtering fee, MCC may have them charged to court (or else if they resist they 
may be subject to further punishment) (R) 
Scope None 
Note: Those rules marked with a star (*) are weakly enforced 
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CHAPTER SIX: Chiefs and their Subject-Citizens: 
Renewing and Redefining Chiefly Authority through 
Public Goods Provision 
In 2009, Makeni’s chiefs lacked both a clear government mandate to address 
the public goods deficit and donor support.  Nevertheless, they remained politically 
powerful and actively engaged in local public goods provision, most prominently the 
production of public order, as the discussion in chapter four indicates.  In this chapter, 
I compare two cases of coproduction by chiefs and subject-citizens in Makeni: the 
relatively successful coproduction of public order by the barri of a senior chief, Pa 
Rok, and the relatively unsuccessful coproduction of community infrastructure 
through chief-led mobilization of unpaid community labour. 
I apply the same analytical approach set out in chapter five, describing the 
coproductive processes through which each good is provided, drawing comparisons 
between them (section 6.1) and elaborating on the main incentives and deterrents 
which influence the actions of chiefs and subject-citizens in each set of coproductive 
arrangements (sections 6.2 and 6.3).  I focus once more on the role played by features 
of the social and political environment which present barriers to local public goods 
provision (chapter one): a political system which provides little motivation for chiefs 
to provide public goods, in this case due to their lifetime hold on power; an 
impoverished public sector, which pays salaries to only a narrow sub-set of those 
involved in chiefdom government and even then at low levels and on an unpredictable 
basis; and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities, given the presence of a 
plurality of actors engaged in providing similar goods and overlapping regimes of 
rules outlined in legislation and in policy. 
6.1 Two cases of chief-led coproduction 
i) Maintaining public order156 
The deeply bifurcated development of the Sierra Leonean state during colonial 
rule has resulted in a judicial system which incorporates two divergent legal 
traditions: customary law and ‘English’ common law.  Residents of Makeni can 
                                                
156 The following description is based on observational and interview data collected between January 
and September 2009, including a month-long intensive period of observation of the barri in August 
2009.  I use the present tense to describe the status quo at that time. 
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choose whether to take their cases to the magistrate’s court, which operates according 
to the ‘English’ common law tradition, or to one of the local courts, which operate 
primarily according to customary law, while incorporating certain elements of 
‘English’ common law.  Both of these courts enjoy official recognition.  Some 
residents eschew officially recognized courts altogether in favour of a chief.  Chiefs at 
all levels in Makeni hear cases.  Senior chiefs have their own barris157—open-sided 
structures where cases are heard and community meetings are held.158  When chiefs’ 
barris act like courts, they are violating the Local Courts Act (1963), which prohibits 
any “exercise or attempt to exercise judicial powers” within a local court jurisdiction, 
unless authorized by alternate legislation.159  Despite their illegality, chiefs’ barris are 
tolerated, and sometimes even protected, by the central government. 
Chiefs’ barris have a complicated relationship with local courts.  They 
compete directly for cases, which they decide using a similar body of customary law.  
However, at the time the research was conducted in 2009, both chiefs’ barris and local 
courts fell under the authority of paramount chiefs.160  Local courts were part of the 
chiefdom administration, supervised by MLG; the resources they earned were paid 
into the chiefdom account; and the local court chairperson was usually selected on the 
recommendation of the paramount chief, and approved by representatives of MLG.  
Therefore in many cases the local court chairperson was a client of the chief and some 
chiefs used their influence over the local court chairperson to shape the outcome of 
cases.   
                                                
157 ‘Barri’ is the most common English spelling found in the academic literature; colonial-era 
documents also tend to use the spelling ‘barri’ or ‘barrie’.  Contemporary newspapers commonly use 
the spelling ‘barray’. 
158 The three local courts in Bombali Sebora chiefdom are also housed in barris, although these are 
official government buildings rather than barris constructed by chiefs’ supporters on their own 
initiative. 
159 Section 40 of the 1963 Local Courts Act states: “(I) Any person who shall—(a) within the area of 
the jurisdiction of any constituted Local Court exercise or attempt to exercise judicial powers, 
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of any Act; or (b) sit as a member of such Court 
without due authority, shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not 
exceeding twenty-five pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both 
such fine and such imprisonment”.  According to Fanthorpe et al (2009, p. 37), some chiefs make an 
argument that their judicial decisions are protected by section 72 (1) of the 1991 Constitution, which 
states: “The institution of Chieftaincy as established by customary law and usage and its non-abolition 
by legislation is hereby guaranteed and preserved”.  If chiefs’ judicial role is part of customary law, 
they argue, then it cannot be abolished. 
160 In July 2011, an amendment to the Local Courts Act was passed which transferred oversight of local 
courts to the Office of the Chief Justice, diminishing paramount chiefs’ influence (Koroma, 2011). 
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As discussed in chapter four, PC Kasangna has not yet been installed fully in 
accordance with Temne custom and therefore shares some of his chiefly powers with 
Pa Rok Sebora Sesay161, including the right to operate the main chiefdom barri.  
There is a clear difference in the physical appearance of the barris overseen by Pa Rok 
and the paramount chief.  Pa Rok’s barri is a permanent structure, painted bright red 
with a heavy thatched roof, while the paramount chief’s barri is a temporary structure 
which consists of a flat palm-leaf roof supported by sticks (ågbaya) (see images 6.1 
and 6.2).  One of the barri officiators explained this: 
According to the ceremonies here, it is due to the tradition that they didn’t 
build one like that over there.  Because Pa Rok has been to kantha162, the 
paramount chief has not been there yet, so they are not supposed to make that 
barri there like how they made Pa Rok’s one…The time when he goes to 
kantha, they are going to build a barri like this one.  So at that time, it will be 
destroyed.  There should only be one barri there for the paramount chief, but 
because he hasn’t been to kantha yet, he doesn’t know the ceremonies, that’s 
it.163 
I chose to study Pa Rok’s barri because its status as the main chiefdom barri made it a 
hub of daily activity attended by a wide range of subject-citizens, while the PC’s more 
subdued barri dealt mainly with cases affecting members of his ruling house. 
Pa Rok’s barri (hereafter ‘the barri’) is located inside the former paramount 
chief’s compound, just a few minutes from the city’s main market.  In the shaded 
interior of the barri, those presiding over cases sit on wooden chairs gathered around a 
wooden table on one side of the barri.  The complainant(s) and the accused(s) sit on a 
wooden bench immediately opposite on the left and right sides respectively.164  
Behind them are three further rows of seating, both plastic chairs and benches, which 
accommodate about 30 people.  When the barri is full, the low walls around the edge 
are used as additional seating.  Four men preside over cases at the barri on a daily 
basis: the chairman, a ceremonial chief with the title Pa Kȧp"r Bana; the vice-
                                                
161 The interim ruler who is the foremost of the former chief’s ceremonial chiefs, or kȧp"r. 
162 A period of ritual seclusion which is a prerequisite for full installation as a Temne chief. 
163 “Akdin to di srimoni ya, di tradishn naim mek dm n mek am lk yanda.  Biks Pa Rok i bin 
dn go na kantha, di paramawnt chif i n go de yt, so dm n spos f mek da bare de lk aw dm 
mek Pa Rok in yon…Di tm we i de go na kantha, dm de bild di bare lk aw dm bild am.  So da tm 
dande, i dn brok.  Ɔnli na wan bare f de nm na di paramawnt chif, bt biks f i n go na kantha 
yet, i n no wetin na di srimoni, na da.” 
164 From the perspective of those presiding over the case. 
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chairman, a retired soldier who is also Pa Rok’s cousin165; the secretary, a literate 
local construction contractor who belongs to the former paramount chief’s ruling 
house, Petbana Marank; and an additional member who belongs to Petbana Masimbo 
ruling house.  Other ceremonial chiefs regularly attend the barri to join them in 
presiding over cases.  They are supported by a messenger who informs people when 
they have been summoned to the barri and follows up on errant individuals who fail to 
attend.  Pa Rok remains involved in the proceedings through regular visits and phone-
calls, acting as the barri’s supervisor. 
The barri officiators166 preside over a wide variety of cases, including those 
dealing with debt, family matters related to divorce or separation, abusive language, 
land, witchcraft and sodalities (secret societies).167  In keeping with their chiefly 
obligations, they do not generally turn cases away, even those that involve disputes 
over very small amounts of money or goods.  Unsurprisingly, there is some tension 
between chiefs and local courts over the scope of their respective jurisdictions, which 
overlap extensively.168  Pa Rok, the barri officiators and senior members of ruling 
houses argued that ceremonial chiefs have exclusive jurisdiction over sodality and 
witchcraft cases, but a local court chairperson in the chiefdom insisted that these cases 
could also be addressed in the local courts.  He also argued that land cases should 
always be dealt with by the local courts because chiefs do not keep written records of 
cases.  In his view, the barri officiators take an opportunistic approach, accepting any 
case that comes their way.  However, Pa Rok and the vice-chairman argued that they 
always refer criminal cases, including rape and theft, to the police.  No matters of rape 
or theft were brought before the barri while I was observing proceedings, but the barri 
officiators did take on a number of cases which are classified as criminal in the 
standard work of reference on customary law in Sierra Leone (Fenton, 1951), 
                                                
165 The vice-chairman originally held the position of chairman, but was demoted because of objections 
to a ‘civilian’ supervising a chief.  The term ‘cousin’ does not necessarily imply first cousin in the 
Western sense. 
166 I use the term barri officiators to refer to all those who preside at the barri. 
167 During fieldwork I observed 35 matters in whole or in part; these broke down as follows: debt (10), 
family matters related to divorce or separation (5), abusive language (4), land (2), witchcraft (2), 
threats of violence (2), physical assault (2), disrespect towards chiefs/barri (3), complaints about senior 
chiefs (2) and sodalities (1).  These are my own categories, which draw on the descriptions given by 
my research assistant and barri officiators.  Two matters were not described in sufficient detail to allow 
categorization. 
168 The 1963 Local Courts Act section 13 (1) gives local courts jurisdiction all civil cases where “the 
claim, debt, duty or matter in dispute does not exceed two hundred pounds in value” and all criminal 
cases where the maximum punishment “does not exceed a fine of fifty pounds or imprisonment for a 
period of six months or both such fine and such imprisonment”.  The values stated are out of date. 
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including two cases of physical assault (one minor, one less so); two cases of 
witchcraft; and one sodality case. 
When one person wishes to initiate a case against another, she169 comes to the 
barri to explain the case to the barri officiators and pays them a bora which usually 
varies from between 2,000-15,000 Le (£0.38 to £2.85) and transportation for the 
messenger which usually costs between 1,000 to 2,000 Le (£0.19 to £0.38).  A bora is 
often described by chiefs as a discretionary token payment which has no set amount.  
In practice, it is not usually possible to initiate a case without paying a bora and it 
would be considered disrespectful to attempt to do so.  The secretary takes down the 
basic details of the case and sends the messenger to let the other person know that a 
case has been brought against her in the barri.  When the accused presents herself, she 
has the option of choosing to have the case sent to another court, either the local court 
or the magistrate’s court, or accepting the authority of Pa Rok’s barri to preside over 
the case.  If she accepts the authority of the barri, she must then ‘return’ the bora and 
the transportation fee by paying the barri the same amount as the complainant. 
The barri officiators then choose a strategy for dealing with the case.  In some 
cases this requires the navigation of competing norms—on the one hand, there is an 
expectation that they will treat cases fairly, but on the other hand they are also 
expected to meet their obligations to relatives and allies.  The strategy chosen also 
reflects the type of case being dealt with.  For those cases where the parties agree 
about the wrong committed, such as debt cases where the debtor acknowledges her 
debt, the barri officiators merely set out and enforce the terms for settlement.  If the 
ability of the debtor to repay is in question, the barri officiators may ask a third party 
to serve as the surety for the debt on the debtor’s behalf, taking on the responsibility 
to pay if she defaults.  In cases where the stories told by the complainant and the 
accused differ, a hearing occurs.  Each party must then pay a further sitting fee 
decided upon by the barri officiators, which varies depending on the number of 
witnesses, the amount of the bora already paid and the complexity of the case, 
amongst other factors.  The hearing consists of a process of testimony and cross-
examination.  Beginning with the complainant, each party testifies and is then 
questioned, first by the opposing party and then by the barri officiators.  This process 
is then repeated for the witnesses.  Each party secures her own witnesses and pays 
                                                
169 I use the female pronoun throughout this chapter to represent the neutral subject.  
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1,000 Le (£0.19) to each one that testifies on her behalf.  Before testifying, each 
person swears to tell the truth on the Bible or the Qur’an before making her statement.  
When one party is suspicious about the veracity of a witness’ testimony, she can ask 
the witness to swear ‘traditionally’170 before testifying instead.  In this case, a 
swearing licence costing 30,000 Le (£5.70) must be purchased from the chiefdom 
administration and the person requesting that the witness swear traditionally must 
seek out a local sorcerer capable of preparing the swear (an object understood to be 
invested with magical power).  The witness then stands in front of the swear when 
promising to tell the truth, with the understanding that if she lies then the supernatural 
forces contained within it or represented by it will ensure that a specified misfortune 
will befall her, such as being killed by a snake.171  
The barri officiators punish actions which violate customary law through the 
imposition of fines and fees.  In many cases, the parties themselves mutually agree on 
the amount that is at stake in their dispute.  However, some violations of customary 
law have fixed fees and fines attached, which can be quite severe.  An accusation of 
witchcraft, which is among the most serious offences one can commit in the eyes of 
the barri, can be particularly costly.  Six women and one young girl accused of 
witchcraft were each required to pay 250,000 Le (£48), a bag of rice worth 
approximately 110,000 Le (£21), a goat worth approximately 150,000 Le (£29), five 
gallons of palm oil worth approximately 80,000 Le (£15.20) and bail of 25,000 Le 
(£4.75) for their release; a total of approximately 620,000 Le (£117) per person.  This 
is an extremely high amount of money given that many economically active adults 
earn around 5,000 Le (£0.95) per day, or less.  Land cases can also be very costly, as 
the parties have to pay the barri officiators to visit and inspect the land.  Two men 
agreed to pay 200,000 Le (£38) to the barri officiators to visit the disputed land which 
was the focus of their case.  The money from the barri does not go into the chiefdom 
bank account; it is retained and dispensed by Pa Rok, or by the vice-chairman of the 
barri acting on his behalf.  According to the barri officiators, each person who 
presides over cases receives a share, as does PC Kasangna.  The vice-chairman 
reported that Pa Rok also uses the funds to meet his obligations to the surviving 
                                                
170 In describing this process as swearing traditionally, I am using the barri officiators’ vocabulary for 
differentiating between this mode of swearing and biblical/Qur’anic swearing. 
171 I am ignorant of the precise means through which the swear works.  See James Littlejohn (1960) for 
further background on the Temne practice of swearing. 
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relatives of the late paramount chief.  Acting on Pa Rok’s behalf, the vice-chairman 
buys a bag of rice and other food supplies for them every two or three weeks and 
covers medical costs and other costs that arise. 
The barri officiators frequently use the threat of imprisonment to encourage 
parties to comply with their wishes.  Within the barri, there is a chair on one side 
beneath a handwritten cardboard sign which reads “criminal chair".  When somebody 
refuses to comply, usually by paying a required amount of money, she is sent to sit in 
that chair until a relative or friend comes with additional funds.  If the barri officiators 
want to exert greater pressure, they threaten to send the person to be locked up at 
Makump, a nearby village which is home to the only chiefdom cell.  The only way 
they can realize this threat is by transferring the case to a local court with a request 
that the person be locked up, as the local courts alone have access to the cell.  The 
threat is therefore difficult to realize but nevertheless appears to be effective. 
Chiefs’ barris are not integrated into the official justice system, and therefore 
it is not possible to appeal the outcome of a case in another court.  However, a similar 
strategy of transferring the case to a local court is used to approximate an appeals 
process.  According to the secretary, when a ruling is made, each party has the option 
to declare that they are dissatisfied.  If this occurs, the barri officiators hold on to the 
expenses from the case rather than delivering them to the favoured party and allow 
the dissatisfied party 14 days to register the case with a local court.  When the local 
court contacts the barri, one of the barri officiators visits the local court chairperson 
with the money from the case and explains what took place.  The case is then heard 
again from the beginning, although local court chairpersons are not immune from 
chiefly influence and may come under some pressure to reach a similar conclusion. 
As discussed in chapter one, public goods provision frequently suffers from 
free-rider problems—when individuals cannot be excluded from the benefits of a 
good, they have a strong incentive not to contribute to its provision, hoping that others 
will carry the responsibility without them.  It is possible to apply the free-riding 
concept to this case, with some qualification.  In this case, the broader benefit 
generated by the barri’s operations is public order (see chapter seven for further 
discussion of this).  Arguably, individuals who reject the barri’s authority and refuse 
to participate in its activities are free-riding on the efforts of chiefs and their peers to 
produce public order.  A parallel in the UK would be evading jury duty, which is 
clearly considered to be a form of free-riding.  However, as the barri is only one site 
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in Makeni that helps to generate public order, individuals could be contributing to this 
good through their participation in the local court, magistrate’s court, or other 
channels and thus not free-riding on the efforts of others to produce public order, 
broadly speaking.  Given that subject-citizens can exercise the choice to have their 
cases heard in other courts, it is notable that it is rare for individuals to reject the 
barri’s authority—during a month-long period of daily observation, I encountered 
only one example of somebody refusing to attend the barri and two accused parties 
who expressed a desire to transfer their cases elsewhere. 
There is a complex web of rules and norms underpinning coproduction of 
public order by subject-citizens and chiefs.  To conclude, I pull out the small number 
that I consider most essential.  On the barri officiators’ side, there is a norm that they 
should hear all cases brought to the barri.  In terms of their approach to deciding 
cases, there are conflicting norms that they should decide cases fairly and that they 
should be sympathetic to the interests of their relatives and allies when deciding 
cases; this is discussed in more detail in section 6.3.  On the side of subject-citizens, 
there is a norm that they should bring cases to the barri.  Beyond that, subject-citizens 
must attend the barri when summoned by the barri officiators, pay a bora and other 
relevant fees and answer chiefs’ questions honestly.  They must also abide by the 
barri officiators’ final decisions and pay any related fines.  As discussed, there are 
important exceptions to these rules—subject-citizens may choose the venue in which 
their case is heard and they may ‘appeal’ their case after a final decision by having it 
heard a second time by the local court.  A fuller summary of rules and norms is set out 
in table 6.A.1, attached as an annex to this chapter. 
ii) Mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure172 
In post-war Makeni, chiefs play a relatively marginal role in mobilizing labour 
to maintain community infrastructure, which is under competitive pressure from other 
actors, particularly the city council.  Neither the paramount chief nor Pa Rok seem to 
be routinely involved in mobilization of labour—this is a task they generally delegate 
to sub-chiefs.  All five ward heads173 I spoke to described playing some role in the 
mobilization of labour to maintain infrastructure in their wards, but in most cases this 
                                                
172 The following description is based on observational and interview data collected between January 
and September 2009.  I use the present tense to describe the status quo at that time. 
173 For chiefdom purposes, Makeni is divided into seven administrative wards, each overseen by a ward 
head.  They report to the section chief, who reports to the paramount chief. 
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was relatively minor.174  Two reported working with youth groups to periodically 
clean out gutters, drains and culverts in their areas; one described working with the 
Islamic Youth Committee to maintain the central mosque, where he also serves as 
assistant manager; a fourth said he was chairman of a neighbourhood organization 
called the Turntable Descendants’ Organization175 which works for community 
development, including the maintenance of community infrastructure; and a fifth 
described a more reactive role, organizing food for young people when they asked for 
his support for maintenance of community infrastructure. 
The ward head chairing the Turntable Descendants’ Organization described a 
recent effort to maintain the area around the local court barri, where plants had grown 
and potholes had developed during the rains.  He spoke of the different strategies he 
used to mobilize youth to contribute their labour.  He encouraged them to take pride 
in their ward, saying, “This is our ward, let us be in competition with other 
wards…don’t let them cry us down”.  He used member contributions to provide 
rewards for workers such as cigarettes and food, which was cooked by female 
volunteers.  However, he also threatened withdrawal of the association’s support in 
times of hardship, such as a death in the family.  Despite this mix of strategies, the 
ward head said that it remained challenging to mobilize youth for community labour.  
He attributed this to the reluctance of ‘strangers’ (those born outside of the chiefdom) 
to contribute to the collective effort, a complaint reiterated by Pa Rok when 
discussing this issue. 
Free-riding therefore presents a substantial problem affecting the coproduction 
of community infrastructure by chiefs and youth.  Susan Shepler (2005, p. 79) defines 
a youth in Sierra Leone as, “someone who is no longer a child, but not yet a ‘big man’ 
or a ‘big woman’”.  She emphasizes that youth is not a straightforward age-based 
category, but one which describes individuals engaged in “certain relations and 
activities” (p. 80).  According to Shepler, initiation into a sodality is necessary, but 
not sufficient for the achievement of adulthood.  Marriage is generally viewed as a 
marker of the transition from youth to adulthood, with girls marrying earlier than 
                                                
174 I did not have the opportunity to observe sub-chiefs engaged in mobilizing labour, as no chief could 
identify an upcoming occasion where he would carry out an exercise of this nature.  This is partly 
because my fieldwork on this topic was delayed until the rainy season during which relatively little 
infrastructural maintenance takes place. 
175 The organization takes its name from the neighbourhood in which it is based, which is in proximity 
to a roundabout, known locally as a turntable. 
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boys.  Those serving as apprentices (including students) are usually considered youth, 
whatever their age.  Youth can also be considered a political category, which 
describes the “subaltern” (p. 83)—those who lack employment, opportunity and 
property, and find themselves in an unequal relationship with elders.  As Shepler 
points out, when viewed from this political perspective, youth can be a terminal state.  
When Makeni’s chiefs speak of mobilizing youth in their communities to assist with 
community maintenance, they are usually referring to young men.  While young 
women can and do play an active role in carrying out certain kinds of physical labour 
towards community maintenance and in preparing food for workers, it is young men 
that chiefs conceive of as the primary targets of mobilization efforts. 
The most straightforward way in which free-riding occurs is when some youth 
free-ride on the efforts of others.  However, it is also possible to argue that members 
of the community who are not considered youth free-ride on the efforts of those who 
are.  Against this interpretation, you could argue that where you find a social division 
of labour, free-riding does not occur, as older people have done their share of 
community labour during their youth, and continue to contribute to the public good of 
the community in other ways fitting to their age.  However, this alternate 
interpretation is undermined by the fact that youth is not a straightforward age-based 
category, but one which links to social status, and therefore there are opportunities for 
those of higher status to avoid community obligations even in earlier life, as Richards 
(2005b) suggests.  At a minimum, the fact that community contributions are collected 
in many instances to support the work suggests that there is an expectation that the 
wider membership of the community will contribute to the maintenance of 
community infrastructure, at least financially, and therefore when people are 
unwilling to make such contributions, they are free-riding on the efforts of youth. 
The essential rules and norms underpinning coproduction by chiefs and 
subject-citizens are therefore relatively straightforward, if not well observed.  Chiefs 
should identify when efforts to maintain public infrastructure are needed and call 
upon subject-citizens to contribute their labour.  They must deploy strategies to 
motivate their subject-citizens to do so and they must also provide resources such as 
materials, tools and food to support their participation.  Subject-citizens must 
contribute their labour when called upon. A fuller summary of rules and norms is set 
out in table 6.A.2, attached as an annex to this chapter. 
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The post-reform MCC plays a significant role in mobilizing labour, 
encroaching on chiefs’ role in this regard.  Following decentralization in Sierra 
Leone, MCC is officially responsible for maintaining core components of community 
infrastructure in Makeni, including roads, culverts and certain community buildings.  
MCC is therefore the main conduit and/or contact point for both government and 
external funding for this maintenance work, which gives the council a significant 
advantage in terms of access to equipment and resources for maintenance.  The two 
most significant donor initiatives providing funds for the rehabilitation of community 
infrastructure in Makeni, the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), a 
national social fund established by a 2001 act of parliament, and Go Bifo, a 
community-driven development project funded by the Japanese Social Development 
Fund via the World Bank, both engage with councils, rather than chiefs. NaCSA 
applies a ‘cash for work’ model, and is thus not reliant on mobilization of unpaid 
youth labour; to the contrary, there is intense youth competition for opportunities.  
However, MCC sits on the regional committee for NaCSA that makes decisions about 
which projects are funded and is thus able to exert influence over the decision-making 
process, consolidating its own reputation as a key actor as regards community 
infrastructure. 
Go Bifo actively encourages a model based on mobilization of unpaid youth 
labour, making funding contingent on inputs of labour and local materials by affected 
community members on the grounds that this increases local buy-in.  According to 
one Go Bifo representative, “If you bring in materials and labour from outside, people 
do not feel part of it.  That’s why before the culture of maintenance was lacking in 
Sierra Leone”.  Of course, such inputs also reduce project costs to the donor.  Go Bifo 
work closely with the city council: the council’s CA is required to co-sign the 
document that allows the release of funds and councillors and WDCs are required to 
play a key role in mobilizing contributions of materials and unpaid labour.  In doing 
so, they use similar strategies to chiefs: seeking the assistance of youth and 
encouraging them with incentives such as community recognition and the provision of 
food.  A local representative of Go Bifo reported that five culverts and two primary 
schools had been rehabilitated through this process—far more tangible results than 
those associated with the city’s chiefs. 
In some cases, youth do not wait for chiefs or MCC to “come with 
development” to their communities, but take action themselves.  Youth groups are in 
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abundant supply in Makeni—the umbrella organization Makeni Union of Youth 
Groups (MUYOG) brings together 48 youth groups, and there are others besides 
which have not joined MUYOG.  As Fanthorpe and Roy Maconachie (2010) have 
argued, many of these groups are oriented towards external funding, and some lie 
dormant for long periods, reactivating when funding opportunities are available.  The 
eagerness of these groups to demonstrate the characteristics and practices which they 
believe to be important to donors, such as a clear organizational structure, a 
constitution, elections, and a 50-50 gender balance, provides some evidence of this.  
Despite their desire to capture external funds, many youth groups also provide a 
means for youth with limited resources and opportunities to organize some 
entertainment and gain some recognition in their communities. 
The youth group Eastern Social Club was founded in 2007 to win funding for 
agricultural projects.  They had limited success in this regard, but did undertake the 
repair of an impassable road which was an important access point to their community.  
At the outset, the group was able to drum up support from neighbours, who made 
small contributions of 1,000 to 2,000 Le (£0.19 to £0.38) per week for food and 
supplies.  Some of the community’s women came and cooked for the group and 
helped to carry stones for the road while they were working.  The group approached 
MCC for material support, and was able to borrow tools, but not the tractor its 
members believed they needed to restore the culvert.  As time went on, community 
contributions became harder to collect and the group was not able to recruit any other 
young people to share the work.  “Some people are not able to sacrifice to do the job.  
Only a few.  When you ask them to do community work, some people say, ‘I have to 
go and find what I will eat.’,” said one member of the group.  Although they were 
able to complete the work to a level where the road was passable before the rainy 
season hit, the road deteriorated again during the rains.  The group’s members went to 
a local chief to ask for his assistance in securing materials to repair the road, but he 
refused, saying they should make do with locally available sand and stone.  They also 
submitted a grant application to MCC, but did not receive any funding.  By the end of 
the rainy season the road was impassable once more.  In this instance at least, youth 
operating alone faced similar difficulties to chiefs in mobilizing labour. 
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iii) Drawing comparisons 
In parallel with the cases discussed in chapter five, the accounts set out here 
are consistent with popular perceptions of relative success and failure in public goods 
provision, and suggest that this variation in performance is linked to underlying 
institutional factors.  While chiefs, barri officiators and subject-citizens generally 
follow the rules underpinning coproduction of public order, neither chiefs nor subject-
citizens appear committed to doing so in the case of coproduction of community 
infrastructure.  While both are longstanding institutions, the former continues to 
function relatively effectively, while the latter appears to be in decline. 
It is notable that in both instances chiefs and their delegates are in competition 
with other local actors as providers of public goods.  Pa Rok’s barri remains a popular 
venue despite the presence of two local courts in Makeni which also decide cases 
using customary law.  As discussed in more detail in section 6.3, the barri has 
numerous characteristics which appeal to users: it decides cases more quickly and 
usually at lower cost than the local court; it operates using the Temne language; and it 
is thought to be more sympathetic to the impact of a case on family relations and to 
the interests of those who belong to a chiefly class.  While for the mostpart these 
features are likely to be longstanding characteristics of chiefs’ barris, it is also 
possible that chiefs have been careful to preserve some of these features in order to 
ensure an edge over local courts.  Low costs are perhaps a good example—while 
chiefs could have increased their fees to levels comparable to local courts, they may 
have decided to keep them lower in order to remain attractive as a venue for deciding 
cases.  There also appears to be a strategic dimension to management of relations with 
local courts.  Rather than treating local courts as opponents, Pa Rok and the barri 
officiators take advantage of their association with them to enhance their coercive 
power and approximate an appeals process.  It is only through transferring a case to a 
local court that a barri officiator can make good on a threat to imprison somebody or 
enable an ‘appeal’ by having the case heard again in a different venue.  While the 
barri officiators could attempt to obstruct subject-citizens seeking to take their cases 
to local courts, instead they generally allow subject-citizens to choose which venue 
their cases are heard in, which helps to maintain cooperative relationships.176 
                                                
176 Although I did observe them put up low-level resistance to a local court transfer in one instance of a 
profitable land case.  In addition, blatant and repeated attempts to prevent subject-citizens having their 
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To determine the significance of these behaviours with greater certainty, 
further historical analysis is needed to trace the development of chiefly adjudication 
following the reconstitution of ‘native’ courts (presided over by chiefs) as local courts 
(with court presidents, or later chairpersons) in the 1960s.  However, my observations 
are consistent with an interpretation that chiefs in Makeni, once excluded from 
presiding over official local courts, have acted strategically to ensure that they 
continue to be sought out as unofficial adjudicators.  In contrast, there are no signs 
that chiefs have attempted to remain competitive with other actors vis-à-vis the 
mobilization of community labour.  They have not carved out a unique role for 
themselves nor found ways to take advantage of access to equipment and resources in 
the same way that Pa Rok and the barri officiators take advantage of the local courts 
to enhance their own power.  In this case, there appears to be some indication that 
chiefs may be voluntarily relinquishing their role as mobilizers of community labour. 
On the side of subject-citizen coproducers, there is a significant free-riding 
problem present as regards the mobilization of youth labour, while I observed few 
instances of subject-citizens rejecting the barri’s authority.  This can be explained in 
part by the character of the goods provided in each case.  The adjudication service 
provided by the barri is a private good with positive externalities in the form of the 
broader benefits of public order generated.  As such, many of those involved in cases 
at the barri are focused on the private benefits they can secure in the process.  The 
community infrastructure generated through chiefly mobilization of labour is closer to 
a public good in the classic economic sense—one that is both non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous.  The provision of this good is therefore more vulnerable to free-riding 
practices.  However, this is not the whole story.  The classic public goods problem 
posed by the mobilization of labour for maintenance of community infrastructure 
could be overcome by chiefs if they were sufficiently committed to doing so and if 
they were able to sway subject-citizens to cooperate.  Related, there are many subject-
citizens who participate in cases at the barri who do not stand to profit substantially, 
for example, guilty parties liable to lose cases and those serving as witnesses.  
Therefore, it seems that there is a fundamental difference in the way chiefly authority 
                                                
cases heard in local courts would be likely to arouse the ire of central government representatives in 
Makeni. 
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is perceived by subject-citizens vis-à-vis each good which affects their willingness to 
cooperate. 
In the following sections, I consider the main incentives and deterrents which 
influence the choices made by chiefs and their delegates and subject-citizens.  I 
address two questions: 
 Why do chiefs hold tight to their role as coproducers of public order, despite 
competition from other actors, while seeming to relinquish their role as 
coproducers of community infrastructure? (section 6.2) 
 Why are subject-citizens persuaded to cooperate with chiefs to coproduce public 
order (even when they do not stand to personally profit from doing so), while they 
are unwilling to do the same to maintain community infrastructure? (section 6.3) 
6.2 Incentives and deterrents for chiefs 
i) Money to eat 
The barri is a vital source of income for Pa Rok and the barri officiators.  Pa 
Rok uses his share to fulfil his customary responsibilities to the former paramount 
chief’s family and to sustain a network of sub-chiefs.  The barri officiators make a 
substantial part of their living from hearing cases at the barri.  In the words of one 
ceremonial chief, “We chiefs rely on Satan to make a living because it is from conflict 
that we get our money to eat.”177  Or, in the words of one elderly Makeni man, “If 
there are no cases the chiefs would not survive because they are not working.”178 
Each step in the barri’s legal process requires the payment of fees or penalties 
by the parties involved.  The barri officiators’ insistence that all payments to the barri 
are made on time and in their full amount indicates the centrality of money to the 
work they do.  The barri officiators never begin discussion of the details of a case 
until the accused party has returned the bora paid by the claimant.  In cases where a 
party fails to return the bora, or to make a debt payment on time, she is usually held 
in the ‘criminal chair’ until a friend or relative comes to pay the money on her behalf.  
An elderly woman who asked if she could hold on to her bora until she had explained 
her case was scolded by the chairman, “You can’t pay money and take it back.  Do 
you think your position better than mine that you are coming to take money from 
                                                
177 Translated from Temne. 
178 Translated from Temne. 
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chiefs?”179  In a witchcraft case where the costs imposed on the accused parties were 
particularly high, the chiefs showed relatively little leeway in negotiating the first 
instalment of the penalties downwards,180 despite the best efforts of the relatives of 
the accused parties to convince them to do so.  The rigour with which chiefs ensure 
that payments are made could be explained as an effort to disincentivize undesirable 
behaviour, rather than as an effort to maximize profits.  However, I observed the barri 
officiators resist the transfer of profitable cases to other venues (both to the local court 
in one instance and to sub-chiefs) which suggests that in some cases at least securing 
a profit is their main concern.  Some of those I spoke to also accused the barri 
officiators of more dubious profit-maximizing practices, such as taking bribes to find 
a case in favour of a particular party, or dishonestly reporting the amount of bora paid 
by the claimant so as to extract a larger bora payment from the accused. 
In most instances, mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain community 
infrastructure actually costs chiefs money, rather than earning a profit.  One of the 
most significant implications of MCC’s official mandate to maintain infrastructure 
from a chiefly perspective is that it makes it far more difficult for chiefs to access 
government or donor funding for infrastructure projects, cutting off one potential 
stream of profits.  In an urban context where individuals seek to exchange their labour 
for wages, and scrutiny of chiefs’ actions is relatively high, chiefs cannot simply 
demand contributions of labour from youth.  Rather, they are expected to provide 
food or other material incentives and the necessary tools and other materials for 
workers to encourage their participation.  To fund this, chiefs can either turn to 
collecting community contributions, thus engaging with a new collective action 
problem, or draw on personal resources.  For this reason, mobilizing labour for 
community infrastructure can be a costly activity. 
ii) Authority to administer 
Chiefly identity is tightly bound up with the practice of presiding over cases.  
Much of chiefs’ authority flows from their right to decide cases, and is renewed by 
their continual exercise of that right.  This conception is supported by Christian 
Lund’s (2007, p. 6) definition of authority as, “an instance of power which seeks at 
                                                
179 Translated from Temne. 
180 The accused parties were required to provide approximately 130,000 Le (£24) and a bag of rice as a 
first installment.  The chiefs eventually accepted 100,000 Le (£19) and half a bag of rice. 
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least a minimum of voluntary compliance and is thus legitimated in some way”; 
authority is thus produced through “an active and contested process of assertion, 
legitimization and exercise”.  This process-oriented approach does not take the 
authority of LGAs for granted, but brings focus on to the way in which authority is 
continually constructed.  Complaining of efforts by MLG representatives to prevent 
his barri from operating, Pa Rok said, “Who is going to be a chief then you don’t 
decide cases?...It’s wrong.  You can only administer when…you have authority.”  I 
interpret this to mean two things: first, that it is not possible to be a chief without 
carrying out the identity-defining activity of deciding cases; and second, that it is 
through the process of deciding cases that the authority to administer one’s chiefdom 
more broadly is acquired.  A local court chairperson described the exercise and 
acquisition of authority by chiefs’ barris in more naked terms: “When they have 
barris, they say, ‘Do this, do it like that,’…you feel that it increases authority.  That is 
why when they tell them to stop, they don’t agree to stop.  They feel that if they leave 
those barris, automatically their powers are finished in the chiefdom.”  Once more, a 
connection is made between the practice of presiding over cases and chiefly authority 
more broadly. 
Pa Rok argued vigorously in favour of the barri’s right to decide cases, 
emphasizing that it has exclusive jurisdiction over sodality and witchcraft cases: 
That barri is the suitable place to handle both custom, traditional matters.  You 
cannot take customary matter or ceremony matter to the local 
court…Society181 cases.  The initiation.  Witchcraft case.  Chief, any 
paramount chief, in any chiefdom…those are the people responsible to handle 
those cases.  No other people…That’s why that barri is necessary. 
The smooth-running of sodalities and control of witchcraft are both issues of 
significant popular concern.  Framing the barri in this light therefore strengthens its 
potential to legitimize chiefs’ judicial role and renew chiefly authority more broadly.  
I consider this move to be—at least in part—a strategic step by Pa Rok to assert an 
advantage over the local courts in Makeni.  This interpretation is supported by the 
vigorous contestation of his claim by one of Makeni’s local court chairpersons, as 
well as by historical events; jurisdiction over witchcraft and certain offences relating 
to sodalities was removed from chiefs by the colonial government and there is a 
                                                
181 He refers to sodality cases. 
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record of such cases being dealt with by official, non-customary courts (Fenton, 1951, 
p. 15; Brooke, 1953, p. 5; Fyle, 1988; Shaw, 1997). 
It is thought that membership of sodalities is close to universal in rural Sierra 
Leone (Richards, et al., 2004, p. ii; Shepler, 2005, p. 100).  While membership may 
be somewhat reduced in urban areas like Makeni, it remains common; there are 
known sodality sites in the city that are forbidden to non-initiates and loud drumming 
can be heard when rites are taking place.  Sodalities are generally considered to be a 
highly legitimate form of social organization; the initiations they perform remain an 
important prerequisite for obtaining adult status and peers undergoing initiation 
together often develop close bonds.  This legitimacy was taken advantage of by armed 
groups during the civil war—the Civil Defence Forces (CDF)182 used sodality 
networks as a basis for recruitment and the RUF’s practice of abduction and initiation 
resonated to an extent with recognized sodality practices (Jackson, 2004, p. 159; 
Richards, et al., 2004, pp. 8-10; Shepler, 2005, pp. 100-104). 
Given the secrecy which attaches to the inner workings of sodalities, it is 
difficult to set out the basis of Pa Rok’s claim to have exclusive jurisdiction over 
sodality cases with precision.183  As in other Temne chiefdoms, the institution of 
chieftaincy in Bombali Sebora is imbricated with the principal male sodality, in this 
case the Poro society; all paramount chiefs and ceremonial chiefs are required to be 
members (Dorjahn, 1960; Little, 1965b).  According to Pa Rok and the chairman of 
the barri, it was during kantha that he acquired authority over the sodalities; this is 
why the power to decide sodality cases resides with him, rather than the paramount 
chief.  Dorjahn (1960) gives an account which is suggestive of how this might take 
place.  He describes a Temne chief ‘buying’ the sodalities during the closing 
ceremonies of his kantha; he pays an amount to each sodality, following which they 
must give a gift to the chief each time they carry out ceremonies to initiate new 
members.  Following this process, the paramount chief is referred to as the “owner of 
the societies” and acts as their “patron-protector” (p. 118).  While the exact process 
                                                
182 The CDF is an umbrella term for militia groups which supported President Kabbah against the RUF 
and the AFRC.  They were based on ethnic hunting societies, most notably the Mende kamajors 
(Hoffman, 2007). 
183 Despite the requirement for secrecy, research has been conducted on sodalities in Sierra Leone 
(Dorjahn, 1959, 1960, 1961; Little, 1965a, 1965b).  However, as sodalities are not the main focus of 
this study I did not want to invest a substantial amount of time in this difficult task.  I was also 
concerned that exposing privileged knowledge intended for sodality members alone would impose high 
costs on research participants. 
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through which chiefs in Bombali Sebora acquire authority over sodalities may well 
differ, this account appears to describe a similar phenomenon.  During the period of 
observation, I observed one sodality-related case being heard in the barri which 
related to a young female initiate who had broken the laws of the main female society, 
Bondo, by entering a site where only more senior members (sowei) were permitted; 
the barri officiators asked that my research assistant not translate the details. 
Witchcraft cases are among the most serious considered by the barri.  The 
nefarious practices attributed to witches in Temne areas include the consumption of 
human flesh and blood, shape-shifting into wild animals to carry out violent attacks, 
and the theft of crops and money; most of these acts are carried out invisibly (Shaw, 
1997, pp. 858-861).  The chairman of the barri referred to some of these ‘invisible’ 
practices in explaining why fines imposed for witchcraft were so high: 
The wealth of people they have destroyed is what they are paying for…The 
rice that you heard they were asked to pay, it is people’s rice that they 
destroyed and when they are asked to pay a bag of rice they grumble…The 
monies they have destroyed, sometimes one is trying to go overseas, they have 
the ability to stop the movement, also one may be interested to learn and they 
can stop it, and when they are asked to pay 200,000 Le (£38) they say it is too 
much!184 
The barri officiators argued that they were better placed than the police and local 
courts to address witchcraft because the latter have to seek physical evidence, and 
cannot rely on ‘native’ techniques for identifying witches, which are more effective.  
In addition, the chairman explained that paramount chiefs acquire authority over the 
chiefdom’s sorcerers during their installation; in practice, nobody is permitted to seek 
out a sorcerer without first obtaining permission and purchasing a licence from the 
chiefdom administration. 
The sole witchcraft case that I observed185 involved an accusation against six 
women and one young girl; those accused parties that I interviewed were extremely 
angry at the situation they found themselves in.186  They contested the strategy chosen 
by the barri officiators, who wanted them to swear ‘traditionally’ to their innocence, 
while they favoured a sorcerer capable of identifying witches.  They argued that the 
process of swearing would not exonerate them as an investigation by a sorcerer 
                                                
184 Translated from Temne. 
185 A second matter of witchcraft which had occurred elsewhere in the chiefdom was brought to the 
barri’s attention by a sub-chief who was seeking Pa Rok’s approval for the sanctions imposed. 
186 The person making the accusation was a young girl.  Her family was not willing to be interviewed. 
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would.  Moreover, they complained that they had been required to pay large sums of 
money before the accusations against them were proven—“they are just extorting 
money from us”, one of the accused said.  However, none argued that their case 
should have been taken to another court and despite their dissatisfaction the parties 
were complying with the barri officiators’ orders, with one exception.  One woman 
sought out assistance from a human rights NGO; the husband of another accused 
party explained this in terms of her inability to pay the fines required, saying: 
“…those that God left without money, they found a solution themselves, they went to 
report to civil society”187.  If he is right, the involvement of a human rights NGO did 
not signify an outright rejection of the chiefs’ authority to judge witchcraft cases, but 
rather represented an attempt to secure protection against possible enforcement action 
by the barri, or to establish leverage in negotiating a reduction in the fine. 
In sum, the data I collected suggest that there is a sufficient basis of local 
belief to support Pa Rok’s jurisdictional claims over sodalities and control of 
witchcraft.  When Pa Rok articulates an exclusive role for the barri in hearing these 
kinds of cases, and subject-citizens bring such cases to be heard by the barri 
officiators, this represents an instance of re-authorization through a “process of 
assertion, legitimization and exercise” (Lund, 2007, p. 7).  The process of 
legitimization is particularly effective because sodalities invoke intense popular 
loyalties and control of witchcraft assuages popular anxieties.  By forging a linkage 
between the barri and these evocative areas, I suggest that Pa Rok encourages a spill-
over effect from re-authorization of the barri to re-authorization of chieftaincy more 
broadly.  Support for this can be found in the work of Peter Geschiere (1996), who 
argues that chiefs’ perceived capability to deal with occult forces is a key marker of 
the legitimacy of their authority in general. 
Chiefs’ performance as mobilizers of unpaid labour to maintain community 
infrastructure appears to be less central to contemporary chiefly identity and therefore 
chiefs’ failure to achieve the necessary level of “voluntary compliance” (Lund, 2007, 
p. 7) to mobilize labour successfully does not profoundly threaten the authority of 
chieftaincy as an institution in contemporary Makeni.  The historical background set 
out in chapter three is suggestive of why this might be the case.  When colonization 
                                                
187 “…so di wan dɛm we Gɔd mek dɛm nɔ bin gɛt, dɛmsɛf fɛn…solushɔn, so dɛm go na sivul sosayati 
go mek di ripɔt” 
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reconfigured chiefs’ powers at the turn of the twentieth century, the substantial loss of 
judicial power was one of the most serious consequences (Kilson, 1966, pp. 14-17; 
Joko-Smart, 1968, p. 34; Wylie, 1977, pp. 190-207; Abraham, 1978, pp. 241-244, 
125-130).  From serving as the highest point of appeal within their territories, chiefs 
were reduced to providing the lowest tier of justice in a system controlled by the 
colonial government.188  The jurisdiction of chiefs’ courts was curtailed to exclude all 
cases involving ‘non-natives’, serious criminal cases (including murder, witchcraft, 
slavery and cannibalism) and inter-faction or inter-chiefdom disputes.  Wylie (1977, 
p. 191) argues that this was “a direct blow to perhaps the most important powers of 
the chiefs” and Abraham (1978, pp. 128-129) concludes that “the former powers of a 
chief were probably reduced by more than half”.  At the same time, it is also 
acknowledged that some of these restrictions on jurisdiction were flouted in practice 
(Finnegan, 1965, p. 22). 
In contrast, chiefs’ powers to command unpaid communal labour are generally 
considered to have been expanded significantly by colonial legislation (Reno, 1995, 
pp. 37-40).  Colonial official J.S. Fenton (1951, p. 4) writes, “By giving the chief 
legal rights to labour…Government greatly strengthened the position of chiefs…and 
rendered the office more secure and attractive”.  These expanded powers to command 
communal labour are properly understood in the context of the concurrent decline of 
domestic slavery.  Slave trading in the interior was abolished with the declaration of 
the Protectorate and in the late 1920s further measures were taken to abolish domestic 
slavery (Little, 1967, p. 260; Ferme, 2001, p. 81; Shaw, 2002, p. 38; Richards, 2005b, 
p. 583).  Colonial recognition of a right to unpaid labour can therefore be interpreted 
both as a means of winning chiefs’ support at a time when their powers to acquire 
slaves were being curtailed, but also of providing some regulation (or at least the 
appearance of regulation) of labour practices at a time when abolitionist sentiment in 
Britain was strong (Abraham, 1978, p. 269; Reno, 1995, pp. 37-40).  Maintaining an 
extensive network of dependents, including slaves, was an important component of 
chiefly identity, and ‘wealth in people’ remains a significant indicator of social status 
today (Ferme, 2001, pp. 172-173; Shaw, 2002, p. 164).  However, powers to call on 
                                                
188 The Protectorate Ordinance (1896) created a three-tiered court system, consisting of: the Court of 
the District Commissioner, the Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs and the Courts of 
the Native Chiefs.  In 1903, the second tier was dissolved, and the Circuit Court of the Colony 
(presided over by a professional magistrate) was introduced as the highest tier. 
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unpaid communal labour were not bound up with chiefly identity in the same way, but 
were in large part a colonial innovation; a “powerful administrative instrument” 
(Richards, 2005b, p. 584) drawn upon by chiefs heavily as restrictions on domestic 
slavery increased. 
Approximately fifty years later, the use of unpaid communal labour was a far 
more prominent issue in the anti-chief uprisings in the North than abuse of judicial 
powers (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 
156-159, 162-158).  The Forced Labour Ordinance (1932) gave chiefs a right to call 
upon unpaid communal labour to work their farms; build and maintain their houses, 
offices and compounds; and transport themselves and their goods.  In addition, unpaid 
labour could be called upon for the construction and maintenance of community 
infrastructure and for public health activities such as sanitation, care of water 
supplies, and so on (Fenton, 1951, p. 9).  The Cox Commission strongly criticized 
chiefs’ use of unpaid labour for commercial farming, citing “overwhelming evidence” 
(p. 166) of widespread impropriety; chiefs came under further criticism for using 
unpaid labour to build modern private homes, many of which were targeted for 
destruction by rioters.  The Commission emphasized the lack of normative support for 
chiefs’ right to unpaid labour: “We have found no witness who can be said to support 
forced labour for chiefs as an ideal concept and very few who came even near to such 
a view” (p. 167).  The Commission was even uneasy about the use of unpaid labour 
for “minor communal services”, noting that “the difficulty remains of deciding which 
communal services are ‘minor’ and as soon as the sanctions applicable for non-
service become greater than the effect of public opinion the labour seems to be 
forced” (p. 162).  The Commission therefore recommended that legislation enabling 
chiefs to call for forced labour be repealed without compensation. 
The Cox Commission (1956, pp. 186-196) was also critical of the practices of 
‘native’ courts, but the criticism was somewhat less searing, and appeared to be 
motivated in part by its commitment  to preserving colonial power.  The Commission 
reported that witnesses had made two main sets of allegations: that there had been 
“irregularities” in the operation of chiefs’ courts and that extra-judicial fining was 
widespread.  The irregularities cited do seem likely to have been of significant 
popular concern, particularly fines “exacted…to the limit of the convicted man’s 
capacity to pay” (p. 189); failure by courts to investigate or adjudicate in some cases 
even after substantial payments had been made; and biased judgements.  However, in 
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its analysis of extra-judicial fining, the Commission appears to conflate two distinct 
practices: the imposition of illegitimate fines by tax assessment committees and 
sanitary overseers, and the imposition of fines when a chief hears cases outside of his 
official court “on what he considers to be his own authority and in his own premises” 
(Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 188).  While 
the former practice is likely to have stirred popular resentment, the latter appears to be 
of concern in large part because it challenges the colonial administration’s status as 
the ultimate source of judicial power.  The Commission argued, “[a]ll attempts on the 
part of anyone to exercise judicial powers without being vested with such powers 
[italics mine] must be ruthlessly suppressed” (p. 195).  This links to the colonial 
administration’s broader interest—expressed in an assessment of the ‘native’ court 
system two years prior to the outbreak of anti-chief violence by colonial official N.J. 
Brooke—in establishing a state of affairs in which all courts can be “properly 
supervised and brought into a uniform system” in which customary and English law 
were fused together (Brooke, 1953, p. 18).  The Cox Commission and Brooke were 
caught between wanting to bring all judicial activity under colonial control and 
recognizing that the administration lacks the capacity to achieve this.  The 
compromise solution they both proposed is that chiefs (including sub-chiefs) should 
be permitted to continue resolving disputes outside of the court system, as long as 
they restrict themselves to arbitration and do not deploy any sanctions.  Within the 
court system, the Commission sought to reposition paramount chiefs as appeal judges, 
thus pursuing reform, rather than abolition, of their judicial powers.189 
The Sierra Leone government’s response to the Cox Commission’s report also 
reflects the greater weight given to the issue of forced labour as a driver of dissent.  In 
a widely circulated public notice following the publication of the report, the 
government highlighted forced labour as an issue that required immediate action: “All 
demands for forced or compulsory labour by Chiefs or any other persons must cease 
forthwith and the necessary legislation will be introduced as soon as possible.”  The 
government followed through on this swiftly with the enactment of the Prohibition of 
                                                
189 Fanthorpe et al (2009, p. 18) argue that in any case by the time of the uprisings “it had…become 
administrative policy to take Native Courts out of Paramount Chiefs’ personal control and to appoint 
Court Presidents to serve for limited terms”.  The Cox Commission (1956, p. 191) notes that in some 
chiefdoms there were centrally appointed court presidents or de facto presidents who regularly 
deputized for the paramount chief, but suggests that courts headed by paramount chiefs remained the 
norm, as does N.J. Brooke (1953, p. 21).  
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Forced Labour Ordinance (1956), although in the legislation a specific exception was 
made for “minor communal services” prescribed by local authorities or public 
officers, as long as members of the community “have the right to be consulted in the 
regard to the need for such services”.  The government did not include a response on 
chiefs’ courts in the public notice (although the illegitimacy of extra-judicial fines 
was underlined), but did respond in its written statement on the Cox Commission’s 
report.  Here the government agreed that “illegal ‘Courts’ must be suppressed”, but 
deferred its judgement on the other reforms proposed on the grounds that “detailed 
examination…must necessarily take considerable time” (Sierra Leone Government, 
1956, p. 15).  Indeed, seven years elapsed between the publication of this statement 
and the passage of the Local Courts Act (1963) which reformed ‘native’ courts; the 
Act established central control over the appointment of local court presidents (chiefs 
were by now excluded from this role); provided for a right of appeal to courts 
operating according to ‘English’ law; and made “adjudication without authority” a 
punishable offence. 
Chiefly powers to call upon unpaid communal labour, never as closely linked 
to chiefly identity as judicial powers, were therefore heavily discredited in the North 
following the 1955-56 uprisings.  Former district officer P.S. Mould (1966) finds that 
“widespread popular feeling against the traditional authority of chiefs and its more 
despotic manifestations” (p. 31) following the uprisings meant that the use of 
communal labour in rural development projects was delayed until the early 1960s in 
Northern Bombali District, while developing from the mid-1950s in the South and 
East.  When this practice began to gain pace in Bombali District, it did so in the 
context of prime ministerial support for voluntary effort and an emerging 
development industry of NGOs and international volunteers.  While chiefs continued 
to play a key role in mobilizing labour during this resurgence, they now had to 
coordinate with these new actors and also faced the challenge of how to incentivize 
workers (Mould, 1966).  These developments are likely to have contributed to a 
further erosion of the link between chiefly identity and the mobilization of unpaid 
labour in the post-colonial period, particularly in urban contexts where wage labour 
dominates. 
Chiefs’ exercise of judicial powers, while also criticized by the Cox 
Commission, was not discredited to the same degree.  While by the 1960s chiefs had 
been ousted from presiding over cases in official local courts (Barrows, 1976, p. 108), 
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these courts continued to operate as part of the chiefdom administration.  The transfer 
of powers to appoint local court presidents (later chairs) to the centre was not always 
observed in practice.  Initially paramount chiefs retained influence over appointments 
as long as they were allied politically with the centre; during the 1970s the posts were 
centrally distributed by the APC as marks of patronage; and by the 1980s control over 
appointments generally returned to chiefs (Fanthorpe, et al., 2009, p. 20).  Moreover, 
acceptance of chiefly involvement in ‘arbitration’ preserved a space for chiefs to 
continue hearing cases outside of the court system as before.  As a result, the strong 
link between chiefly identity and deciding cases which already existed at the 
declaration of the Protectorate was able to weather the storm of anti-chief sentiment in 
the mid-1950s with relative success.  Thus the distinct origins of chiefly adjudication 
and mobilization of unpaid communal labour and the historical trajectory each 
followed subsequently helps to explain why the former remains more critical to 
chiefly identity than the latter. 
This comparison also suggests that the centrality of chiefly adjudication to 
chiefly identity may well have been reinforced by the decline of chiefly powers to 
mobilize unpaid labour.  As chiefs came under pressure to refrain from heavy usage 
of unpaid labour for private gain, they are likely to have clung more tightly to their 
role in deciding cases as a source of authority.  Paul Richards (2005b) sees an even 
closer linkage between the two areas, arguing that chiefs and elders in the Gola Forest 
region use their judicial powers specifically to secure the unpaid labour of young 
men, presumably given the difficulties faced in doing so through more direct 
channels. 
6.3 Incentives and deterrents for subject-citizens 
i) Private benefits and practical advantages vis-à-vis local courts 
As discussed, the adjudication service offered by chiefs is a private good with 
positive externalities in the form of the public order it generates.  When a 
complainant/accused has a case in Pa Rok’s barri, her primary concern is usually to 
“gɛt in rayt”190 (have her rightful claim upheld), and secure the money and 
reputational benefits due to her.  Arguably, these actors could secure similar benefits 
                                                
190 This is a Krio phrase. 
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in the local courts, but there are numerous reasons why many subject-citizens prefer 
to pursue their interests in Pa Rok’s barri. 
The service it offers is swifter, and usually cheaper.  In the local courts, a 
complainant pays a standard summons of 15,000 Le (£2.85) and the accused party is 
given 14 days notice before her court appearance.  In the barri, the amount of bora 
paid is flexible and it is common for the case to begin the same day as it is brought or 
the following day.  The barri does not keep written records, which allows for a faster 
and less stilted hearing and appeals to some subject-citizens because there is no 
permanent record of the dispute which could be used against them in the future.  
Further, the proceedings at the barri take place in the Temne language, while Krio is 
usually used at the local court. 
In addition to these practical advantages, some prefer the barri over local 
courts because of their beliefs in the favourable quality of chiefly judgement or in 
chiefs’ appropriateness to hear certain kinds of cases, including sodality and 
witchcraft cases.  One aspect of the barri’s judgements that some favour is their 
sensitivity to family dynamics than the local courts.  The barri’s secretary said:  
In that barri, we look at the relationship between people.  In traditional191 
courts they don’t want to know whether…this man is your brother or your 
sister…all they do is follow the law and if you…follow the law all throughout, 
the family relationship may hamper somewhere. 
This view was echoed by one of the claimants in the court, who had encouraged his 
daughter to bring her case against a young female relative to the barri rather than the 
local court in order to avoid too many problems developing between them.  At the end 
of the case, his daughter did not keep all the money awarded to her, but returned half 
of the winnings to the accused who had now admitted she was at fault—an immediate 
reconciliatory step. 
Some members of a chiefly elite favour the barri because they believe they can 
secure preferential treatment there.  On the occasions that I witnessed relatives 
participating in cases in the barri there was evidence of sympathetic treatment, but the 
barri officiators did not always pervert the course of justice in their relatives’ favour.  
For example, a complaint was brought against one of Pa Rok’s sisters regarding an 
unpaid debt of a rɔba192 (plastic container used to hold palm oil) to a fellow trader.  
                                                
191 Here he means conventional courts like the local courts and the magistrate’s court. 
192 This is a Krio term. 
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She refused to return the bora on the grounds that she did not have enough money.  
She was briefly sent to sit in the ‘criminal chair’, from where she continued to argue 
with the barri officiators.  Eventually, the barri officiators returned the bora to the 
complainant and asked her to forgive Pa Rok’s sister, who it was agreed would return 
the container.  An accused party with less prestigious connections would have been 
forced to stay in the ‘criminal chair’ until the money for the bora was brought to the 
barri and would have been severely scolded for arguing with the barri officiators.  
Nevertheless, the wrong she had committed was acknowledged by the barri and the 
debt was not forgiven.  This incident suggests that a norm to decide cases fairly is in 
tension with a norm to provide preferential treatment to one’s relatives and allies. 
As community infrastructure produced through chiefly mobilization of unpaid 
labour is closer to a classic public good, there are no comparable private benefits 
available to youth for offering their labour or to community members for making 
contributions to support this labour.  These actors are therefore more vulnerable to the 
free-rider problem—there is a reduced incentive to contribute labour or money, as all 
will have a share in the good produced regardless.  However, this free-riding problem 
could be overcome by sufficiently motivated and authoritative chiefs.  As a point of 
comparison, accused parties who know they are liable to lose their cases also face 
disincentives to comply with the barri, yet do so regardless.  In subsequent sections I 
argue that the key differences are the somewhat oppositional interests of chiefs and 
youth, as compared to the aligned interests of chiefs and the chiefly elite which 
constitutes a key user group for the barri; and the stronger sanctions against non-
cooperation in the case of the barri which are in turn linked to higher levels of popular 
acceptance of chiefs’ authority in this arena. 
ii) Vested interests in the ascendancy of chieftaincy 
Chiefs’ most important partners in mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain 
community infrastructure are youth. As briefly discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Richards (2005b) views the opposition between a chiefly elite and subaltern youth in 
stark terms.  He argues that chiefs seek to exploit youth labour through customary 
marriage arrangements which involve long-standing labour obligations and onerous 
fines which impoverished youth are forced to repay in kind.  Those in support of this 
argument tend to view youth associationalism as a strategy for resisting domination 
by a chiefly elite (Fithen & Richards, 2005).  Fanthorpe and Maconachie (2010) argue 
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for a more nuanced account of youth-chief relations, which takes into account young 
people’s “complex and multiple interconnections with established authority 
structures” (254).  Many of their observations about post-war youth associationalism 
and youth-chief relations resonate with my own findings.  Like them, I find that the 
powerful influence of post-war aid in Makeni makes it difficult to determine the 
longer term social significance of contemporary forms of youth associationalism.  
Youth groups are often formed within the context of specific development initiatives, 
and are focused on capturing donor funding.  Similarly, I concur with their view that 
there is weak evidence of youth pursuing associationalism as a means to exit the 
patronage system.  Makeni’s chiefs continue to deploy strategies of incorporation to 
co-opt influential youth leaders; for example, the former chairman of MUYOG now 
serves on both the chiefdom youth council and the district youth council.  Youths 
actively seek chiefly support for their personal and collective initiatives, often 
engaging them as patrons who will advocate on their behalf. 
The paramount chief himself is relatively popular among young people, with a 
reputation for responding supportively when called upon, and many of Makeni’s 
youth describe their relations with chiefs as “cordial” at first response.  However, 
relations between youth and sub-chiefs are often more fraught.  Sub-chiefs sometimes 
behave like jealous competitors, resenting youth efforts to initiate development 
activities independently, as well as the political attention they receive.  One young 
man and youth group member described this rivalry, “…when it’s time for election, 
when the councillors and MPs come, they target us young men.  Sometimes the chiefs 
become jealous…They say we are not more important than them, they are the big 
ones.”  He described a recent contest between his friend and the local sub-chief’s 
favoured candidate for a position on one of the WDCs set up to liaise with MCC.  His 
friend was successful, but was subsequently warned by the chief and his allies that he 
would fall victim to a witch gun193 attack if he went against the chief’s wishes.  “As 
long as we challenge them, we become enemies to them,” he said. 
Chief-youth relations in Makeni seem to be very uneven and many of the 
youth whose efforts are required to maintain community infrastructure appear to feel 
                                                
193 Rosalind Shaw (2002, p. 208) describes a witch gun as “a weapon constructed out of such materials 
as a piece of papaya stalk (or other tube-like object), a grain of sand (or other potential missile), and an 
explosive powder to activate it” which a witch can transform into “a piece of lethal artillery that may 
be used to shoot victims from considerable distances”. 
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quite ambivalent about chieftaincy as an institution.  While they do not necessarily 
seek its downfall, nor do they have a vested interest in enabling the renewal of chiefly 
authority and shoring up the institution.  Young people who are members of ruling 
houses are likely to be an exception to this rule, but they are the least likely to remain 
long in the ranks of youth (understood as a political category), and are also least likely 
to be shouldering the burden of demand for unpaid labour. 
My period of observation of the barri suggested that it was used at high 
frequency by members of a chiefly elite.  In total, I observed thirty-five matters194 
being discussed at the barri; it became evident during proceedings that at least nine of 
these (approximately 25%) involved members of ruling houses.195  Three of these 
matters involved complaints brought by chiefs and prominent members of ruling 
houses about disrespectful behaviour, three were relatively minor cases which 
happened to be complaints against relatives of chiefs, one was a dispute between two 
young girls (and their families) who were both members of a chiefly elite and two 
were more serious matters that involved complaints against the paramount chief and 
Pa Rok.  The very existence of the barri is a marker of the political ascendancy of 
chieftaincy; the chiefly elite has a vested interest in maintaining this state of affairs 
because their own status is enhanced by association.  The barri also offers a venue 
where members of a chiefly elite can advance their private interests through bringing 
cases, and enjoy a more sympathetic hearing when cases are brought against them.  
These actors are therefore incentivized to provide robust support to the barri, both 
participating actively in efforts to legitimize its operations and complying with its 
commands. 
Yet the chiefly elite does not seem to monopolize all of the benefits of the 
barri.  To an extent, the barri also appears to be a venue where the behaviour of a 
chiefly elite is regulated—petty cases were brought against known relatives of chiefs 
and concerns were raised there about the behaviour of senior chiefs.  In addition, there 
does not appear to be a bar to cases being brought by those of lower status.  Lying in 
close proximity to the main market, the ‘bread and butter’ of the barri lies in 
enforcing the repayment of often modest debts between traders—10 of the 35 matters 
                                                
194 Some of these matters became cases heard by the barri; others were simply discussed and it was 
agreed that they would be resolved elsewhere. 
195 Others may have done so; given the dynamic nature of proceedings and my desire to observe in a 
non-intrusive way, it was not possible to speak to all of those involved in matters brought before the 
barri. 
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I observed were debt cases.196  Given the emphasis in the literature on chieftaincy as a 
mode of governance that upholds the power of a male gerontocracy (Richards, 2005b; 
Jackson, 2006), the particular investment of the chiefly elite in the barri raises 
concerns about adverse consequences for women and youth.  The barri officiators did 
express bias against women in the context of family matters, generally portraying 
women as the source of problems within the family.  At the same time, women (who 
are well-represented among traders) were active users of the barri—18 out of the 35 
matters raised there were brought by female complainants.  Only five cases obviously 
involved somebody who could be described as a youth, and in three of those cases the 
young person was the complainant.  This could be interpreted as evidence that the 
barri was not a popular venue for youth to bring cases; at the same time, there was no 
evidence of an elderly elite using the barri to discipline youth or to gain control of 
their labour (Richards, 2005b; Mokuwa, et al., 2011).  Given the hierarchical nature 
of Sierra Leonean society, I interpret the chiefly elite’s active use of and compliance 
with the barri as reinforcing a more general norm of compliance, while at the same 
time observing that it has an impact on the fairness of decision-making. 
iii) Acceptance of chiefly authority and related strength of sanctions 
In my discussion of the incentives motivating chiefs, I have highlighted the 
extent to which the renewal of chiefly authority is a cyclical process of “assertion, 
legitimization and exercise” (Lund, 2007, p. 6).  The legitimization of the barri by 
subject-citizens through active uptake of its services (when local courts are also 
available) and general willingness to comply with its instructions empower the barri 
officiators to impose strong sanctions against the minority who seek to evade its 
authority.  While willingness to comply with the barri is in large part the result of 
subject-citizens’ voluntary acceptance of chiefly authority, sanctions also play a role 
in maintaining high levels of compliance. 
The barri officiators do allow subject-citizens an exit option in the form of 
transferring their cases to other courts.  Aside from this, they employ multiple 
enforcement tactics to ensure subject-citizen compliance.  The barri messenger is sent 
out to pursue those who do not respond to requests to appear.  The barri officiators 
publicly chastise those they perceive to be disrespecting their authority in the barri, 
                                                
196 Although I cannot say conclusively how many involved somebody from a ruling house. 
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and in some cases impose spot fines.  Those who refuse to pay barri fees and fines or 
who default on debt repayments are sent to sit in the ‘criminal chair’ until somebody 
comes to their aid.  The barri officiators also make liberal use of threats to send non-
compliant individuals to the local court cell at Makump.  Local court chairpeople are 
not necessarily willing to support chiefs to follow through on this threat.  One 
complained, “Well you don’t just bring somebody to the local court and serve him a 
criminal warrant…What has he done now?  Or is it because he didn’t go to your 
court, the kangaroo court…When I put somebody in prison unlawfully, I am the one 
that has that problem.”197  Nevertheless, those I spoke to generally believed that barri 
officiators had the power to imprison people, which renders the threat effective. 
Aside from these sanctions, which work by imposing monetary and 
reputational costs on those individuals who disobey the barri officiators’ instructions, 
there is a risk that non-compliance will result in a lasting enmity with the barri 
officiators, and with Pa Rok in particular.  Falling into the bad graces of a powerful 
chief like Pa Rok, who is known to defend his reputation and authority vigorously, 
can be quite dangerous.  Ceremonial chiefs retain their positions for life, so an enmity 
with such a person can have a lasting impact on a person’s well-being.  Pa Rok is 
involved in many different aspects of social and economic life in Makeni, and 
therefore has the potential to hurt his enemies in a wide variety of ways, not least by 
bringing cases against them. 
In the case of mobilization of unpaid labour, a cycle of de-authorization of 
chiefly authority appears to have been initiated which has an incrementally corrosive 
effect, redefining the scope of chiefly authority over time.  In general, sub-chiefs are 
not aggressive in asserting their right to mobilize unpaid labour due to weak 
incentives to do so.  The lukewarm response of youth to the calls for labour that they 
do make further undermines their legitimacy in this domain, weakening chiefly 
authority.  For the mostpart, disempowered and weakly incentivized sub-chiefs bring 
relatively few sanctions against those who refuse to contribute money or labour to 
maintenance of community infrastructure.  While Pa Rok could involve himself in 
pressurizing youth to cooperate more fully with chiefly efforts to mobilize labour, he 
                                                
197 “Wl you n js bring smbdi na di lokal kt, yu kam sav dis psin kriminal…Wetin i dn du 
naw?... biks i n go na di kangaru kt we na una kt de…Wn a put smbdi nlful na prison, na 
mi gt da prblm de.” 
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chooses not to do so.  If this cycle continues, chiefs’ role in mobilizing unpaid labour 
is likely to diminish further, perhaps until the scope of chiefly authority excludes this 
activity altogether. 
Concluding comments 
Pa Rok and the barri officiators have strong incentives to remain competitive 
as providers of public order.  The barri generates revenue on a daily basis which is 
used to fulfil Pa Rok’s customary obligations, sustain a network of ceremonial chiefs 
and provide a livelihood for those he has chosen to work in the barri.  In this way, Pa 
Rok is able to use his position to provide for a network of supporters who will remain 
loyal to him.  Ensuring that the main chiefdom barri remains in operation also appears 
to be critical to maintaining the authority of chieftaincy as an institution.  By claiming 
exclusive jurisdiction over sodality and witchcraft cases, Pa Rok is able to tap into 
subject-citizens’ beliefs about chiefs’ role in sodalities and control of witchcraft to 
legitimize the barri and renew its authority effectively.  Mobilizing unpaid labour to 
maintain community infrastructure can be a costly, rather than profitable, activity and 
is less closely bound up with chiefly identity and thus less significant to the authority 
of chieftaincy as an institution; there are historical reasons for this difference.  Given 
these weak incentives, Makeni’s chiefs are not fighting to hold on to this role as 
newer actors with an interest in mobilizing youth labour step in. 
Incentives for subject-citizens to comply with chiefs’ wishes are multiple and 
complex, and different combinations of incentives are likely to be relevant to 
differently positioned actors.  Many of those participating in cases at the barri are 
more motivated by the private goods that accrue to them when they win a case than 
the broader public order benefits enjoyed by all of Makeni’s residents.  They are often 
attracted by the practical advantages and qualitative differences in judgements offered 
by the barri as compared to its main competitor, the local courts.  A substantial 
proportion of the barri’s clients are members of a chiefly elite who have a vested 
interest in the ascendancy of chieftaincy which is buttressed through the barri’s 
operations; this may encourage some who are liable to lose their cases to comply with 
the barri regardless.  Motivated by the benefits they receive through its operation and 
emboldened by subject-citizens’ acceptance of the barri’s authority, Pa Rok and the 
barri officiators enforce the barri’s instructions vigorously, further contributing to 
high levels of subject-citizen compliance. 
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Subject-citizens providing money or labour for the maintenance of community 
infrastructure, particularly youth, are keenly aware of those who benefit from their 
sacrifices without making matching contributions.  While characterization of chief-
youth relations as a form of class struggle may not be empirically supported, youth in 
Makeni appear to be fairly ambivalent towards chiefs and therefore do not have a 
strong vested interest in the perpetuation of chiefly authority which might motivate 
them to comply with chiefly requests for unpaid labour in order to shore up the 
institution of chieftaincy.  Weak sanctions against non-cooperation with chiefly 
mobilization efforts, which are likely to reflect chiefs’ lack of investment in this good, 
as well as youth attitudes to chiefly calls for labour, leave the free-riding problem 
unaddressed. 
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Annex 
Table 6.A.1 Key rules and norms underpinning the coproduction of public order by barri 
officiators and subject-citizens in Pa Rok’s barri 
Type of 
rule/norm 
Content of rules (R) and norms (N) 
Position There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a subject-citizen coproducer 
Boundary (entry 
and exit rules) 
LGA: Chiefs must take on the role of LGA responsible for delivering public order 
through deciding cases (or else see their authority diminish) (R); chiefs may 
delegate their authority to hear cases to non-chiefs (barri officiators) (N) 
Subject-citizen coproducer: Subject-citizens must take on the role of coproducers 
of public order (or else face punishment by chiefs/their peers) (R) 
Choice Access: Barri officiators should hear all cases brought to the barri (N) 
Fairness: Barri officiators should decide cases fairly (N) 
Relatives/allies: Barri officiators should be sympathetic to the interests of 
relatives and allies when deciding cases (N) 
Jurisdiction: Barri officiators must not hear criminal cases (or else face 
punishment by the police/central government) (R); barri officiators may hear civil 
cases (N); barri officiators should hear all cases related to sodalities and 
witchcraft (N) 
Initiating cases: Subject-citizens should bring cases to the barri officiators (N) 
Venue: Barri officiators must permit subject-citizens to choose the venue in which 
their cases are heard (or else face punishment by central government) (R) 
Attendance: Subject-citizens must attend the barri when summoned by the barri 
officiators (or else face punishment by the barri officiators) (R) 
Payment: Subject-citizens must pay a bora and specified fees to the barri 
officiators (or else their cases will not be heard) (R); subject-citizens must pay any 
fines imposed by the barri officiators (or else face punishment by the barri 
officiators) (R) 
Use of resources: Pa Rok must use revenue from the barri to meet his obligations 
to the relatives of the former paramount chief (or else face disgrace) (R) 
Third parties: Third parties should serve as witnesses and sureties for the parties 
involved in the case (N) 
Information Honesty: Subject-citizens must answer chiefs’ questions about the cases honestly 
(or else face divine/supernatural punishment) (R) 
Language: Barri officiators and subject-citizens should communicate in Temne 
(N); if one party to the case does not speak Temne, a translator must be used (or 
else the case will not proceed) (R) 
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Type of 
rule/norm 
Content of rules (R) and norms (N) 
Aggregation Decision: Subject-citizens must accept the final decision of the barri officiators 
(or else face punishment by the barri officiators) (R) 
Appeal: Barri officiators must permit subject-citizens to ‘appeal’ their cases 
through a second hearing in a local court (or else face punishment by central 
government) (R) 
Payoff Venue/appeal: If barri officiators refuse to allow subject-citizens to choose the 
venue in which their cases are heard or prevent them from ‘appealing’ their cases 
through a second hearing in a local court, representatives of central government 
may intervene to shut down the operations of the barri (or else if barri officiators 
resist they may punish them further) (R) 
Attendance/decision: If subject-citizens refuse to attend the barri when summoned 
or refuse to accept the final decision of the barri officiators, they may be treated as 
enemies by Pa Rok and his supporters (or else if subject-citizens resist Pa Rok 
may escalate his expressions of enmity) (R) 
Fees/fines: If subject-citizens refuse to pay the fees/fines imposed by the barri 
officiators, they may be sent to the criminal chair (or else if they resist the barri 
officiators may punish them further, including through imprisonment if the local 
court is willing to cooperate) (R) 
Scope None 
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Table 6.A.2 Key rules and norms underpinning the coproduction of community infrastructure 
by chiefs and subject-citizens 
Type of 
rule/norm 
Content of rules (R) and norms (N) 
Position There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a subject-citizen coproducer 
Boundary (entry 
and exit rules) 
LGA: Chiefs should take on the role of LGA mobilizing subject-citizens to 
maintain public infrastructure (N) 
Subject-citizen coproducer: Youths must take on the role of subject-citizen 
coproducer contributing their labour to maintain public infrastructure (or else face 
punishment by chiefs) (R)* 
Choice Resources: Chiefs must provide resources for subject-citizens to carry out 
maintenance of public infrastructure (or else subject-citizens will not cooperate) 
(R) 
Mobilization: Chiefs must deploy strategies to motivate subject-citizens to 
contribute their labour (or else subject-citizens will not cooperate) (R) 
Labour: Subject-citizens must contribute their labour when called upon (or else 
face punishment by chiefs/their peers) (R)* 
Information Subject-citizens should make chiefs aware when efforts to maintain public 
infrastructure are needed (N) 
Aggregation Chiefs should identify when efforts to maintain public infrastructure are needed 
and call upon subject-citizens to contribute their labour (N) 
Payoff Labour: If subject-citizens refuse to contribute their labour when called upon, they 
may face the disapproval of their peers, fines or other chiefly punishments (or else 
if they resist they may be punished further) (R) 
Scope None 
Note: Those rules marked with a star (*) are weakly enforced 
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Images 
 
 
Image 6.1 Pa Rok’s barri, September 2009 (author’s photograph) 
 
Image 6.2 Paramount Chief Kasangna’s barri, September 2009 (author’s photograph) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Comparing Success and Failure in the 
Coproduction of Local Public Goods 
In this chapter, I draw together some of the diverse strands of discussion 
introduced in chapters five and six.  I consider how these cases fit with existing 
theories of coproduction, and what they add to them.  I then set out four inter-related 
propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed 
in Sierra Leone in the short- to medium-term.  While these propositions are based 
principally on the micro-level evidence contained in the case studies, I draw 
connections to a broader set of case study material on local public goods provision in 
developing countries where relevant.  The propositions are generalizations to the level 
of theory—they have not been tested.  As discussed in chapter one, they are most 
relevant to small and medium-sized urban settings in Sierra Leone, but may have 
applicability to other settings in Sierra Leone as well as comparable urban settings 
elsewhere in West Africa.  To conclude, I revisit the analytical framework applied and 
address some of the criticisms likely to be levelled against it. 
7.1 Theories of coproduction revisited 
My choice of coproduction as an analytical lens was based on the affinities I 
perceived between the four cases studied and Joshi and Moore’s (2004) account of 
coproduction.  None of the cases I describe are deliberate efforts by LGAs to 
encourage citizen participation in order to improve the quality of public goods 
provision or governance, such as those described by Ostrom (1996).  Two of the 
cases—a clean market and community infrastructure—are principally a response to 
weak state capacity; they have “governance drivers”.  (Subject-)citizen labour 
substitutes for the labour of public workers, and financial contributions plug critical 
resource gaps to enable provision of these goods to take place.  The remaining two 
cases—public order and safe supply of meat—have more complex drivers.  In these 
cases, the inputs made by (subject-)citizens and LGAs are interdependent.  The 
butchers control the cattle slaughtered and screened at the slaughterhouse and have 
valuable information about signs of cattle disease in the region, while only subject-
citizens can provide the information required for the barri officiators to decide cases.  
The interdependence of inputs in these cases means that it would be very difficult or 
impossible for LGAs to provide these goods alone (Parks, et al., 1981; Ostrom, 1996).  
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However, this does not exclude the possibility that weak state capacity plays a role in 
structuring these coproductive arrangements. 
In the context of interdependence, (subject-)citizen inputs can move along the 
spectrum from just meeting minimum requirements to far exceeding them.  In the 
cases studied, the burden on (subject-)citizens is quite heavy.  Butchers must cover all 
of the transportation costs, slaughter the cattle themselves and pay user fees intended 
to cover the full operating costs of the facility.  The barri is also fully funded through 
user fees and subject-citizens bear the bulk of the logistical work in pulling together a 
case.  These cases raise difficult questions about where the boundary between state 
and (subject-)citizen responsibility for provision should properly lie, but there is 
certainly a good argument to be made that as a consequence of state weakness the 
inputs required of subject-citizens are unreasonably high.  These cases can therefore 
also be considered to have governance drivers. 
The provision of public order through a chief’s barri can be read as a response 
to weak state capacity in a second sense, in that it is an example of chiefs and their 
delegates providing a good for which another state institution is officially responsible.  
Returning to Helmke and Levitsky’s (2006) theory of informal institutions discussed 
in chapter two, the system of chiefs’ barris is a clear example of an informal 
institution which is “substituting” for a formal one—the local court system—even in 
the face of hostile legislation.  There are two possible explanations for this: local 
courts are unable to meet the level of local demand for legal services, or local courts 
provide a service that compares unfavourably with that offered by chiefs’ barris.  
These explanations are not mutually exclusive and the evidence suggests that some 
combination of the two applies.  Local courts in Makeni are busy and waiting times 
relatively long which suggests they are over-subscribed, yet local court chairmen 
clearly view chiefs as competitors rather than allies managing an overflow service.  In 
the words of one court chairman: 
[Pa Rok’s barri] is disturbing us greatly…we want cases, plenty of cases, at 
the local court because we pay into revenue…when he holds on to a lot of 
cases you find that he is disturbing the local courts…Because if his barri 
hadn’t been established, you would find that any case that somebody has, 
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either he would go to the magistrate or he would come to the local court, you 
see.198 
This attitude suggests competition prevails for at least a subset of cases (perhaps the 
most profitable ones).  At the root of both explanations for the co-existence of chiefs’ 
barris and local courts is a problem of weak state capacity—the central state has failed 
to ensure an adequate supply of judicial services, to make certain that those services 
meet local demand and to enforce laws that prevent rival actors from providing 
competing services. 
The situation regarding mobilization of unpaid labour for community 
infrastructure is more difficult to interpret.  If it is accepted that chiefs and local 
councils both have an official mandate for this activity (in the form of legislation still 
in effect), then coproductive arrangements for the mobilization of unpaid labour led 
by both chiefs and local councils could be interpreted as “complementary” informal 
institutions.  Indeed, the boundary between the formal and the informal could be 
considered blurred in these instances, as rules governing such arrangements are 
created in part through “officially sanctioned channels”, but largely communicated 
and enforced outside such channels.199  However, if local councils are treated as the 
proper authority with responsibility for community infrastructure, as the LG Act 
(2004) suggests, then chiefs once more appear to be substituting for another state 
agency.  Under this interpretation, the continued involvement of chiefs in mobilizing 
unpaid labour for community infrastructure suggests either a failure of local councils 
to rapidly and effectively assume responsibility for this activity and/or of the central 
state to enforce new rules regarding the respective jurisdictions of LGAs.  The 
difficulties faced in interpreting this case indicates the grey area in which chiefs tend 
to operate—they are formally recognized as part of local government yet their official 
mandate remains fuzzy and activities conducted through official channels bleed into 
more informal (even illegal) activity. 
While even the more successful cases of coproduction I describe are motivated 
by necessity rather than desire, this does not preclude the possibility that these 
                                                
198 “[Pa Rok in barri] de ambɔg wi gretli…wi go want kesis dɛm, mɛk dɛm plɛnti, [na di] lokal kɔt 
bikɔs na wi de pe rɛvinu…wɛn i kin ol ɔnto bɔku-bɔku kes dɛm yu de fɛn awt se i de ambɔg di lokal 
kɔt dɛm…Bikɔs if in bare nɔ de ɛstablish, yu fɛn awt se ɛni kes we sɔmbɔdi ol, ida i go magistret ɔ i 
kam na di lokal kɔt, yu si.” 
199 Helmke and Levitsky (2006, p. 5) define informal institutions as “social shared rules…that are 
created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels”. 
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arrangements offer some advantages over provision carried out by LGAs exclusively.  
In the case of a clean market, LGA and trader inputs are substitutable: either local 
government workers could provide the labour required to gather waste or traders 
could do so.  According to Ostrom (1996), coproductive provision is more efficient 
than government provision as long as the opportunity cost to coproducers is lower 
than the wage rate of government workers; while I cannot offer any precise 
calculation, this is likely to apply to market cleaning given that traders often carry out 
this work during quiet periods of the day when customer traffic is low. 
In the case of public order generated by the barri, the inputs made by chiefs 
and their delegates and subject-citizens are interdependent and thus there is potential 
for synergy—each side can influence the other in a positive direction, leading to 
greater mutual effectiveness (Evans, 1996a; Ostrom, 1996).  The account I set out in 
chapter six suggests that there is some synergy between the efforts of chiefs and their 
delegates and subject-citizens in the barri.  Through their active cooperation with 
chiefs at the barri (for example, bringing cases, paying fees, giving testimony and 
abiding by judgements), subject-citizens provide necessary inputs of information and 
legitimize chiefs’ role as arbiters.  Thus empowered and informed, chiefs and their 
delegates are able to perform effectively in terms of issuing and enforcing decisions.  
Their relative effectiveness sustains subject-citizens’ beliefs in their legitimacy and 
thus encourages ongoing cooperation.  In contrast to the barri, local courts may 
constrain subject-citizens’ ability to testify by requiring the use of Krio, applying 
procedural and legal norms that are unfamiliar to some participants and by 
documenting testimony in writing.  As a result, local courts may limit the potential for 
synergy between subject-citizens and officiators relative to barris. 
Evidence of the broader governance benefits of coproduction anticipated by 
some authors is modest (Evans, 1996a; Ostrom, 1996; Ackerman, 2004; Mitlin, 
2008).  Ostrom (1996) and Ackerman (2004) see coproduction as offering 
opportunities for expanding participation in and influence over decision-making, 
including in core areas of state activity.  In the cases I describe, (subject-)citizens take 
on largely operational rather than design roles and the areas of coproductive activity 
(with the important exception of the provision of public order) are not core state 
functions.  Evans’ (1996a) and Ostrom’s (1996) arguments about coproduction as a 
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means to generate fungible developmental social capital200  have some limited 
applicability.  The barri does generate social capital which ‘spills over’ to reinforce 
chiefly authority more broadly.  However, as regards the standing of subject-citizens 
vis-à-vis their chiefs, the reinforcement of chiefly authority through the barri is a 
conservative rather than a transformative ‘spill over’ effect.  While strong chiefly 
authority could have developmental effects by facilitating other forms of public goods 
provision, it could also encourage anti-developmental behaviour by chiefs interested 
in defending their authority from challenges (Acemoglu, et al., 2012).  At the market, 
the relatively close engagement of the TU executive and MCC does provide a 
platform for cooperation in areas beyond waste management.  However, the TU does 
not derive its influence over MCC so much from the “positive social relations” 
resulting from “practical engagement with the state” to clean the market (Mitlin, 
2008, p. 351), as its control of valued material and political resources.  Put another 
way, successful coproduction of a clean market is more a consequence of the TU’s 
influence over MCC than a cause of it (see 7.2 for further discussion on this point).  
This is illustrated by the contrasting situation of the butchers, who exercise relatively 
little influence over MCC despite an ongoing “practical engagement with the state”. 
Joshi and Moore’s (2004) concerns about coproduction leading to blurred 
accountability do not seem particularly salient to these cases.  In the context of an 
ethnographic study of local government in Tanzania, Kelsall, Siri Lange, Simeon 
Misaki and Max Mmuya (2005, p. 10) argue that applying Western theories of 
accountability is comparable to “trying to nail jelly to the wall”.  They write: 
Reality at local level is a fluid field of interpenetrating institutions and actors, 
informed by co-mingling cultures of accountability which place rather loose, 
and not always consistent, restraints on the actions of leaders. 
This description fits the field of local public goods provision in Sierra Leone well.  
Given the prevalence of clientelism, the weakness of electoral routes to 
accountability, and the relative lack of civil society accountability-seeking, it seems 
fair to conclude that lines of LGA accountability to (subject-)citizens for public goods 
provision are already quite blurred.  Coproduction cannot therefore be held 
responsible for a significant deterioration of clarity regarding accountability 
arrangements.  In addition, (subject-)citizens involved in coproduction are not 
                                                
200 Evans (1996a, p. 1033) uses this term to describe “norms of trust and reciprocity and the networks 
of repeated interaction that sustain them”. 
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altogether exempt from societal accountability.  For example, traders have an 
obligation to gather waste that is recognized by their peers; youth have an obligation 
to provide their labour for the maintenance of community infrastructure; and subject-
citizens have an obligation to support their family and friends by serving as witnesses 
and sureties.  Failure to meet these obligations is met by some degree of social 
disapproval—this may not always be a particularly robust accountability mechanism, 
but is perhaps comparable in strength to appeals to chiefs to meet their fatherly 
obligations to subject-citizens or to councillors to meet their obligations to their 
clients. 
In terms of the material effects of coproduction on equality, three main 
concerns were raised by the literature discussed in chapter two: that coproduction 
would encourage a tiered system of citizenship in terms of entitlement to goods and 
services; that vulnerable populations would be exploited; and that elites would capture 
the benefits of coproduction, or use their involvement in coproduction to leverage 
greater political influence at the expense of the poor (Miraftab, 2004; Zerah, 2009; 
Boesten, et al., 2011).  The council-led cases of coproduction provide fairly weak 
support for these claims.  While there are risks of exploitation in terms of how waste 
gathering responsibilities are distributed among sub-groups of traders, there was no 
obvious tension around this issue and observation suggested that a wide variety of 
traders pitched in.  There was some evidence of elite diversion of waste collection 
services (see section 7.3), but the extent of this appeared fairly modest.  In the case of 
the slaughterhouse, coproductive arrangements took advantage of butchers’ political 
vulnerability to some extent, but there was no elite capture of the benefits generated 
through coproduction. 
The chief-led cases of coproduction raise more significant concerns in terms 
of inequality.  Coproduction aside, the organization of chiefdom government already 
implies a tiered system of citizenship which accords enhanced rights to some subject-
citizens (for example, members of ruling houses and chiefdom councillors) and fails 
to recognize the claims of others altogether (Fanthorpe, 2001).  As coproduction led 
by chiefs works through chiefly institutions, the hierarchical relations which underpin 
chieftaincy are generally reproduced in the process.  Mobilization of unpaid labour to 
maintain community infrastructure relies heavily on the labour of youth, creating risks 
of exploitation; nevertheless, youth may gain some benefits from the infrastructure 
generated.  Pa Rok’s barri provides an example of coproduction subject to elite 
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capture; chiefly elites enjoy preferential treatment when bringing cases to the barri 
and also benefit from the barri’s reinforcement of a social order within which they 
hold elevated status.  However, lower-status subject-citizens also appear to use the 
barri to gain access to low-cost, swift resolution of disputes (see 7.2 for further 
discussion of this point).  Neither case of coproduction studied appears to represent an 
expansion in scope of inequality, for example, through the reinscription of inequalities 
forged in one sphere of action in a second sphere of action.  However, there is an 
argument to be made that chief-led forms of coproduction have historically influenced 
the way in which newer bodies such as local courts and local councils engage with 
(subject-)citizens, expanding the scope of inequality.  To summarize, chief-led 
coproduction reproduces the inequalities which are characteristic of chiefdom 
government but tends to do so within the confines of recognized spheres of action; 
those subject-citizens whose unequal status is reproduced during the process of 
coproduction may nevertheless gain some benefit from the goods provided. 
The cases studied therefore offer a rather mixed view of coproduction, 
providing some evidentiary support for the claims of both advocates and critics of this 
mode of local public goods provision.  In light of these insights, in chapter eight I 
reflect on the potential value of coproduction as a means of addressing the public 
goods deficit in Sierra Leone.  In the next section I build on the finding that 
coproduction provides one means of maintaining the flow of basic public goods in 
weak states where otherwise none might exist.  I set out four propositions about the 
conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in post-war Sierra 
Leone, given features of the social and political environment such as weak electoral 
incentives for LGAs to provide public goods, intense resource scarcity in the public 
sector, low levels of popular trust in LGAs and overlapping LGA mandates for pubic 
goods provision. 
7.2 Conditions for successful coproduction: four propositions  
The more successful cases of coproduction are characterized by an alignment 
of LGA and coproducing partner incentives which enables meaningful and productive 
cooperation.  This is not at all surprising, and indeed Ostrom’s (2005) IAD 
framework, which I employ in modified form, has an in-built assumption that two 
parties in an action situation will only cooperate if each calculates that the benefits of 
doing so are greater than those of non-cooperation.  This does not imply an egalitarian 
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arrangement—as Ostrom (2005, p. 33) notes, “[i]n some action situations, the 
standing of the participants is grossly unequal, allowing some to have substantial 
power over others and the relative benefits they can achieve”.  For example, one party 
could be incentivized to cooperate through coercive measures imposed by the other.  
Of greater interest are the insights these cases offer into the conditions under which an 
alignment of incentives might be achieved in urban Sierra Leonean and comparable 
contexts. 
I argue that such an alignment of incentives is more likely to occur, and thus 
coproduction of local public goods is more likely to succeed: 
a. When coproduction of a public good forms one component of a broader political 
exchange between LGAs and coproducing partners which provides supplementary 
motivation. 
b. When low-cost monitoring of LGAs is integrated into the coproductive 
arrangements, overcoming the barrier of coproducing partners’ weak trust in 
government. 
c. When coproduction is underpinned by a stable alliance between LGAs and a 
supportive elite, yet remains relatively inclusive. 
d. When coproductive arrangements build on longstanding institutions which 
resonate with both LGAs and coproducing partners and facilitate collective 
action.201 
I discuss each in turn to flesh out their meaning and significance. 
i) Politicized exchange 
As discussed in chapter one, a prominent feature of the political context in 
Makeni is that LGAs are largely disinterested in providing public goods for electoral 
reasons—this condition is likely to apply in most localities in Sierra Leone.  In the 
case of democratically elected local councils, reasons for this disinterest include the 
low credibility of public goods promises, leading to reliance on patronage to win 
votes; the dominance of ethno-regional politics which means that the party rather than 
the people chooses local candidates; and reluctance on the part of local politicians to 
impose the costs associated with public goods provision on their constituents for fear 
of losing their seat (Juul, 2007; Keefer, 2007; Kandeh, 2008).  Elected for life, chiefs 
                                                
201 This proposition is influenced by the broader work of the APPP Local Governance strand, which I 
describe in sub-section iv). 
 220 
are well protected from electoral pressures once they have secured their position.  As 
a result, LGAs are likely to be adequately incentivized to coproduce public goods 
only when they can secure essential resources—whether financial, political, or 
otherwise—through the process. 
In the case study of a clean market presented in chapter five, the allure of the 
TU to MCC derives from the financial and political resources it controls.  The TU is 
the gateway not only to the significant local revenue generated by market dues but 
also to donor revenue dependent on demonstrating a minimum level of results in 
terms of waste collection.  In addition, the TU has the capacity to organize politically 
disruptive action against the council, or lend its support.  The TU’s members value 
the collection of waste for its own sake, while executive members of the TU also 
stand to profit personally from deals brokered with MCC regarding market dues.  The 
coproduction of a clean market is therefore not a neutral, technical exchange with 
parties making the required inputs to secure a commonly desired good; rather, it is a 
messy political exchange in which various parties seek to secure distinct outcomes 
that they value.  To put it another way, bargains around political support and access to 
resources provide the motivation necessary for a bargain around public goods 
provision. 
In contrast, the absence of a broader political exchange between MCC and the 
butchers means that MCC is not sufficiently motivated to pursue coproduction in 
earnest; instead, the council puts in the bare minimum of effort to keep the 
slaughterhouse running.  This weakens the butchers’ motivation to attend the facility 
due to the poor quality of services provided.  In this case, a bargain based solely on 
public goods provision fails; if it had been underpinned by linked bargains which 
provided further incentives for action, it may not have done so. 
Joshi and Joseph Ayee (2002) reach a similar conclusion about the importance 
of politicized exchange in their analysis of a coproductive tax collection arrangement 
established at a national level between the Ghana Private Road Transport Union 
(GPRTU) and the Ghanaian government.  The basis of this arrangement was a close 
political relationship between the GPRTU and the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) government (1981-2001).  The GPRTU’s members played a critical 
role in political mobilization, providing vehicles to transport supporters to rallies and 
disseminating political propaganda to their passengers.  They supported government 
decisions, even against those of the Trades Union Congress to which it belonged.  A 
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GPRTU strike would also have meant significant economic disruption, giving the 
PNDC government good reason to keep the union on side.  The GPRTU was 
rewarded for its political loyalty with monopolistic privileges such as sole control of 
lorry parks and the right to enforce road traffic violations; government support in 
disputes with rival unions; and favourable access to subsidized motor supplies.  The 
coproduction of tax revenue was an extension of this existing relationship.  Eager to 
increase national revenues, the government introduced a new system of informal 
sector taxation in the late 1980s which allowed a small number of informal sector 
unions, including the GPRTU, to collect tax from their members on the state’s behalf 
and receive a commission on the revenue collected.  While not without problems, 
Joshi and Ayee judge this innovative approach to have resulted in a significant 
improvement of tax revenues.  They see the politicized relationship between the 
PNDC and the GPRTU as a crucial factor contributing to its relative success, as the 
agreement around taxation is one element of a broader reciprocal arrangement which 
encouraged cooperation. 
I describe the coproduction of a clean market by MCC and the TU as a fragile 
bargain because of its vulnerability to political conflict and shifting political alliances.  
The recent history of the relationship between MCC and the TU demonstrates this—a 
conflict over the management of dues fed into a strike against MCC’s chairman over 
corruption allegations, leading to a period of ill-will between MCC and the traders.  
However, Joshi and Ayee’s (2002) account demonstrates that coproduction based on 
politicized exchange can be relatively enduring—at the time of their study, the tax 
collection arrangement between the GPRTU and the PNDC had been in place for 
almost fifteen years.  The PNDC’s extended hold on power played a significant role 
in enabling this arrangement, as did the dominance of the GPRTU in the passenger 
transportation sector.  However, when the account was published, the arrangement 
continued under the National Patriotic Party which came to power in 2001 and the 
authors suggest that it may continue to do so as there are signs that the National 
Patriotic Party recognizes the political importance of the GPRTU. 
There are some forms of politicized exchange that have quite detrimental 
effects on public goods provision.  For example, Ayee and Richard Crook (2003) and 
Diana Cammack (2012) describe cases where politicians have secured control of 
service delivery roles for their political supporters, who use them to earn rents for 
themselves and their political patron.  Ayee and Crook focus on the control of public 
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toilets in Accra and Kumasi, Ghana, arguing that the community groups managing 
these facilities were commonly the dependents of local politicians, and in some cases 
were created by them.  The revenues generated by these facilities were therefore 
siphoned off for political purposes, rather than re-invested.  Cammack (pp. 10-22) 
describes a very similar dynamic as regards the control of water kiosks202 in peri-
urban areas in Malawi, although kiosks have tended to be officially managed by 
sector-specific committees which have been captured by politicians rather than 
community-based groups.  The consequence of this type of approach, Ayee and 
Crook (2003, p. 29) argue, is that “the actual performance of the service becomes less 
important than the privately distributed pay-offs it generates”.  This has a deleterious 
effect on the quality of the good provided and leads to violent conflict over the control 
of delivery points as politicians rise and fall. 
In the cases Ayee and Crook and Cammack describe, service delivery has 
been fully captured by politicians as a source of patronage.  The citizen organizations 
responsible for managing public toilets and the supply of water have no significant 
independent identity or influence—they are either created by or controlled by 
politicians.  Both citizens and politicians are principally interested in material pay-
offs: those managing public toilets and water kiosks are seeking employment and 
political favour, while politicians are seeking rents.  In contrast, the cases of relatively 
successful coproduction of a clean market and tax revenue involve a balance of power 
between government and more autonomous citizen organizations.  At least one party 
in each instance has an interest in the outcomes of coproduction—the TU’s members 
value a clean market for its own sake and the Ghanaian government values higher tax 
revenues.  It is this that motivates the other party to meet its commitments as part of a 
broader set of reciprocal exchanges. 
However, this kind of arrangement is unlikely to achieve the best results as the 
quality of goods and services is not the first priority of all actors involved.  In the case 
of Makeni’s market, MCC has an interest in achieving a sufficient level of cleanliness 
to satisfy the traders and its donors, but not in achieving the highest standard of 
cleanliness possible.  Similarly, the members of the GPRTU have an interest in 
collecting sufficient tax to keep the PNDC government satisfied, but not in exceeding 
that target.  When the source of motivation for coproduction of a good for some 
                                                
202 Although note that water in this context is a private good. 
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parties is bound up in broader exchange, performance will only matter to the extent 
that it impacts on maintaining that exchange and the flow of benefits it provides. 
ii) Integrated low-cost monitoring 
Trust in LGAs in Sierra Leone, particularly local councils, is low.  As 
discussed in chapter one, recent survey data indicate that local councils are less 
trusted than chiefs, and levels of trust for both local councils and chiefs are far lower 
in Bombali District than in the South (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008b, p. 37; 
Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, pp. 82-84).  The gap between trust in councils and chiefs is 
perhaps unsurprising, as among the key reasons given for the demise of first 
generation councils is their lack of resonance with ordinary Sierra Leoneans (chapter 
three).  While this might be less significant in urban settings, the (albeit rather 
limited) secondary evidence presented about MCC’s history suggests that it has been 
filled with the favourites of the ruling party and used as tool for predatory extraction 
(chapter four).  The gap in trust between North and South is likely to be linked to the 
history of underdevelopment and higher levels of chiefly exploitation in the North 
(chapters three and four). 
Coproduction of a good by LGAs and (subject-)citizens requires significant 
inputs from both sides.  (Subject-)citizens with a genuine interest in the benefits of the 
good, who are willing to engage in collective action for its production, are likely to be 
discouraged by anxieties that LGAs will fail to reciprocate, duping them. Bolten 
(2008, pp. 91-97) describes how residents’ lack of trust in government undermined 
NPRC attempts to provide electricity and piped water in Makeni in the 1990s, as 
residents were simply unwilling to pay their bills.  She links their lack of trust to 
anxieties about corruption and resentment at the provincial capital’s relative 
underdevelopment as compared to rival capitals Bo and Kenema, resulting in a sense 
of entitlement to better services at no further cost. 
In the case of waste collection in Makeni’s market, the corrosive effects of 
low trust are mitigated by low-cost monitoring of the local council’s actions which is 
built into the structure of the coproductive arrangement.  Visible inputs by the local 
council (and the traders) are made on a daily basis and therefore there is a low risk of 
the traders being duped to any significant degree—they have relatively full 
information about the local council’s actions which places them in a strong position to 
impose sanctions swiftly if needed.  In this case, sanctions take the form of degrees of 
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non-compliance.  This results in higher levels of confidence in reciprocal action by 
the local council, making productive coordination possible. 
This case resonates with Ostrom’s (1990, pp. 94-100) discussion of 
monitoring costs in her landmark study of long-standing collective pool resource 
(CPR) institutions.  Contrary to the received wisdom that monitoring and enforcement 
of rules governing access to CPR presents a significant collective action problem due 
to the high costs to the enforcer combined with diffuse benefits to the users of the 
CPR, Ostrom finds that more successful CPR institutions tend to be characterized by 
relatively low monitoring costs.  She gives the example of irrigation rotation systems 
in which the next irrigator to receive water waits nearby for the current user to finish, 
making it difficult for any irrigator to exceed his/her allotted amount of water.  In this 
situation, monitoring is a “natural by-product” (p. 96) of users accessing the 
commons.  As such, trust in one’s fellow irrigators’ intentions is not really 
necessary—the in-built monitoring provides the confidence that fellow irrigators will 
follow the rules. 
Similarly, in the case of waste collection in Makeni’s market, the in-built low-
cost monitoring of local council and trader inputs is not present by intentional design, 
but is merely a fortunate by-product of the most obvious approach to clearing waste in 
a coproductive mode.  This is not common to all instances of coproduction.  For 
example, coproduction of a safe supply of meat requires daily payments by the 
butchers, but also periodic investments by the council to maintain the slaughterhouse 
and coproduction of public order in the barri requires subject-citizens to make the 
necessary payments and provide evidence before the barri officiators deliver a 
judgement.  In these instances, trust could help to facilitate cooperation.  Levels of 
trust in Pa Rok’s barri are sufficient to bring in a steady flow of cases.  In contrast, 
MCC’s violation of the agreement reached with the butchers is likely to have eroded 
any trust that they previously had in MCC, presenting a significant barrier to 
renegotiation of their coproductive relationship. 
iii) Inclusive elite alliance 
The case of Pa Rok’s barri suggests that the stability of a coproductive 
arrangement can be strengthened if a proportion of the coproducing subject-citizens 
have a vested interest in either the provision of the good or the ascendancy of the 
form of local government.  In this case, chiefly elites view the barri as a fitting venue 
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in which to advance their private interests and their status is enhanced when the 
institution of chieftaincy thrives.  As a result, this group is particularly motivated to 
cooperate with chiefs to coproduce public order.  A similar dynamic could occur in 
cases of local council-led provision—those who might have a vested interest in the 
institution’s prominence include the kinship groups of councillors or administrative 
staff working at the council; and CBOs and NGOs whose funding is linked to projects 
carried out in partnership with the council. 
The main risk implicit in coproduction which relies on significant elite inputs 
is that the good produced will be captured by elites and targeted exclusively to their 
needs (Zerah, 2009; Boesten, et al., 2011).  For example, elite pressure could induce 
the council to focus its efforts on providing waste collection in one area of the city 
only, restricting access to clean streets and the associated health benefits.  
Alternatively, a chiefly elite could monopolize chiefly adjudication services, or bias 
systematically the outcomes of chiefs’ judicial decisions, leaving lower status 
residents without access to fair, low-cost justice and reducing the volume of public 
order benefits generated.  Elite support therefore only contributes to the success of 
coproduction when elites operate in an inclusive mode and do not seek to secure all of 
the benefits produced for themselves. 
Elite capture is a high risk in Sierra Leone where there has been a notable 
history of predatory governance benefiting elites (chapters one and three).  Paul 
Richards and his colleagues (2005b; Mokuwa, et al., 2011) have argued that the 
capture of judicial power by chiefs and other elites enables them to abuse this power 
to secure control of young men’s labour.  Acemoglu et al (2012) present evidence 
which suggests that public goods provision is poorer in chiefdoms where power has 
been continually concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of ruling families.  
Finally, Melissa Labonte (2011) suggests that post-reform local councils are 
vulnerable to elite capture in the absence of a number of key measures: steps to 
reduce aid volatility, monitoring of levels of elite capture in local council-led projects, 
avoidance of funding in excess of local councils’ absorptive capacity and reform of 
chieftaincy. 
It is clear that Pa Rok’s barri is in the control of chiefly elites.  In chapter six I 
argue that this does not prevent non-elites from gaining access to their services, but 
does imply some extent of elite bias in the decision-making process, particularly in 
cases which pit non-elites against elites.  Given this, the barri clearly reproduces 
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social inequality.  However, the survey data in chapter four indicate that senior 
representatives of households are generally satisfied with chiefs’ role in deciding 
cases; there are no significant differences in levels of satisfaction between men and 
women, older and younger respondents and those respondents who have relatives 
directly involved in chiefdom governance and those who do not.  This suggests that 
levels of elite bias are within a range acceptable to many respondents.203  Jean-
Philippe Platteau (2009, p. 46) argues that there is often relatively high acceptance of 
unequal arrangements in societies where “hierarchical, asymmetric and highly 
personalized relations” prevail, as long as non-elites gain some benefits from such 
arrangements.  In this case, my judgement is that the benefits of coproduction remain 
relatively broad, although elites benefit more than non-elites. 
Mohammad Masud’s (2002) study of coproductive policing in Karachi 
provides a further example where elite involvement plays a critical role, yet the 
benefits of coproduction remain relatively broad.  Masud describes the role of the 
Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC)—an organization led by 40 members of 
the business community with the backing of the governor, and now legislation—in 
working closely with the police to improve security in Karachi.  The members of the 
CPLC are motivated by particular concerns about high levels of crime which 
undermine business growth and the rise of kidnapping.  Among the CPLC’s functions 
are the management of online crime databases which can be accessed by the police on 
a 24-hour basis, including a database of registered and stolen vehicles and a database 
of all criminal cases; conducting monthly crime analysis to identify patterns of crime; 
providing specialist support in kidnapping cases; and frontline assistance to citizens in 
terms of dispute resolution and reporting crimes.  The CPLC is largely funded by 
contributions from the business community and individuals, as well as an annual 
government grant. 
Masud argues that the CPLC’s efforts do not only serve elite interests.  While 
its involvement in kidnapping serves a wealthy elite, its work on car theft has greater 
benefits for the relatively unprotected middle class and their frontline services in 
terms of crime reporting and dispute resolution benefit the poor in particular, as many 
in this group are not willing to engage the police directly due to anxieties about 
                                                
203 Respondents are drawn from a group within which older and more established city residents are 
likely to be more highly represented, but there is no particular bias in respondent selection towards 
more elite respondents. 
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possible mistreatment.  While the members of the CPLC are largely elite 
businessmen, many are drawn from minority business communities to whom they 
have obligations of care.  CPLC members are also subject to scrutiny by a “critical 
countervailing elite” (p. 26) of journalists, lawyers and politicians, who are not 
permitted to join the organization.  Like Pa Rok’s barri, this example deals with the 
coproduction of public order and security.  In this field, it is arguably in the interests 
of elite participants in coproduction to keep the scope of benefits broad, as low quality 
public order and security for the poor tends to have knock on effects for their own 
vulnerability to disorder and crime. 
iv) Building on longstanding institutions 
This proposition is influenced by the broader work of the Local Governance 
strand of the APPP.  Drawing on APPP fieldwork, including findings from my 
research (Workman, 2011), Booth (2010, p. 5) proposes that local public goods 
provision is more likely to succeed when “there are institutions enabling local 
collective action which…make use of institutional elements inherited from the past 
which motivate, enable and guide individuals to take particular actions”.  He draws on 
Greif’s (2006) argument (set out in chapter two) that there is a “fundamental 
asymmetry” between institutional elements inherited from the past and newer 
alternatives because the former are the default that individuals draw on to make sense 
of situations, anticipate others’ behaviour and determine the appropriate way to 
behave themselves.  By building on longstanding institutions, LGAs will also benefit 
from any local efforts made to improve these institutions over time through gradual 
tinkering (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011) (chapter two). 
Coproduction of a clean market builds on longstanding institutions for the 
regulation of traders’ behaviour.  Market chiefs, the TU and peers enforce a generally 
accepted set of rules about how traders should behave, discouraging free-riding from 
the waste collection effort.  As MCC has no proper system of its own in place to 
regulate traders’ behaviour, and lacks the resources to fund a third-party monitoring 
effort, these regulatory institutions are extremely helpful in maintaining levels of 
trader cooperation.  Taking advantage of existing institutions is likely to be 
particularly important for local councils, as they have come under pressure to deliver 
a variety of public goods for which they have no functional arrangements in place.  
The situation for the coproduction of public order is more complex.  The rules 
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underpinning coproduction in the barri are themselves longstanding institutions.  
However, Pa Rok and the barri officiators also reinforce linkages with other 
longstanding institutions, for example, those related to the control of witchcraft and 
the management of sodalities.  They therefore develop a cluster of longstanding 
institutions which facilitates collective action and to some extent prevents newer 
actors (such as local courts or the councils) from taking advantage of those 
institutions themselves.  None of these longstanding institutions are fixed or 
unchanging—they are themselves subject to ongoing gradual (and sometimes more 
dramatic) processes of change. 
The APPP Local Governance strand identify further examples of relatively 
successful arrangements for local public goods provision which build on longstanding 
institutions.  For example, the imihigo system in Rwanda is a system of performance 
contracts for LGAs which “depends on both rewards and sanctions, some of them 
drawing on concepts of honour and shame with historical roots going back to the 
former kingdom of Rwanda”, backed by top-down pressure (Booth, 2010, p. 18).  A 
further example is offered by the emergence of a system of town chiefs in urban areas 
of Malawi which combines chiefs who were officially appointed during the 1960s to 
1980s, rural hereditary chiefs whose localities have now urbanized and self- or 
communally-appointed chiefs (Cammack, Kanyongolo, & O'Neil, 2009; Booth, 2010, 
p. 29).  These examples emphasize that building on longstanding institutions often 
involves a process of creative reworking of recognized sets of rules which are given 
new meaning when applied in a different context or with a different interpretation.  
James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2009, pp. 15-16) identify four dynamics 
through which institutions can be gradually transformed: displacement (replacement 
of rules); layering (introduction of new rules on top of old ones); drift (changed 
impact of rules due to shifts in context); and conversion (changed enactment through 
strategic redeployment).  Complex combinations of these dynamics are likely to be in 
evidence when newer institutional arrangements selectively draw in elements of 
longstanding ones. 
Nor will all longstanding institutions resonate with those engaged in 
coproduction or facilitate collective action; chief-led mobilization of unpaid labour 
provides one example of a longstanding institution whose resonance is in decline.  As 
discussed in chapter two, Greif presents a theory of endogenous institutional change: 
when the exogenous variables that influence motivation to follow the rules are 
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changed by the outcomes of that institution, they can contribute to processes of 
institutional reinforcement or erosion.  There is some evidence to suggest that both 
exogenous and endogenous drivers of change are present in the case of chief-led 
mobilization of unpaid labour.  While I cannot give a full account, the historical 
material set out in chapters three and six enables me to provide a partial sketch 
identifying some of the key variables at play.  At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, colonial legislation which enabled chiefs to take advantage of unpaid labour, 
weak colonial oversight of chiefs’ use of these powers, reasonably robust beliefs in 
the legitimacy of chiefly authority and the presence of a growing commercial market 
for crops meant that the payoffs for chiefly exercise of powers to mobilize unpaid 
labour were high.  Initially, this led to reinforcement of the institution, which chiefs 
deployed in a wider range of situations, for example, to build modern houses.  
However, increased chiefly exercise of these powers contributed to growing popular 
resentment and changes in beliefs about the legitimacy of chiefly mobilization of 
labour, finally expressed through the 1955-56 anti-chief riots.  The fall-out from these 
riots led to a change in legislation which reinforced popular perceptions of chiefly 
mobilization of labour as illegitimate and reduced chiefly pay-offs for chiefly exercise 
of these powers.  Combined with the rise of the cash economy this has reduced the 
number of settings in which chiefs can exercise these powers; a trend that has been 
accelerated by the involvement of other actors in mobilization of labour.  
Longstanding institutions in decline can therefore gradually cease to function as the 
default template for action, thus losing their advantage over newer alternatives. 
7.3 The analytical approach in critical perspective 
i)’Success versus failure’: challenges in categorizing cases 
One of the principal challenges presented by a ‘success versus failure’ 
research design is categorizing cases appropriately as relative successes or relative 
failures in public goods provision.  The case study narratives presented in chapters 
five and six suggest that there are particular tensions around the categorization of safe 
meat and public order. 
In the case of safe meat, the lack of clarity on butchers’ views about the value 
of having a slaughterhouse facility, even if well-functioning, raises a question about 
whether this case can be considered a failure of coproduction.  In my view, it can, as I 
do not view a clear desire by coproducing parties to coproduce a good as an essential 
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pre-condition for coproduction.  MCC sought the butchers’ involvement in providing 
safe meat at the slaughterhouse, and the butchers gave their initial consent.  Even if 
the butchers were lukewarm on the value of the facility, the evidence presented 
suggests that the potential for successful coproduction existed, had MCC adhered to 
its original promises and demonstrated greater commitment, in turn encouraging the 
butchers to cooperate more actively.  If this is the case, then the breakdown of 
cooperation can reasonably be considered a failure of coproduction. 
As regards chiefly dispute resolution, there is a question about how to define 
the public good ultimately produced by this activity.  I exercised some discretion in 
defining the good which results from chiefly dispute resolution as public order, rather 
than justice.  I did so because I considered it a more straightforward outcome of 
effective dispute resolution.  If chiefs are deemed effective at resolving disputes, it 
seems logical that they are producing a form of public order, understood as a state of 
affairs in which a set of rules regulating the conduct of members within a community 
are maintained.  This can be considered a public good insofar as it generates stability 
and peace.  However, effective resolution of disputes does not necessarily produce 
justice, understood as fairness or moral rightness.  Chiefs’ involvement in deciding 
cases has been challenged in the literature precisely on the grounds that the public 
order they generate is unfair to some, notably young men and women (Richards, 
2005b; Mokuwa, et al., 2011).  I decided that it would be challenging for the purposes 
of case selection to assess respondents’ perceptions of whether chiefly dispute 
resolution was both effective and fair, particularly given the survey’s focus on senior 
representatives of households, whose views are unlikely to be reflective of a youth 
perspective.  I therefore simply asked survey respondents whether they considered 
chiefs to be effective at dispute resolution. 
I recognize two main weaknesses with the approach taken.  First, from a 
measurement perspective, it would have been more precise to include a specific 
reference to public order outcomes when assessing satisfaction.  As it stands, some 
respondents are likely to have taken into account how fair they consider chiefs to be 
when assessing their effectiveness, and thus there is a lack of clarity as to whether 
respondents are satisfied with public order/justice outcomes.  Second, this approach 
does not recognize the feedback loop between justice and public order.  A public 
order widely considered to be deeply unfair is more likely to generate the ills of 
instability and conflict than the benefits of stability and peace. 
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ii) Beyond local explanations 
The explanations for performance in local public goods provision that I set out 
in chapters five and six focus principally on the dynamics between LGAs and their 
coproducing partners.  In doing so, it is not my intention to neglect the important 
influence of central-local relations over LGA performance, which has been well-
documented in the literature (Crook, 2003; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Robinson, 2007).  
I have established the overall dynamics of patterns of central-local linkage in Sierra 
Leone (chapter three), draw these into my case study discussions where appropriate 
(chapters five and six) and revisit these issues in a more deliberate way in chapter 
eight.  However, at the operational level which was my focus in developing these case 
studies, there was limited evidence of direct central government intervention.  This is 
a finding in and of itself, and one that suggests that both top-down performance 
pressure and rent-seeking by central government in the context of public goods 
provision are relatively low.  I acknowledge that my comparison of ‘success’ and 
‘failure’ by the same LGAs probably diminished the explanatory role played by 
central-local relations, which would have been drawn into focus more by a design that 
compared LGA performance across regions known to exhibit different patterns of 
central-local engagement.  For example, a comparison of MCC (controlled by the 
ruling party) and Bo City Council (controlled by the opposition) would have been 
more likely to yield interesting results in this regard. 
The evidence I did collect on central-local relations in the context of the cases 
studied suggests a tentative narrative of central support for the two more successful 
cases of public goods provision.  In the case of the barri, Pa Rok argued that it was 
operating with the express authorization of President Koroma, but against the wishes 
of the local representatives of MLG—the resident minister and the provincial 
secretary.  He told me that they attempted to shut down the barri, but were forced to 
back down after the president took his side. 
Pa Rok: …They went and reported me to the president twice, but whenever 
they report me, they used to…I used to [defeat]204 them, so finally…we are 
talking as you, but I don’t trust them any longer.  So even at times when they 
call me, I…I wouldn’t go there.  Nothing, they have nothing to do with me, 
because I told them, ‘You have nothing to do with me, you can’t sack me.  
You can’t do anything to me.’  Because I have the backing of the…president. 
                                                
204 Square brackets are used here to indicate poor audibility and thus an uncertain transcription. 
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[…] 
Interviewer: …So why do you think the president supported you? 
Pa Rok: Because he knew [their reports are fake].  What they are doing is 
wrong.  They can’t…they should not interfere into our tradition.  It’s very 
wrong.  That’s what he told them, before me.  He told them once, two, three, 
from there.  None of them came my way again, because he told them, ‘See, 
this is the last.  Anytime I get report from you…you people report this man to 
me, I’ll take action’.  So they forget about it. 
The resident minister refused to confirm this story when I asked him about it, saying 
that such matters were handled by the provincial secretary.  I was unable to secure a 
further interview with the provincial secretary to ask him about this specific incident, 
but in an earlier interview he had described Pa Rok as a “short and very troublesome 
man”, which is suggestive of some history of conflict or difficulties between them. 
Given my lack of access to senior government figures, I can only speculate 
about possible reasons why the president might have protected the barri against his 
appointed MLG representatives.  This could have been part of a general effort to 
maintain the political support of chiefly elites who are important for electoral reasons 
(chapter three).  Alternatively, as Makeni is the president’s home town, it might have 
related to more specific local political dynamics.  One possibility in this vein is that 
the protection offered to the barri was linked to Pa Rok’s close relationship with the 
attorney general Abdul Serry Kamal, his cousin and the former paramount chief’s 
son.  According to Pa Rok, it was the attorney general who enabled him to secure his 
position in the face of competition from rivals; as his patron, the attorney general’s 
local influence is enhanced by Pa Rok’s position, which is far more prominent when 
his barri is operating. 
In the case of the cleaning effort in the market, I found some evidence to 
suggest that waste management had value to the central government both as a means 
of preserving the reputation of the party and as a resource which could diverted for 
private ends.  As the president’s home town and a key political base in Northern 
Province, Makeni can be considered one of the public faces that the president shows 
the world, and his and the party’s reputation are therefore affected by conditions 
there.  Waste collection can be a useful means for ensuring that Makeni shows Sierra 
Leone its best face.  More often that not, MCC calls a general cleaning day in order to 
prepare for presidential visits or other significant political events.  The APC 
conference in April 2009 saw one of the most impressive cleaning efforts conducted 
 233 
that year; in addition, the city was decked with red and white bunting and the city hall 
where the conference was held was repainted in APC colours. 
Waste collection services can also be diverted to serve important members of 
senior politicians’ personal and political networks.  On one occasion I was sitting with 
the tricycle riders in the council’s canteen when the mayor came in to call two of the 
riders out for a pick-up at the president’s mother’s house.  When we arrived at her 
compound, we found a large water tank with the top cut off loaded to the brim with 
waste.  Large branches stuck out of the top of the tank, and all around it were 
numerous smaller piles of waste in bowls and barrows.  The two tricycle riders began 
to gradually tackle the accumulated waste, first emptying the various bowls into the 
tricycle waste containers, then struggling to tip over the water tank and starting on the 
huge mound of rotting waste this created.  I left her compound after half an hour or 
so, estimating that it would take them an hour or two to deal with the volume of waste 
encountered. 
While it is relatively clear that a functional waste management service offers 
some benefits to central government actors, it is difficult to clearly demonstrate that 
additional central support is provided for this activity as a result.  The regular ‘tied’ 
waste collection grant is provided to all councils based on a common rationale and is 
under the supervision of donor-funded units, so is not particularly vulnerable to 
political influence.  The allocation of waste collection vehicles is more likely to 
reflect a political judgement.205  In 2009, Makeni was reasonably well equipped in 
that regard and had received a set of tricycles from central government in 2006.  
Central government may also have played a role in brokering an expected shipment of 
a skip truck, skips and a bulldozer backed by UNDP and One World Link funds.  I 
was also told that the APC party provides additional funds for the beautification of 
Makeni to coincide with key events such as the party conference. 
This limited and tentative evidence suggests that central support contributed to 
the success of the barri, and probably also to the waste collection effort in the market.  
I found no comparable evidence of direct central intervention in the case of the 
slaughterhouse or of mobilization of unpaid labour for community infrastructure.  
However, even if central intervention did play a contributing role in the more 
                                                
205 For example, Catherine Bolten (2008, pp. 242-243) notes an occasion when Makeni was passed 
over for a new tipper for waste collection by the SLPP government in favour of Kono, the country’s 
main diamond mining district, where they had a higher likelihood of winning electoral support. 
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successful cases, different patterns of central-local engagement do not adequately 
account for the performance gap between ‘successes’ and ‘failures’. 
iii) Agency 
One of the main critiques of rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is the way 
in which it models agency.  RCIs have been accused of focusing too exclusively on 
material sources of motivation; assuming that preferences are exogenous to 
institutions, rather than shaped by institutional context; and over-emphasizing the 
extent to which actors base decisions on a strategic calculus, rather than habit (chapter 
two).  In chapters five and six, I focus on the main categories of incentives which 
influence LGAs and (subject-)citizens in the context of the coproductive 
arrangements studied.  I emphasize those incentives which vary across cases of 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ and therefore offer some explanatory insight into why actors 
behave differently in each case.  I base my understanding of the main incentives at 
play both on how actors behave and what they say about their motivation and the 
motivation of others.  The underlying model of agency implied is relatively 
straightforward—individual behaviour in the context of coproduction is influenced by 
the incentives described, resulting in aggregate effects at the level of coproductive 
outcomes.206  This implies that actors make a strategic calculation and engage in goal-
oriented behaviour.  In accordance with the IAD framework, I focus on individuals as 
decision-makers in the context of a particular role that they play, rather than seeking 
to understand individual motivation in a more holistic and embedded way.  I 
recognize that this is a significant simplification of human motivation and its 
influence on behaviour.  However, my goal is to identify broader reasons why local 
public goods provision is more successful in some instances than others.  Arguably, a 
fine-grained approach looking closely at the embedded motivation of individuals is 
not necessary for this purpose, and could even obscure the commonalities between 
individuals which lead to aggregate outcomes. 
In line with Ostrom’s (2005) approach, the incentives I describe include both 
material and non-material sources of motivation.  On the LGA side, I characterize 
MCC as being motivated primarily by material gain and political power.  This 
characterization is not intended to encompass the full range of motives which guide 
                                                
206 With the exception of MCC, which I treat as a collective actor. 
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public officials at an individual level (for example, see Olivier de Sardan (2012, pp. 
12-19)).  I consider material incentives to be a powerful influence on chiefs, but I also 
emphasize that chiefs have an interest in renewing their authority, both as an 
affirmation of their identity and because of the benefits its exercise brings to them.  
On the (subject-)citizen side, I describe varied sources of motivation, including a 
desire for the goods provided; a desire not to be duped; a desire not to face 
punishment; and an interest in shoring up one’s social status. 
Historical institutionalists (HIs) often object to the characterization of 
preferences as exogenous to institutions.  Like Ostrom, I take preferences to be fixed 
for the purposes of analyzing each case.  However, I recognize that there is a feedback 
loop between institutions and the preferences which motivate individuals to reproduce 
them.  Even preferences for material benefits, which might seem the most obvious 
example of exogenous preferences, are shaped by institutional context.  For example, 
in their study of corruption, Olivier de Sardan and Blundo (2006, p. 83) argue that 
when a public official secures a lucrative posting, there is a strong social expectation 
that s/he will profit from it as far and fast as possible; they write “someone who does 
not avail him- or herself of an opportunity of this kind that presents itself is 
considered ‘crazy’, or is suspected of having selfishly ‘devoured’ the fruit of his or 
her putative illicit activities”.  It is perhaps more obvious that chiefs’ interest in 
renewal of their authority is influenced by their understanding of chiefly identity, 
which is shaped by their lifetime experience of the institutions of chiefdom 
government.  Similarly, the value (subject-)citizens accord to goods such as public 
order and cleanliness is socially constituted, in part through the institutions which 
have historically provided such goods.  In my view, recognition of this feedback loop 
does not invalidate the analytical approach I have taken.  It simply highlights another 
dimension of institutional functioning which is particularly critical to understanding 
processes of institutional change. 
The emphasis I place on strategic calculus seems appropriate for more 
political institutions based on LGA-(subject-)citizen engagement, which do not have 
the same taken-for-granted quality as some social institutions.  In the two cases of 
MCC engagement with interest-based associations, relatively autonomous actors with 
independent sources of power reach mutual accommodations based on fairly explicit 
bargains negotiated at face-to-face meetings.  When these bargains are not upheld, a 
re-assessment takes place which leads to a shift in behaviour.  For example, the 
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butchers resist paying an increased slaughtering fee and the traders refuse to gather 
waste as usual.  This behaviour is clearly strategic. 
In the two cases of chiefly engagement with subject-citizens, strategic 
behaviour also appears to be prominent.  Urban chiefs are under pressure from 
councils and local courts, and must act strategically to maintain their contemporary 
relevance.  Given this, Pa Rok’s efforts to carve out exclusive jurisdiction for the barri 
over witchcraft and sodality matters are best interpreted as a strategic step to gain an 
advantage over the local courts.  If he were simply acting in accordance with taken-
for-granted beliefs then one would not expect his claims to be contested so vigorously 
by the local courts.  Moreover, chiefs’ jurisdiction over these areas was challenged 
significantly under colonial rule and thus is unlikely to have a straightforward taken-
for-granted quality.  Subject-citizens clearly have a strategic choice to make about 
whether to take cases to the barri or elsewhere (although this may be more or less 
constrained depending on circumstances), and they exercise that choice.  And if chief-
led mobilization of labour is in decline as it appears to be, it is difficult to argue that 
either chiefs or subject-citizens are acting habitually as patterns of behaviour change.  
None of this is to deny that habitual behaviour also plays a role in the cases of 
coproduction studied—individuals are familiar with the general institutional patterns 
and draw on established routines of behaviour.  However, there is sufficient evidence 
of strategic behaviour to justify an incentive-focused approach. 
iv) Historical analysis 
The analysis I present in chapters five and six privileges a spatial comparison 
of ‘success versus failure’—I focus on four cases of coproduction during a single time 
period on a single setting of the key outcome of interest (performance in local public 
goods provision).  This type of comparison is well-recognized (Gerring, 2007, pp. 
164-165, 128) and is suited to my aim of illuminating key differences in the 
institutional arrangements which underpin ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public 
goods provision.  However, there is a risk that such a comparison will result in too 
narrow an approach, which highlights the structural features of institutions and their 
effects without understanding why an institution takes a particular form or what the 
broader conditions are that enable particular features to function effectively. 
While limited secondary literature, archival materials and research funds have 
prevented me from incorporating a systematic temporal comparison of the four cases 
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studied, I have attempted to avoid the problems associated with a dehistoricized and 
decontextualized analysis.  In chapter three, I have set out a general history of local 
government in Sierra Leone and in chapter four I have built on this with an account of 
local government in Makeni specifically.  These chapters provide the historical 
foundation and wider context for subsequent analysis and are explicitly drawn upon 
during the case study discussions for that purpose.  I have also incorporated a limited 
temporal comparison of the colonial origins and development of chiefs’ role in 
deciding cases and mobilizing labour because it provides relevant support for my 
conjecture that the former is more closely linked to chiefly identity.  This is a good 
example of the way in which temporal comparison can enrich insights emerging from 
a spatial comparison, but it also indicates that insights from spatial comparison, while 
sometimes limited, are not necessarily invalid. 
v) Reflections on the IAD framework 
The main aim of this thesis is to deepen our understanding of alternative 
approaches to addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone, not to deepen our 
understanding of institutional theory.  I have employed the IAD framework as a tool 
to assist me in this process, rather than considering it an object of investigation.  For 
this reason, I do not discuss the IAD framework further in the concluding chapter, but 
focus instead on the main concerns of the study. 
I do, however, have a brief concluding reflection to share on my experience of 
applying the IAD framework in the context of qualitative research.  While I found the 
framework extremely helpful to carry out a structured comparison of four cases, its 
sheer density made it challenging to apply.  As describe in chapter two, there are 
seven basic components of an action situation, three categories of exogenous 
variables acting on the action situation, one of which is sub-divided into seven further 
categories, and each action situation is nested within a wider series of action 
situations at different levels.  This is a lot of ground to cover. 
The framework is conceived of as a means to address the “babbling 
equilibrium” problem which afflicts institutional theory—researchers using different 
language to refer to similar concepts.  However, because it is difficult to apply the 
framework in a comprehensive way without subsuming the research within it, many 
researchers take a somewhat flexible approach to the framework’s application and 
some do not specify precisely how they have applied it.  I have aimed to avoid this 
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pitfall by setting out clearly how I have made use of the framework and annexing my 
analysis of the rules underpinning each case.  But it is possible that a more 
parsimonious framework might be more effective at increasing the coherence of 
debate about institutional theory. 
Concluding comments 
In this chapter, I have taken a view on the collective implications of the four 
cases studied.  In particular, I have set out four conditions under which coproduction 
is more likely to succeed in small- and medium-sized towns in Sierra Leone.  These 
four propositions are by no means intended to be comprehensive—they are based on 
the selective insights the cases studied afford.  In presenting them, I am not 
encouraging any particular linked policy action.  For example, I am not suggesting 
that the Sierra Leone government or donors should attempt to support coproduction 
whenever one of these conditions obtains, and I am certainly not suggesting that 
efforts should be made to manufacture these conditions in order to increase the likely 
success of coproduction.  Instead, my purpose in developing these propositions is 
twofold: to deepen our understanding of how coproduction works in a Sierra Leonean 
context; and to contribute to efforts to think creatively about alternatives to a ‘good 
governance’ approach to institutional reform based on overhaul of social and political 
institutions.  I develop this point further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions 
The broad purpose of this study has been to inform thinking about strategies to 
address the local public goods deficit in Sierra Leone (and comparable contexts) 
(chapter one).  In preceding chapters (five to seven), I have set out arguments to 
explain the gap between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in coproduction in a number of 
specific cases and I have extrapolated from these cases to develop a set of 
propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed 
in the current social and political climate in Sierra Leone.  In this final chapter, I 
reflect on the main implications of these findings in three areas.  First, I consider what 
potential coproduction offers as a means of addressing the public goods deficit in 
Sierra Leone, building on earlier discussions of coproduction (chapters two and 
seven).  Next, I consider the implications of applying a more empirically grounded 
and gradual approach to institutional reform at the policy level.  Finally, I consider 
how such an approach could be applied to local government reform in Sierra Leone, 
as well as the study’s implications for the broader academic debate on this topic 
(chapter three). 
8.1 Coproduction and the public goods deficit 
In assessing the potential of coproduction as a means of addressing the public 
goods deficit in Sierra Leone, one is immediately confronted with the analytical 
difficulties the concept poses because of its breadth and the conflicting interpretations 
it encompasses.  On the one hand, some authors frame coproduction as a response to 
weak state capacity—it has governance drivers (Joshi & Moore, 2004).  In weak 
states, examples of coproduction can be found even in core areas of state activity and 
a higher level of citizen inputs is often required than in settings where state capacity is 
more robust.  While some of these arrangements may be desirable only in the short-
term while a gap in state capacity exists, others may ironically end up representing an 
improvement over state-centric alternatives and remain desirable over the longer term.  
There are other authors who frame coproduction as a welcome alternative to a more 
centralist approach (Ostrom, 1996).  Under this interpretation, coproduction is 
understood more as a deliberate policy intervention to encourage citizen participation 
in the provision of public goods in recognition of the importance of both state and 
citizen inputs, and the interdependence between them.  Pursuing this kind of strategy 
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is anticipated to result in the production of social capital which spills over to other 
areas of state-citizen engagement (although I can see no specific barrier to this 
occurring in the case of governance-driven coproduction), improving the quality of 
governance more broadly.  Therefore coproduction can be interpreted as either a sign 
of state weakness or strength, and while some coproductive arrangements are 
considered a necessary compromise, others are considered highly desirable and to be 
deepened over the longer term. 
The cases I present broadly support a narrative of coproduction as an 
adaptation to state failure.  There are clear governance drivers for two of the cases (a 
clean market and community infrastructure) and more ambiguous governance drivers 
for the remaining two (public order and safe meat).  I find no evidence that 
coproduction is contributing to a deepening of state-citizen engagement which 
empowers citizens.  I do observe a spillover of social capital from the barri (Evans, 
1996a; Ostrom, 1996), but this principally reinforces chiefly authority rather than 
increasing chiefly responsiveness.  In none of the cases described does coproduction 
provide an avenue for (subject-)citizens to exert significant influence over decision-
making processes (Ackerman, 2004; Mitlin, 2008).  In general, the coproductive 
arrangements studied reproduce existing social inequalities, although I see no signs 
that they expand their scope substantially (Miraftab, 2004; Samson, 2010).  All of this 
points to an important role for coproduction in increasing the quantity of public goods 
available (as compared to an alternative where state provision fails due to insufficient 
resources), but not necessarily in improving the quality of such goods or in 
empowering (subject-)citizens. 
This narrative is incomplete, however.  Even the relatively straightforward 
cases of governance-driven coproduction (a clean market and community 
infrastructure) raise difficult questions about whether such arrangements are desirable 
over the longer term.  The potential efficiency gains these cases offer (as long as 
opportunity costs are lower for coproducers than public officials) need to be assessed 
and weighed against other implications of the coproductive arrangements, for 
example their effects on inequality.  Two of the cases (public order and safe meat) are 
also motivated by the presence of interdependent local government and (subject-
)citizen inputs.  For these goods, some form of coproduction is not only desirable but 
necessary over the longer term, even under conditions of state strength.  This does not 
imply a lack of malleability—the coproductive arrangements could take very different 
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forms in the future.  The cases studied therefore also lend support to the argument that 
state recognition of interdependence and investment in coproduction is important to 
addressing the public goods deficit over the longer term. 
The study of coproduction has creative potential because it is likely to 
generate a useful pool of ideas about strategies for local public goods provision which 
fit well with local sensibilities and work under prevailing social and political 
conditions.  The logic behind this argument is that governance-driven cases of 
coproduction usually represent local solutions to gaps in public goods provision.  As 
the ‘failed’ cases in this study demonstrate, local solutions will not necessarily 
succeed in generating a reasonable supply of public goods; however, they have an 
advantage at the outset because they are more likely to ‘go with the grain’ of local 
social and political logics than those imported by donors or driven from the centre 
(Kelsall, 2008; Booth, 2012).  I do not mean to simplify or romanticize local problem-
solving.  In practice, the dynamics are complex; for example, Pa Rok’s barri can be 
considered a local solution to a gap in adjudication services, but it is also the product 
of highly centralized colonial policy which gave official recognition to chiefs’ courts 
at the end of the 1800s.  Similarly, MCC’s arrangement with the TU can be 
considered a local solution, but the council itself is the product of a decentralization 
process based on a donor blueprint and driven from the centre.  While there may be 
few purely local solutions, when local actors exercise significant autonomy in solving 
collective action problems and determining arrangements for public goods provision, 
a good contextual fit is more likely. 
The propositions I set out about the conditions under which coproduction is 
more likely to succeed in Sierra Leone (chapter seven) represent one attempt to think 
creatively about the implications of coproduction.  Most of the conditions identified 
can be interpreted as workarounds (whether deliberate or not) for features of the 
social and political environment which are generally unsupportive of public goods 
provision.  For example, the presence of a politicized bargain overcomes the problem 
of a political system which offers weak electoral incentives for public goods 
provision, the integration of low-cost monitoring overcomes the problem of poor trust 
in local government and building on longstanding institutions overcomes the problem 
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of weak operational capacity and can also bolster legitimacy.207  The presence of an 
inclusive elite alliance addresses a more general free-riding problem, but does so in a 
way that runs counter to the commonplace view that elite involvement is antithetical 
to the achievement of developmental outcomes.  These propositions are therefore 
suggestive of an alternate institutional approach to solving the public goods deficit in 
Sierra Leone—one that is based on the development of workarounds for key obstacles 
rather than the overhaul of key social and political institutions required by ‘good 
governance’.208  I explore the implications of this further in the next section.209 
Coproduction has its limits—while it is helping to address the public goods 
deficit in Sierra Leone, it is highly unlikely to eliminate it altogether.  Sierra Leone’s 
(subject-)citizens do not command the resources or the expertise to plug all existing 
gaps in provision.  Many forms of governance-driven coproduction probably fall into 
the category of what Olivier de Sardan (2012) calls a “palliative solution”, which I 
interpret to mean one that does not address the underlying problem of weak state 
capacity to provide public goods.  Critics of neoliberalism go further, arguing that 
acceptance of coproduction as a strategy for public goods provision normalizes a 
neoliberal vision of a leaner state, and thus undermines the case for strengthening 
state capacity to provide public goods over the longer term (Miraftab, 2003; Zerah, 
2009).  In chapter two, I describe empirical work in this vein which points to 
examples where coproduction has been adopted explicitly as a component of national 
development strategies and justified by the language of participation and 
empowerment, while deepening inequality (Miraftab, 2003; Zerah, 2009; Samson, 
2010) (chapter two).  The history of structural adjustment in Africa gives good reason 
to take these concerns seriously.  However, this body of work risks exaggerating the 
extent to which coproduction is a product of neoliberal policy and the extent to which 
coproduction has been co-opted as part of a neoliberal narrative. 
                                                
207 While the first two conditions are suited to resolving these particular obstacles to collective action, 
building on longstanding institutions could help to resolve a wide range of collective action problems. 
208 This resonates with the focus of the APPP Local Governance strand on identifying ways of 
overcoming “key bottlenecks” (Booth, 2012, p. 34). 
209 In chapter one, I identified four barriers to public goods provision: a political system which provides 
LGAs with little motivation to provide public goods, poor trust, resource scarcity and a lack of clarity 
around roles and responsibilities.  Coproduction itself can be considered a kind of workaround for 
resource scarcity.  In chapter six, I suggest that lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities has 
ambivalent effects—in addition to undermining public goods provision, it can result in competition 
between local actors which encourages better performance. 
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Governance-driven coproduction is a response to weak state capacity.  The 
narrative I set out in chapter one explores how structural adjustment reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s exacerbated public sector decline in Sierra Leone.  Pressures on 
public resources remain substantial in the post-war period and donors’ willingness to 
provide support to the Sierra Leonean state comes with strings attached, which 
includes limits on the size of the public sector.  It is therefore clear that donor policy 
has contributed to the emergence of governance-driven coproduction in Sierra Leone 
and that donors continue to impose constraints on the size of the public sector even as 
they support state-building processes.  Nevertheless, it is a stretch to argue that donor 
policy is the main cause of governance-driven coproduction in Sierra Leone when 
domestic politics has clearly played a more substantial role (chapter one). 
The argument that coproduction is vulnerable to co-optation as part of a 
neoliberal narrative normalizing a lean state is perhaps more persuasive.  However, I 
do not see a great deal of evidence that this has happened in practice in Sierra Leone 
where donor discourse is very much focused on citizens playing an accountability-
seeking rather than a coproductive role vis-à-vis local public goods.  There is also an 
argument to be made that coproduction, because it requires significant inputs from 
both government and citizens, lends far less support to an idealized vision of a lean 
state than other popular modalities of public goods provision, such as self-
provisioning through collective action or private provision on an associational or 
commercial basis.  Unlike these modalities, coproduction could equally well be 
deployed to support a narrative about strengthening state capacity to provide public 
goods.  First, some varieties of coproduction can be considered a temporary fix to a 
gap in public goods provision, which keeps the state engaged, while providing space 
to build state capacity over the longer term.  Second, as discussed, strengthening 
coproduction where there is significant interdependence between state and citizen 
inputs can be considered a capacity building strategy.  In practice, coproduction, 
which remains relatively invisible in Sierra Leone, has not been deployed in service 
of a capacity building narrative.  However, the relative flexibility of the concept 
suggests that it would be difficult for it to be co-opted fully by a narrative in favour of 
slimming down the state. 
Advocates of ‘good governance’ might see coproduction as limiting state 
development along democratic lines.  In their eyes, the accommodations coproductive 
arrangements make with existing social and political logics are likely to be viewed as 
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undermining longer-term efforts to transform those logics.  For example, the 
workarounds that I describe for features of the social and political environment which 
obstruct local public goods provision could simply be interpreted by advocates of 
‘good governance’ as reinforcing a system of clientelist politics, leaving conditions of 
poor trust in government unaddressed and reinforcing the dominance of traditional 
elites.  These are valid concerns.  However, the bodies of institutional theory and 
empirical evidence discussed in this study (chapters one and two) suggest that 
democratizing reform based on ‘good governance’ templates stands relatively little 
chance of success.  It is therefore possible to turn the question around, and ask how 
far such idealistic reforms should be prioritized over coproductive arrangements 
which are making a contribution to addressing the public goods deficit? 
To summarize the arguments made here, I see coproduction as having the 
potential to address the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone in four main ways.  First, 
coproduction can maintain a supply of public goods when state capacity is weak and 
state provision has eroded or collapsed.  Second, coproductive arrangements that are 
not desirable in the longer term could provide a temporary fix, enabling the state to 
build its capacity and resume greater responsibility for provision.  Third, some 
instances of coproduction (including, but not limited to, those based on 
interdependence) are desirable in the longer term, and if invested in by the state could 
help to improve the quality of public goods.  Fourth, a better understanding of 
successful coproductive arrangements already in existence is likely to generate new 
ideas about approaches to local public goods provision more broadly that are 
congruent with social and political realities. 
Judgements about the desirability of different coproductive arrangements are 
likely to involve trade-offs based on a relatively complex set of considerations, for 
example, the quantity and quality of the goods they generate, and their implications 
for the character of state-citizen relations, social equality and the development of state 
capacity over the longer term.  Furthermore, such judgements ultimately rely on a 
motivating vision of the type of state sought and thus far there appears to be relatively 
little consensus on this question in post-war Sierra Leone.  Donors tend to seek a state 
that is compliant with ‘good governance’ ideals while also being lean and efficient 
and high levels of aid dependency provide multiple avenues for them to pursue this 
vision.  While the Sierra Leone government partially embraces this vision in its 
formal policy proclamations, it continues to conflict with the demands of the 
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clientelist mode of politics that persists in Sierra; the precise nature of these conflicts 
is often concealed to avoid disrupting the flow of aid.  Public debate on the desired 
shape of the state therefore takes place in an awkward space between the conflicting 
agendas of donors and central government.  Furthermore, the media does not play a 
particularly effective role in stimulating the public imagination; media coverage on 
governance issues is often rather shallow, and is partially captured both by the ‘good 
governance’ agenda of donors and ethno-regional political agendas.210  While they do 
not control all the dimensions of this situation, donors could certainly create more 
space for national debate by adopting a more pragmatic and less ideological approach 
to governance reform. 
To return to the wider debate in the literature, I neither conceive of 
coproduction as a straightforward means of improving the quality of public goods and 
governance, nor as thoroughly co-opted by neoliberal ideology.  I see considerable 
value in coproduction’s potential to maintain basic supply of local public goods when 
state capacity is weak, its potential to enable improvements in state capacity, and its 
potential to serve as a source of innovative ideas for improving public goods 
provision.  However, coproduction is clearly no ‘magic bullet’; some coproductive 
arrangements have troubling implications for social equality and the development of 
state capacity over the longer term and thus judgements about their desirability are 
likely to involve complex trade-offs. 
8.2 Wider policy implications: a grounded and gradual 
approach 
Beyond the coproduction debate, this study has wider implications for policy 
to improve public goods provision in African countries.  ‘Good governance’ 
orthodoxy holds that the best approach to improving local public goods provision is 
via democratic decentralization, but the evidence in support of this link is weak.  This 
study represents an attempt to set aside that assumption and focus on what existing 
patterns of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods provision can tell us about 
alternative routes to improving the supply of local public goods (chapter one).  I have 
provided evidence that relative successes in local public goods provision in Sierra 
Leone can be achieved through the development of workarounds for key obstacles 
                                                
210 Many stories in the three papers I monitored had the appearance of being paid placements by NGOs 
or politicians. 
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rather than the overhaul of social and political institutions (chapters five to seven).  I 
have reviewed key contributions to institutional theory which emphasize the value of 
a gradual approach to institutional reform (chapter two) and I have also provided 
empirical examples from my own research and from the wider literature which 
suggest that arrangements for local public goods provision which build on existing 
institutions appear to have an advantage (chapters five to seven).  Drawing on these 
insights, I argue that policy to improve the supply of local public goods in African 
countries should be more empirically grounded and if institutional reform is pursued a 
gradual approach should be taken. 
There are a number of prominent contributions to the development studies 
literature which draw similar conclusions.  William Easterly (2006, pp. 60-111) sets 
out evidence to show that standardized institutional reforms introduced under IFI 
structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s failed to produce 
growth.  He concludes that it is beyond the abilities of Western economists to design 
comprehensive institutional reforms which will bring growth to poor countries.  
Instead, he advocates for “gradual, piecemeal reform and spontaneous 
efforts…among poor people themselves” (p. 101).  Ha-Joon Chang (2002, pp. 129-
135) argues that the package of institutional reforms imposed by IFIs is entirely 
inconsistent with the historical experience of institutional development in rich 
countries.  With this history in mind, he concludes that some of the institutions 
required by IFIs are unnecessary and costly, institutions do little unless they are 
harnessed to effective policies and the adoption of a multitude of new institutions in a 
short timeframe is a wholly unrealistic prospect.  Evans (2004, p. 30) labels the 
promotion of a single package of standardized institutions based on an idealized 
Anglo-American template “institutional mono-cropping” and argues that such an 
approach ignores both the critical importance of fit between institutions and context 
and the underlying distribution of power, while also discouraging innovation. 
The findings of three multi-year research programmes looking at issues of 
governance and public goods provision also point in a similar direction (Centre for the 
Future State, 2010; Booth, 2012; Putzel & Di John, 2012).  The Centre for the Future 
State (2005-2010) (2010, p. 70) argues that donors’ preoccupation with promoting 
Anglo-American institutional templates should be over-turned in favour of a more 
empirically grounded approach which recognizes that “effective public authority is 
created in a variety of different ways, through bargaining between public and private 
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actors, and that ‘informality’, instead of being the main problem, could also be part of 
the solution”.  James Putzel and Jonathan Di John (2012, p. 50), summarizing the 
main findings of the Crisis States Research Programme (2001-2010), reject the 
“unrealistic and unfeasible ‘big push’ macro-institutional reforms that are advocated 
by the ‘good governance’ agenda” and suggest that a more effective strategy would 
include building gradually on sectoral “pockets of growth”.  Finally, Booth (2012, p. 
95), writing on behalf of the APPP (2007-2012), advocates the abandonment of the 
“standard institutional formulas” in favour of “[w]orking in a context-sensitive, best-
fit way”.   
What would a more empirically grounded and gradual approach to improve 
local public goods provision demand of donors and African reformers (including 
those inside and outside of government)?  A more empirically grounded approach 
would require a shift in mindset and greater investment in knowledge production 
(Centre for the Future State, 2010, p. 70; Booth, 2012, p. 95).  Conceptually, donors 
and other reformers would need to free themselves from the constraints posed by the 
‘good governance’ agenda and by conventional practice more broadly and adopt a 
more open-minded approach.  They would need to invest in building a context-
specific knowledge base about how public goods are provided in practice, the main 
interests at stake in their provision and the historical development of public goods 
provision, among other issues.  Building such a knowledge base would require the 
engagement of public officials and the wide array of non-state actors making essential 
inputs into public goods provision, often through unofficial channels.  Within donor 
organizations, greater continuity in staffing would be needed to enable a deeper 
organizational grasp of this knowledge base which was genuinely reflected in policy. 
It is more difficult to envisage exactly how this improved knowledge base 
would support gradual institutional reform.  Drawing on this evidence base, donors 
and African reformers could devise top-down solutions based on gradual adjustments 
to existing institutions, but given the complexity and unpredictability of institutional 
processes, these would still carry a high chance of failure and unintended 
consequences.  Alternatively, they could lend support to promising developments 
already underway.  However, identifying such developments would remain difficult, 
as would determining the appropriate form of support.  Booth (2012, p. 89) strongly 
opposes the conventional combination of funds plus imported associational templates 
deployed by donors, arguing that the most common outcome is the obstruction of 
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local problem-solving.  As an alternative, he conceives of a more limited role for 
external actors as contributors to “the creation of an enabling environment for local 
problem-solving”.  The Centre for the Future State (2010, p. 76) also envisages a 
reduced role for donors, arguing that they should shift “from being experts with 
responsibility for ‘delivering’ on the millennium development goals, to at best being 
effective facilitators of local political processes”.  In the NGO blogosphere, there is 
now discussion of  a ‘participatory institutional appraisal’ approach “where 
development actors specialize in convening discussions of local players to get over 
these logjams in ways that reflect and adapt local traditions and values” (Green, 
2012). 
This proposed solution presents significant implementation challenges because 
it is highly unlikely to be perceived by local actors as a radical break with the past; 
instead, externally convened discussions would unfold within the context of an 
existing set of relations between donors/reformers and local ‘beneficiaries’.  Given 
this, the experience of past participatory programming which has attempted to 
incorporate a version of local problem-solving discussions—although usually 
combined with pressure to adopt imported institutional templates—is instructive 
(Tembo, 2003; Platteau & Abraham, 2004; Platteau, 2009; Casey, Glennerster, & 
Miguel, 2011).  Externally convened discussions are likely to run up against the 
problem that local actors tend to perceive such occasions either as a necessary step to 
access donor funds or as an opportunity to earn per diems and other allowances 
(Platteau, 2009, pp. 28, 51). As a consequence, participants are accustomed to 
expressing views that they believe donors will find sympathetic, rather than their own 
preferences.  This results in a significant risk that solutions agreed during such 
discussions will not be implemented (Tembo, 2003, p. 115).  As long as funding 
continues to be attached to such discussions, practices of dissembling are likely to 
prevail, yet a new approach which involved convening discussions without any linked 
material benefits is likely to breed resentment.  It is also likely that elites rather than 
the poor and those of low social status will dominate such discussions and thus the 
solutions reached, like the examples of coproduction discussed in this study, will 
reproduce (or perhaps even deepen) inequality (Platteau & Abraham, 2004; Platteau, 
2009).  Facilitating problem-solving discussions which genuinely break with the past 
would therefore demand an exceptional degree of subtlety, skill and foresight, as well 
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as the acceptance that the solutions reached to improve local public goods provision 
may well not be consistent with reformers’ preferences on social justice. 
Aside from these implementation challenges, there is widespread agreement 
that the barriers to donor reform along the lines suggested are high (Duffield, 2001; 
Unsworth, 2009; 2010; Booth, 2011, 2012).  In the UK, there are currently substantial 
political pressures to spend more money in ‘fragile states’, to provide clear evidence 
of how this money has been spent and the results achieved and to ensure that aid 
remains in line with idealized democratic principles.  These pressures are not highly 
compatible with increased spending on knowledge production, reduced spending on 
democratic institution building and engagement in an experimental process of 
convening local actors which is unlikely to yield immediate and dramatic successes.  
Booth (2012, p. 95) suggests that public receptiveness of citizens in donor countries to 
a more pragmatic narrative about aid may be higher than anticipated; however, it 
would require a donor government which was genuinely committed to aid 
effectiveness rather than the appearance of doing good to pursue this option in 
earnest.  Political pressures aside, significant organizational and deeply personal 
interests would also have to be overcome in order to secure aid agency commitment 
to a diminished role in some areas and to organizational restructuring intended to 
substantially increase reliance on country-specific expertise rather than generalist 
knowledge (Duffield, 2001, pp. 262-265). 
In sum, the outlook for the adoption of a more grounded and gradual approach 
to improving local public goods looks relatively bleak.  However, in keeping with the 
argument that a gradual approach to institutional reform has a greater likelihood of 
success, I identify some possible entry-points through which this approach might 
begin to be advanced.  First, donors are funding much of the research which suggests 
that an alternative approach to improving local public goods provision is needed211, 
which creates opportunities for ongoing dissemination of these kinds of ideas and a 
gradual shift in perspective.  Second, donor organizations are attracted to the idea of 
innovation, even if this often takes the form of “innovative reworking of failure” 
(Duffield, 2001, p. 264).  As a consequence, it is possible that a more grounded and 
gradual approach could be experimented with through the recognized modality of a 
                                                
211 For example, the APPP, the Centre for the Future State and the Crisis States Research Programme 
are all funded by DFID. 
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pilot exercise, although in order to demonstrate any positive results it would probably 
need to run over the longer term.  Third, it is possible that NGOs with independent 
means such as foundations might have an interest in taking these ideas forward on an 
experimental basis and subsequently promoting them to governments. 
8.3 Local government in Sierra Leone 
To conclude the study, I return to its central concern: local government and 
the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone.  I consider what my findings contribute to 
the academic debate about local government set out in chapter three and set out my 
ideas for how a grounded and gradual approach to institutional reform could be 
applied in this context. 
i) Chiefs 
This study lends support to the generally reformist thrust of Fanthorpe’s 
(2005) work on chiefs, rather than with Paul Richards’ (2005b) more abolitionist 
narrative.  My reading of the historical literature (chapter three) emphasizes the extent 
to which the institution of chieftaincy is deeply embedded within the structure of the 
state.  I describe the incorporation of paramount chiefs into the colonial state, how 
this led to an alliance between political parties and chiefs at the birth of the post-
colonial state and was then subsequently translated into an utilitarian pattern of 
central-local linkage between chiefs and national politicians which has persisted to the 
present day.  Through this process of incorporation, chiefs have acquired control over 
local citizenship regimes and political influence which go some way to explaining 
their continued relevance locally (Fanthorpe, 2005).  At the same time, the 
discussions in chapters four and six emphasize that chiefs are deeply embedded in 
society through their linkages to sodalities (in the North) and ruling house elites, 
personalized relationships with their subject-citizens and ‘thick’ norms and beliefs 
about the role of chiefs.  Given chieftaincy’s enduring significance both within 
national and local arenas, I find it highly questionable that abolition of chieftaincy 
was ever a politically feasible option in the post-war period, even given the significant 
disruption of the civil war. 
Findings from my fieldwork draw a picture of chiefly governance that is both 
popular and flawed, but not entirely abusive.  The survey I conducted complements 
existing survey data (discussed in chapter three) which show high levels of 
satisfaction with chiefs’ performance as agents of development relative to other 
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government actors (Sawyer, 2008; Fanthorpe, et al., 2011).  Given the multi-polar 
nature of political authority in the city of Makeni, this is unlikely to be explained by 
chiefs’ capture of civil society, as Acemoglu et al (2012) contend.  My survey data, 
while limited in scope to Makeni, provide a higher level of specificity about which 
aspects of chiefs’ performance are perceived positively, and which are not.  In 
particular, chiefs’ role as adjudicators stands out as an area of high recognition and 
satisfaction.  The case study data provide some insight into the reasons for this: chiefs 
are perceived as authoritative and legitimate decision-makers; the service they 
provide offers qualitative advantages, or, put another way, fits better with local 
preferences; and influential elites perceive their own social status to be linked to the 
strength of chiefdom institutions.  While the barri is skewed towards elite interests, its 
benefits are not fully monopolized by elites.  Chiefs flex their muscles even less as 
regards the mobilization of unpaid labour; their powers in this regard appear to be on 
the wane as youth are relatively unwilling to cooperate and chiefs find mobilization 
onerous and unprofitable. 
These findings are at odds with Richards’ (2005b) general arguments that 
chiefs systematically use both their powers to mobilize community labour and their 
judicial powers to exploit youth labour.  However, they are specific to the urban 
milieu of Makeni and therefore do not contradict the more circumscribed evidence 
subsequently presented by Richards and his colleagues (Mokuwa, et al., 2011) that 
local justice institutions in the Gola Forest are used as a mechanism for exploitation 
of low-status youth.  The Gola Forest in Southern and Eastern Sierra Leone is a 
remote agrarian region bordering Liberia and, according to the authors, “the only part 
of the country where the rebel RUF could claim any degree of voluntary support” (p. 
341).  Even within that specific context, the authors find that the strategic use of 
‘woman damage’ (adultery) accusations is only applicable in the context of the 
subsistence-oriented mode of production represented by polygyny and upland rice 
farming.  It is therefore unsurprising that I did not observe this phenomenon in the 
urban context of Makeni where youth are commonly engaged in the cash economy. 
The limited literature available suggests that the decline of chiefly 
involvement in the mobilization of unpaid labour is also more of an urban 
phenomenon.  Based on semi-structured interviews conducted in six locations, 
Johanna Boersch-Supan (2012, p. 44), concludes that there is a “clear rural-urban 
pattern” as regards mobilization of community labour—in villages, chiefs take the 
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lead, while in towns, youth cooperate directly with local councils.  This is broadly 
consistent with my experience in Makeni: I find that the council-led model is one of 
the more common patterns of mobilization, while chief-led and youth-led 
mobilization also occurs (chapter six).  While Boersch-Supan considers the decline of 
chiefs’ powers to mobilize labour in urban areas to be an example of “decentralisation 
and empowerment of youth…reining in chiefly powers” (p. 45), my account 
emphasizes the deeper historical roots of this trajectory.  The greater prevalence of 
chiefly mobilization of unpaid labour in rural areas may also explain Fanthorpe et al’s 
(2011, pp. 21, 30, 47) assertion that chiefs continue to profit from construction 
contracts on a widespread basis by accepting funds and then calling on communities 
to provide local materials and labour on a ‘voluntary’ basis.  While chiefly excesses 
appear to be greater in rural areas, lending greater weight to an abolitionist narrative, 
it is in these areas that chiefs also tend to be most deeply embedded and thus the need 
for reform is if anything more urgent. 
This study points to adjudication as the most prominent chiefly activity, 
suggesting one obvious entry point for reform.  However, when conducting fieldwork 
in 2009, it was notable that the role of chiefs in deciding cases remained a marginal 
consideration in donor-supported justice sector reform programming.  Assessing 
DFID’s Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), Peter Albrecht (2010) and 
Albrecht and Jackson (2010) take a similar view.  Albrecht and Jackson (2010, p. 46) 
write: 
Given the role of chiefs as providers of 80% of local level justice (according 
to common in-country estimates), and also the identification of chiefdom 
justice as being influential in the road to conflict in the first place…it is still 
striking how little direct attention they appear to have received from the JSDP. 
Like Albrecht and Jackson, when I reviewed JSDP’s work in 2009, I found only two 
contributions to primary justice: work on the development of a new local courts bill 
and a customary law restatement programme in Moyamba District.  When I spoke to 
JSDP representatives, they took the position that there was no need to interfere with 
chiefs’ involvement in hearing cases, as long as chiefs limit themselves to arbitration, 
rather than adjudication.  As discussed in chapter six, this is an evasive strategy which 
has been in use since the colonial period (Brooke, 1953, p. 18; Commission of Inquiry 
into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 195); by calling what chiefs do 
‘arbitration’, it can be safely ignored. 
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Albrecht and Jackson (2010, p. 47) argue that chiefs have been neglected by 
donors in the context of justice sector reform because of their reluctance to develop 
programming for an institution they do not understand well; Albrecht (2010, p. 5) sees 
the “rigid dichotomy between state and non-state actors” in development policy as a 
particular conceptual difficulty in the case of Sierra Leone’s chiefs, as in practice they 
bridge this divide (a point I discuss in chapter one).  Albrecht and Jackson also 
emphasize the difficulties that donors face in navigating the politicized relationship 
between chiefs and central government, both in terms of finding the right balance of 
support between the two levels and in terms of central government sensitivities about 
direct donor engagement with chiefs.  I want to propose a further reason for donors’ 
neglect of chiefs—a deep unease in engaging with actors they perceive to be 
fundamentally illiberal and in handling the associated presentational risks.  By 
ignoring chiefs and investing in formal institutions they recognize as legitimate, 
donors hope that chiefly authority will wither away under competitive pressure.  
Interestingly, this approach jells with that of national politicians in Sierra Leone, who 
also ignore much chiefly activity, but for quite different reasons.  They hope to 
preserve chiefly autonomy and foster good relations with chiefs, whom they consider 
to be valuable political allies; for them, non-intervention is a strategy to allow chiefly 
authority to thrive undisturbed. 
The cases I present suggest that both donors and central government are right 
about the effects of non-intervention on chiefs to some extent.  I find that chiefs in 
Makeni are operating under significant competitive pressure from other governmental 
and non-governmental actors.  In those arenas where they see little to gain, such as 
mobilization of unpaid labour, chiefly withdrawal is a credible possibility.  However, 
competitive pressure means that chiefs are likely to hold on even more tenaciously to 
those roles they see as critical to their livelihoods and the survival of chieftaincy as an 
institution, such as deciding cases.  Furthermore, tenaciousness in a critical area is 
likely to be intensified by withdrawal from one perceived to be less critical.  All the 
evidence points to the resilience of chiefly adjudication and suggests that it is highly 
unlikely that chiefs will be persuaded to voluntarily accept a more limited role in this 
regard.  It therefore seems counter-productive for donors to continue to ignore chiefs 
in the context of justice reform—no serious strategy to improve local courts and 
increase uptake of their services can be developed without careful consideration of the 
role played by chiefs’ barris alongside them. 
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Howe could reform which took account of chiefs’ well-established role as 
adjudicators proceed?  While this study suggests that Richards’ (2005b) 
characterization of chiefly justice does not fit the reality in Makeni, my analysis is not 
intended to be a celebration of chiefly adjudication.  There is a clear tension between 
the fact that the barri provides a service that is generally valued, yet sustains an 
underlying social order that is highly unequal.  This tension raises both empirical and 
philosophical questions which cannot be addressed fully here.  For example, does the 
customary law applied in chiefs’ barris reflect dominant social norms, or does it 
impose oppressive strictures which fail to keep up with normative change?  And how 
far should those interpreting customary law attempt to ‘lead’ rather than ‘follow’ 
social norms?  Tim Kelsall (2009a, pp. 258-259) points out further difficulties linked 
to the involvement of external actors in legal reform in Sierra Leone.  His main 
argument is that “law ought not to be an instrument of cultural imperialism”—until 
there is majority support for a particular norm, he suggests, it should not be enforced 
as law.  To this end, he advocates a “dialogical approach to legal institution building” 
based on “genuine engagement with the worldview of the Other”.  In pursuing such 
an approach, donors and other reformers in Sierra Leone will face challenges in 
navigating the normative tensions between international law, ‘English’ common law 
and customary law, and difficulties in separating the view of the majority from the 
view of elites. 
Bearing in mind the need for a dialogical approach to move reform of chiefly 
adjudication forward, I briefly sketch out two (mutually compatible) policy options 
for further consideration.  The first option is for central government to provide greater 
central recognition of and support for chiefs’ role in primary justice, for example, 
underpinning legislation, guidance and appropriate oversight to limit abuses of power.  
This option would take advantage of the particular legitimacy that chiefs appear to 
enjoy as adjudicators and ensure adequate access to officially-sanctioned adjudication 
services.  The Chiefdom and Tribal Administration Policy (2011) seems sympathetic 
to this option, stating that chiefs’ role in conflict prevention and resolution “shall be 
given statutory recognition with specific mandates so as to improve the coordination 
amongst key stakeholders such as the police and the formal court system”.  Yet this 
option would present significant challenges in working out the relationship between 
chiefs and local courts, keeping in mind that the latter have only recently been drawn 
under the authority of the Ministry of Justice in order to achieve a separation of 
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executive and judicial power.  It is possible to conceive of an approach where chiefs 
provided a mediation service which was attached to local courts (or magistrate’s 
courts) (Rawls, 2011; Crook, 2012), or one where chiefs and local courts were set on 
a relatively equal footing and integrated into the justice system on similar terms.  In 
both cases, it would be challenging (but perhaps not impossible) to secure the 
agreement and support of both chiefs and the legal establishment. 
The second option would be for central government to reform local courts to 
behave more like chiefs’ barris.  In chapter six, I argue that barris remain competitive 
with local courts because they offer a number of advantages—they are quicker, 
cheaper, use the Temne language, apply only customary law and show respect for 
family dynamics.  In chapter seven, I suggest that some of these characteristics enable 
fuller subject-citizen participation and thus are likely to result in a more synergetic 
relationship between chiefs and subject-citizens in the coproduction of public order 
than that found in the local courts.  This option takes advantage of the good 
contextual fit of barris, and would presumably undercut any edge they currently have 
over local courts.  Erica Harper (2011, p. 38) suggests that official courts can improve 
their competitiveness vis-à-vis customary ones by “reducing and simplifying filing 
procedures, streamlining case processing to reduce the number of times that 
disputants need to appear in court, eliminating or reducing case filing 
costs…employing translators or multilingual court staff, and allowing cases to be 
heard in local dialects”, as well as “importing modalities, principles or features of 
customary justice”.  Crook et al (2010) find that magistrate’s courts in Ghana are 
more in sync with popular values than neo-traditional land secretariats because they 
offer both a balanced perspective (rather than one skewed towards the interests of 
elites) and lean towards local preferences by employing a conversational style of 
questioning, allowing the use of local languages and applying customary principles.  
It is important to underline that enhancing the appeal of local courts in this way would 
not be sufficient to discourage use of chiefs’ barris unless local courts were accessible 
and plentiful enough to handle local demand. 
ii) Local councils 
Fanthorpe (2005) argues that decentralization in its current form is highly 
unlikely to lead to a transformation in political culture because it is essentially a 
conservative reform which revives a failed model of government.  This study finds 
 256 
plenty of evidence of strong continuities between MCC and earlier city 
administrations, including: the presence of recycled administrators (Jackson, 2006), 
central influence over the selection of political representatives, close links between 
political personnel and chiefs and the adoption of familiar routines of behaviour, such 
as cycles of corruption (chapter four).  I argue that in Makeni the close link between 
past and present councils leaves MCC with a difficult inheritance of low public trust, 
which is reinforced by repetition of old behaviours (chapter five).  Recent survey data 
suggest that low public trust in councils is unlikely to be easily overcome by initial 
improvements in the supply of public goods; in two out of four districts surveyed, 
Fanthorpe et al (2011, pp. 81-83) find that while local councils are judged to bring 
more development than any other government actor, they are trusted less.  While I 
concur that local councils have limited potential to transform political culture, this 
study suggests that they do have some potential to help address the public goods 
deficit.  They would be better able to do so if they were able to overcome the 
inhibiting legacy of low trust which makes revenue-raising and public cooperation 
difficult, but this would require them to remain in operation over the long-term and 
demonstrate a different pattern of behaviour, or at least continued practical relevance.  
However, there are a number of threats to councils’ longevity, some of which echo 
the factors that led to the demise of first generation councils (chapter three). 
First among these is dependency on external support.  First generation 
councils floundered when colonial grants covering administrative costs were 
withdrawn; locally-raised revenues were wholly inadequate given competition with 
chiefs and the lack of a functional social contract to legitimize taxation (not to 
mention widespread corruption) (Cartwright, 1970; Tangri, 1978b).  Like its 
predecessor, the current council system has been established at the behest of external 
actors, and is dependent on their support for its continued survival.  While donor 
funding is one of the critical factors which has enabled councils to provide public 
goods, it also leaves the council system vulnerable to collapse and alleviates the need 
for central government to make a genuine commitment to its support.  As long as the 
local council system is perceived as a gateway to donor funding, there is no need for 
central government to make difficult decisions about its value, and to allocate scarce 
resources accordingly.  Given that sustained central support is perhaps the most 
critical factor in determining the long-term survival of the council system, this is 
problematic. 
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A further explanation offered for the failure of first generation councils is 
capture by paramount chiefs, who exploited council resources to extend their own 
networks of influence (Kilson, 1966, pp. 202, 207-216).  Fanthorpe (2005) and 
Jackson (2006) express concern that history may repeat itself in this regard.  
However, Fanthorpe et al (2011) suggests that a pattern of mutual accommodation 
between chiefs and councils is emerging, rather than one of chiefly capture of 
councils.  In urban settings such as Makeni, the risks of chiefly capture are 
particularly low given the presence of a strong central government, party political 
structures and more liberal elements such as NGOs and local radio stations.  Yet 
chiefs continue to represent an important source of political competition which could 
threaten local councils’ survival.  First, councils have to compete with chiefs to win 
the affections of Sierra Leoneans.  Second, they have to compete for the support of 
central government.  The political utility of chiefs to the centre is well-proven, and 
during the post-war period there has been every sign that central government intends 
to continue relying on this pattern of central-local linkage to obtain electoral 
advantage and to maintain public order (chapter three).  Currently, chiefs possess a 
number of distinct advantages over local councillors as political partners: their 
longevity in office; the useful ambiguity which surrounds their role in legal, 
administrative and policy terms; their nominal political neutrality, which enables the 
transfer of loyalties following regime change with relative ease; low levels of donor 
scrutiny into their activities; and their command of resilient local networks and 
institutions. 
The political utility of local councils to the centre is far less clear, and is 
complicated by the party political nature of the local council system.  Due to the 
deeply polarized system of party politics, the central government can rely only on 
those councils controlled by the ruling party, while the remaining councils provide a 
means for the opposition to build political support.  Danielle Resnick (2011) argues 
that ruling parties in Africa commonly seek to constrain opposition councils to 
prevent this from happening, taking advantage of incomplete fiscal decentralization 
(where devolution of responsibilities is not backed by an appropriate allocation of 
resources) to do so.  Fanthorpe et al’s (2011) positive account of Bo City Council’s 
performance (controlled by the SLPP) suggests that the APC has not been fully 
successful in this regard; the authors (perhaps somewhat optimistically) conclude that 
the experience of being in opposition has encouraged SLPP-led councils to “[explore] 
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the political possibilities of rational- bureaucratic best practice” (p. 16).  The APC 
government’s recent decision to reintroduce centrally-appointed district officers is 
probably best interpreted as a strategy to counter opposition council success and re-
assert central control in the run-up to the 2012 national elections (in which they 
ultimately prevailed).  The implications of this dilemma for the long-term survival of 
the council system will depend in large part on whether politicians believe that the 
political future is likely to hold regular alternation of power between the two main 
parties, or the opportunity for one party to develop a sustained hold on power, as in 
the recent political past. 
Donors pushed decentralization through rapidly in the post-conflict period 
because it was a recognized ‘good governance’ strategy which seemed to them to 
neatly address some of the drivers of Sierra Leone’s civil war.  The introduction of 
the local council system therefore does not fit with the grounded and gradual 
approach to institutional reform outlined in the previous section; it is a clear example 
of the imposition of an international blueprint (although the ‘progressive’ template 
intended was reshaped to resemble an earlier, more conservative import in the 
process).  However, this starting point does not preclude donors and other reformers 
from adopting a more grounded approach to support of local councils moving 
forward.  This study points to two particular aspects of blueprint thinking vis-à-vis 
local councils which are ideologically motivated and problematic as regards public 
goods outcomes. 
The first is a tendency to depoliticize local councils, treating them as neutral 
service provision agencies.  Esser (2012, p. 416) writes powerfully about this 
phenomenon in his account of post-war Freetown City Council (chapter three), 
suggesting that attempts by reformers to deny the council’s political nature merely 
cripple their ability to engage with it appropriately.  In his words: 
[t]he effectiveness of institutional reforms pushed on to national agendas by 
international agencies is compromised by the latter’s reproduction of a ‘virtual 
world of inauthentic reality’…which either fails to appreciate or deliberately 
denies the inherently political character of urban life. 
More specifically, a depoliticized vision of the role of local councils leads donors to 
identify weak technical capacity as one of the main barriers faced in local public 
goods provision and to invest heavily in a corresponding programme of capacity 
building.  This study emphasizes that local councils are fundamentally political actors, 
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whose motives are likely to be power-enhancing.  Lack of council motivation to solve 
collective action problems therefore constitutes a more important barrier to improved 
public goods provision than poor technical capacity.  And even when councils are 
motivated, they may still face challenges in securing the necessary public cooperation 
due to low levels of trust. 
A depoliticized vision of local councils also implies that it would be preferable 
if these bodies operated on a non-partisan basis, as some donors argued at the time 
that they were established (Fanthorpe, 2005; Esser, 2012).  Not only does this run the 
risk of inhibiting the expression of local preferences (Esser, 2012), it also has 
implications for councils’ capacity to prove their utility to the centre.  I have argued 
that partisan politics complicates central government’s assessment of the utility 
offered by a system of local councils because opposition councils are perceived as a 
threat.  Yet if both political parties come to accept the likelihood of a future of 
alternating power, they are very likely to prefer a partisan system which allows them 
to retain greater influence when out of office over a non-partisan system which does 
not.  While a non-partisan system might seem to offer potential for greater local 
responsiveness (as compared to a system hitched to the will of national politicians), it 
seems likely that non-partisan councils would either succumb to central capture or be 
disregarded, making the ultimate failure of the council system more likely. 
A second troubling component of donor support for local councils is the 
preoccupation with citizen engagement as a means to build ‘demand side’ 
accountability.  Booth (2012, pp. 66-71) provides a forceful critique of ‘demand side’ 
thinking.  He argues that while the donor community made a positive step in 
recognizing that ‘supply side’ approaches (focused on strengthening public sector 
agencies) were often subject to political capture, no comparable “flash of political 
realism” has yet been applied to ‘demand side’ approaches (focused on strengthening 
civil society).  He cites a number of limitations of ‘demand side’ approaches, 
including the weakness of societal accountability without complementary pressures 
from within the public sector, and the complicity of citizens in patterns of poor 
governance (even while they are the victims of the resulting policies). 
My linked criticism of the ‘demand side’ orthodoxy is that it is too 
prescriptive about the roles citizens should play.  In the context of local public goods 
provision in Sierra Leone, donors conceive of citizens’ proper role as one of 
monitoring local council performance and holding local councils to account for the 
 260 
quality of provision (World Bank, 2009, pp. 58-60).  This obscures the widespread 
presence of coproductive arrangements for local public goods provision, which not 
only place different and often more substantial demands on citizens, but may in fact 
make it difficult for them to take up the monitoring and accountability-seeking roles 
donors envision for them.  For example, members of interest-based associations may 
not wish to destabilize a fragile bargain underpinning a successful coproductive 
arrangement with their local council in order to engage in potentially fruitless 
accountability-seeking.  Similarly, subject-citizens may prefer not to seek 
accountability from the paramount chief or Pa Rok for questionable practices in the 
barri for fear that they will no longer be able to take cases there in the future. 
In light of these insights, how could donors and other reformers refocus their 
efforts to support local councils and thus reduce the public goods deficit?  Greater 
acceptance of the political nature of councils and improved understanding of how 
councils operate in context are needed as a starting point.  A more sector specific 
approach may be helpful, as prior to channelling funds for a particular good or service 
through councils, there is a need to consider whether councils are adequately 
motivated to make good use of them.  If not, no amount of technical capacity building 
is likely to have an impact.  Attention needs to be paid to existing arrangements for 
provision of particular goods; if these are working fairly well, care should be taken 
not to disrupt them through the introduction of new blueprints for action.  Councils 
should also be given more latitude and possibly support to reach political 
accommodations with local and central stakeholders that can support public goods 
provision.  To this end, capacity building programmes could incorporate training on 
more political skills such as negotiation, which play an important role in councils’ 
work.  At the same time, investment in ‘demand side’ programming should be 
scrutinized carefully, as such programming may cut across existing coproductive 
dynamics which make a greater contribution to public goods provision. 
Concluding comments 
This study offers no ‘magic bullet’ for closing the public goods deficit in 
Sierra Leone.  Instead, it makes three main contributions to our understanding of local 
public goods provision in Sierra Leone which could help to inform modest steps 
towards that goal.  First, it provides much-needed insight into how local councils and 
chiefs go about providing public goods in practice, illuminating in particular the 
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important role played by coproduction.  Second, it demonstrates the complexities of 
coproduction in a weak state like Sierra Leone: on the one hand, coproduction helps 
to prevent the public goods deficit from growing larger, but on the other hand some of 
its manifestations have difficult implications for equality and long-term state capacity.  
I suggest that managing these complexities will require public debate and difficult 
trade-offs.  Finally, it suggests a number of possible directions for improving local 
public goods provision through a grounded and gradual approach.  In the first 
instance, this means avoiding disruption of arrangements based on workarounds to 
key barriers to local public goods provision which are reasonably effective at 
generating public goods.  However, it could also mean enabling or supporting gradual 
reform of local government institutions in a direction anticipated to improve local 
public goods provision.  If no ‘magic bullet’ is offered, it may be that none exists; 
rather a sustained process of gradual change offers the most likely route to closing the 
public goods deficit and in itself presents a daunting challenge for reformers which 
will require creative policy making and sustained commitment. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Timeline for main period of fieldwork 
Table A.1.1 Timeline for main period of fieldwork 
Date Activity 
Oct 08 Interviews with Freetown-based stakeholders in decentralization 
process 
Nov-Dec 08 Preliminary research trip to Makeni 
Jan 09 Refinement of research design 
Feb-Mar 09 Focused scoping based on research design 
May 09 Case study 1: Clean market through waste management activities led 
by MCC 
Jun 09 Case study 2: Safe meat through construction and management of a 
slaughterhouse led by MCC 
Jul 09 Survey of senior representatives of households 
Aug 09 Case study 3: Public order through deciding cases at Pa Rok’s barri 
Sep 09 Case study 4: Community infrastructure through mobilization of 
labour led by chiefs 
Oct 09 Interviews with Freetown-based stakeholders in decentralization 
process 
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A.2 Sample selection 
I designed the sample to be representative of senior representatives of 
households in Makeni.  According to the 2004 census, there are 12,260 households in 
Makeni.  I chose a sample size of 272 senior representatives of households based on 
the resources available for the survey to be divided equally between  male and female 
representatives.  Ultimately, 279 senior representatives of households were 
interviewed, 132 male and 147 female. 
Stage 1: Dwelling unit selection 
I could not access a household listing for Makeni nor did I have sufficient 
resources at my disposal to develop one.  Instead I used a list of dwelling units 
prepared by MCC in 2005 for the collection of house rates as the sampling frame.  
After cleaning, a total of 7,627 dwelling units remained on the list (158 entries were 
removed because the address information was incomplete).  The sampling frame 
included a number of inaccurate listings due to the inclusion of vacant lots in 
anticipation of construction and exclusion of informal housing and newer lots. 
National census data from 2004 did not include a count of dwelling units.  The 
dwelling unit count available from MCC (7,758) suggested that there were 
approximately 1.6 households resident in each dwelling.  I estimated that 
approximately 170 dwelling units would need to be visited to reach the desired 
sample size (272/1.6=170).  In order to allow for inaccuracies in the sampling frame 
and in the estimate of households per dwelling unit, I made a random selection of 340 
dwelling units from the sampling frame.  These were allocated in random number 
order until the required number of interviews was completed.  They were allocated 
either to a male or female interviewer, who conducted interviews only with members 
of the same sex.  In total, 160 dwelling units were allocated to enumerators. 
If the dwelling unit listed in the sampling frame was an empty lot or there was 
no house with the listed house number on the street, enumerators were instructed to 
go to the next nearest doorway on the left when facing the lot or point on the street 
where the house should be based on the numbering sequence.  If there was no clear 
numbering sequence on the street, that dwelling unit was excluded.  Twenty-three 
dwelling units were excluded in this manner.  Interviews were conducted at 129 of the 
remaining 137 dwelling units that were located successfully.  At the remaining eight 
dwelling units, residents did not consent to complete the household listing (four 
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dwelling units), no residents could be reached after three re-visits (two dwelling units) 
or there was no eligible respondent within the household(s) resident there (two 
dwelling units). 
Stage 2: Household selection 
In accordance with reputable national surveys recently conducted in Sierra 
Leone, a household was defined as “all the people who usually eat out of the same 
pot” (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008a).  One respondent from every household 
resident at each dwelling unit was interviewed to prevent bias against households 
drawn from multi-household dwelling units.  A total of 326 households were 
identified at the 129 dwelling units where interviews were conducted, approximately 
2.5 per dwelling unit.  Of these, interviews were conducted with representatives of 
279 households (approximately 86%).  No interviews were conducted with the 
remaining 47 households due to non-consent (8 households), failure of enumerators to 
meet with the appropriate respondent after three re-visits (21 households), and the 
lack of an eligible respondent within the household (18 households). 
Stage 3: Respondent selection 
All female enumerators interviewed women and male enumerators 
interviewed men.  Female senior representatives of households were selected 
according to the following criteria: 
 If the recognized head of household was a woman, she was interviewed. 
 If the recognized head of household was a married man, his spouse was 
interviewed.  If he had several wives all of whom were members of the same 
household, the eldest wife was interviewed. 
 If the recognized head of household was an unmarried man, the eldest woman 
aged 18 and above was interviewed. 
Male senior representatives of households were selected according to the 
following criteria: 
 If the recognized head of household was a man, he was interviewed.  In the case 
of polygamous households where one man was the head of several households 
who ate from different pots, he was the only representative interviewed. 
 If the recognized head of household was a woman, the eldest man aged 18 and 
above was interviewed. 
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A.3 Survey questionnaire 
 
Step 1. Interviewer information  COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
1. Name of interviewer: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Interviewer ID: |___||___| 
 
 
Step 2. Property information  COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
3. Assigned property ID: |___||___||___||___| 
 
4. Assigned property address: ____________________________________________________________  
 
5. Assigned property located successfully?  Yes |___|   No |___| 
 
6. If NO, were you able to identify another property by going to the nearest doorway on the left to the 
uninhabited property OR skipped number in the numbering sequence? Yes |___|   No |___| 
 
If YES, PROVIDE ALTERNATE ADDRESS: 
 
 _________________________________________________________________________________ 
             
             If NO, REPORT TO SUPERVISOR 
 
 
Supervisor information (SUPERVISOR: COMPLETE AFTER REVIEW) 
 
7. Supervisor name: ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Supervisor ID: |___||___| 
 
9. Date of review: |___||___|/|___||___|/|___||___||___||___| 
 
10. Time review complete: (24 hour clock) |___||___|: |___||___| 
 
11. Comments: _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Data entry information (DATA ENTRY PERSON: COMPLETE AFTER ENTRY) 
 
12. Data entry person name: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Data entry person ID: |___||___| 
 
14. Comments: _________________________________________________________________________ 
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Step 3. Introduction 
READ OUT: 
 I am (name) and I am a student at (name of institution). [KRIO: Mi na ____ ɛn mi na studɛnt na ____.] 
I am collecting information about local government and public services in Makeni. [KRIO: A de kam fɔ 
gada infɔmeshɔn bɔt lokal gɔvmɛnt ɛn di gud tiŋ dɛn we dɛn de du na Makeni.] 
 We are conducting short interviews with people in Makeni to learn about their views on this topic.  Are you 
willing to assist me? [KRIO : Wi de du smɔ l smɔ l intavu dɛn wit pipul dɛn na Makeni fɔ lan bɔt 
wetin dɛn tink bɔt dis topik.  Yu go ebul ɛp mi Ma/Pa?] 
 
 
Step 4. Household listing COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
A HOUSEHOLD IS A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO USUALLY EAT FROM THE SAME POT. 
THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD IS THE PERSON RECOGNIZED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE 
HOUSEHOLD AS ITS HEAD. 
 
READ OUT: 
-How many people are living on this property? [KRIO: Amɔs pipul dɛn de na dis os/kɔmpownd/yad?] 
-Do they all usually eat from the same pot?  [KRIO: Dɛn pipul dɛn ɔ l de it na di sem pɔt?] 
IF NO, THEY BELONG TO SEPARATE HOUSEHOLDS 
-Which groups usually eat from the same pot? [KRIO: Udat dɛn de it na di sem pɔt?] 
 
FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD: 
-Who is the head of the household? [KRIO: Udat na di ɛd ɔf di os?]  
IF RECOGNIZED HEAD LIVES IN SOMEWHERE ELSE (e.g. Freetown) ASK FOR ACTING HEAD 
IF NO RECOGNIZED HEAD, CHOOSE OLDEST PERSON 
-How many people are there in the household? [KRIO: Amɔs pipul dɛn de it na di sem pɔt?] 
 
Household listing: 
 Head of 
household 
first name(s) 
Head of 
household last 
name 
Sex 
(M/F) 
Number of 
people in 
household 
Interviewed 
respondent 
from 
household? 
(Y/N) 
If no, why? 
1=Short absence 
2=Long absence 
3=Refused 
4=No eligible 
person 
5=Other (explain) 
Follow-up 
needed 
1=None 
2=Revisit 
01        
02        
03        
04        
05        
06        
07        
08        
09        
10        
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Step 5. Respondent identification 
 
FEMALE INTERVIEWERS: Interview women only:  
i) if the household is headed by a woman, interview her 
ii) if the household is headed by a married man interview his wife 
iii) for polygamous households, if many wives belong to a single household interview the first wife 
only; if each wife is in a separate household, interview each wife 
iv) if the household is headed by an unmarried man, interview the oldest responsible woman over 
the age of 18 in the household. 
 
MALE INTERVIEWERS:  Interview men only:  
i) if the household is headed by a man, interview him 
ii) if the household is headed by a woman, interview the oldest responsible man over the age of 18 in 
the household 
 
IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE:  
i) ask for an appropriate time to come back and find them at home 
ii) ask where you can find them and go there to do the interview as long as you will not be intruding. 
 
DO NOT INTERVIEW ANYBODY ELSE IN THE HOUSEHOLD. 
 
 
Step 6. Respondent information COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
15. Household number (FROM TABLE ON P.2): |___||___| 
 
16. Respondent last name: ________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Respondent first name:  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Relationship to head of household: 
1=Self (household head)    
2=Spouse 
3=Son/daughter 
4=Sister/brother 
5=Nephew/niece 
6=Parent 
7=In-law 
8=Grandchild 
9=Other relative: 
_________________________ 
0=Not related 
|___| 
 
19. If NOT self or spouse, indicate reasons: __________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Step 7. Consent COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW 
READ OUT: 
 I am (name) and I am a student at (name of institution).  [KRIO: Mi na ___ ɛn mi na studɛnt na ___.] 
 I am collecting information about local government and public services in Makeni.  The information will be 
used to prepare a report which will make recommendations about how to improve public services in the 
city. [KRIO: A kam gada infɔmeshɔn fo no bɔt lokal gɔvmɛnt ɛn di tiŋ dɛn we dɛn de du fɔ di 
pipul dɛn na Makeni.  Di infɔmeshɔn we wi de gada wi go yus am fɔ mek ripɔt usay wi go 
sujɛst aw di lokal gɔvmɛnt go push fɔ di tiŋ dɛn we dɛn de du.] 
 I would like to conduct a short interview with you which will take about 30 minutes. [KRIO: A go lek fɔ 
aks yu sɔm simpul kweschɔn dɛn.  I jus go tek mi smɔ l tɛm.]  
 I will ask you questions about yourself, your family, and your views on local government.  [KRIO: A go 
aks yu smɔ l kweschɔn bɔt yusɛf, yu famili ɛn wetin yu tink bɔt lokal gɔvmɛnt.] 
 All of your answers will be kept confidential—nobody will know what we talk about. [KRIO: ɔ l wetin we 
de kam tɔk go lɛf bitwin mi ɛn yu.  Nɔbɔdi nɔ go no bɔt wetin wi go tɔk.] 
 I would really appreciate your assistance in filling out the questionnaire, but participation is voluntary. 
There is no need to answer any question.  If you wish to end the interview at any time, you may do so. 
[KRIO: A go gladi if yu ebul ɛp mi fo mek wi tɔk dis tɔk bɔt if yu nɔ go ebul, i fayn, a nɔ go 
fɔs yu.  If yu nɔ want ansa ɛni wan pan di kwɛschɔn dɛn i also fayn.  If yu want fɔ tap di 
intavu, yu kin du so.]  
 Are you willing to participate in an interview? [KRIO: Pan ɔ l wetin wi dɔn tɔk, yu go ebul tɔk wit 
mi?] 
 
YES |___|                    NO |___|     IF NO, END THE INTERVIEW 
 
 
Step 8. Interview information COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
20. Date of interview: (DD/MM/YYYY): |___||___|/|___||___|/|___||___||___||___| 
 
21. Time start of interview: (24 hour clock) |___||___|: |___||___| 
 
 
SECTION 1: RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Sex 
 
DO NOT ASK 
1=Male 
2=Female |___| 
2. How old are you? 
[KRIO: Amɔs ia yu ol?] 
 
|___|  |___|  years 
 
3. In what district and chiefdom were you 
born?  
[KRIO: Naw us distrikt ɛn us chifdɔm we 
yu bɔn?] 
 
District: ____________________________________ 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___||___||___||___| 
 
Chiefdom: __________________________________ 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___||___||___||___| 
 
4. What is your religion? 
[KRIO: Wetin na yu relijɔn?] 
 
DO NOT READ OUT OPTION 
1=Christian 
2=Muslim 
3=Other: 
____________________________________ 
|___| 
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5. What is your ethnic group? 
[KRIO: Wetin na yu trayb?] 
 
DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS.  LISTEN TO 
THE RESPONSE AND RECORD ONE ITEM 
ONLY. 
 
 
1=Temne 
2=Limba 
3=Loko 
4=Fullah 
5=Mende 
6=Mandingo 
 
7=Other: 
___________________________________ 
 
|___| 
6. In school, what was the highest class or form 
you completed? 
[KRIO: Yu bin de go skul?   
Usay yu tap?] 
 
 
DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS.  LISTEN TO 
THE RESPONSE AND RECORD ONE ITEM 
ONLY.   
 
PROMPT TO ENSURE THAT CLASS/FORM 
COMPLETED. 
 
00=None 
01=Koranic only 
11=Primary 1 
12=Primary 2 
13=Primary 3 
14=Primary 4 
15=Primary 5 
16=Primary 6 
17=Primary 7 (old 
system) 
 
21=JSS 1/form 1 
22=JSS 2/form 2 
23=JSS 3/form 3 
24=SSS 1/form 4 
25=SSS2/form 5 
26=SS3/form 6 
31=Technical/vocational 
32=Teacher training (any 
year) 
33=Nursing (any year) 
34=University (any year) 
|___|___| 
1=Yes, 2=No 
Bicycle |___| Electric fan |___| 
Mobile phone |___| Umbrella |___| 
Generator |___| TV |___| 
7. Do you or does anyone in your household own 
any of the following items? 
[KRIO: Yu ɔ ɛni ɔda pɔsin we de it na yu pɔt 
gɛt ɛni of dɛn tiŋ dɛn ya we a de kam kɔ l 
so?] 
 
READ OUT EACH ITEM 
 
Car/truck/motorcycle |___| Radio or radio cassette player |___| 
1=Yes, 2=No 
Paramount chief or 
section chief |___| 
Chiefdom 
councillor/tribal 
authority (the ones 
who have the right 
to vote for 
Paramount Chief) 
|___| 
Kapr (ceremonial) 
chief |___| 
Mayor/local 
councillor |___| 
Sub-chief e.g. ward 
head, town chief, 
village headman, etc. 
|___| Council administrator |___| 
8. Do you or does anyone in your household hold 
any of the following positions? 
[KRIO: Yu ɔ ɛni ɔda pɔsin we de it na yu pɔt 
ol ɛni ɔf dɛn posishɔn dɛn ya we a de kam 
kɔ l so?] 
 
READ OUT EACH ITEM 
 
Chair or clerk in local 
court |___| 
Ward committee 
member |___| 
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SECTION 2: MAKENI CITY COUNCIL 
READ OUT: 
 Now I want to ask you some questions about Makeni City Council.  
[KRIO: Naw a wan le wi kam tɔk bɔt  Makeni City Council.] 
 
 After the war, a law was passed which established new elected local councils in Sierra Leone.   
[KRIO: Afta di wa, dɛn bin briŋ wan lɔ we se wi de vot fɔ nu lokal kawnsil na Salone.] 
 
 The new elected Makeni Town Council was established in 2004 with Musa Mansaray as its leader.   
[KRIO: Insay 2004, we bin vot fɔ wan nu kawnsil na Makeni we Musa Mansaray bin di lida.] 
 
9. From 2004 when it was established until 
now, what good things has the new Makeni 
City Council done for the city? 
[KRIO: Frɔ 2004 we dɛn briŋ dis nu Makeni 
City Council until naw, wetin na di gud 
tiŋ dɛn we yu fil se Makeni City Council 
dɔn du fɔ di siti?] 
 
ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY 
USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE: 
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY 
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING 
YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? 
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE 
SPECIFIC?.  
 
1: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
2: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
3: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
4: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
5: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: 
|___|     |___|     |___|      |___|     |___| 
10. Of all the good things you have mentioned, 
which is the best thing that the council has 
done for the city? 
[KRIO: Pan ɔ l di gud tiŋ dɛn we yu dɔn kɔ l, 
us wan na di bɛtɛ bɛte tiŋ we di kawnsil 
dɔn du fɔ di siti?] 
 
Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list 
above 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___| |___| 
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11. From 2004 when it was established until 
now, what has Makeni City Council failed to 
do for the city?  
[KRIO: Frɔ 2004 we dɛn briŋ dis nu Makeni 
City Council until naw, wetin na di tiŋ dɛn 
we yu fil se Makeni City Council nɔ du fɔ 
di siti?] 
 
ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY 
USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE: 
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY 
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING 
YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? 
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE 
SPECIFIC? 
 
1: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
2: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
3: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
4: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
5: _______________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: 
|___|     |___|     |___|      |___|     |___| 
12. Of all the failures you have mentioned, which 
is the most important thing the council has 
failed to do for the city? 
[KRIO: Pan ɔ l di tiŋ dɛn we yu dɔn kɔ l we 
yu fil se dɛn nɔ du, us wan na di bɛte wan 
we di kawnsil nɔ du fɔ di siti?] 
 
Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list 
above 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___| 
|___| 
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13. How satisfied are you with the work Makeni City Council is doing right 
now to collect trash and clean the city?   
[KRIO: Aw yu fil bɔt di wok we di Makeni City Council de du naw 
fɔ kɔ lɛkt di dɔti ɛn klin di siti?] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fɔ tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan we fit di we yu 
fil bɔt di klinin ɔf di siti:] 
 
1= You are very unsatisfied, the city is very dirty.  
[KRIO: 1=Yu nɔ rili-rili fil fayn, di siti i dɔti pasmak.] 
2= You are unsatisfied, the city is dirty. 
[KRIO: 2=Yu nɔ fil fayn, di siti i dɔti, bɔt i nɔ dɔti pasmak.] 
3=You are satisfied, the city is clean. 
[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, di siti i klin, bɔt i nɔ klin pasmak.] 
4=You are very satisfied, the city is very clean. 
[KRIO: 4=Yu rili-rili fil fayn, di siti i klin pasmak.] 
 
Do you want me to repeat the options? 
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔ l dɛn tiŋ dɛn bak?] 
 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
1=Very unsatisfied 
2=Unsatisfied 
3=Satisfied 
4=Very satisfied 
 
|___| 
14. Does the council come to collect trash from your house? 
[KRIO: Di pipul dɛn we de wok na di kawnsil kin kam kɔ lɛkt dɔti 
na yu os?] 
1=Yes 
2=No 
99=Don’t know 
 
|___| 
15. In 2004, Makeni City Council built a slaughterhouse for slaughtering 
cows on Agriculture Road.  Which of the following statements best 
describes your knowledge of the slaughterhouse: 
[KRIO: Insay 2004, Makeni City Council bin bild wan os usay dɛn 
de kil kaw na Agrikɔ lchɔ Rod.  Us wan pan dɛn tɔk ya we a de 
kam tɛ l yu go ɛp mi fɔ no wetin yu no bɔt di slawtaos?] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you three options and I want you to pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu tri tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu 
no bɔt di slawtaos:] 
 
1=You don’t know anything about the slaughterhouse. 
[KRIO: 1=Yu nɔ no natin bɔt di slawtaos.] 
2=You have heard about the slaughterhouse from your neighbours or on the 
radio. 
[KRIO: 2=Yu yɛri bɔt di slawtaos tu yu neba dɛn ɔ na radio.] 
3=You have visited the slaughterhouse in person. 
[KRIO: 3=Yu dɔn go na di slawtaos yusɛf sɛf.] 
 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
1=Don’t know anything 
2=Heard about 
3=Visited 
 
|___| 
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SECTION 3: CHIEFS 
READ: 
 Now I want to ask you some questions about chiefs in Makeni. 
[KRIO: Naw wi de kam tɔk bɔt chif dɛn na Makeni.] 
 
16. Which chiefdom is this house based in? 
[KRIO: Insay us chifdɔm dis os de?]  
1=Bombali Shebora 
2=Makari Gbanti 
99=Don’t know 
 
|___| 
17. What good things do the Paramount Chief 
and his sub-chiefs do for the city of 
Makeni? 
[KRIO: Wetin na di gud tiŋ dɛn we di 
Paramownt Chief ɛn di ɔda chif dɛn we 
de ɛp am du in wok de du fɔ di siti?] 
 
ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY 
USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE: 
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY 
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING 
YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? 
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE 
SPECIFIC? 
 
1: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
2: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
3: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
4: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
5: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: 
|___|     |___|     |___|      |___|     |___| 
18. Of all the good things you have mentioned, 
which is the best thing that chiefs do for 
the city? 
[KRIO: Pan ɔ l di gud tiŋ dɛn we yu dɔn 
kɔ l, us wan na di bɛte bɛte tiŋ we di chif 
dɛn de du fɔ di siti?] 
Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list 
above 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___| 
|___| 
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19. What are chiefs failing to do for the city of 
Makeni? 
[KRIO: Wetin na di tiŋ dɛn we yu fil se di 
chif dɛn nɔ du fɔ di siti?] 
 
ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY 
USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE: 
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY 
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING 
YOUWOULD LIKE TO ADD? 
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE 
SPECIFIC? 
 
1: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
2: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
3: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
4: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
5: _________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: 
|___|     |___|     |___|      |___|     |___|  
20. Of all the failures you have mentioned, 
which is the most important thing that 
chiefs are failing to do for the city? 
[KRIO: Pan ɔ l di tiŋ dɛn we yu dɔn kɔ l we 
yu fil se dɛn nɔ du, us wan na di bɛte 
wan we di chif dɛm nɔ du fɔ di siti.] 
Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list 
above 
 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___| 
|___| 
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21. How satisfied are you with the contribution chiefs make to maintaining 
security in Makeni?  By security I mean protecting people against violence 
and theft. 
[KRIO: Aw yu fil bɔt wetin di chif dɛn de du fɔ mek wi gɛt kolat na 
Makeni?  Kolat a min nɔ fɔ fet, nɔ fɔ tif.] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fɔ tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu fil 
bɔt wetin di chif dɛn du fɔ mek wi gɛt kolat:] 
 
1=You are very unsatisfied, chiefs make a very small contribution to 
maintaining security. 
[KRIO: 1=Yu nɔ rili-rili fil fayn, di chif dɛn de ɛp smɔ l wan fɔ mek we 
gɛt kolat.] 
2=You are unsatisfied, chiefs make a small contribution to maintaining security. 
[KRIO: 2=Yu nɔ fil fayn, di chif dɛn de ɛp smɔ l fɔ mek we gɛt kolat.] 
3=You are satisfied, chiefs make a large contribution to maintaining security. 
[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, di chif dɛn de du bɔku tiŋ fɔ mek we gɛt kolat.] 
4=You are very satisfied, chiefs make a very large contribution to maintaining 
security. 
[KRIO: 4=Yu rili-rili fil fayn, di chif dɛn de du bɔku-bɔku tiŋ fɔ mek 
wi gɛt kolat.] 
 
Do you want me to repeat the options? 
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔ l dɛn tiŋ dɛn bak?] 
 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
1=Very unsatisfied 
2=Unsatisfied 
3=Satisfied 
4=Very satisfied 
 
|___| 
22. How satisfied are you with the dispute resolution carried out by chiefs in 
Makeni? 
[KRIO: Aw yu fil bɔt di we ɛn mana we chif dɛn de tɔk kes na 
Makeni?] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fɔ tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu fil 
bɔt aw di chif dɛn de tɔk kes:] 
 
1=You are very unsatisfied, chiefs are very ineffective at resolving disputes. 
[KRIO: 1=Yu nɔ rili-rili fil fayn, dɛn nɔ de rili-rili du wɛ l fɔ tɔk kes.] 
2=You are unsatisfied, chiefs are ineffective at resolving disputes. 
[KRIO: 2=Yu nɔ fil fayn, dɛn nɔ de du wɛ l fɔ tɔk kes.] 
3=You are satisfied, chiefs are effective at resolving disputes. 
[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, dɛn de du wɛ l fɔ tɔk kes.] 
4=You are very satisfied, chiefs are very effective at resolving disputes. 
[KRIO: 4=Yu rili-rili fil fayn, dɛn de rili-rili du wɛ l fɔ tɔk kes.] 
 
Do you want me to repeat the options? 
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔ l dɛn tiŋ dɛn bak?] 
 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
 
1=Very unsatisfied 
2=Unsatisfied 
3=Satisfied 
4=Very satisfied  
|___| 
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23. How satisfied are you with chiefs’ efforts to organize community labour for 
development in Makeni?  For example, fixing damaged roads, culverts and 
other things like that. 
[KRIO: Aw yu fil bɔt di we di chif dɛn de tray fɔ briŋ pipul dɛn togɛda 
fɔ wok fɔ dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt na Makeni?  Lek fɔ mek rod we pwɛ l, kɔ lvut,  
ɔ ɛni oda tiŋ.] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fɔ tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu fil 
bɔt aw di chif dɛn de tray fɔ briŋ pipul dɛn togɛda fɔ wok fɔ 
dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt:] 
 
1=You are very unsatisfied, chiefs never organize community labour when it is 
needed. 
[KRIO: 1=Yu nɔ rili-rili fil fayn, di chif dɛn nɔ wan de briŋ pipul dɛn 
togɛda fɔ wok fɔ dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt we di pipul dɛn nid.] 
2=You are unsatisfied, chiefs rarely organize community labour when it is 
needed. 
[KRIO: 2=Yu nɔ fil fayn, di chif dɛn kin briŋ pipul dɛn togɛda wan-
wan tɛm fɔ wok fɔ dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt we di pipul dɛn nid.] 
3=You are satisfied, chiefs often organize community labour when it is needed. 
[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, di chif dɛn kin briŋ pipul dɛn togɛda sɔm tɛm 
dɛn fɔ wok fɔ dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt we di pipul dɛn nid.] 
4=You are very satisfied, chiefs always organize community labour when it is 
needed. 
[KRIO: 4=Yu rili-rili fil fayn, di chif dɛn ɔ l tɛm kin briŋ pipul dɛn 
togɛda fɔ wok fɔ dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt we di pipul dɛn nid.] 
 
Do you want me to repeat the options? 
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔ l dɛn tiŋ dɛn bak?] 
 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
1=Very unsatisfied 
2=Unsatisfied 
3=Satisfied 
4=Very satisfied  
|___| 
4=Most important to 1=Least 
important 
99=Unable to rank item 
Keeping the city clean |___| 
Ensuring the safety of 
meat for consumption |___| 
Maintaining security |___| 
24. How would you rank the following activities in order of importance: 
[KRIO: Aw yu go ebul put dɛn tiŋ ya fɔ bɛgin pan di wan we yu fil se 
bɛtɛ pas di ɔda tiŋ dɛn:] 
READ OUT: 
-Keeping the city clean  [KRIO: Klin di siti] 
-Ensuring the safety of meat for consumption  [KRIO: Mek shɔ se di bif we 
dɛn sɛ l ɛn we wi de it nɔ gɛt nɔ sik] 
-Maintaining security [KRIO: Mek wi gɛt kolat] 
-Organizing community labour for development  [KRIO: Briŋ pipul dɛn 
togɛda fɔ wok fɔ dɛvɛ lɔpmɛnt] 
 
Which activity is most important? [KRIO: Us tiŋ bɛtɛ pas ol?] RANK 4 
Which activity is the next most important? [KRIO: Us wan we nia di fɔs wan 
we yu kɔ l?] RANK 3  
Which activity is the most important after that? [KRIO: Us wan we nia di 
wan we yu jus kɔ l?] RANK 2 
Which activity is least important? [KRIO: Us wan de bɔtɔm.] RANK 1 
Organizing community 
labour for development |___| 
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SECTION FOUR: AUTHORITY 
25. How strong is the authority of the Makeni City 
Council over the people of Makeni? 
[KRIO: Aw trɔŋ yu fil se di Makeni City Council gɛt 
pawa fɔ kɔntrol di pipul dɛn na Makeni?] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you four options and I want you to 
pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fɔ tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan 
we fit di we yu fil bɔt aw trɔŋ di pawa of di 
Makeni City Council de fɔ kɔntrol di pipul dɛn:] 
 
1=Very weak, people never do what the council asks. 
[KRIO: 1=Rili-rili wik, di pipul dɛn nɔ wan de du 
wetin di kawnsil de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
2=Weak, people rarely do what the council asks. 
[KRIO: 2=Wik, pipul dɛn wan-wan tɛm kin du 
wetin di kawnsil de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
3=Strong, people often do what the council asks. 
[KRIO: 3=Trɔŋ, pipul dɛn sɔm tɛm kin du wetin di 
kawnsil de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
4=Very strong, people always do what the council asks. 
[KRIO: 4=Rili-rili trɔŋ, ɔ l tɛm di pipul dɛn de du 
wetin di kawnsil de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
 
Do you want me to repeat the options? 
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔ l dɛn tiŋ dɛn bak?] 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
1=Very weak 
2=Weak 
3=Strong 
4=Very strong 
 
|___| 
26.  What gives the Makeni City Council authority over 
the people? (Why do they have authority over the 
people?) 
[KRIO: Wetin yu fil se naim gi di Makeni City 
Council di pawa fɔ kɔntrol di pipul dɛn?] 
 
ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING 
PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE: 
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY 
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU 
WOULD LIKE TO ADD? 
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE 
SPECIFIC? 
 
1: ________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
2: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
3: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
4: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
5: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: 
|___|     |___|     |___|      |___|     |___|  
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27. How strong is the authority of the Paramount Chief 
and his sub-chiefs over the people of Makeni? 
[KRIO: Aw trɔŋ yu fil se di Paramownt Chif ɛn di 
ɔda chif dɛn we de ɛp am gɛt pawa fɔ kɔntrol di 
pipul dɛn na Makeni?] 
READ OUT: 
I am going to give you four options and I want you to 
pick one: 
[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fɔ tiŋ dɛn we yu go pik wan 
we fit di we yu fil bɔt aw trɔŋ di pawa of di chif 
dɛn de fɔ kɔntrol di pipul dɛn:] 
 
1=Very weak, people never do what chiefs ask. 
[KRIO: 1=Rili-rili wik, di pipul dɛn nɔ wan de du 
wetin di chif dɛn de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
2=Weak, people rarely do what chiefs ask. 
[KRIO: 2=Wik, pipul dɛn wan-wan tɛm kin du 
wetin di chif dɛn de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
3=Strong, people often do what chiefs ask. 
[KRIO: 3=Trɔŋ, pipul dɛn sɔm tɛm kin du wetin di 
chif dɛn de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
4=Very strong, people always do what chiefs ask. 
[KRIO: Rili-rili trɔŋ, ɔ l tɛm di pipul dɛn de du 
wetin di chif dɛn de aks dɛn fɔ du.] 
 
Do you want me to repeat the options? 
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔ l dɛn tiŋ dɛn bak?] 
 
RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY 
1=Very weak 
2=Weak 
3=Strong 
4=Very strong 
 
|___| 
28. What gives the Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs 
authority over the people? (Why do they have 
authority over the people?) 
[KRIO: Wetin yu fil se naim gi di Paramownt Chif 
ɛn di ɔda chif dɛn we de ɛp am di pawa fɔ kɔntrol 
di pipul dɛn?] 
 
ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING 
PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE: 
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY 
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU 
WOULD LIKE TO ADD? 
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE 
SPECIFIC? 
 
1: ________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
2: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
3: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
4: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
5: ________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________ 
DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: 
|___|     |___|     |___|      |___|     |___|  
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29. Who has more authority in Makeni—the city council 
or the Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs? 
[KRIO: Udat gɛt pawa fɔ kɔntrol di pipul dɛn pas 
in kompin na Makeni—na di Makeni City Council ɔ 
di Paramownt Chief ɛn di ɔda chif dɛn we de ɛp 
am?] 
 
1=The city council has more authority 
2=The Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs 
have more authority 
3=They both have the same amount of 
authority 
 
|___| 
 
END SURVEY 
 
THANK THE RESPONDENT!
 280 
 
INTERVIEWER REVIEW 
 
1. Time end of interview (24 hour clock) 
 
(24 hour clock) |___||___|: |___||___| 
 
2. What language was this survey mainly 
conducted in? 
1=Krio 
2=Temne 
3=Other: 
________________________ 
 
|___| 
 
3. How was the respondent’s skill in speaking 
and understanding the language used? 
1=Displayed no problems speaking or 
understanding  
2=Displayed a little difficulty speaking or 
understanding  
3=Displayed moderate difficulty speaking 
or understanding  
4=Displayed serious problems speaking or 
understanding  
 
|___| 
 
4. Were any people other than the respondent 
present during all or part of this interview? 
1=Yes 
2=No  SKIP TO Q. 6 
|___| 
 
5. What is their relationship to the respondent?  1=Spouse 
2=Parent/grandparent/guardian 
3=Child 
4=Neighbour/co-worker 
5=Other: 
________________________ 
 
|___| 
 
6. Are you very confident, somewhat confident or 
not very confident in the overall quality and 
truthfulness of this respondent’s responses? 
 
1=Very confident  
2=Somewhat confident 
3=Not confident |___| 
7. Explain the reasons for your level of 
confidence in question 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Additional comments:  
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A.4 Supplementary butcher questionnaire 
 
Interview information (COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW) 
 
1. Name of butcher: ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Butcher ID number: |___||___||___||___| 
 
3. Location of butcher stall: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Date of interview: (DD/MM/YYYY): |___||___|/|___||___|/|___||___||___||___| 
 
5. Time start of interview: (24 hour clock) |___||___|: |___||___| 
 
 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
6. Respondent type 1=stall owner 
2=assistant 
 
|___| 
7. Sex 1=male 
2=female 
 
|___| 
8. What year were you born? |___| |___| |___| |___| (YYYY) 
 
If year not known, best estimate of age in years: |___| |___| 
 
9. In what chiefdom and district were 
you born?  
 
Chiefdom: __________________________________ 
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District: ____________________________________ 
10. What is the highest level of education 
you have achieved? 
 
1=None 
2=Primary incomplete 
3=Primary complete 
4=JSS incomplete 
5=JSS complete 
6=SSS incomplete 
7=SSS complete 
8=Technical/vocational 
9=Teacher training 
10=Nursing 
11=University (any year) 
12=Koranic only 
 
|___| 
11. What ethnic group do you belong to? 
 
 
1=Fula 
2=Temne 
3=Limba 
 
4=Other: ____________________________________ 
|___| 
12. What is your religion? 
1=Christian 
2=Muslim 
 
3=Other: ____________________________________ 
 
|___| 
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13. How satisfied are you with the 
slaughterhouse facilities currently 
provided by the city council?   
 
I am going to give you four options 
and I want you to pick one: 
1=You are very satisfied, the facilities 
are excellent and don’t need any 
improvement. 
2=You are satisfied, the facilities are 
good overall, although they could be 
improved upon. 
3=You are not satisfied, the facilities 
are bad overall and improvements 
need to be made. 
4=You are very unsatisfied, the 
facilities are terrible and great 
improvements need to be made. 
 
READ OPTIONS.  RECORD ONE 
RESPONSE ONLY. 
 
1=Very satisfied 
2=Satisfied 
3=Not satisfied 
4=Very unsatisfied 
 
|___| 
 
 
Time end of interview: (24 hour clock) |___||___|: |___||___| 
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